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The protection of environmental refugees has been a topical issue during the
last decades in both the societal debate and the academic discourse. The term
‘environmental refugee’ became into popular use following El-Hinnawi’s
working paper for the United Nations Environment Programme (hereafter:
UNEP) in 1985. He defined environmental refugees as
‘those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily
or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or
triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the
quality of their life.’1
This definition has not been accepted as a legal definition and even though
several propositions have been made, no other definition has been broadly
accepted so far. This is mainly due to the complexity of decisions people have
to take when migrating and the broad variability in types of forced environ-
mental migration and migration situations.
In practice, several big stakeholders have highlighted various aspects of
environmentally forced migration. The former Representative of the United
Nations Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced
Persons, Kälin, illustrated the impact on human rights and claimed that:
‘Experience tells us that displacement caused by natural disasters takes just as high
a human toll as conflict-induced displacement. More often than not people displaced
by natural disasters are in need of live-saving humanitarian assistance. Their
personal lives are shattered and their livelihoods destroyed. The most vulnerable
amongst them are particularly at risk. The consequences of natural disasters exacer-
bate pre-existing inequalities and patterns of discrimination, further marginalize
the poor, single women, the elderly, or persons with disabilities or suffering from
HIV/AIDS and chronic diseases, and affect the rights of minorities of indigenous
peoples. This is why more robust measures are needed to address the humanitarian
consequences of displacement in the wake of natural disasters, including those
caused by climate change.’2
1 Hinnawi 1985, p. 4.
2 Kälin 2008.
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In an International Organization for Migration (hereafter: IOM) research series,
McLeman focusses on the security aspects and concludes that:
‘The impacts of anthropogenic climate change are expected to lead to large-scale
population displacements and migrations in the coming decades, with the potential
to create instability and conflict in the most vulnerable regions […]. In the worst-
case scenario, the impacts of climate change will cause large-scale population
displacements in unstable states such as Pakistan, reverse a decade of peace-building
progress in West Africa, create new diasporas from small island states, and cause
already-crowded urban centres to swell with additional impoverished rural
migrants.’3
There is also a growing awareness of environmental degradation (and climate
change more in particular) as a cause of migration. This awareness has for
example been reflected in the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (hereafter: UNFCCC) and has been highlighted in the Global
Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular
Migration. However, so far, the development of the international legal frame-
work has not kept in pace with the protection need of those environmentally
displaced. For example, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Guterres
warned that:
‘For people displaced across an international border by natural disaster or, as is
increasingly the case, by a complex of factors exacerbated by climate change, the
responsibility for providing protection and assistance is less clear. Some cross-border
movements may be dealt with within the existing international refugee framework,
which has proven to be flexible over the past decades, but others may require new
approaches, premised upon new forms of inter-State cooperation, international
solidarity and responsibility-sharing.’4
1.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
1.1.1 Overall study objective
This study focusses on the normative protection of environmental refugees.
The overall aim of this study is to assess the capacity of existing and future
international normative frameworks to protect environmental refugees and
to provide a systematic review of the legal aspects of environmentally forced
migration. This study also aims to develop existing law, both by way of
creative interpretation and extrapolation and by way of an international hybrid
law approach.
3 McLeman 2011, p. 9.
4 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, foreword.
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Within the context of the overall aim, this study firstly aims to examine
the current state of international law in this field. The analyses is structured
along three different approaches: a rights-based approach, a security approach
and a responsibility approach. Each of these approaches is rooted in a different
disciplinary background and leads to a different justification for an engagement
of the international community. A further classification is made for different
types of environmental refugees, to allow for a more in depth analyses of the
theory on everyday practice. After this analysis, this study assesses secondly
how the legal framework could evolve (under the three approaches) in order
to provide an improved response to environmentally forced displacement.
It explores these protection possibilities through creative interpretation or
extrapolation by analogy and assesses existing legal principles on their possibil-
ity to be adapted, or particularised to respond to this new situation of environ-
mental refugees. Lastly, in order to address the problems connected with
environmentally forced migration in a comprehensive manner, this study will
attempt to combine the different approaches to the protection of environmental
refugees through an international hybrid law approach. With respect to the
different types of environmental refugees, this study attempts to interpret the
law with a view to the ever-changing environment in which it must be applied
through a context-oriented and dynamic interpretation.
1.1.2 Basic premises of the study
The starting point of the study is the presumption that States have various
duties and owe positive obligations, under international law to different
categories of migrants – particularly those compelled to migrate. In accordance
with international law, the national State is primarily responsible for the
protection of its people against forced migration as a result of environmental
degradation. Based on current studies,5 we can conclude that most environ-
mental refugees migrate within the borders of developing States. These States
must be considered often to be unable to deal with the burden of environ-
mentally forced displacement. Environmentally forced migration composes
an international problem that negatively impacts the enjoyment of human
rights and imposes a threat to development and possibly to peace and security.
Considering that climate change (as one of the major causes of environmental
degradation) is a global process, the international community also has at least
a moral, but possibly a legal responsibility to support and strengthen different
States’ ability to provide protection from displacement, during and after
displacement.6
5 See for example Ginnetti 2015.
6 See for example Strik and Terlouw 2019, p. 137 onwards. They analysed whether there
is a shared responsibility for States in the protection of refugees.
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1.1.3 Academic and societal contribution of the study
This study aims to provide a contribution to academic science and to society
and policy. At the academic level, it seeks to contribute to the general debate
on the normative response to environmentally forced migration. This study
clarifies the terminology and defines the scope of ratione personae as well as
ratione materiae. It also critically reflects on the way the problem of environ-
mentally forced migration is currently addressed in a non-holistic way under
the different (sub)systems of internal law. The premises upon which the choice
for a certain (sub)system is based are critically assessed, challenging the
different solutions that are offered by the different (sub)systems. The three
way approach of this study (rights-based, security and responsibility approach)
may also provide practical insight for policy makers which systems of law
to address in finding solutions for different types of environmentally forced
displacement and allows for a more cohesive analyses of the protection possi-
bilities.
This study also has a societal value. Environmentally forced displacement
affects millions of people every year. For example, more frequent and intense
environmental disasters are destroying lives, livelihoods, physical infrastructure
and fragile ecosystems. They can impair human capabilities and threaten
human development in all countries – especially in the poorest and most
vulnerable ones.7 Alarming predictions have been made about the potential
for climate change to fuel war and other forms of violent conflict and to
threaten international peace and security.8 Both the global nature of the en-
vironmental degradation and the vulnerability of environmental refugees ask
for a social debate. An in depth research on the current and future legal
protection regimes for environmental refugees can provide input for the
discussion on protection frameworks.
1.1.4 Added value of the study compared with existing research
A source of inspiration, for this thesis is an article written in 2002 by Bates
‘Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environ-
mental Change‘.9 Bates offers the blueprint for the categorization of the group
of environmental refugees, that forms the basis of the legal analyses in this
research. Several other books and articles provide in depth legal analysis of
the protection possibilities under international law for specific types of environ-
mental refugees under different subsystems of law, such as a book written
in 2012 by McAdam called ‘Climate Change, Forced Migration, and Inter-
7 Ginnetti 2015, p. 48.
8 Saul 2009, p. 1.
9 Bates 2002.
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national Law‘,10 an article of 2012 by Kälin and Schrepfer on ‘Protecting
People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change Normative Gaps
and Possible Approaches’,11 an article by Tol and Verheyen on ‘State respons-
ibility and compensation for climate change damages--a legal and economic
assessment’,12 an article of 2012 by Boyle on the future of human rights and
the environment,13 and a 2015 dissertation by Christiansen on ‘Climate Con-
flicts – A Case of International Environmental and Humanitarian Law’.14
Apart from these works, several relevant reports and studies have been pub-
lished by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and public
interest groups, such as a report of 2009 by the then UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, Guterres, on ‘Climate change, natural disasters and human dis-
placement: a UNHCR perspective‘15 and a 2009 report by the UN Secretary-
General ‘Climate Change and its possible security implications’.16
Although these works all draw attention to the issue and are very valuable
and merit recognition, none of these works address the topic of the environ-
mental refugee from the different approaches in a structured way. This study
aims to fill that scholarly gap by comprehensively focusing on the broad
spectrum of environmental refugees. This study clarifies the concept of environ-
mental refugees by comprehensively addressing different (sub)systems of
protection (the approaches) and their benefits and limitations and their assump-
tions. This research also attempts to combine these different approaches in
order to enhance protection possibilities. By addressing different scenarios
causing the environmental degradation, these categories and their legal pro-
tection regimes are discussed separately per type, since a one-size-fits- all
response is not appropriate for such a diverse group.
A systematic analysis of the different approaches has several advantages.
An increased knowledge on the various approaches amongst legal practitioners
will allow for a more interdisciplinary-oriented legal approach. A better
knowledge of the approaches will also allow for better framing of environ-
mentally forced migration as a breach of the respective legal regimes. This
can help to remove the topic of environmentally forced migration from the
legal ‘no-man’s land’ where it currently resides. As the various approaches
are in line with the policy analyses, legal practitioners will also become better
equipped to identify and challenge underlying assumptions and to advice
policy makers on the other approaches. A systematic analysis through these
approaches thus will create a better link between the legal and policy dis-
10 McAdam 2012.
11 Kälin, Schrepfer 2012.




16 UNGA UN Doc A/64/350, Report of the Secretary-General on Climate change and its
possible security implications, 11 September 2009.
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ciplines and allows for a critical analysis of the approaches. This study forms
the legal basis for such a policy approach.
In sum, this study addresses the problem of environmentally forced migra-
tion from an international law perspective. Compared to the above mentioned
works on environmental refugees, this study constitutes an updated, more
detailed, structured and expanded version, addressing both the existing legal
situation (de lege lata) and the desired future legal situation (de lege ferenda).
1.2 STRUCTURE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The study consists of four parts. Part I discusses the concept of environmental
refugees, addresses the terminology used in both this study and the general
literature, explains the definition used and explains the classification in cat-
egories of the environmental refugees and the approaches as adopted in this
research. Part II identifies, examines and clarifies the international legal frame-
work for the protection of environmental refugees and deals with what the
current state of the law is (lex lata). This part is structured along the classifica-
tion in categories of environmental refugees and approaches as described in
part I. Part III discusses what the law ought to be (lex ferenda). Existing legal
principles will be assessed on their possibility to be adapted, or particularised
to respond to this new situation of environmental refugees, through creative
interpretation or extrapolation by analogy in order to close some of the pro-
tection gaps. Lastly, Part IV examines possibilities to combine different pro-
tection frameworks and to apply different frameworks at the various types
of environmental refugees. In this way, the study seeks to review both the
status quo and the possible evolution and progressive development of the
international legal protection framework for environmental refugees.
The overarching research question is:
How are environmental refugees protected under international law and how can
this protection be enhanced?
In order to provide a reply, the following sub questions are posed:
1 What is an environmental refugee?
1.1 What is understood under the term ‘environmental refugee’?
1.1.1 What is the scope ratione personae?
1.1.2 What is the scope of ratione materae?
1.2 What categories of environmental refugees can be identified?
1.3 How can the concept of environmentally forced migration be legally
approached?
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2 What is the current legal international protection framework for environmental
refugees under the rights-based approach, the security approach and the responsib-
ility approach?
3 To what extent can existing legal principles be applied and modified through
evolutionary and/or dynamic interpretation, extrapolation or analogy under the
rights-based approach, the security approach and the responsibility approach?
4 Can a combination of the rights-based approach, the security approach and the
responsibility approach enhance protection possibilities for environmental refugees?
1.3 METHODOLOGY
This research can be classified as theoretical, doctrinal and qualitative legal
research. Based on the classification of different groups of environmental
refugees (part I) existing legal standards are identified, examined and clarified
(part II, de lege lata), the descriptive legal research. Part III and IV discus the
desired future legal situation (de lege ferenda). As most legal instruments are
not designed for the purpose of protecting environmental refugees, several
instruments and legal concepts – such as the Refugee Convention, the non-
refoulement principle, the responsibility to protect, international environmental
law, human rights law, the UN Convention Against Torture, international
humanitarian law and the Convention on Statelessness – have to be researched
from the perspective of their capability to address environmentally forced
migration. These existing principles and rules are part of different subsystems,
which to a large extent operate independently from each other. In order to
assess protection possibilities, it is necessary to bring these fields of inter-
national law closer together. One of the principal methods used in this research
to achieve this is treaty interpretation, based on the methods indicated in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.17 The primary method of treaty
interpretation is textual, contextual and teleological. Subsidiary, the intentions
of the drafters of the treaty may serve to confirm an interpretation. Treaties
should be interpreted in a dynamic way, and, based on the principle of effect-
iveness, in such a way that they have their appropriate effect.18 Modern en-
vironmental and human rights norms can be used to interpret established
norms. As was stated in the in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, ‘new norms
have to be taken into consideration, and [...] new standards given proper
weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also when con-
tinuing with activities begun in the past’.19 Other elements that may be taken
into account are the practice and attitudes of State parties.20 Apart from this,
17 Art. 31 and 32 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
18 See for example Aust 2013, Villiger 2009 and Bowman, Kritsiotis 2018.
19 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v. Slovakia 1997, para 140.
20 See for example Lo 2017.
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soft law, in particular principles and standards formulated in non-binding
documents, constitutes an important reference point for this study.21 Two
types of soft-law instruments are central in this research: (1) non-binding
resolutions and declarations adopted by States at international forums, such
as UN General Assembly resolutions and documents resulting from world con-
ferences; and (2) standard-setting instruments adopted by organs of inter-
national organisations made up of independent experts, such as the work of
the UN International Law Commission and the International Law Association.
These soft-law instruments areexamined in order to interpret and clarify
modern trends and emerging obligations under international law, to give
substance and meaning to these obligations under international law and to
assess the direction in which international law is developing. The interpretation
of relevant provisions will be done principally with the aid of subsidiary
sources of international law, i.e. (quasi-) judicial decisions and legal writings.
Part IV adopts an international hybrid law approach22 (that considers the
rules of international law concurrent, indivisible, interdependent, and
interrelated) to combine the different approaches that have been adopted to
protect environmental refugees. In order to assess protection possibilities for
the various types of environmental refugees, a context-oriented and dynamic
interpretation to international law will be applied.23 This interpretation is
based on the perception that international law should be interpreted with a
view to the ever-changing environment in which it must be applied.
1.4 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The primary concern of this study is to map the normative protection possibil-
ities for environmental refugees. This study itself does not research the relation-
ship between environmental degradation and forced migration. This study
acknowledges that the relationship between environmental degradation and
forced migration is complex and affected by social, economic and political
factors.24 This study also does not deal with implementation gaps as a result
of a lack of political will or a lack of funding. The aim of this research is to
provide a legal framework in which existing rules and principles can be
instrumental to provide better legal protection for environmental refugees.
21 See list of sources of international law as formulated in Art. 38 Statute ICJ. See also for
example Boyle 2006.
22 See for a similar approach in the context of climate change Corendea 2016.
23 Kolmannskog, Trebbi 2010 p. 729 and 730.




As the term environmental refugee is not a legal term and because there is
also no generally accepted definition, the objective of this part is to clarify the
concept of the environmental refugee and to adopt a working definition (§ 2.1).
As the environmental refugee covers a broad and diffuse group of people
forcedly displaced due to environmental degradation, the concept is further
clarified based on a typology of the phenomenon of environmentally forced
migration (§ 2.2). This typology allows for a more in debt analyses. Finally,
this chapter explores different approaches that can be adopted to deal with
environmentally forced displacement (§ 2.3). These approaches lay the basis
for the analysis of the international law framework in part II.

2 The concept of the environmental refugee
‘Environmental strains that transcend national borders are already be-
ginning to break down the sacred boundaries of national sovereignty
[...] Dealing with global change will be more difficult. No one nation
or even group of nations can meet these challenges, and no nation can
protect itself from the actions – or inaction – of others.’
Mathews, former vice president of the World Resources Institute.1
Science is telling us that environmental degradation is on the rise.2 The
pressure on land and other resources is rising in all regions of the world due
to macro-level changes such as rapid growth of populations, urbanization,
climate change, water scarcity and food and energy insecurity and local causes
such as the carelessness, mismanagement of resources, increasing industrial
accidents/pollution, poor planning, poor infrastructure, poor governance and
monitoring. These pressures will, along with other factors, contribute to migra-
tion and displacement. In decades to come, environmental degradation will
motivate or force millions of people to leave their homes in search of viable
livelihoods and safety.3 More people are already displaced annually by natural
disasters than by conflict, and the long term effects of climate change are
expected to trigger large-scale population movements within and across
borders.4
The forced migration is often referred to as ‘environmentally forced migra-
tion’ and those displaced as ‘environmental refugees’ or ‘environmentally
forced migrants’. However, what displacement should be qualified as environ-
mentally forced migration, and who qualifies as an environmental refugee
is still up for debate.
1 Mathews 1989.
2 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 6. Natural disasters – floods, earthquakes, hurricanes,
mudslides – and other types of environmental degradation are both increasing in frequency
and intensity. Over the last two decades the number of recorded natural disasters has
doubled from some 200 to over 400 per year. Nine out of every ten natural disasters today
are climate-related.
3 Warner et al. 2009, p. 1.
4 UNHCR 2012.
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2.1 FRAMING THE CONCEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES
As there is no global institution that can legally and authoritatively define
environmentally forced migration, this paragraph relies on academic research
(§ 2.1.1) and declarations of stakeholders (§ 2.1.2) to determine the scope of
the concept and the ratione personae and materiae (§2.1.3). This paragraph also
provides a clarification on the working definition and the terms used in this
research (§ 2.1.4) as terms may vary between the different stakeholders and
disciplines.
2.1.1 Early academic research
This paragraph looks into some of the definitions proposed by key players
in the field. The goal is not to give an extensive overview of the literature on
this subject, but to get an insight in the variety of definitions by key players
and to determine where the major differences lie, in order to further research
the complexities (§ 2.1.3) and to establish a working definition.
The most-quoted definition of ‘environmental refugee’ was provided by
El-Hinnawi in 1985, then working for the UN Environment Programme. In
the aftermath of the displacements caused by the gas leak in Bhopal in India
and the nuclear catastrophe in Chernobyl, he defined environmental refugees
as: ‘[…] those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat,
temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption
(natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardised their existence and/or
seriously affected the quality of their life.’5 El-Hinnawi defined environmental
refugees in a manner consistent with the humanitarian mission of UNEP rather
than using more analytic criteria.6
Another frequently quoted definition is that by the British environmentalist
Myers. He defined environmental refugees as:
‘Environmental refugees are persons who can no longer gain a secure livelihood
in their traditional homelands because of what are primarily environmental factors
of unusual scope. The factors include drought, desertification, deforestation, soil
erosion and other forms of land degradation; resource deficits such as water
shortages; decline of urban habitats through massive over-loading of city systems;
emergent problems such as climate change, especially global warming; and natural
disasters such as cyclones, storm surges and floods, also earthquakes, with impacts
aggravated by human mismanagement. There can be additional factors that ex-
acerbate environmental problems and that often derive in part from environmental
problems: population growth, widespread poverty, famine and pandemic disease.
Still further factors include deficient development policies and government systems
5 Hinnawi 1985, p. 4.
6 Bates 2002, p. 466.
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that “marginalize” people in senses economic, political, social and legal. In certain
circumstances, a number of factors can serve as “immediate triggers” of migration,
e.g. major industrial accidents and construction of outsize dams. Of these manifold
factors, several can operate in combination, often with compounded impacts. In
face of environmental problems, people concerned feel they have no alternative
but to seek sustenance elsewhere, either within their countries or in other countries,
and whether on a semi-permanent or permanent basis.’7
This working definition mixes environmental reasons with other reasons such
as population growth, widespread poverty, famine and pandemic disease. From
a legal perspective, this definition is too broad to be of use, as it creates a
category that is so broad that it may become meaningless. Another broad
definition is by Bates (who proposed a classification of refugees): ‘people who
migrate from their usual residence due to changes in their ambient non-human
environment.’8 This definition is ‘necessarily vague in order to incorporate
the two most important features of environmental refugees: the transformation
of the environment to one less suitable for human occupation and the acknow-
ledgment that this causes migration.’9
Suhrke adopts a more legal approach and links forced migration to the
concept of traditional refugees:
‘If it is to have a meaning at all, the concept of environmental refugee must refer
to especially vulnerable people who are displaced due to extreme environmental
degradation […]. In extreme situations, environmental change can remove the eco-
nomic foundation of the community altogether (as when indigenous people lose
their forests or fishing grounds). To survive at all, they must move. Responding
primarily to push-factors, they become refugees in much the sense that current
sociological and legal terms define the condition’.10
So far, no definition has been widely supported.
The alarmists vs sceptics
Due to the complexity of the problem and the lack of generally accepted
definitions, estimates on the number of people in need for protection vary
widely. At the extreme end, the alarmist Meyers suggested that as many as
200 million people will be forced to migrate as a result of climate change by
2050.11 Most apocalyptically, in 2007 a report by Christian Aid suggested that
nearly a billion people could be permanently displaced by 2050: 250 million
7 Myers, Kent 1995, p. 18.
8 Bates 2002, p. 468.
9 Ibid., p. 468 and 469.
10 Suhrke 1993, p. 9.
11 Myers, Kent 1995, p. 1. Brown argues that ‘Professor Myers himself admits that his estimate,
although calculated from the best available and limited data, required some “heroic extra-
polations”’ in Brown, Hammill & McLeman 2007, p. 8.
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by climate change-related phenomena such as droughts, floods and hurricanes,
and 645 million by dams and other development projects.12 These alarmists
predictions emphasise a causal relationship between environmental degradation
and displacement. The alarmist’s main goal is the development of new policy
instruments to protect those displaced.
On the other hand, the sceptics criticise the concept of environmental
degradation as a (single) cause of forced migration. They stress that migration
and displacement is triggered by complex and multiple causes among which
environmental degradation is just one, and predicts that the number of cases
where displacement can be directly linked to the effects of environmental
degradation will be few.13 They point out that ‘whilst there is a general pre-
sumption that both migration and displacement can be linked to deteriorating
environmental conditions and slow-onset climate change, detailed empirical
evidence on these links is both limited and often highly contentious.’14
Also the fact that migration is not considered an adaptation strategy, is
criticized.15 With Pottier, Black agrees that migration is not an ‘end result’
which can be labelled simply as a ‘problem’, but often forms part of the
solution. As Black puts it ‘migration is again perhaps better seen as a custom-
ary coping strategy. In this sense, movement of people is a response to spatio-
temporal variations in climatic and other conditions, rather than a new phe-
nomenon resulting from a physical limit having been reached.’16 Tacoli’s field
research shows that ‘migration is better defined as an adaptive response to
socioeconomic, cultural, political and environmental transformations, in most
instances closely linked to the need to diversify income sources and reduce
dependence on natural resources […] Non-environmental factors largely deter-
mine the duration, destination and composition of migrant flows.’17 This
concept of migration as adaptation is now broadly accepted.18
Where alarmists focus on the big picture of environmental degradation
(and possibly other reasons) and the necessity to migrate at a certain moment,
the sceptics focus on the people moving solely for reasons that have a clear
relationship with the environmental degradation. As a result the alarmists take
into account a potentially much larger group of persons that are forced to
migrate. So, while projections of the extent of displacement differ widely, it
is generally accepted that the effects of climate change and other forms of
environmental degradation will result in large-scale movements of people.
12 Baird et al. 2007, p. 7.
13 See also § 2.1.3.
14 Zetter 2011, p. 11.
15 Morton, Boncour & Laczko 2008, p. 6.
16 Black 2001, p. 6.
17 Tacoli 2011, p. v.
18 See for example UNHCR 2011, p. 2 or Zetter 2008, p. 62.
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Also the growing knowledgebase on links between environmental degradation
and migration takes the debate towards a middle ground.19
2.1.2 Acceptance of the concept by stakeholders
For political reasons, a relevant question is: why protect environmental refugees
and not forced migration for other reasons? It is therefore relevant to see if
norm entrepreneurs20 accept environmental refugees as a group worthy of
protection
In the last decade, the acceptance of the nexus between either climate
change, environmental degradation or disasters and migration has grown
exponentially. The 2016 UN Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,21 in its
introduction, acknowledged migration in response to the adverse effects of
climate change, natural disasters (some of which may be linked to climate
change), or other environmental factors. It also considered: ‘We commit to
addressing the drivers that create or exacerbate large movements. […] We will
take measures, inter alia, to […] combating environmental degradation and
ensuring effective responses to natural disasters and the adverse impacts of
climate change.’22 In 2018, following on from the 2016 UN Declaration for
Refugees and Migrants, many States have adopted two UN General Assembly
Compacts, one on migrants and the other on refugees. The Global Compact
on Safe and Orderly Migration23 includes commitments to addressing the
impact of climate change on forced movement.24 It devotes a section to
‘Natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and environmental
degradation’.25 The Global Compact on Refugees26 also recognizes the inter-
action of climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters with the
drivers of refugee movements and states that people displaced across borders
in this context will be assisted by relevant stakeholders.
19 See for example in the context a case study in four countries by Zetter 2011, p. 37.
20 According to the broadly accepted theory of the development of international and regional
norms by Finnemore, Sikkink 1998, the first stage of norm development is norm emergence
where ‘norm entrepreneurs’ persuade society to identify with an emerging norm.
21 UNGA Doc A/RES/71/1, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 September
2016. 71/1. New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, 3 October 2016.
22 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, para 43.
23 UNGA UN Doc A/RES/73/195, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 Decem-
ber 2018. 73/195. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 11 January
2019.
24 See also § 11.3.1.
25 Global Compact for Migration, OBJECTIVE 2: Minimize the adverse drivers and structural
factors that compel people to leave their country of origin, Article 18 h up to and including l.
26 UNGA UN Doc A/73/12, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Part II Global compact on refugees, 13 September 2018.
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The issue has also been taken up in the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion for Climate Change negotiations. It has been accepted that the extent to
which people will move because of the effects of climate change will depend
on the extent to which global temperatures rise, which in turn will depend
on the success of measures to mitigate the production of green-house gasses
spearheaded by the UNFCCC. Since the Cancún Adaptation Agreement human
mobility has played an increasing role in the UNFCCC negotiations.27 Lastly,
in 2018, the UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement reported its findings to the
24th Conference of the Parties at Katowice.28
The Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on Human Rights and
Climate Change, which recognizes migrants and persons displaced across
international borders in the context of climate change.29 The Resolution recog-
nizes the links between migration, displacement, climate change and human
rights. It also recognizes that migrants, are disproportionally affected by climate
change. It requests OHCHR to research and identify human rights protection
gaps linked to human mobility in the context of climate change. Finally it calls
upon States to continue and enhance international cooperation and assistance
for adaptation measures to help developing countries, especially those that
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change as well
as persons in vulnerable situations, including migrants and persons displaced
across international borders in the context of the adverse impact of climate
change.30 More recently, the Human Rights Council released a report by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on ‘Addressing human
rights protection gaps in the context of migration and displacement of persons
across international borders resulting from the adverse effects of climate change
and supporting the adaptation and mitigation plans of developing countries
to bridge the protection gaps.’31 In September 2019, five UN human rights
treaty bodies issue a joint statement on human rights and climate change. It
considered that:
27 See § 7.3.1 on human mobility in UNFCCC negotiations.
28 The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate
Change Impacts, Task Force on Displacement Activity II.2. Analysis Report. Mapping
Human Mobility Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation and Climate Change
in International Processes, Policies and Legal Frameworks. International Organization for
Migration IOM, August 2018. See also § 7.3.1.
29 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/RES/35/20, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council
on 22 June 2017. 35/20. Human rights and climate change, 7 July 2017.
30 Mapping Human Mobility Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation and Climate
Change in International Processes, Policies and Legal Frameworks, p. 63, 64, and 65.
31 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/38/21, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights. Addressing human rights protection gaps in the context of migration and
displacement of persons across international borders resulting from the adverse effects
of climate change and supporting the adaptation and mitigation plans of developing
countries to bridge the protection gaps, 23 April 2018.
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‘5. Migrant workers and members of their families are forced to migrate because
their States of origin cannot ensure the enjoyment of adequate living conditions,
due to the increase in hydrometeorological disasters, evacuations of areas at high
risk of disasters, environmental degradation and slow-moving disasters, the dis-
appearance of small island states due to rising sea levels, and even the occurrence
of conflicts over access to resources. Migration is a normal human adaptation
strategy in the face of the effects of climate change and natural disasters, as well
as the only option for entire communities and has to be addressed by the United
Nations and the States as a new cause of emerging migration and internal displace-
ment.
6. In that regard, States must address the effects of climate change, environmental
degradation and natural disasters as drivers of migration and ensure that such
factors do not hinder the enjoyment of the human rights of migrants and their
families. In addition, States should offer complementary protection mechanisms
and temporary protection or stay arrangements for migrant workers displaced
across international borders in the context of climate change or disasters and who
cannot return to their countries.’32
The link between climate change and migration has now been broadly accepted
within the UN. The legal consequences of this link are however much less clear
and will be further discussed in this study.
At its 3335th meeting, held on 4 August 2016, the International Law Com-
mission decided, in accordance with Article 23 of its statute, to recommend
to the General Assembly the elaboration of a convention on the basis of the
Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters.33 The
General Assembly took note of the Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons
in the Eevent of Disasters, presented by the Commission, and invited Govern-
ments to submit comments concerning the recommendation by the Commission
to elaborate a convention on the basis of these Articles.34
The United Nations Environment Assembly (hereafter: UNEA), during the
second edition of the UNEA, held in Nairobi in May 2016, dedicated specific
thematic sessions to questions of environmental migration and displacement,
32 Joint Statement on “Human Rights and Climate Change” by the Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, 16 September 2019, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24998&LangID=E.
33 ILC, Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, with commentaries
2016 ILC sixty-eighth session, in 2016, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part
of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session A/71/10, para 48. The report
will appear in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2016, vol. II, Part Two.
34 UNGA UN Doc A/RES/71/141, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 13 Decem-
ber 2016. 71/141. Protection of persons in the event of disasters, 19 December 2016.
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notably through the High-Level Symposium on ‘Environment and Dis-
placement: Root causes and implications’.35
The UNHCR has explicitly accepted (at least elements of) the concept on
several occasions.36 Although there is no legal acknowledgement of the con-
cept of environmental refugees, the UNHCR has weighed in on the issue of
terminology to compel the acceptance of a common definition (at least for
policy purposes). Avoiding the term ‘refugee’,37 UNHCR has cautiously moved
towards a definition of environmentally displaced persons as ‘person whose
migration movement is of a forced nature and decisively induced by an
environmental factor.’ In 2005, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights adopted a resolution on ‘The legal implications
of the disappearance of States and other territories for environmental reasons,
including the implications for the human rights of their residents, with parti-
cular reference to the rights of indigenous peoples’.38 The UNHCR has also
been actively engaged (through networks) in commissioning research on
climate change-related movement and raising it as a normative protection
gap.39 The IOM is one of the biggest norm entrepreneurs. The IOM hosts the
Environmental Migration Portal a knowledge platform on people on the move
in a changing climate. This portal promotes new research, information
exchange and dialogue, intended to fill the existing data, research and know-
ledge gaps on the migration-environment nexus. The IOM developed a working
definition in 2007 which defines ‘environmental migrants’ as follows:
35 Mapping Human Mobility Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation and Climate
Change in International Processes, Policies and Legal Frameworks, p. 42.
36 In 2005, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
adopted a resolution on the legal implications of the disappearance of States and other
territories for environmental reasons: OHCHR, UNGA UN Doc E/CN.4/DEC/2005/112,
The legal implications of the disappearance of States and other territories for environmental
reasons, including the implications for the human rights of their residents, with particular
reference to the rights of indigenous peoples, 20 April 2005. In 2009, the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights examined the links between human rights and
climate change, including a whole section on displacement UNGA UN Doc A/64/350,
Report of the Secretary-General on Climate change and its possible security implications,
11 September 2009. Also, the 2018 Global Compact for Migration mentions climate migration
several times.
37 Meyer 2008, p. 10, UNESCO advocates for the term ‘environmentally displaced person’
as the term ‘environmental refugee’ ‘usually implies the crossing of state borders, whereas
movements concerned here may be occurring within the borders of a state. In addition,
it poses a significant risk of diluting the concept of “refugee” as legally defined in the 1951
UN Refugee Convention even though it may rightly point to the forced character of the
movement.’
38 OHCHR, UNGA UN Doc E/CN.4/DEC/2005/112, The legal implications of the disappear-
ance of States and other territories for environmental reasons, including the implications
for the human rights of their residents, with particular reference to the rights of indigenous
peoples, 20 April 2005.
39 See for example UNHCR 2014.
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‘Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling
reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects
their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose
to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their
country or abroad.’40
The purpose of this definition is to try to encompass population movement
or displacement, whether it be temporary or permanent, internal or cross-
border, and regardless of whether it is voluntary or forced, or due to sudden
or gradual environmental change.41
On the regional level, the European Union Parliamentary Assembly
‘notes that environmental factors, including climate change, continue to have a
dramatic impact on those at risk of being deprived of their livelihoods because
of natural or man-made environmental disasters which force people to migrate.’42
Furthermore,
‘The Assembly considers that the absence of a legally binding definition of “climate
refugees” does not preclude the possibility of developing specific policies to protect
people who are forced to move as a consequence of climate change. Human mobil-
ity and displacement due to climate degradation require a better response. Council
of Europe member States should therefore take a more proactive approach to the
protection of victims of natural and man-made disasters and improve disaster
preparedness mechanisms, both in Europe and in other regions.’43
The concept has also been accepted in less obvious fora. On 11 September 2009
a report prepared by the UN Secretary General on ‘Climate Change and Its
Possible Security Implications’ has been released.44 Since then,
‘climate change implications for threats to international peace and security have
come to the fore of the work of the Security Council in the field of natural resources
and the environment, frequently with the support of elected members of the
Council.’45
40 IOM 2019.
41 Aghazarm, Laczko 2009, p. 19.
42 European Union Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2307 (2019) A legal status for “climate
refugees”, Text adopted by the Assembly on 3 October 2019 (34th Sitting), para 1.
43 Ibid., para 3.
44 UNGA UN Doc A/64/350, Report of the Secretary-General on Climate change and its
possible security implications, 11 September 2009.
45 Kron 2020, p. 248. See for example UNSC UN Doc S/RES/2349, Adopted by the Security
Council at its 7911th meeting, on 31 March 2017, at para 26.
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Also other authoritative organisations such as the World Bank,46 the Asian
Development Bank,47 and many more have taken up on the topic. It is there-
fore safe to conclude that a political momentum has built in support of a
specific protection for the benefit of those forcedly displaced by environmental
degradation (and more in particular for climate refugees). Mayer aptly
describes the current status of acceptance of the concept in the following
words:
‘Despite its logical inconsistencies, the case for a governance of environmental
migration appears as a magical recipe for norm entrepreneurs. There is no essential
reason why migrants should be protected rather than other vulnerable people, but
migrants attract more attention, if only because of the fear that they may be ap-
proaching “us.” Nor is there any reason to focus on environmental migrants or
climate migrants specifically but anything related to climate change attracts a rare
degree of public attention, and, possibly, of engagement. By joining the deep-rooted
fears of migration with the existential uncertainties raised by climate change, the
concepts of environmental migration or, even more, of climate migration have an
immense “marketing” potential.’48
In summary, we can conclude that there is an acceptance of the concept of
environmental refugee by important stakeholders, even though the protection
of environmental refugees is arbitrary. However, the fact that the protection
is arbitrary doesn’t imply that environmental refugees should not benefit from
a possible willingness by decision makers to protect them. Many (if not all)
migration instruments are to some extent arbitrary. All the existing instruments
were adopted because there was a political will to protect these specific groups.
And even the most prominent instrument in the west, the Refugee Convention
has been repeatedly denounced as arbitrary. For this reason, I strongly disagree
with authors who suggest that the protection of the group of environmental
refugees should be abandoned altogether. Based on the assumption that
protection of this group should be pursued, in order to establish a legally
suitable protection framework (as opposed to a political one), it needs to be
determined which people are entitled to (international) protection.
2.1.3 The scope of ratione personae and materiae
This paragraph explores which people should be entitled to international
protection. As McAdam points out, the need for protection and the type of
46 The World Bank has devoted a webpage to the topic: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
climatechange.
47 The Asian Development Bank has also devoted a webpage to the topic: https://www.adb.
org/themes/climate-change-disaster-risk-management/main.
48 Mayer 2016, p. 196 and 197. For an overview of important research and policy develop-
ments, see Gemenne, Zickgraf & Ionesco 2015, p. 5-10.
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movement (temporary or permanent and internal or cross-border) depends
greatly upon unknown variables, including the extent to which movement
is already an adaptation strategy employed by the community (e.g. cyclical
movement in flood-prone areas) and can continue to be used as an adaptive
strategy, the level of assistance available within the country, pre-existing
migration options for that community, and whether movement is initial flight
in response to a sudden disaster, or pre-emptive and/or secondary movement
where climate impacts are more slow onset in nature.49 All these elements
require further analyses. Therefore, this paragraph will discuss the main
complexities: causality, voluntary versus forced migration, temporary versus
permanent migration and internal versus cross-border migration. After this,
a working definition is adopted.
Causality
Whilst there is a general presumption that both migration and displacement
can be linked to deteriorating environmental conditions, migration and dis-
placement are complex processes conditioned by social, economic and political
factors.50 As Mence and others point out:
‘There is consensus among many analysts that identifying cases where there are
direct and exclusive linkages between environmental factors and cross-border
migration is difficult and likely to be rare. Those critical of attempts to draw direct
correlations have long argued that the causes of migration are highly complex,
involving a range of political, economic and social factors that may influence
responses to environmental stress. The strength of family, social, cultural and ethnic
networks, the effectiveness of state responses to disasters and the level of poverty
and wealth all appeared to influence coping strategies and migration decisions.
Further, all of these variables are likely to vary over time and space.’51
It is very likely that environmental degradation impacts will contribute to an
increase in forced migration. However, the term environmental refugee implies
a mono-causality that one rarely finds in human reality.52 For Black (one the
most prominent sceptics of environmental refugees) this is multi-causality
disqualifies the legitimacy of focusing on environmental refugees as a signi-
ficant group of migrants, deserving of the world’s attention. Black argues that
‘although environmental degradation and catastrophe may be important factors
in the decision to migrate, and issues of concern in their own right, their
49 McAdam 2011, p. 10.
50 See for example McLeman, Hunter 2010.
51 Mence 2013, p. 8.
52 Only in some cases the environmental degradation will be so dramatic and so all-encom-
passing of livelihoods that, regardless of livelihood strategy or socially constructed differ-
ences in wealth, most or all inhabitants of an impacted area will be forced to migrate, for
example in the context of powerful tsunamis and wildfires.
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conceptualisation as a primary cause of forced displacement is unhelpful and
unsound intellectually, and unnecessary in practical terms.53
Currently, the law recognizes either economic migrants or political refugees.
However, as a result of the multiple factors influencing the decision to migrate,
the distinctions between refugees and migrants and voluntary and involuntary
movements are becoming increasingly blurred. At this point, the law fails to
reflect reality. As Koser notes, trying to categorise migrants within traditional
dichotomies is simplistic and ignores the mismatch between traditional migrant
categories and the reality of ‘mixed motivations’ and ‘mixed flows’.54 As such,
environmental degradation itself might not trigger the movement of persons,
but it has the potential to do so combined with other factors. To identify the
‘primary cause’ of those movements might be impossible as several causes
reinforce each other.55 Elliot nicely sums it up in the context of climate
migrants: ‘The long-standing debate on the definition of “climate migrants”
reflects more than a difference of perspectives between more or less ambitious
proposals: rather, it is symptomatic of the impossibility of determining the
often indirect influence that environmental factors may have in actual displace-
ment.’56 However, a precondition for using the qualification environmental
refugee is that environmental change can indeed be identified as a root cause
for migration movements. If environmental factors cannot be significantly
separated from social, economic or other factors, migrants should not be
considered as environmental migrants.
A solution to this problem of multi-causality might be found in a parallel
to the Refugee Convention. Even with ‘traditional’ (political) refugees the
decision to migrate is often multi-causal and is not solely caused by the per-
secution.57 The Refugee Convention, does not require that persecution be the
sole, or even the main, reason for the displacement of political refugees; it only
requires that there is persecution. In order to be entitled to receive protection
under the traditional refugee regime, it is sufficient to establish that the threat
of persecution was enough to justify prompt flight. A similar objective criterion
that a good reason exists, could be adopted concerning environmental refugees
by analogy.58 Whenever the environmental degradation jeopardises the exist-
ence and/or seriously affects the quality of life, one can assume that the
environmental degradation was the reason to migrate. Another possibility
would be to adopt a sine qua non approach.59 Whenever a migration would
not have taken place without the environmental degradation, the movement
will be considered as the cause of the migration. Finally, if no agreement on
53 Black 2001, p. 1.
54 Mence 2013, p. 8.
55 Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 17.
56 Elliott et al. 2012, p. 32.
57 See also § 5.1.1.
58 Wyman 2013, p. 172 and 173.
59 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 27.
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any qualification can be found, it would be possible to adopt an ‘I know it
when I see it’60 line of reasoning that allows for decisions on a case-by-case
basis.
Voluntary vs forced migration
In law, policy and practice, forcedly displaced persons are treated differently,
often as a category of persons more in need, and therefore with stronger rights,
than migrants.61 For cross-border migration, the difference is obvious. Where
voluntary migrants are only allowed access to third countries under very strict
conditions and are not entitled to special protection , (certain types of) forced
migrants (refugees) are offered protection. As a result, (political) refugees are
often contrasted with ‘voluntary’ economic migrants. However, as has been
noted above, this rigid distinction between ‘voluntary’ economic migrants and
‘forced’ refugees is somewhat misleading. The distinction can best b character-
ized as a spectrum, rather than a single moment in time. On one side of the
spectrum there is migration as a (near-normal or) normal adaptation strategy
that should not invoke protection. As Black pointed out ‘People have historical-
ly left places with harsh or deteriorating conditions, whether this is in terms
of poor rainfall, high unemployment, or political upheaval, or some combina-
tion of these or other adverse factors.’62 It can provide a means of escaping
danger and increasing resilience, especially when it is planned.63 On the other
hand of the spectrum, – due to the extent of environmental degradation and
the limit of the adaptive and mitigating capacities of individuals, local com-
munities or States, – the migration changes from a (near normal) adaptation
strategy to what is called by Warner et al. a ‘survival mechanism of last
resort’.64 Under this type of survival migration, movement only happens as
a last measure and survival migrants are therefore in need for protection. Some
authors like Bates have therefore suggested to adopt a continuum. ‘People
who have absolutely no control over their relocation represent the environ-
mental refugee end of the continuum, designated as “forced”. Moving to the
left across the continuum are people with more control over the decision to
migrate. At the far left of the continuum, voluntary environmental migrants
include only those who maintain control over every decision in the migration
process.’65 The continuum is characterised by growing pressures and fewer
choices. In this continuum, voluntary migration is characterised by a voluntary
decision, i.e. a situation where at least some alternative quality options are
available. ‘Voluntary’ does not necessarily imply complete freedom of choice,
60 Justice Potter Stewart’s concurring opinion on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 1964.
61 Kolmannskog 2012, p. 6.
62 Black 2001, p. 14.
63 McAdam 2011, p. 4.
64 Warner, Dun & Stal 2008, p. 13.
65 Bates 2002, p. 468.
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but merely that “voluntariness exists where space to choose between realistic
options still exists.”’66
The distinction between normal adaptation strategies and survival migra-
tion is complex. For one, the number of people forced into survival migration
depends on the level of mitigation and adaptive measures. The better people,
communities or States are capable to prevent negative effects from environ-
mental degradation or adapt to negative effects from environmental degrada-
tion, the least they are forced into survival migration.67 Research shows that
the people most at risk for survival migration are not those who are most
frequently exposed, but the ones least able to adapt or mitigate.68 As a result,
poor people with limited resources to adapt or mitigate are at the highest risk
for survival migration. This situation is aggravated when countries face severe
capacity constraints and have weak or dysfunctional governments, or when
costs dwarf a country’s resources. Also, decisions on the individual level can
affect whether there are still alternative quality options available.69 In short,
there is a level of uncertainty about the effects of environmental change in
general, which also affects the need for protection and therefore the distinction
between voluntary and forced migration. As Zetter points out, only in some
cases environmental change will be so dramatic and so all-encompassing of
livelihoods that, regardless of livelihood strategy or socially constructed
differences in wealth, most or all inhabitants of an impacted area will be forced
to migrate. For example, designating prohibited areas for settlement because
of hazard/disaster risk, or preventing return to highly vulnerable locations
after an extreme hazard event, or resettling people from hazard prone areas.
These types of migration constitute perhaps the clearest examples of forced
displacement.70
In order to determine the scope of ratione personae, criteria have to be
developed to determine when a movement is no longer voluntary, but happens
under compulsion. The Secretary General on Human Rights of Internally
66 Ginnetti, Franck 2014, p. 13.
67 For example, building resilience by setting up early warning systems for natural disasters
such as cyclones affects the number of casualties and the level of damage and might prevent
people from being forced into survival migration. Kälin en Schrepfer’s analysis is illustrative.
They have identified three elements that determine the potential of climate related disasters
to trigger population movements. 1 the climate-related hazard – its intensity, scope and
frequency, 2 the vulnerability of affected people to such an event and 3 the capacities of
those affected to cope with it. Kälin, Schrepfer 2012.
68 Kolmannskog 2008, p. 4.
69 For example, harvest all the forest may lead to soil erosion and further environmental
degradation that might cause someone to migrate. Or building one’s house next to a river
while doing nothing to prevent it for flooding. This leads us to the question if one should
be considered an environmental refugee when one contributes to the situation that forces
one to migrate. Or legally framed: could one appeal to protection irrespective of one’s own
contribution to the environmental degradation?
70 Zetter 2011, p. 14.
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Displaced Persons suggested that: ‘One option would be based on a vulnerabil-
ity analysis to assess when vulnerabilities have reached a degree that a person
was forced to leave his or her home. It is obviously extremely complex to
develop generic criteria on this basis and to apply them individually, in
particular in situations of slow onset disasters.’71 Further research on the links
between environmental degradation and migration and a development on a
case by case basis will have to inform more detailed definitions in future.
Developing a more detailed definition will however not automatically
support the most desired outcome. In practice, many people will migrate in
anticipation, because they recognize that their local situation will eventually
deteriorate and want to have the ability to relocate before they are forced to
do so.72 As these people have some alternative quality options available, this
type of migration is generally considered voluntary. However, pre-emptive
movement in such circumstances may be a rational human response, that
allows other people to stay. Therefore, anticipatory movement may be a good
way to prevent emergency situations and unnecessary casualties. As is stands,
environmental refugees are conceptually sandwiched between the non-fitting
legal concepts of voluntary migrants and refugees.
Temporary vs permanent migration
The distinction between forced or voluntary displacement becomes more
significant depending on whether the displacement is temporary or permanent.
For example, extreme hazard events such as flooding undoubtedly ‘force’
displacement; but the significance of the displacement and the scope of the
rights to be protected will differ fundamentally if the displacement then
becomes permanent.73 Both scenarios – temporary and permanent migration –
require different protections mechanisms and have different implications for
defining the legal status of displaced populations. The complicating factor is
that there is no common understanding of what constitutes ‘temporary’ or
‘permanent’ migration. The IOM mapped the various definitions on permanent
migration in 2009:
‘Definitions range from six months away from the place of origin with no plans
to return for “permanent” migration (Findley, 1994 citing Hugo, 1980; Standing,
1985; Prothero & Chapman, 1985), to movement from the usual place of residence
to another country for a period of at least three months but less than a year for
“short-term migration” (IOM, 2004: 60). […] The Inter Agency Standing Committee
Framework for Durable Solutions argues that the ending of displacement is a
process through which the need for specialized assistance and protection diminishes
(Ferris, 2008). In fact, knowing whether movements are permanent or temporary
71 Kälin 2008.
72 Kunz 1973.
73 Zetter 2011, p. 14.
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following natural disasters would require accurate demographical measurements
spanning several years (Smith & McCarty, 1996: 265, 294).’74
As any timeframe will be arbitrarily, the most practical solution may be found
in aligning with migration policies on permanent residence permits.
On top of this conceptual vagueness, in practice the duration of the stay
is influenced by decisions on the individual, State and international level. Even
if return is possible, some people might not return for various reasons, such
as the populations capacity and resources to rebuild livelihoods in the affected
areas or the opportunity for income diversification. The more rapid and
effective the State is able to recover the social, economic and physical aspects
of the affected areas, the likelier it is that people will return to their homes
and thus are temporarily displaced.75
Internal vs cross border migration
The overwhelming majority of the people moving for environmental reasons
is, and will be, migrating within their own countries.76 If we simply look at
the numbers, realistically the focus should be on internal migration and cross-
border movements in the same region, as only a very small group of environ-
mental refugees will end up in western countries. Interestingly, the protection
of internally displaced persons (hereafter: IDPs) has gained less attraction in
the public debate than cross-border migration. Several reasons have been given
in the literature for this phenomena: (1) migration is viewed as posing more
challenges on the international community than internal migrants, (2) the
majority of internal displacements take place within developing countries and
the persons moving to the developed world cause more concerns, and (3) it
is assumed that a stronger legal and normative framework is already in place
for those displaced internally by the effects of environmental change.77 As
the aim for this research is to provide a broad overview of protection possibil-
ities, it analyses all types of migration, regardless of the number of people
involved in this type of migration. However, it needs to be acknowledged that
from a policy perspective these numbers are highly relevant in determining
which action should be undertaken.
2.1.4 Working definition
The most frequently quoted definition in the context of environmentally forced
migration by El-Hinnawi is very broad: ‘those people who have been forced
74 Aghazarm, Laczko 2009 p. 270.
75 See also § 2.1.3.
76 See for example Escap 2015.
77 Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 41.
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to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a
marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that
jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life.’78
Although this definition initiated the debate, it does not suffice from a legal
perspective for a lack of distinction. However, the alternative – creating a very
narrow definition that applies only to a limited type of environmental degrada-
tion – is falling short in protecting those in need for protection: all those
forcedly displaced by environmental degradation.
The element of force in this research is understood as a continuum. The
tipping point from voluntary to forced migration in the continuum can best
be developed on a case by case basis. This working definition obviously differs
from other definitions (such as from the IOM) that do not distinguish between
voluntary and forced migration. This can be explained from the goal of the
research to map legal protection regimes.
The element of moving away from one’s traditional habitat includes all
movements, irrespective of whether these movements cross international
borders or remain inside the country. This working definition does not dis-
tinguish between international or cross-border migration. However, the legal
protection possibilities do make this distinction and will therefore be discussed
within the relevant legal frameworks.
The research covers both temporary and permanent displacement. Again,
the aim of providing a framework requires the analyses of both types of
migration. The research presupposes that the main goal is to return people
to their place of origin as soon as possible. The temporary or permanent
character will be explicitly discussed within the relevant legal frameworks.
This research aligns the distinction between temporary and permanent migra-
tion with migration policies on permanent residence permits.
This research understands ‘a marked environmental disruption‘ as a certain
degree of damage. If societies are capable to bear the burden of environmental
degradation themselves, no international protection is required. This research
uses the same standard as United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction (hereafter: UNISDR) (currently operating under the name United
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR)) and the Nansen Initiative.
Disasters are understood as ‘serious disruption of the functioning of a com-
munity or society causing widespread human, material, economic or environ-
mental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society
to cope using its own resources.‘79
78 Hinnawi 1985, p. 4.
79 See The Nansen Initiative Definitions, available at https://www.nanseninitiative.org/
secretariat. This is similar to the definition adopted by the ILC in the Draft Articles on the
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters 2016. Article 3 defines disasters as ‘“disaster”
means a calamitous event or series of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great
human suffering and distress, mass displacement, or large-scale material or environmental
damage, thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of society’.
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The element of ‘a jeopardised existence and/or seriously affected quality
of life’ is closely related to the element of force. There can only be an element
of force when the movement is caused by a situation that is serious enough
to justify the movement. Circular migration or income diversification strategies
(although they might prevent forced migration and may be a very reasonable
adaptation strategy) are not considered to jeopardise the existence and/or
seriously affected quality of life, and are therefore excluded from the scope
of ratione personae.80 Just as with the element of force, this element should
be decided on a case by case basis.
Similar to the approach taken by Ammer et al.,81 this analyses includes
(1) the prevention phase that covers the prevention of situations of environ-
mental change, adaptation and mitigation measures and (2) the phase of coping
with environmentally forced migration which Ammer refers to as ‘environ-
mental flight’. As Ammer points out, the prevention of obligations to prevent
situations of environmental change is relevant, as ‘firstly, it serves the imme-
diate avoidance of environmental change; secondly, the violations of those
obligations can result in State obligations in accordance with the rules of State
responsibility (e.g. compensation).’82 Even though in the prevention stage
it will be hard to determine whether forced displacement will happen, this
phase is included in the research as different legal regimes focus on the pre-
vention of harm. It is also the best possible outcome when forced migration
can be avoided altogether.
Figure 1: Schematic overview of situations covered83








































80 Of course it is difficult to establish exactly when an existence is jeopardised or when the
quality of life is seriously affected. Especially when you take into consideration that field
research shows that in many cases of gradual environmental degradation, the people most
poor and in need for protection are unable to leave, while others relatively well of anticipate
worse to come and leave at an early stage.
81 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 2.
82 Ibid., p. 2.
83 Ibid., p. 2.
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Terminology in this research
This research adopts the term ‘environmental or climate refugee’ for those
forcedly displaced by environmental degradation or climate change more in
particular. If we consider the acceptance of the topic by norm entrepreneurs,
we see a strong focus on climate (change)-induced migration, and within that
topic a strong focus on man-made climate change. Despite the strong argument
of political support for this particular concept, this research opts to use the
more neutral term ‘environment’. It allows for a broader analysis of different
legal regimes for their capacity to respond to forced migration. This fits in
with the daily practice of most of the stakeholders, who deal with migration
per se and do not take into consideration if the migration is caused by climate
change. On top of that, the term environment may face less resistance, as it
does not become entangled in discussions about the validity of climate change.
It also ensures that causality does not have to be drawn between individual
events and climate change.84
Science does not allow us to determine whether a specific disaster is caused
by natural circumstances or is the effect of climate change.85 It is also difficult
(and in many cases impossible) to draw a direct causal link between the
pollution of a certain actor that has led to a specific disaster in another country
that has led to the forced migration.86 However, whenever a climate narrative
provides for better protection, this research uses this narrative. Especially in
the context of the responsibility approach87 and the justice narrative,88 the
climate change argument provides for legal or moral obligations for protection.
This research also adopts the term ‘(environmental) refugee’. Although
accepted as part of popular vocabulary,89 the use of the term in the legal
context is controversial.90 The general debate on terminology is structured
along two lines of reasoning. The first line focuses on the legal meaning of
the term refugee and thus denounces the use of the term. This group prefers
the term ‘migrant’. The second line of reasoning focuses on the ordinary
meaning of the word ‘refugee’.91 In this line of reasoning, the term refugee
implies a forced nature of the movement and calls for protection. The group
that focusses on the legal meaning rightfully points out that the term refugee
has a precise, well-defined legal meaning and that this definition does not
84 See for example Nash 2012, p. 3.
85 Elliott et al. 2012, p. 32.
86 See also § 7.4.3.
87 See § 2.3.3.
88 See § 13.2.1.
89 Findlay, Geddes 2011, p. 140 use bibliometric data to chart an increase in the use of the
term ‘environmental refugee’ in academic journals since the 1980s, despite its frequent
criticism.
90 For example it is suggested that ‘The terms of “climate refugee” and “environmental
refugee” should be avoided as they are inaccurate and misleading’, UNHCR 2011, p. 561.
91 Oxford dictionary: A person who has been forced to leave their country in order to escape
war, persecution, or natural disaster.
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include environmental factors.92 So, unless the legal landscape changes, the
legal term refugee does not apply. Also, important stakeholders such as the
UNHCR and the IOM emphasize that, although people displaced by environ-
mental degradation are often forcedly displaced and in need of assistance,
their protection need differs from that of those ‘traditional’ refugees. ‘Tradi-
tional‘ ‘refugees could not turn to their own governments for protection
because states were often the source of persecution and they therefore needed
international assistance, […] whereas environmental migrants continued to
enjoy national protection whatever the state of the landscape.‘93 Some argue,
that by using the term refugee for environmentally forced migration, the
protection of ‘traditional’ refugees under the Refugee Convention may be
harmed.94 These are strong arguments for not using the term refugee. How-
ever, the alternative use of the term migrant also embodies a lot of disad-
vantages. The term migrant implies a voluntary choice to migrate and can
instigate a stronger protection of national borders. In that sense, the connota-
tion of the term refugee can be very beneficial for the support.95 Campaigners
argue that any other term than refugee would downplay the seriousness of
the situation of affected people and that a higher proportion of the general
public can sympathise with the implied sense of duress. On the contrary, the
term ‘refugee’ is colourful and descriptive and calls for attention for one of
the major problems of our times. I agree with Stavropoulou that ‘Even though
the term ‘environmental refugee’ is legally inaccurate, it is more compelling
than the term ‘environmental migrant’ because it evokes a sense of global
responsibility and accountability, as well as a sense of urgency for impending
disasters.‘96 The element of flight and the element of needing assistance, make
the term ‘refugee’ a compelling word to describe the phenomena addressed
here. As Renaud and others pointed out, ‘people who have been forced to
move because of environmental disasters must often flee with expediency.
Such individuals need protection and assistance, often in a way that is very
similar to Convention refugees. They may require a safe place to stay, food
and water, health and legal assistance, and possibly resettlement.‘97 Therefore,
this research adopts the term ‘refugee‘, as it stresses the forced character of
the movement and stimulates questions of protection and responsibility.
92 See § 5.1.1.
93 Wilkinson 2002, p. 13.
94 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International
Organization for Migration, and other humanitarian organizations have advised that these
terms have no legal basis in international refugee law and should be avoided in order not
to undermine the international legal regime for the protection of refugees. For an overview,
see for example Boano, Zetter & Morris 2008, p. 8.
95 Lehman 2009.
96 Stavropoulou 2008, p. 12.
97 Renaud et al. 2011, p. e12.
The concept of the environmental refugee 31
2.2 Types of environmental refugees in this research
Current migration patterns due to environmental degradation are very com-
plex. As McAdam rightfully pointed out: ‘a number of very different scenarios
are captured within the rubric, it is obvious that it is only through examining
them separately, with attention to their distinctive and common features, that
any meaningful normative frameworks can be developed‘98 This research
therefore (in parts II and III) applies the general legal frameworks to different
types of refugees. This paragraph first describes relevant typologies as devel-
oped in the academic literature, and then clarifies the types of environmental
refugees that are used in this research. A word of caution is needed, as these
scenarios are a typology. In reality, they may coincide and overlap.
El Hinnawi identified three broad categories of environmental migrants:
(1) persons who are displaced temporarily but who can return to their original
home when the environmental damage has been repaired, (2) persons who
are permanently displaced and have resettled elsewhere, and (3) persons who
migrate from their original home in search for a better quality of life when
their original habitat has been degraded to such an extent that it does not meet
their basic needs.99 Bates reclassified existing literature in three qualitatively
different situations.
Figure 2: Classification of environmental refugees by Bates100
Disaster
An unintended catastrophic
event triggers human migration
Expropriation
The wilful destruction of
environment renders it unfit for
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An incremental deterioration of
the environment compels

























































Kolmannskog has published extensively on the various types of environmental
disruptions. He proposes the following typology: (1) natural disasters, (2)
gradual environmental degradation, (3) environmental conflicts, (4) environ-
98 McAdam 2010, p. 2 and 3.
99 Kolmannskog 2008, p. 8.
100 Bates 2002, p. 470.
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mental destruction as a consequence of or as a weapon in conflicts, (5) environ-
ment conservation, (6) development projects, and (7) industrial accidents. His
proposal also contained further sub-categories based on distinctions such as:
(a) human-made or natural change, (b) climate change-induced or all environ-
mental change, (c) temporary or permanent environmental change, (d) tem-
porary or permanent migration, and (e) internal or international/cross-border
migration.101 This typology is also generally adopted in the framework devel-
oped by Kälin, that was subsequently adopted by the UN’s Inter-Agency
Standing Committee Working Group on Migration/Displacement and Climate
Change102 and by the European Parliament.103
This research adopts a similar approach, but it excludes ‘environmental
destruction as a consequence of or as a weapon in conflicts’ as this is a very
specific type of environmental damage that should be dealt with from a very
different legal angle.104 Also environmental conservation and development
projects are discussed under the umbrella term ‘planned resettlement’, for their
similarities in protection needs. Finally, the category of ‘industrial accidents’
has been broadened to environmental contamination as to clearly include
intentional pollution. In some parts of the research, the term climate refugee
is used. This term overlaps with the various types of environmental refugees,
as is demonstrated in the next diagram.
Figure 3: The relation between climate change and the types of environmental refugees
101 Kolmannskog 2008.
102 IASC Working Group 2008.
103 Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 35.
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2.2.1 Sudden-onset disasters
In line with the UNISDR and the definition of the Nansen Initiative, in this
research a disaster is understood as ‘serious disruption of the functioning of
a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic
or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected
community or society to cope using its own resources’.105 In other words,
widespread loss of life alone is not enough – there must be an additional social
impact to invoke protection obligations. This definition includes series of events
resulting in widespread suffering and distress, as environmentally induced
migration is often driven by smaller, frequent or repetitive events. The common
denominator is that other factors, such as socio-economic factors only have
secondary influence on the decision to migrate. This research does not opt
for a limitation to natural disasters as this refers to a difference in origin (only
those that occur naturally) that is not reflected in the need for protection. Those
affected by man-made disasters are in a similar need for protection (e.g. climate
change increases the likeliness of floods) as those that are struck by the same
events that occur naturally. On top of this, even natural disasters are affected
by human actions. For example, their trigger (or increased magnitude and
frequency) can be caused by social or economic factors such as land use change
and the severity of their impacts is often linked to increased exposure of
affected populations because of natural population growth in critical areas.106
However, the different nature of the disaster natural or man-made may have
an effect on the legal protection possibilities (e.g. for man-made disasters the
obligation to cause no harm may provide extra protection.107 Therefore, in
this research whenever the nature of the disaster is relevant for the legal
protection regimes, this differentiation will be made within the relevant legal
framework.
Sudden-onset disaster induced displacement is often a form of acute
displacement, as sudden-onset disasters often result in the destruction of
housing that, in turn, invariably results in the large-scale displacement. In
many settings, those displaced choose to return home once conditions so
permit.108 The causality and the element of force are relatively easy to estab-
lish for migration due to big natural disasters. The swiftness of the disaster
may lead to evacuations before or after the event. Depending on the magnitude
of damage to physical infrastructure, they may result in a pulse of distress
migration out of the affected region. However, for (a series of) small disasters
causing displacement, the causality and the element of force are much harder
105 See The Nansen Initiative Definitions, available at https://www.nanseninitiative.org/secret
ariat.
106 Renaud et al. 2011, p. e18.
107 See § 7.4.1.
108 Scott 2009, p. 27.
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to proof. Case studies show that the actual impact of a disaster – and therefore
its potential to trigger population movements –will depend on a combination
of three elements: (1) the disaster hazard – its intensity, scope and frequency,
(2) the vulnerability of affected people to such an event and (3) the capacities
of those affected to cope with it.109 This non-linear causality makes it harder
to determine in which situations migration must be considered forced and
caused by the disaster. Especially for migration caused by a series of events,
it will be hard to differentiate between voluntary (or economic) migration and
forced migration, as a series of events will lead to a tipping point that is
dependent on many factors and many people leave before their existence is
jeopardized and/or their quality of life is seriously affected.
There is growing evidence that at least the number of people displaced
by climate-related sudden-onset disasters is very substantial.110 Much of the
sudden-onset disaster displacement is temporary and short distance. This type
of displacement is often a form of acute displacement as sudden-onset disasters
often result in the destruction of housing that, in turn, invariably results in
the large-scale displacement. In many settings, those displaced choose to return
home once conditions so permit.111 Whether this is possible depends on both
States as well as on affected populations capacity and resources to rebuild
livelihoods in the affected areas. The effectiveness and success of response,
recovery and rehabilitation efforts largely determine how long people are
displaced. If disaster response after sudden-onset disasters is slow and ineffect-
ive, this limits the range of choices about people’s mobility and people cannot
return to the affected area. These people can become permanently dis-
placed.112 In this research, those displaced by sudden-onset disasters are
considered forcedly displaced if they are displaced inside or outside their
country and they cannot return to their place of origin for factual or legal
reasons or cannot reasonably be expected to do so because of a lack of security
or sustainable livelihoods there.
109 See in the context of climate-related hazards: Ginnetti 2015.
110 See for example Gemenne, Zickgraf & Ionesco 2015.
111 Scott 2009, p. 27.
112 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 7.
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Figure 4: Schematic overview of other impacts on the status of those displaced by
sudden-onset disasters113
2.2.2 Slow-onset disaster
Slow onset disasters, such as drought and desertification, land and soil de-
gradation, water resources degradation, pest infestations, and sea level rise
will lead to a tipping point at which people’s lives and livelihoods come under
such serious threat that they have no choice but to leave their homes. The
nature of the migration is linked to the degree of severity of the environmental
degradation and can only be established on a case-by-case basis. It is virtually
impossible to determine exactly at which point people’s lives and livelihoods
come under such serious threat that the migration should be considered
































forced.114 The causes may unfold over months or years and may affect vast
regions. The common response to slow-onset degradation is to adapt and
possibly to supplement family income by (temporal) labour migration. In this
situation, identifying the root cause for migration will be difficult and can only
be achieved through a process of interviews with the migrants and cross
checking with people living in or knowledgeable about the place of origin
of the migrants.115 Renaud et al. rightfully pointed out that: ‘Environmental
factors can be the dominant push factor, in which case migrants should be
considered environmental migrants. However, in many cases, the environ-
mental factors might not be significantly separated from other factors (e.g.,
social, economic, cultural or political), in which case migrants should not be
considered environmental migrants.’116 Therefore, one of the main problems
for the protection of those displaced by slow-onset disasters is that it is ex-
tremely difficult to establish to what extent environmental degradation was
the dominant decision to migrate. For example, how do you draw the line
between someone moving because his plot of land, and thus his harvest, is
too small, and someone moving because a drought reduced his revenue due
to crop failure?117 As such, the causality between the environmental degrada-
tion and the migration is often hard to establish.
Also the element of force is hard to construct. As Kälin sums it up: ‘If areas
start to become uninhabitable […] during a first phase, leave voluntarily to
find better (economic) opportunities elsewhere within or outside their country,
but later movements may amount to forced displacement and become perman-
ent as inhabitants of such regions no longer have a choice but to leave per-
manently.’118 Slow-onst events allow people from degrading environments
some room to negotiate when, where, and how they migrate. As a result of
this ‘freedom of decision’, this type of migration is often considered a voluntary
migration.119 Only in the latest stage of degradation, the freedom of decision
no longer exists. It is very difficult to decide when migration can be considered
forced. The extent to which this type of migration is forced can only be decided
114 See for example Ferris 2012a ‘It is likely that most of those who migrate will be individuals
or families who decide that conditions are such that it is time to leave their homes and
communities. They will make decisions on the basis of the perceived risk of staying where
they are, analysis of possibilities for settlement elsewhere, and available resources for
making the move. However, other families in more or less the same situation may decide
that they do not have enough resources to move on their own and need to wait, despite
hardship, until government assistance for moving becomes available. People taking the
initiative to move are usually more skilled, stronger, younger and healthier than those who
stay behind. They have assets and opportunities while those who remain are often more
vulnerable, making resettlement efforts more difficult.’
115 Renaud et al. 2011, p. e21.
116 Renaud et al. 2011, p. e21.
117 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 25 and 26.
118 Kälin 2008, p. 4.
119 Kolmannskog 2008, executive summary.
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on a case by case basis. As Ferris pointed out, this will in general be extremely
difficult, as it requires detailed knowledge of the place of origin of the
migrants. Ferris raises the conceptual questions: How do you tell and who
decides when land is uninhabitable? And is this permanent? She poineds out
that slow-onset degradation is often not just a one-way end process, but for
example drought may be very severe in some years and not in others. She
also pointed out that sometimes an area of land may be uninhabitable for the
current population, but maybe if there were few people it would be okay.120
Despite these legal difficulties, the slow onset nature of the environmental
degradation does provide an opportunity which does not usually exist in other
instances of mass displacement: to plan for responses, instead of having to
rely on remedial instruments as in the case of flight. As is pointed out by
Farquhar ‘there will be significant benefits for both origin and destination
communities if the migration of increasing numbers of people can be “managed
progressively through a co-ordinated approach.” […] Schemes which work
on the model of pre-emptive, voluntary migration have a much higher chance
of success than delaying action until the mass resettlement of communities
becomes the only option.’121 The gradual character also allows for adaptation
including State measures, such as flood defence infrastructures.122 New legal
opportunities should be sought to benefit from this possibility of future
planning.
120 Anderson 2012.
121 Farquhar 2015, p. 42.
122 Kolmannskog 2008.
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Figure 5: Schematic overview of other impacts on the status of those displaced by slow-
onset disasters123
Loss of State territory
The most frequently quoted example in the literature of climate induced
migration, is that of the small island development States (hereafter: SIDS) in
particular the small Pacific island States of Kiribati and Tuvalu as they are
considered the showcase and will be affected in an early stage by sea-level
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rise. It is widely acknowledged that the people on these SIDS are affected by
climate change. In 2009, the Secretary-General acknowledged that
‘in the case of small island developing States, the adverse impacts of climate change
are already increasing the rate of domestic migration and relocation, with people
from rural areas and outlying islands moving to urban centres as they lose their
livelihoods and lands owing to natural disasters and sea-level rise. This migration
is placing enormous strains on food, housing, education, health, and water supplies,
as recipient communities struggle to accommodate the number of people migrat-
ing.’124
Also several declarations on the impacts have been made by the inhabitants
of these islands themselves.125
States can be affected in several ways: (a) States can totally disappear,
mostly island-States, (b) States can lose a significant proportion of their territ-
ory, leaving only such territory as will be unable to support the existing
population, and (c) States can lose a significant proportion of their territory,
with serious implications for the existing population.126 Obviously, sea level
rise is a slow process. In the initial phases, people will migrate to other islands
belonging to the same country or abroad in search of better opportunities.
Later, such movements can turn into forced displacement because areas of
origin could become uninhabitable and in extreme cases the remaining territory
of affected States could no longer accommodate the whole population or would
disappear entirely, rendering return impossible. Obviously, such persons will
be in need of some form of international protection.127 As Mc Adam pointed
out, the move is likely to take place a long time before the islands are sub-
merged.128 This leads to the conceptual problem to determine when is the
point at which people are considered to leave forcedly.
Due to the slow-onset character, there is a timeframe in which the (inter-
national) community can respond. Mobility issues associated with the impacts
of sea-level rise require both timely and proactive interventions, and pertinent
reactive responses. Legal and other measures are needed to help people: (a)
remain in situ, where this is possible and desirable, (b) move elsewhere, in
anticipation of harm (including immigration access for early migrants), and
(c) be protected and assisted if they are displaced. In some extreme cases, such
124 UNGA UN Doc A/64/350, Report of the Secretary-General on Climate change and its
possible security implications, 11 September 2009.
125 See for example, Loughry, McAdam 2008, p. 51.
126 UN Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2004/CRP.1, Other Matters. The
Human Rights Situation of Indigenous Peoples in States and Territories Threatened with
Extinction for Environmental Reasons, 13 July 2004.
127 Kälin 2008, p. 4 and 5.
128 McAdam 2010, p. 4.
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as in the case of the low-lying SIDS and potential statelessness, there may be
a need for a cross-border relocation.129
Figure 6a: Sea-level rise – Impacted area still exists130
129 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 15.
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Figure 6b: Sea-level rise – impacted area no longer exists
2.2.3 Armed conflict
Environmental degradation such as drought may have consequences for
conflict, for example by making resources scarcer and increasing compe-
tition.131 Conflict may also arise over resource abundance.132 These conflicts
(where environmental degradation is a root cause) trigger forced migration
in an indirect way. Initially the environmental change results in violent conflict,
and only in a second phase are the affected forced to flee due to the violence.
131 See for example Rakhi et al. 2014, p. 19 and Rüttinger et al. 2015.
132 For example disputes over maritime boundaries, competition in the polar regions High












































Early literature on this topic, suggested that climate change was a growing
cause of conflict over diminishing resources that led to population displace-
ment that would become more pronounced as the effects of climate change
worsened.133 However, the critics of this type of environmentally forced mi-
gration, suggested there is little evidence of direct causality between environ-
mental factors and armed conflict.134 A lack of hard evidence led some of
these authors to conclude that the pervasiveness of security concerns in relation
to environmentally-related migration is heavily influenced by political consider-
ations.135 This image became more nuanced in time. In 2007 the Secretary-
General, warned about the destabilising effect of environmental change:
‘Environmental degradation has the potential to destabilize already conflict-
prone regions, especially when compounded by inequitable access or
politicization of access to scarce resources’.136 Kolmannskog also argued that
‘The environment is only one of several inter-connected causes of conflict and
is rarely considered to be the most decisive factor.’137 As Kron pointed out,
the topis has gained interest in the Security Council. ‘In recent years, there
has been a trend towards addressing conflict prevention and root causes of
conflict, including environmental drivers. […] several members underlined
the way that climate change can serve to aggravate existing security factors
and act as a ‘threat multiplier’. In addition, the UN Secretary-General has noted
that climate change is an integrated part of his conflict prevention agenda.’138
Another paradigm is that environmentally forced migration may be a cause
for conflict. Several climate and security reports consider migration to be one
of the most worrisome aspects of climate change. The IOM concludes that
‘Rapid mass population movements have the potential to negatively affect well-
being, stability and safety in the receiving communities by modifying existing
socioeconomic and cultural balances. Receiving communities often suffer the arrival
of newcomers as a burden, as the influx of the foreign population results in com-
petition for scarce resources, services and income opportunities, potentially leading
to impoverishment, tension and conflict.’139
133 Saul 2009, p. 4
134 For example, Gleditsch 2015 and Black 2001, p. 8-10.
135 Mence 2013, p. 9.
136 Secretary-General’s statement at open Security Council debate on energy, security and
climate, 17 April 2007, available at: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2007-
04-17/secretary-generals-statement-open-security-council-debate-energy.
137 Kolmannskog 2008, p. 18.
138 Kron 2020, p. 251 and 252. See also p. 252-258 for a more extensive overview of considera-
tions of the UNSC on the link between climate change international security.
139 Hoffmann, Guadagno & Quesada 2013, p. 89 and see also Saul 2009, p. 5 who argues that
‘Mass displacement carries risks of internal and inter-State conflict, including due to political
sensitivities about migration control, the inflammation of ethno-centric political agendas,
and increasing isolationism. Here there is a two-fold risk of radicalisation: first, within
communities faced with receiving large numbers of ‘climate refugees’ and secondly, within
displaced communities frustrated by the unwillingness of the international community
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Kolmannskog pointed out with greater accuracy that, ‘The conflict potential
of migration depends to a significant degree on how the government and
people in the place of transit, destination or return respond.’140 It is too early
however to draw general conclusions. For example Christiansen pointed out
that:
‘Although research on migration pressures and environmental stress as a source
of conflict has improved the understanding of specific situations. It has not provided
clear general conclusions. In particular, the potential linkages and interplay between
climate change and security issues are mediated by a number of contextual factors
– including governance, institutions, access to information and external resources
and availability of alternatives.’141
A third paradigm is that environmental degradation may simply coincide with
conflict. For example, when a natural hazard strikes a community that is
affected by conflict, it tends to exacerbate the pre-existing inequalities and
tensions, impacting vulnerable parts of the population in a disproportionate
manner. As a rule, sudden disasters tend to heighten dissatisfaction with the
ruling government. Weak and/or unsatisfactory State structures are exposed
during and after disasters, which may eventually lead to conflict.142
2.2.4 Environmental contamination
It is generally accepted that industrial or technological contamination can cause
environmental degradation to such an extent that people are forced to migrate.
Environmental contamination includes: accident release (occurring during the
production, transportation or handling of hazardous chemical substances),
(chemical, mine or nuclear) explosions, (chemical or atmosphere) pollution
(degradation of one or more aspects in the environment by noxious industrial,
chemical or biological wastes, from debris or man-made products and from
mismanagement of natural and environmental resources), acid rain and sudden
collapses of large buildings and constructions such as dams.143 Depending
on the type and severity of the pollution, it can unintentionally produce
migration both temporary or permanent and acute or gradual. Some types
to adequately respond to their plight. Dissatisfaction may be aggravated by concerns that
those who bear a disproportionately large burden of the impact of climate change – develop-
ing countries – are not the major historical source of carbon emissions. Any failure by
developed or relatively developed countries to responsibly respond to climate-induced
displacement may generate further tensions.’
140 Kolmannskog 2008, p. 21.
141 Christiansen 2016.
142 Kolmannskog 2008, p. 19.
143 Morel 2014, p. 52.
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of sudden-onset contamination cause permanent migration (e.g. nuclear
accidents144) while others cause temporary migration (e.g. an accident with
chemical materials during transport). As with other types of sudden-onset
disasters,145 causation and force are relatively easy to establish.
For slow-onset contamination, such as soil, air and water pollution, the
pollution builds over a longer period of time and people have the possibility
to adapt to the situation or to plan their migration. Therefore, in such situations
it is hard to determine if migration is forced and/or caused by environmental
degradation.
Figure 7a: Environmental contamination - Impacted area still suitable for human
habitation146
144 Examples are the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, in Ukraine former USSR in 1986, and the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident triggered by an earthquake and tsunami
in March 2011.
145 See § 2.2.1.
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Figure 7b: Environmental contamination - Impacted area no longer suitable for human
habitation
2.2.5 Planned resettlement
Planned resettlement covers different types of planned relocation. It includes
people who are displaced by intentional land use changes e.g. development
projects147 such as dam construction,148 transport infrastructure develop-
ment, as well as conservation programs, such as wildlife re-introduction
schemes and the creation of game parks and bio-diversity zones, also often
oust communities. Planned resettlement also includes resettling people from
hazard prone areas and designating prohibited areas for settlement because
of hazard/disaster risk, or preventing return to highly vulnerable locations
after an extreme hazard event.149 The big difference between planned resettle-
ment and other types of environmentally forced migration is that the timing
of displacement is fixed and planned.
147 Defined by EACH-FOR as ‘people who are intentionally relocated or resettled due to a
planned land use change’ EACH-FOR 2008. This type of displacement is also referred to
as ‘Development Induced Displacement’ and DID or ‘development-forced displacement
and resettlement’ and DFDR.
148 See Stanley 2004.














































Development projects, such as natural resource extraction, urban renewal
or development programs, industrial parks, and infrastructure projects (such
as highways, bridges, irrigation canals, and dams) often involve the intro-
duction of direct control by a developer over land previously occupied by
another group. All development projects require land, often in large quantity.
One common consequence of such projects is the upheaval and displacement
of communities. Conservation programs, such as wildlife re-introduction
schemes and the creation of game parks and bio-diversity zones, also often
oust communities. Unlike for refugees and IDPs, there are no institutions or
publications dedicated to tracking overall development-induced displacement
and resettlement. Therefore, no precise data exists on the numbers of persons
affected by development induced displacement throughout the world.150
As development projects commonly involve environmental change or
degradation at a particular locality to an extent that the population in that
locality can no longer reside in their usual place of residence, the migration
can be qualified as forced migration.151 As the environment is often degraded
for the long term, the migration is often permanent. The consequences of
development induced displacement depend largely on how resettlement is
planned, negotiated, and carried out. There is a legally liable entity for indem-
nification of the displaced. As such, the issues surrounding assistance, re-
location and protection of such displaced persons differs greatly from the issues
surrounding displacement of the other types of environmentally forced migra-
tion. However, even though there is a legal liable entity for indemnification,
many studies show that the planning process is often not consultative and
compensations frequently do not compensate actual losses.152 Development
induced displacement often affects the economically, politically, and socially
most vulnerable and marginalized groups in a population.153 Sometimes the
resettlement turns into forced evictions. The Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (hereafter: CESCR) defines forced evictions as ‘the perma-
nent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or
communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the
provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.’154
For planned resettlement from hazard prone areas, it is obvious that the
displacement is forced. People may have to be (forcibly) evacuated and dis-
placed from their homes and prohibited from returning there and be relocated
to safe areas. As return may not be possible, the displacement may be perma-
nent.155 Sustainability of the solution chosen is important to avoid permanent
150 Stanley 2004, introduction.
151 EACH-FOR 2008, preliminary findings.
152 Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 29.
153 Stanley 2004, 4.2 Varying levels of risk for indigenous peoples, women, and other groups.
154 CESCR, General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing Art. 111: Forced evictions,
20 May 1997, at para 3.
155 Kälin 2008, p. 2 and 3 at para iv.
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and protracted displacement situations or even return to high risk zones
exposing the lives of returnees to a high risk incompatibly with human rights
standards.156
2.3 APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES
In the legal literature, an element that has broadly been overlooked, is the fact
that the topic of environmental refugees is often approached as either a human
rights, a security, or a responsibility issue. Each of these approaches is rooted
in a different disciplinary background and leads to a different justification
for an engagement of the international community. As the current debate is
often organised through channels with the same objective and the same
approach, consequences of opting for one or the other of those approaches
(apart from listing their benefits and disadvantages) are not considered.
This research will demonstrate that the difference in approaches is a highly
relevant difference that should be considered by legal practitioners (and policy
makers), as the approach determines the expectations that one holds from the
law and provides a framework in which complementary norms are bargained.
A different approach thus leads to a different logical solution and therefore
preselects legal outcomes (see part II). On top of that, neither the rights-based,
nor the security, nor the responsibility approach are on themselves sufficient
to create a solution for the complex and global character of the phenomenon
of environmentally forced migration (see part III). This research argues for
a combined approach that is supported by the individual strengths of the
approaches (see part IV). This paragraph describes the different approaches.
2.3.1 The rights-based approach
It has been broadly accepted that environmental degradation has implications
for the full enjoyment of human rights. On several occasions, the International
Court of Justice (hereafter: ICJ) and regional human rights courts have con-
firmed that environmental degradation can lead to a violation of human rights
(see part II). The report A/HRC/10/61157 by the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) contained a detailed section
focused on the impact of climate change on migration. It states that the effects
of climate change will fall hardest on the rights of those people who are
already in vulnerable situations owing to factors such as geography, poverty,
gender, age, indigenous or minority status and disability. On the regional level,
156 Ibid., p. 5.
157 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights on the relationship between climate change and human rights,
15 January 2009.
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the European Parliament conducted a study in 2011 on environmentally in-
duced migration and one of the key findings of this report is that existing
policies could be reviewed and additional mechanisms should be considered
which should be rooted in a human rights based approach.158
In the context of this research, the rights-based approach considers environ-
mentally forced migration from an anthropocentric point of view, addressing
the adverse effects of environmental degradation on human beings. The Rights-
based approach is based on the idea that every human being is both a person
and a rights-holder, empowered to claim the rights he or she is entitled to
against duty- bearers. The duty-bearers are primarily the home States of the
people affected, however as the most impacted States by environmental degra-
dation are generally developing States, this research also explores duties for
third States.159 The strongpoint of the approach is that it directly addresses
environmental impacts on the life, health, private life, and property of indivi-
dual humans, rather than on other states or the environment in general.160
It also prescribes special responsibility for the protection of vulnerable popula-
tions and minorities, including women, children and indigenous groups, as
environmentally forced displacement is considered to exacerbate these vulner-
abilities. The (oftentimes human) rights-based approach offers legally binding
and enforceable entitlements and rights for individuals, even when national
laws lack these standards. However, most of the human rights that are affected
by environmentally forced migration have notoriously weak protection regimes.
Therefore, the rights narrative often relates to a broader humanitarian dis-
course, conceiving the governance of environmental migration as essentially
a question of international solidarity.161
2.3.2 The security approach
In general, the security approach is based on the presumption that population
displacement and involuntary migration are considered threats from unco-
ordinated coping that could increase the risk of domestic conflict as well as
have international repercussions.162 The recent Global Risks Report 2019 from
the World Economic Forum identifies extreme weather events and the failure
of climate change mitigation and adaptation as the two most likely risks the
world is facing, and ranks them second and third after nuclear war in terms
of negative impact.163 On 17 April 2007, the Security Council held its first-ever
158 Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011.
159 See § 10.3.
160 Boyle 2012 or Frigo 2011, p. 6.
161 Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 6.
162 UNGA UN Doc A/64/350, Report of the Secretary-General on Climate change and its
possible security implications, 11 September 2009, para 16.
163 World Economic Forum 2019, p. 5.
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debate on the impact of climate change on peace and security. Several recogni-
tions of climate change as a threat to peace have followed. In the reports on
climate and security, climate change was frequently described as a ‘threat
multiplier’ for conflict. In 2009, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution
on ‘Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications’ (A/64/350). The
report summarizes that ‘climate change is often viewed as a “threat multiplier”,
exacerbating threats caused by persistent poverty, weak institutions for
resource management and conflict resolution, fault lines and a history of
mistrust between communities and nations, and inadequate access to informa-
tion or resources.’164 According to the resolution, forced displacement due
to climate change can lead to localized conflicts or spill over into the inter-
national arena in the form of rising tensions or even resource wars.165 The
report also identifies several ‘threat minimizers’, of which migration is explicit-
ly mentioned under the chapter on coping and security.166 Recently, in Jan-
uary 2019, the UN Security Council hosted a debate on the risks relating to
climate security.167 In the run up to this debate, the UNSC has recognized
on various occasions, the threats that climate change and related environmental
stresses, such as land degradation and desertification, pose to international
peace.168
The traditional security approach is based on the assumption that it is a
State’s interest to act early in order to prevent future political instability, and
to cooperate in order to avoid illegal migration.169 As Mayer puts it – the
strength of the security narrative lies in the idea that – ‘states should cooperate,
because this is in their own, well-understood interest, defined mostly on
utilitarian grounds.’170 It focusses on the interest of States rather than on the
164 UNGA UN Doc A/64/350, Report of the Secretary-General on Climate change and its
possible security implications, 11 September 2009, summary.
165 Ibid., para 16.
166 Ibid., para 13.
167 UNSC UN Doc S/PV.8451, Maintenance of international peace and security. Addressing
the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security, 25 January 2019,
or before that UNSC UN Doc SC/13417, Addressing Security Council, Pacific Island
President Calls Climate Change Defining Issue of Next Century, Calls for Special Represent-
ative on Issue, 11 July 2018.
168 The Planetary Security Initiative gave a short overview ‘In March 2017, the UNSC recognised
climate change for the first time as contributor in a conflict-prone region, Lake Chad
Resolution 2349. In January a presidential statement was released in which climate change
was recognised as a risk factor in West Africa and the Sahel. Subsequently, in March 2018
the UNSC adopted Resolution 2408 regarding climate change as a factor driving conflict
in Somalia. Most recently, in June 2018, climate change was included in the extension of
the UN MINUSMA mission mandate that operates in Mali Resolution 2423. The agreed
language of these resolutions refers to the adverse effects of climate change as a factor that
contributes to destabilization, and the importance of adequate risk assessment and analysis
in this regard.’ Planetary Security Initiative 2018.
169 Mayer 2016, p. 193.
170 Ibid., p. 193.
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ethical duties of States. As such developed States may be convinced that it
is in their best interest to act now (by supporting affected States) instead of
facing conflict and insecurity or receiving floods of migrants in the future.
This creates possibilities for early measures such as mitigation and adaptation
and disaster risk reduction. Another important strongpoint of the security
approach is that the approach offers an integrated approach that encompasses
for example foreign policy, diplomacy, trade and (sustainable) development
cooperation. It also involves a new stakeholder: the military. The military has
a broad field experience with the effects of climate change on security and
with dealing with uncertainties by using scenarios in their planning processes.
It also possesses of (non-public) detailed strategic intelligence. This approach
can therefore offer various non-legal benefits.
A weakness of the security approach is that a strong focus on mass-migra-
tion to developed countries may incite western governments to close their
borders for migration. Under the security approach, developed countries often
perceive migration as ‘voluntary and therefore as not compelling the ‘inter-
national community’ to respond [...]. The assumption here is that States can
respond as and when they see fit through domestic immigration policy.’171
This approach may therefore be beneficial for the prevention of migration,
but may be harmful for those forced to flee. This fear is reflected by many
affected developing countries and especially by the SIDS. Affected States argue
that it is not their interest that is central in the discussion, but the interest of
the polluting States.172 In a response to this lack of attention for the affected
people, some have tried to reframe environmentally forced migration as a
‘human security’ issue. This approach also regards the interest of those affected
and argues that basic human rights support global peace and security. The
human security approach focusses on current and emerging threats to the
security and well-being of individuals and communities. This approach aims
to be people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and preventive and
addresses the root causes behind the threats.173
From a legal perspective, the security approach mainly focusses on under
what conditions third State nationals will be allowed on a State’s territory.
The topic of environmental degradation is of growing importance for this field.
In 2018, following on from the 2016 UN Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,
many States have adopted two UN General Assembly Compacts, one on
migrants and the other on refugees. The Global Compact for Safe and Orderly
171 McAdam 2012, p. 212.
172 As is pointed out in Voigt 2009, p. 294, the High Representative and the EU Commission
stated in this context that Climate change impacts will fuel the politics of resentment
between those most responsible for climate change and those most affected by it. Impacts
of climate mitigation policies or policy failures will thus drive political tension nationally
and internationally.
173 See for a more detailed explanation for example McAdam, Saul 2008, Elliott et al. 2012 or
Commission on Human Security 2003.
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Migration174 dedicates a paragraph to environmentally induced migration.175
The Global Compact on Refugees176 excludes environmental refugees from
its scope, but still acknowledges environmental degradation as a driver of
migration. These and other instruments on migration will be discussed in
parts II and III.
2.3.3 The responsibility approach
The link between environmental degradation and migration is complex and
the reasons for migration are often multi-causal. However, a growing number
of case studies ties ever stronger links between pollution, environmental
degradation and migration. Therefore, preventing pollution, can prevent
environmentally forced migration as it addresses (one of the) root cause(s)
of migration. Moreover, while countries of the global north are primarily
responsible for the pollution, the countries that will suffer most from it are
situated in the global south. This reflects one of the most fundamental issues
related to man-made environmental degradation that has its effects across
borders (such as climate change): accountability. It is plain that cross-border
pollution such as climate change poses significant challenges to international
law as it transcends the classical structure of an international legal order that
divides our planet into territorially defined areas over which States are said
to have sovereignty. Issues associated with climate change permeate national
boundaries: emissions or actions in one State will have adverse consequences
in another, and in areas over which States have no jurisdiction or sover-
eignty.177
The responsibility approach defines special obligations to prevent trans-
boundary harm. The law of State responsibility determines the consequences
of a State’s failure to comply with its international obligations. In general, it
requires a State that breaches an international obligation to cease the violation
and provide reparations for any harm caused to another State.178 The inter-
national obligations for combating or preventing pollution of the environment
are rooted in international environmental law, with broadly recognised prin-
ciples such as the “no harm” principle, polluters pay principle and the pre-
cautionary principle. The responsibility approach calls for solutions based on
better accountability and environmental protection standards. A strongpoint
174 UNGA UN Doc A/RES/73/195, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 Decem-
ber 2018. 73/195. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 11 January
2019.
175 See § 11.3.1.
176 UNGA UN Doc A/73/12, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Part II Global compact on refugees, 13 September 2018.
177 Pachauri et al. 2014.
178 Shelton, Kiss 2007, p. 19.
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of the responsibility approach is that it shifts the debate from protection of
migrants to mitigation and compensatory remedies to prevent migration. It
also carries a moral weight, as developed countries are causing pollution,
which provides the opportunity to leverage funding and assistance for the
affected countries.
Within the UNFCCC and its subsequent Conferences of Parties (hereafter:
COPs), the connection between climate change and human mobility is increas-
ingly acknowledged. Even though, currently it is generally considered that
the UNFCCC does not contain primary obligations that could lead to State
responsibility,179 it does reflect in its preamble that States ‘have the respons-
ibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.’180 In the Conference of Parties of Cancún it was also
explicitly acknowledged that ‘owing to historical responsibility, developed
country Parties must take the lead in combatting climate change and the effects
thereof.’ A similar responsibility for support can be found in the Sustainable
Development Goals181 that also cover environmentally forced migration.182
Responsibility therefore covers a broader spectrum than legal liability and
responsibility. It also covers questions of State support and moral obligation.
2.4 CONCLUSION
The complex character of the phenomenon of environmentally forced displace-
ment requires systematic analyses. Based on the typology and the approaches
the next chapters will provide systematic analyses of the legal aspects of
environmentally forced migration in order to deduce to what extent the current
international frameworks offer adequate protection183 (part II), to what extent
current regimes can be interpreted to better protect environmental refugees
(part III) and how the different approaches can be combined to enhance
protection possibilities (part IV).
179 See § 7.3.1 primary obligations under the UNFCCC.
180 Voigt 2008, p. 3 and 4.
181 UNGA UN Doc A/RES/70/1, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 Septem-
ber 2015. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 21 Octo-
ber 2015
182 See § 7.6.
183 Adequate protection is understood in this study as the situation in which people can have
a life in dignity and can enjoy the core of their human rights (such as a right to life, food
and housing).
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The international law framework
The current part of this book discusses the extent to which contemporary
international law is able to address the protection needs of environmental
refugees. Even though environmental refugees are not recognised as a group
entitled to protection, there are well established international and regional
legal instruments, covenants and norms that partially apply. The significance
of this part of the book lies in its assessment of these norms and the identifica-
tion of protection gaps.
The aim of this part is to allow for a more effective and coherent use of
international law by systematically mapping applicable rules and norms. For
the systematic analysis, this part subsequently addresses the rights-based
approach (chapters 3 and 4), the security approach (chapters 5 and 6) and the
responsibility approach (chapters 7 and 8). Within these approaches, special
attention is paid to the various types of environmental refugees. This chapter
demonstrates that the choice for one or the other approach is relevant, as it
carries different assumptions, and determines the expectations one hold from
the law. A word of caution is needed however. Whilst this system of classifica-
tions by approaches is theoretically useful and highlights the multi-faceted
approaches to environmentally forced migration, it is rare that approaches
will fall purely into one category. To complicate matters, terminology used
in one context often has another meaning (and/or) goal when used in other
context.

3 The rights-based approach
The rights-based approach covers both the human rights framework and the
internally displaced persons protection framework. The human rights frame-
work focusses on the effects of environmental degradation on the human rights
of all people irrespective of whether they are displaced or not. The internally
displaced persons framework offers a more specific framework for those who
have been forced to flee within their own country. Often these frameworks
will overlap. This chapter systematically maps applicable rules and norms
of the human rights framework (§ 3.1) and the internally displaced persons
framework (§ 3.2) and then applies those to the various subtypes of environ-
mental refugees (chapter 4).
3.1 THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
The primary legal sources for human rights are the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (hereafter: UDHR), the 1966 International Covenants on Civil
and Political Rights (hereafter: ICCPR) and on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (hereafter: ICESCR).1 The two Covenants are supplemented by treaties
that protect the rights of children, migrant workers, and people with disabil-
ities, and that prohibit torture as well as racial and gender discrimination and
enforced disappearances.2
1 These instruments are supplemented by regional human rights instruments: the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Proto-
cols and the Revised European Social Charter, the American Declaration on Rights and
Duties of Man, the American Convention on Human Rights and its Additional Protocol
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; and the Arab Charter on Human Rights.
2 These include, at a global level, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Protocols; the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities hereafter: CRPD; the Convention
for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination hereafter: CERD; the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment hereafter:
CAT; and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance.
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Most human rights treaties do not directly refer to environmental pro-
tection.3 However, the link between the environment and human rights has
been recognized by numerous international human rights bodies in a rather
ad hoc and apparently uncoordinated and non-systematic manner.4 Regional
tribunals and quasi-tribunals have based norms of environmental protection
on other rights that are protected. Most of these norms are based on civil and
political rights, as these systems often allow individuals to complain before
courts or tribunals.5 There are fewer authoritative interpretations of economic,
social, and cultural rights, as these rights have fewer opportunities to be
clarified through case-by-case adjudication. Nevertheless, the CESCR and the
regional systems do have methods by which they may elaborate on States’
duties with respect to economic, social, and cultural rights in decisions that,
while not binding, may have significant persuasive effect.6 These include
General Comments by the supervisory body of the ESC Covenant, the CESR,
as well as its concluding observations on State reports. Finally, also duties
have been assigned to States based on rights held by groups, or by individuals
because of their membership in groups. As Knox pointed out, ‘even though
the treaties appear to assign states different types of duties for different cat-
egories of rights [civil and political rights, and economic, social, and cultural
rights, and group rights, added by author], the jurisprudence has developed
very similar requirements across the board.’7
States have an obligation to respect, protect, fulfil and promote all human
rights for all persons without discrimination. As the Secretary-General and
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights clarifies in the con-
text of climate change:
‘Among other impacts, climate change negatively affects people’s rights to health,
housing, water and food. These negative impacts will increase exponentially
3 Two regional agreements do recognize environmental rights: the ACHPR, states that ’all
peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their
development’, and the Protocol of San Salvador, recognizes the right of everyone to live
in a healthy environment.
4 See for example Hesselman 2011.
5 Knox 2009, p 170-171.
6 As is summarized by Knox ‘The CESCR reviews countries’ reports on their own compliance
with the ICESCR and provides interpretations of the Covenant in General Comments. An
additional protocol to the Social Charter authorizes a committee of experts, the European
Committee of Social Rights, to consider – collective complaints submitted by nongovern-
mental organizations concerning non-compliance by states that have accepted the protocol.
The Inter-American Commission can address the rights protected by the Protocol of San
Salvador in its country reports and can hear communications alleging – violations of the
formally non-binding American Declaration, which recognizes some economic, social, and
cultural rights, including the right to the preservation of health. The African Commission
can hear claims concerning all rights in the African Charter, including economic, social,
and cultural rights.’ In Knox 2009, p. 174.
7 Knox 2009, p. 170.
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according to the degree of climate change that ultimately takes place and will
disproportionately affect individuals, groups and peoples in vulnerable situations
including, women, children, older persons, indigenous peoples, minorities, migrants,
rural workers, persons with disabilities and the poor. Therefore, States must act
to limit anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (e.g. mitigate climate change),
including through regulatory measures, in order to prevent to the greatest extent
possible the current and future negative human rights impacts of climate change.’8
In the same report it is clarified that – in order to ensure that all persons have
the necessary capacity to adapt to climate change – :
‘States must ensure that appropriate adaptation measures are taken to protect and
fulfil the rights of all persons, particularly those most endangered by the negative
impacts of climate change such as those living in vulnerable areas (e.g. small
islands, riparian and low-lying coastal zones, arid regions and the poles). States
must build adaptive capacities in vulnerable communities, including by recognizing
the manner in which factors such as discrimination, and disparities in education
and health affect climate vulnerability, and by devoting adequate resources to the
realization of the economic, social and cultural rights of all persons, particularly
those facing the greatest risks.’9
If procedural requirements are met, States are allowed a great deal of discretion
to find a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests
of others in the broader community, whether the harm is caused by the State
directly or by a private actor. However, States’ substantive decisions must
protect against environmental harm that reduces the enjoyment of rights below
minimally acceptable levels and must take effective steps to reduce pollution.10
Therefore, although States have discretion to decide how to protect human
rights against environmental degradation there may be some minimum
measures that would be required as a matter of international, regional, or
domestic human rights law.11 The SG of the UNHCR clarifies that to ensure
accountability and effective remedy for human rights harms caused by climate
change, those affected by climate change and its impacts, must have access
to meaningful remedies, including judicial and other redress mechanisms.
‘States should be accountable to rights holders for their contributions to climate
change, including for failure to adequately regulate the emissions of businesses
under their jurisdiction, regardless of where such emissions or their harms
actually occur.’12 It is however unclear how such a legal accountability should
8 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/33/31, Right to development. Report of the Secretary-General
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 26 July 2016, Annex II para
2.
9 Ibid., Annex II para 3.
10 Knox 2009, p. 180.
11 Ibid., p. 185
12 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/33/31, Right to development 2016, Annex II, para 4.
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be constructed. This chapter will demonstrate that States have a wide margin
of appreciation to decide on how to act and legal institutions are cautious to
conclude that States have failed their obligations. This analysis starts with an
overview of the general limitations. It then gives an overview of the general
obligations (§ 3.1.1.) and most relevant substantive rights (§ 3.1.2.), procedural
rights (§ 3.1.3.) and group rights (§ 3.1.4.).
3.1.1 General limitations of the human rights framework
In general there are some limitations to the human rights framework. At the
international level, the international system for monitoring and enforcing
human rights is inherently limited by national sovereignty.13 The juris-
prudence on environmental law was developed in the context of harm that
does not cross an international boundary. The benefits and the costs of the
actions causing the harm are felt within a single polity. Therefore, if that State
follows procedural safeguards to ensure that all those affected are able to
participate fully in the decision-making process, then the resulting decision
is entitled to a presumption of legitimacy. Knox rightfully pointed out that
‘those safeguards do not translate easily to environmental harms such as
climate change, which are caused by and affect many different countries.’14
Also, much environmental harm results from private conduct. These private
actors are not bound directly by human rights treaties. States therefore seem
to be required to take the steps necessary to restrict private actors from causing
environmental harm that interferes with protected rights.15 Especially for small
or developing States, it may be hard to restrict big multinational enterprises.
Another difficulty on the international level is to prove a violation of
affected rights. Although, the international community has increasingly ack-
nowledged the negative effects of environmental degradation on human
rights,16 it does not, however, necessarily violate human rights. In a report
13 As Morel pointed out ‘On the national level, many states have not incorporated international
human rights norms in their domestic laws. On a regular basis policies and practices
breaching human rights standards occur worldwide. Many states lack an effectively and
objectively operating judicial system. On the individual level, people may be unaware of
their rights and entitlements under international human rights law. People may also be
deterred from approaching judicial institutions for several reasons, including lack of legal
aid and financial means.’ Morel 2014, p. 59, 60.
14 Knox 2009, p 168-169.
15 Ibid., p. 172.
16 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 2009, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,
the UNGA UN Doc A/RES/71/1, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on
19 September 2016. 71/1. New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, 3 October 2016
and the UNGA UN Doc A/RES/73/195, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly
on 19 December 2018. 73/195. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,
11 January 2019.
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of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
three mayor obstacles were identified:
‘First, it is virtually impossible to disentangle the complex causal relationships
linking historical greenhouse gas emissions of a particular country with a specific
climate change-related effect, let alone with the range of direct and indirect implica-
tions for human rights. Second, global warming is often one of several contributing
factors to climate change-related effects, such as hurricanes, environmental degrada-
tion and water stress. Accordingly, it is often impossible to establish the extent
to which a concrete climate change-related event with implications for human rights
is attributable to global warming. Third, adverse effects of global warming are often
projections about future impacts, whereas human rights violations are normally
established after the harm has occurred.’17
Taking these general limitations into consideration, the next paragraph will
discuss individual human rights and assess their protection possibilities for
those affected by environmental degradation.
3.1.2 Substantive rights
The substantive rights are the most likely to suffer from environmental degra-
dation and decisions to migrate are often based on a lack of these substantial
rights.18 The most relevant rights will be discussed hereafter.
Figure 9: Overview of relevant substantive rights
Substantive rights Legal framework
The right to life art. 6 ICCPR; art. 6 CRC; art. 3 UDHR; art. 7 UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;
art. 2 ECHR, art. 4 American Convention on
Human Rights; art. 4 African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights; art. 5 Arab Charter on
Human Rights.
The right to property art. 5 CEDAW; art. 14 Convention on Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples; art. 17 of the UDHR; art. 1
ECHR, Protocol No. 1, art. 21 ACHR; the UN
Guiding Principles on the Rights of Internally
Displaced Persons; the UN ‘Pinheiro’ Principles
on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees
and Displaced Persons
The right to respect for private and family life art. 10 of the ICESCR, art. 8 ECHR
17 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 2009, para 70.
18 See for example, UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/7/5, A/64/255, A/HRC/10/61 and A/HRC/13/
21, para 43 and 44.
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Substantive rights Legal framework
The right to food art. 11 ICESCR; art. 25 UDHR; art. 24(c) CRC; art.
14 para 2(h) CEDAW; art. 5(e) ICERD; art. 25(f),
28 para 1 CRPD; FAO Voluntary guidelines to
support the progressive realization of the right to
adequate food
The right to water art. 11 ICESCR; principle 1 and 2 Stockholm
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment; para 18.2 Agenda 21;
para 18 of the Johannesburg Declaration on
Sustainable Development
The right to health art. 7(b), 10, 12 ICESCR; art. 12, 14 para 2(b)
CEDAW; art. 25 UDHR; art. 5(e)(iv) ICERD; art.
24 CRC; art. 16 para 4, 22 para 2, 25 CRPD; art. 43
para 1(e), 45 para 1(c), 70 ICRMW; art. 25
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples;
art. 24 UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples
The right to an adequate standard of living art. 11 ICESCR; art. 25 UDHR; art. 27 CRC; art. 14
CEDAW
The right to culture art. 27 ICCPR
The right to development art. 22 ACHPR; principle 1 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development
The right to self-determination art. 1(1) ICCPR; art. 1(1) ICESCR; art. 20, 21
ACHPR; art. 1 para 2, art. 55, art. 73 UN Charter;
art. 1 para 2 Declaration on the Right to
Development (1986); art. 3, 4 Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous People (2007)
The right to humanitarian assistance art. 1(3) Charter of the United Nations
The right to life
Historically, the right to life has often been viewed in the context of the use
of lethal force by States against its citizens. Environmental threats, in general,
do not fit in this context, as environmental threats do not involve the use of
lethal force, are frequently caused by non-State actors engaged in legitimate
activities, and the victims are neither specifically targeted, nor under a special
degree of State control. However, the connection between environmental
degradation and the right to life is now generally accepted.
This connection was endorsed at the ICJ by Judge Weeramantry who stated
that
‘the protection of the environment is [...] a vital part of contemporary human rights
doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to
health and the right to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate on this, as
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damage to the environment can impair and undermine all the human rights spoken
of in the Universal Declaration and other human rights instruments.’19
The UN Human Rights Committee (hereafter: HRC) considered in General
Comment 36 that:
‘Environmental degradation, climate change and unsustainable development
constitute some of the most pressing and serious threats to the ability of present
and future generations to enjoy the right to life. [258] Obligations of States parties
under international environmental law should thus inform the contents of article
6 of the Covenant, and the obligation of States parties to respect and ensure the
right to life should also inform their relevant obligations under international environ-
mental law. [259] Implementation of the obligation to respect and ensure the right
to life, and in particular life with dignity, depends, inter alia, on measures taken
by States parties to preserve the environment and protect it against harm, pollution
and climate change caused by public and private actors. States parties should
therefore ensure sustainable use of natural resources, develop and implement
substantive environmental standards, conduct environmental impact assessments
and consult with relevant States about activities likely to have a significant impact
on the environment, provide notification to other States concerned about natural
disasters and emergencies and cooperate with them, provide appropriate access
to information on environmental hazards and pay due regard to the precautionary
approach.’ [emphasis added]20
The General Comment makes the very relevant remark that a right to life
requires the obligation to respect and ensure a life with dignity. As in parti-
cular for slow-onset environmental degradation, most people will have left
long before their actual life is under threat, due to unharsh living conditions
that no longer allow for a life in dignity. Even though it may be unclear at
what point in time exactly a life is no longer a life in dignity, and even if there
are nog clear obligations on State action, at least the report draws attention
to the applicability of the right to life in a broad sense. The General Comment
also stresses the relevance of other legal instruments, that may be given sub-
stance through the right of life.21
The HRC confirmed in the Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay case the
undeniable link between the protection of the environment and the realization
of human rights and that environmental degradation can adversely affect the
effective enjoyment of the right to life. Therefore, severe environmental degra-
19 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v. Slovakia, ICJ Reports
1997, separate opinion of vice president Weeramantry para Ab, p. 91.
20 HRC, General Comment No. 36: General comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/
36, 30 October 2018, at para 62.
21 See also part IV.
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dation can give rise to findings of a violation of the right to life.22 In that case,
the Committee concluded to a violation of Article 6 ICCPR, for heavily spraying
toxic agrochemicals that ‘poses a reasonably foreseeable threat to the authors’
lives’.23
For environmental degradation to violate the right to life, several criteria
must be met. McAdam suggests 5 criteria that apply to the right to life based
on an analysis of the views expressed by the HRC in relation to individual
complaints:
‘ The risk to life must be actual or imminent;
The applicant must be personally affected by the harm;
Environmental contamination with proven long-term health effects may be
a sufficient threat, however there must be sufficient evidence that harmful
quantities of contaminants have reached, or will reach, the human environment;
A hypothetical risk is insufficient to constitute a violation of the right to life;
and
cases challenging public policy will, in the absence of an actual or imminent
threat, be considered inadmissible.’24
With respect to the threat being actual or imminent, it can be established that
the impact of environmental degradation in general and in particular of climate
change on the right to life is generally accepted. The Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that:
‘A number of observed and projected effects of climate change will pose direct
and indirect threats to human lives. IPCC AR425 projects with high confidence
an increase in people suffering from death, disease and injury from heatwaves,
floods, storms, fires and droughts. Equally, climate change will affect the right to
life through an increase in hunger and malnutrition and related disorders impacting
on child growth and development; cardiorespiratory morbidity and mortality related
to ground-level ozone.’26
Climate change will exacerbate weather-related disasters which already have
devastating effects on people and their enjoyment of the right to life, particular-
22 HRC, Portillo Cáceres et al. v. Paraguay, Comm. No. 2751/2016 (2019), para 7.4.
23 Ibid., para 7.5.
24 McAdam 2012, p. 57.
25 IPCC AR4 Working Group II WGII Report, p. 393.
26 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights on the relationship between climate change and human rights,
para 22.
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ly in the developing world.27 The CESCR has also stressed that States should
take positive measures to protect the right to life.28
Even though cautious, international tribunals have been determining that
environmental harms violate the right to life.29 The broadest interpretation
of the right to life was taken by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(hereafter: IACtHR). In the Villagran Morales case,30 the Court has stated that:
‘The right to life is a fundamental human right, and the exercise of this right is
essential for the exercise of all other human rights. If it is not respected, all rights
lack meaning. Owing to the fundamental nature of the right to life, restrictive
approaches to it are inadmissible. In essence, the fundamental right to life includes
not only the right of every human being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily,
but also the right that he will not be prevented from having access to the conditions
that guarantee a dignified existence. States have the obligation to guarantee the
creation of the conditions required in order that violations of this basic right do
not occur and, in particular, the duty to prevent its agents from violating it.’31
This wide approach seems to imply a duty for States to protect against environ-
mental degradation that may result in the loss of life.
Already in 1982, the HRC has stated in the Port Hope Case32 that the pro-
tection of the right to life requires positive measures, which reasonably includes
the provision of food and other subsistence aid.33 In this case, the complainant
alleged that dumping of nuclear wastes within Port Hope, Ontario, was causing
large-scale pollution of residences thus threatening the lives of people. Though
the HRC ultimately declared the complaint inadmissible due to failure to
exhaust local remedies, it observed that the case raises serious issues under
Art. 6(1) of the ICCPR, with regard to a State’s obligation to protect human
life.34
In a 1997 report on human rights in Ecuador, the Inter American Commis-
sion on Human Rights (hereafter: IACmHR) said that pollution from oil exploita-
27 For example, an estimated 262 million people were affected by climate disasters annually
from 2000 to 2004, of whom over 98 per cent live in developing countries. Tropical cyclone
hazards, affecting approximately 120 million people annually, killed an estimated 250,000
people from 1980 to 2000. UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61, para 22 and 23.
28 In HRC, General Comment No. 6 at 6 at para 1 and 5, the HRC warns against interpreting
the right to life in a narrow or restrictive manner. It states that protection of the right to
life requires the State to take positive measures.
29 Glazebrook 2009, p. 313.
30 IACtHR Case Street Children Villagran-Morales et al. v. Guatemala 1999.
31 Ibid., para 144. See also Clark et al. 2007, p. 64.
32 HRC, Port Hope E.H.P. v. Canada 1982.
33 Economic and Social Council UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2 , Report of the Representat-
ive of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on
Human Rights resolution 1995/57 Compilation and analysis of legal norms, 1995, para
185.
34 Scanlon, Cassar & Nemes 2004, para 8.
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tion and mining in the Oriente region had caused grave health problems in
local communities, and that these health problems adversely affected the
inhabitants’ right to life.35 The Commission said that the State’s human rights
obligations extended beyond its own agents’ contribution to the problem. The
threat to life (and health) could give rise to an obligation on the part of a State
to take reasonable measures to prevent such risk, or the necessary measures
to respond when persons have suffered injury. The State must ensure that it
has measures in place to prevent life-threatening harm from pollution, in-
cluding from private sources, and – respond with appropriate measures of
investigation and redress when environmental contamination infringes its
residents’ right to life.36 The IACmHR avoided setting out concrete limits on
environmental degradation, noting that States have the freedom to develop
their own natural resources. Instead, it emphasized procedural safeguards.37
The European Court of Human Rights (hereafter: ECtHR) has confirmed
that public authorities may be required to take measures to prevent infringe-
ments of the right to life.38 In the context of dangerous activities by non-State
actors, whose actions were not directly attributable to the State, the ECtHR
decided on the scope of the right to life. In the Öneryildiz v. Turkey case,39
the government had been informed of the risk of a methane gas explosion
at a waste disposal site, but no steps were taken to address the problem. An
explosion subsequently killed 39 people. The Court began by establishing that
the protection of the right to life applies to any activity, public or private that
may pose a risk to life. At the hearing the Government submitted that:
‘the State’s responsibility for actions that were not directly attributable to its agents
could not extend to all occurrences of accidents or disasters and that in such
circumstances the Court’s interpretation as to the applicability of Article 2 should
be neither teleological nor broad, but rather should remain restrictive. Otherwise,
it might be inferred that the mere fact of being near an airport, a nuclear power
station or a munitions factory or of simply being exposed to chemicals could give
rise to a potential violation of Article 2.’40
The Court however rules that:
‘The positive obligation to take all appropriate steps to safeguard life for the
purposes of Article 2 (see paragraph 71 above) entails above all a primary duty
on the State to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed
to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life […]. This obligation
35 IACmHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador 1997, at 91.
36 Ibid., at 88, 91 and 92, as cited in Knox 2009, p. 10 and 11.
37 Knox 2009, p. 179.
38 Council of Europe 2012, p. 18 and 19.
39 ECtHR, Öneryildiz v. Turkey 2004.
40 Ibid., para 67.
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indisputably applies in the particular context of dangerous activities, where, in
addition, special emphasis must be placed on regulations geared to the special
features of the activity in question, particularly with regard to the level of the
potential risk to human lives. They must govern the licensing, setting up, operation,
security and supervision of the activity and must make it compulsory for all those
concerned to take practical measures to ensure the effective protection of citizens
whose lives might be endangered by the inherent risks.’41
This ruling emphasises that States must take measures to prevent the loss of
life caused by foreseeable environmental degradation, especially for dangerous
activities.
This positive duty was confirmed in the Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia
case.42 In this case, six Russian nationals lived near the Pionerskaya river and
water reservoir. Reacting to exceptionally heavy rain and the risk of the dam
breaking, the State-owned water company in charge of the reservoir decided
to release a large amount of water into the river. This caused a heavy flash
flood in Vladivostok. No emergency warning was given and three applicants
were at home during the flood and could barely save their lives. The Court
decided that the operation of such a reservoir undoubtedly falls into the
category of dangerous industrial activities, particularly given its location.43
Therefore, ‘The Court finds that the authorities had positive obligations under
Article 2 of the Convention to assess all the potential risks inherent in the
operation of the reservoir, and to take practical measures to ensure the effective
protection of those whose lives might be endangered by those risks.‘44 The
Court finds that the Government’s responsibility was engaged as: ‘the author-
ities failed to establish a clear legislative and administrative framework to
enable them effectively to assess the risks’ and ‘there was no coherent super-
visory system to encourage those responsible to take steps to ensure adequate
protection of the population living in the area, […] ‘it has not been established
that there was sufficient coordination and cooperation between the various
administrative authorities to ensure that the risks brought to their attention
did not become so serious as to endanger human lives.’45
The Court notes that in practice, inhabitation of the area had not been pre-
vented and preventive measures were not taken. Both elements add to the
violation of Article 2 of the Convention.46 The Court also considers the wide
margin of appreciation in matters where a State is required to take positive
action. The Court considers that: ‘no impossible or disproportionate burden
41 Ibid., para 89. and 90.
42 ECtHR, Kolyadenko and others v. Russia 2012.
43 Ibid., para 164.
44 Ibid., para 166.
45 Ibid., para 185.
46 Ibid., para 168-170.
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would have been imposed on the authorities in the circumstances of the present
case if they had complied with their own decisions and, in particular, taken
the action indicated therein to clean up the Pionerskaya river to increase its
throughput capacity and to restore the emergency warning system at the
Pionerskoye reservoir.’47
The ECtHR later decides on the scope of State’s obligations in the context
of a foreseeable loss of life due to a natural disaster. In Budayeva v. Russia48
multiple mudslides hit the town of Tyrnauz that was developed in the 1950s
as part of a large-scale industrial construction project. The Court decided that
Russia had failed its positive obligation to warn the local population, to imple-
ment evacuation and emergency relief policies or, after the disaster, to carry
out a judicial enquiry, despite the foreseeable threat to the lives of its inhabit-
ants in this hazardous area. The Court emphasises that:
‘where the State is required to take positive measures, the choice of means is in
principle a matter that falls within the Contracting State’s margin of appreciation.
[…] In this respect an impossible or disproportionate burden must not be imposed
on the authorities without consideration being given, in particular, to the operational
choices which they must make in terms of priorities and resources; this results from
the wide margin of appreciation States enjoy. This consideration must be afforded
even greater weight in the sphere of emergency relief in relation to a meteorological
event, which is as such beyond human control, than in the sphere of dangerous
activities of a man-made nature.’49
States thus have an obligation to protect against the loss of life by non-danger-
ous activities when the loss of life is foreseeable. States have a wide margin
of appreciation to decide which measures to take. This burden must be reason-
able and depends on the cause of the risk.50
This positive obligation in the context of natural disasters has been con-
firmed in the Özel and Others v. Turkey case.51 This case concerned the
deaths of the applicants’ family members, who were buried alive under build-
ings that collapsed in the town of Çınarcık, which was located in a region
classified as ‘major risk zone’ on the map of seismic activity. Expert reports
47 Ibid., para 183.
48 ECtHR, Budayeva and others v. Russia 2008.
49 Ibid., para 134 and 135.
50 The ruling limits State responsibility in the context of emergency relief: ‘where the State
is directly involved in the protection of human lives through the mitigation of natural
hazards, these considerations should apply in so far as the circumstances of a particular
case point to the imminence of a natural hazard that had been clearly identifiable, and
especially where it concerned a recurring calamity affecting a distinct area developed for
human habitation or use. The scope of the positive obligations imputable to the State in
the particular circumstances would depend on the origin of the threat and the extent to
which one or the other risk is susceptible to mitigation.’ Ibid., para 137.
51 ECtHR, Özel and Others v. Turkey 2015.
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established several construction deficiencies, such as the use of sand and sea
gravel, which severely reduced the strength of the concrete and eroded the
iron pillars. Following criminal proceedings that lasted more than 12 years,
two out of five suspects who worked for the construction company, were
convicted. A limited damages award was ordered against the company itself.
There was no authorization to prosecute the government officials who failed
to enforce the building regulations.52 The ECtHR noted that the national author-
ities had been fully aware of the risks to which the disaster zone was subject.
The local authorities, with their responsibility to issue building permits, thus
had a role and responsibility of primary importance in the prevention of risks
related to the effects of an earthquake. The Court held that there had been
a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural head, finding
in particular that the Turkish authorities had not acted promptly in determin-
ing the responsibilities and circumstances of the collapse of the buildings which
had caused the deaths. Indeed, the importance of the investigation should have
made the authorities deal with it promptly in order to determine the respons-
ibilities and the circumstances in which the buildings collapsed, and thus to
avoid any appearance of tolerance of illegal acts or of collusion in such acts.
The Court explained that this obligation consisted mainly in the adoption of
measures to strengthen the authorities’ capacity to respond to lethal and
unexpected natural phenomena such as earthquakes. Such prevention involved
land planning and control over urban development.53
For slow-onset disasters, the situation is slightly different. As McAdam
rightfully pointed out, the HRC held that for a person to be considered a
‘victim’ of a violation of the ICCPR (and thus eligible to bring an individual
complaint), ‘he or she must show either that an act or an omission of a State
party has already adversely affected his or her enjoyment of such right, or
that such an effect is imminent.’54 The refusal of the Committee to find a claim
admissible on the basis of a potential threat to life due to the potential use
of nuclear weapons, does not augur well for a successful claim on the basis
of potential, slow onset climate change impacts, especially given the far less
forceful comments of the Committee about the links between climate change
and the right to life.55 In Tauira v. France, the ECmHR found that there was
insufficient evidence to show that French nuclear testing in the Pacific would
52 The ruling has been criticized for imposing only moral human rights obligations on corpora-
tions, instead of legal ones. For example Verdonck argues that ‘In this particular case, two
fundamental issues could have been discussed: the extent to which corporate conduct can
be denounced as a human rights violation and the way in which corporate accountability
can or should be enforced.’ In Verdonck 2015.
53 ECtHR, Özel and Others v. Turkey 2015, para 173-174.
54 HRC, Aalbersberg and 2,084 other Dutch Citizens v. The Netherlands 2006, para 6.3, as cited
in McAdam 2011, p. 51.
55 McAdam 2011, p. 50 and 51.
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directly affect the applicants’ right to life, private life and property.56 In the
Athanassoglou and others v. Switzerland case, the ECtHR decided on the impact
of a nuclear power plant on the right to life. The ECtHR concluded that the
complainants had not successfully established a threat to them individually
that was imminent.57
In the context of environmental pollution, the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter: ACmHPR) recognized human rights
obligations as imposing obligations on States not only to refrain from violating
rights directly, but also to take positive steps to protect the rights, including
from interference by third parties. The Social and Economic Rights Action
Centre vs Nigeria case58 concerned exploitation by the Nigerian government
of oil reserves through the State oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum
Company. These operations have caused environmental degradation and health
problems resulting from the contamination of the environment among the
Ogoni People. The Complainants also allege that the Nigerian Government
violated the right to life, given the wide spread violations perpetrated by the
Government of Nigeria and by private actors.59 The Commission emphasized
that Nigeria’s duty was not simply to refrain from violating rights itself, but
also to protect its citizens from damaging acts that may be perpetrated by
private parties, including Shell Oil, Nigeria’s partner in extracting the
resources.60 In conclusion, the jurisprudence on the right to life clearly shows
that States must install a legal framework to effectively deter threats to the
right to life, and must require everyone involved to take practical measures
to ensure the protection of those whose lives might be endangered.61
States are under a positive obligation to take appropriate steps to safeguard
the lives of those within their jurisdiction. The extend of the obligations for
States depends on the cause and foreseeability of the threat and the possibilities
for mitigation.62 This obligation entails above all a primary duty on the State
to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide
effective deterrence against threats to the right to life.63 ‘Only in exceptional
circumstances courts will revise the material conclusions of the domestic
authorities when the procedural standards are adhered to.’64 Dangerous activ-
ities and other man-made disasters impose a higher burden than activities
56 ECmHR, Tauira and others v. France 1995, as cited in McAdam 2011, p. 51.
57 The dissenting judges noted the irony that ‘it is virtually impossible to prove imminent
danger in the case of inherently dangerous installations’. ECtHR, Athanassoglou and others
v. Switzerland 2000, para 46.
58 ACmHPR, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria 2001.
59 Ibid., para 67.
60 Knox 2009, p. 173.
61 Ibid., p. 179.
62 Kälin, Dale 2008.
63 Ibid.
64 ECtHR, Fadeyeva v. Russia 2005, para 105. See also Knox 2009, p. 176.
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beyond human control. In the context of emergency relief, States have obliga-
tions when the imminence of a natural hazard had been clearly identifiable.
States become liable for deaths, outside the context of dangerous activities,
if they have occurred because the authorities neglected their duty to take
preventive measures when the threat had been clearly identifiable and effective
means to mitigate the risk were available to them. States however have a wide
margin of appreciation in deciding what action to take, while limited resources
are taken into consideration. This limitation is important, as most threats to
life will take place in developing countries with limited resources.
The right to property
The right to property65 covers many aspects of environmentally forced migra-
tion. It can be relied upon to prevent forced migration,66 to protect against
forced evictions,67 to compensate for the loss of property after forced migra-
tion,68 or to protect against arbitrarily and/or unlawfully prevention from
returning home.69
Regional courts have dealt with the connection between environmental
degradation and the loss of property. The Inter American Court held that the
right to property is of particular importance to the indigenous community
because without rights to the land and resources on which they rely, the very
physical and cultural survival of such peoples is at stake. Hence the need to
protect the lands and resources they have traditionally used to prevent their
extinction as a people.70 In the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community
v. Nicaragua case, the IACtHR gave a broad interpretation to the meaning of
‘property’. The Court found that government grants of logging concessions
on the traditional lands of indigenous people violated the right to property
under the American Convention, even though their land-claim based on
ancestral possession was not accepted under national law. The IACtHR held
that a community’s right to property includes not only the right to own the
65 General Comment No. 4 on the Right to Adequate Housing 1991, General Comment No. 7
on Forced Evictions 1997, and UNHCR et al. 2007.
66 For example, when measures are taken to prevent the rise of water in order to protect
houses.
67 See § 4.5.
68 For example, climate change may result in the deprivation of property without compensa-
tion, particularly in coastal areas subject to flooding and permanent inundation, and may
also have an effect on land uses as a result of changing weather and climate patterns in
Aghazarm, Laczko 2009, p. 408.
69 See for example Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p 62 and 63.
70 See for example, IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname 2007 and IACtHR, Mayagna Sumo
Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua 2001 ‘[T]he close ties of indigenous people with the
land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their
spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival.’ See also HRC, General Comment
No. 23: The Rights of Minorities 1994, stating that the right of minorities to enjoy their own
culture may consist in a way of life which is closely associated with territory and use of
its resources.
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land that the community has traditionally occupied, but also the right to own
the natural resources it has traditionally used.71 The Court considered that
‘Through an evolutionary interpretation of international instruments for the pro-
tection of human rights, taking into account applicable norms of interpretation and
pursuant to article 29(b) of the Convention – which precludes a restrictive
interpretation of rights –, it is the opinion of this Court that article 21 of the
Convention protects the right to property in a sense which includes, among others,
the rights of members of the indigenous communities within the framework of
communal property, which is also recognized by the Constitution of Nicaragua.’72
This ruling is especially important for the protection of the rights of indigenous
peoples who are forced to migrate due to environmental degradation due to
the loss of their land by either development- or conservation projects or
pollution. As their rights are often not recognised under national law.73 A
strong land claim might prevent migration when indigenous peoples are
consulted in the decision-making process. Or at least they can be compensated
for their losses. As in other environmental human rights cases, the Inter-
American system has adopted procedural safeguards to protect this right.74
In Öneryildiz v. Turkey,75 the ECtHR considered that the treatment of
waste, as a matter relating to industrial development and urban planning, is
regulated and controlled by the State. As such, it brought the accidents in this
sphere within the State’s responsibility. Therefore, the authorities were required
to do everything within their power to protect private proprietary interests.
Consequently, finding that certain suitable preventive measures existed, which
the national authorities could have taken to avert the environmental risk, that
had been brought to their attention, the Court concluded that the national
authorities’ failure to take the necessary measures amounted to a breach of
their positive obligation under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR.76
In Budayeva and Others v. Russia,77 the ECtHR emphasized that the obliga-
tion to protect the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, is not ab-
solute. Unlike the right to life, which
‘includes a duty to do everything within the authorities’ power in the sphere of
disaster relief for the protection of that right, the obligation to protect the right
71 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname ‘The natural resources found on and within tribal
people’s territories that are protected under Article 21 are those natural resources traditional-
ly used and necessary for the very survival, development and continuation of such people’s
way of life.’, para 122.
72 IACtHR, Mayagna Sumo Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua 2001, at para 148.
73 Cotula 2008, p. 27.
74 Knox 2009, p. 186. See also § 3.1.4. indigenous peoples and vulnerable groups.
75 See also § 3.1.2 the right to life.
76 ECtHR, Öneryildiz v. Turkey 2004, para 135.
77 See also § 3.1.2 the right to life.
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to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, […] cannot extend further than what is
reasonable in the circumstances. Accordingly, the authorities enjoy a wider margin
of appreciation in deciding what measures to take in order to protect individuals’
possessions from weather hazards than in deciding on the measures needed to
protect lives.’78
States must strike a ‘fair balance’ between the demands of the general interest
of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s
fundamental rights.79 This obligation does not require States to compensate
the full market value of the destroyed property, when the damage occurs due
to natural disasters.
‘In the present case, the damage in its entirety could not be unequivocally attributed
to State negligence, and the alleged negligence was no more than an aggravating
factor contributing to the damage caused by natural forces. In such circumstances
the terms of compensation must be assessed in the light of all the other measures
implemented by the authorities, account being taken of the complexity of the
situation, the number of affected owners, and the economic, social and humanitarian
issues inherent in the provision of disaster relief.‘80
The abovementioned cases demonstrate that authorities are expected to take
measures to protect property to the extend to what is reasonable under the
circumstances. It remains to be seen however to what extent a claim to the
right of property can force a State to act in order to prevent damage from
occurring when the cause for environmental degradation is outside its reach
(for example with climate change). Although the Budayeva and Others v.
Russia case demonstrates that even in case of natural disasters, the State has
certain obligations, the court emphasizes that the burden must be reasonable
and strike a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the
community and the individual’s fundamental rights. This seriously limits the
obligation for States for environmental degradation that is beyond their control
such as (climate change related) natural disasters. The main focus therefore
lies on procedural rights.
In addition, the CESCR has elaborated, in particular, on the right to adequate
housing derived from the right to an adequate standard of living recognized
in Article 11 (1) of the ICESCR. In its general comments, the Committee noted
that the human right to adequate housing is of central importance to the
enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights.81
78 ECtHR, Budayeva and others v. Russia 2008, para 175.
79 Ibid., para 181.
80 Ibid., para 182.
81 UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2, Compilation and analysis of legal norms, 1995.
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The right to respect for private and family life
To date, the link between the right to family life and environmental degrada-
tion has not attracted a great deal of attention. Issues relating to access to
resources and sustainable livelihoods are most often linked to the right to an
adequate standard of living under Article 11 of the ICESCR, which arguably
also incorporates elements of the right to family life.82 The right to family
life is also included Article 10 ICESCR. On the regional level, the ECtHR has
found that severe environmental pollution can affect people’s wellbeing and
prevent them from enjoying their homes to such an extent that their rights
under Article 8 ECHR are violated. The Manual on Human Rights and the En-
vironment of the Council of Europe stipulates that:
‘Environmental degradation does not necessarily involve a violation of Article 8
as this article does not include an express right to environmental protection or
nature conservation. (c) For an issue to arise under Article 8, the environmental
factors must directly and seriously affect private and family life or the home. Thus,
there are two issues which the Court must consider – whether a causal link exists
between the activity and the negative impact on the individual and whether the
adverse have attained a certain threshold of harm. The assessment of that minimum
threshold depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the intensity and
duration of the nuisance and its physical or mental effects, as well as on the general
environmental context.‘83
The ECtHR found that States have a positive obligation to protect the right to
private and family life against actions of State and non-State actors. In López
Ostra v. Spain,84 the applicant alleged ongoing serious health problems from
pollution emanating from a nearby tannery waste treatment plant. The ECtHR
held:
‘Naturally, severe environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and
prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private
and family life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their health.
Whether the question is analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State – to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicant’s rights under para-
graph 1 of Article 8 […] –, as the applicant wishes in her case, or in terms of an
“interference by a public authority” to be justified in accordance with paragraph 2
[…], the applicable principles are broadly similar. In both contexts regard must
be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests
of the individual and of the community as a whole, and in any case the State enjoys
a certain margin of appreciation.’85
82 For a more detailed analysis of this link see Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 50.
83 Council of Europe 2012, p. 45.
84 ECtHR, López Ostra v. Spain 1994.
85 Ibid., para 51.
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As with the right to property, the Court emphasizes that there has to be a fair
balance between the rights of the community and the individual and that States
have a wide margin of appreciation on deciding which measures to take.
In the case of Guerra and others v. Italy,86 the applicants alleged a breach
of various rights, resulting from the operation of a chemical factory near their
town. The chemical factory produced fertilizers and other chemicals and was
classified as ‘high risk’ in criteria set out by Presidential Decree. In that context,
‘The Court considers that Italy cannot be said to have “interfered” with the ap-
plicants’ private or family life; they complained not of an act by the State but of
its failure to act. However, although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of
protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities,
it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition
to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent
in effective respect for private or family life [...] In the present case it need only
be ascertained whether the national authorities took the necessary steps to ensure
effective protection of the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family
life as guaranteed by Article 8.’87
In the Case of McGinley and Egan v. The United Kingdom,88 the ECtHR de-
cided on a case resulting from a number of atmospheric tests of nuclear
weapons in the Pacific Ocean and at Maralinga, Australia between 1952 and
1967. The Court noted in particular that, where a Government engages in
hazardous activities which might have hidden adverse consequences on the
health of those involved in such activities, respect for private and family life
under Article 8 of the Convention requires that an effective and accessible
procedure be established which enables such persons to seek all relevant and
appropriate information.89
In Fadeyeva v. Russia,90 the applicant alleged that the operation of a steel
plant in close proximity to her home endangered her health and well-being.
The ECtHR stated that even if the pollution did not cause any quantifiable harm
to the applicant’s health, it affected the quality of life at her home, in violation
of Article 8. The Court also suggested that strong indirect evidence would
be a sufficient basis for finding that pollution had affected human health.91
The threshold for establishing an effect to the health seems lower than in tort
cases, as the Court suggested that strong indirect evidence would suffice.
86 ECtHR, Guerra and Others v. Italy 1998.
87 Ibid., para 58.
88 ECtHR, Case of McGinley and Egan v. The United Kingdom 1998.
89 Ibid., para 101.
90 ECtHR, Fadeyeva v. Russia 2005.
91 Ibid., para 88.
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In Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine,92 the State had built and put into
operation a coal mine, whose spoil heap is located 100 metres from the Dubet-
ska-Vakiv family house. According to a number of studies by governmental
and non-governmental entities, the operation of the factory and the mine has
had adverse environmental effects. The ECtHR stressed with regard to the
minimum threshold necessary to invoke Article 8 that no issue will arise if
the detriment complained of is negligible in comparison to the environmental
hazards inherent in life in every modern city.93 On the responsibility of States
the Court emphasized that:
‘the Court must examine whether a situation was a result of a sudden and un-
expected turn of events or, on the contrary, was longstanding and well known to
the State authorities (see Fadeyeva, cited above, §§ 90-91); whether the State was
or should have been aware that the hazard or the nuisance was affecting the
applicant’s private life (see López Ostra v. Spain, 9 December 1994, §§ 52-53,
Series A no. 303-C) and to what extent the applicant contributed to creating this
situation for himself and was in a position to remedy it without a prohibitive outlay
(see Ledyayeva, cited above, § 97).‘94
In the Case of Brincat and Others v. Malta,95 ship-yard repair workers were
exposed to asbestos for a number of decades beginning in the 1950s to the
early 2000s which led to them suffering from asbestos related conditions. The
ECtHR held that there had been (a violation of Article 2 (right to life) of the
Convention in respect of the applicants whose relative had died, and) a viola-
tion of Article 8 of the Convention. It found in particular that, in view of the
seriousness of the threat posed by asbestos, and despite the margin of appre-
ciation left to States to decide how to manage such risks, the Maltese Govern-
ment had failed to satisfy their positive obligations under the Convention, to
legislate or take other practical measures96 to ensure that the applicants were
adequately protected and informed of the risk to their health and lives.97 The
Court held (in line with previous cases) that:
‘the State has a positive duty to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure
an applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention […]. In particular, the Court
92 ECtHR, Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine 2011 See for an extensive analysis Fitzmaurice 2011.
93 For a claim to arise under Art. 8, the Court considered that the environmental hazard attains
a level of severity resulting in significant impairment of the applicant’s ability to enjoy
his home, private or family life. ‘The assessment of that minimum level is relative and
depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the intensity and duration of the
nuisance and its physical or mental effects on the individual’s health or quality of life,’
Ibid., para 105.
94 Ibid., para 108.
95 ECtHR, Case of Brincat and Others v. Malta 2014.
96 Ibid., para 112.
97 Ibid., para 116.
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has affirmed a positive obligation of States, in relation to Article 8, to provide access
to essential information enabling individuals to assess risks to their health and lives
[...]. It has also recognised that in the context of dangerous activities, the scopes
of the positive obligations under Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention largely overlap
[…]. Indeed, the positive obligation under Article 8 requires the national authorities
to take the same practical measures as those expected of them in the context of
their positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention.’98
The Court has derived from Article 8 State obligations to avoid harmful
emissions, to conduct impact assessments, to inform affected parties and to
have them participate in the decision-making.99 As the obligation must be
reasonable and appropriate and has to strike a fair balance, States have a wide
margin of appreciation and the level of development of the national State is
taken into consideration.100
On the national level, the Hague Court of Appeal in the Dutch Urgenda
case elaborated on how Article 8 (and 2) ECHR are relevant in determining
if the Dutch State has violated its duty of care by not doing enough to avert
the imminent danger caused by climate change:
‘Although Urgenda cannot directly derive rights from these rules [Article 21 of
the Dutch Constitution, the “no harm” principle, the UN Climate Change Conven-
tion, with associated protocols, and Article 191 TFEU with the ETS Directive and
Effort Sharing Decision based on TFEU] and Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, these regulations
still hold meaning, namely in the question discussed below whether the State has
failed to meet its duty of care towards Urgenda. First of all, it can be derived from
these rules what degree of discretionary power the State is entitled to in how it
exercises the tasks and authorities given to it. Secondly, the objectives laid down
in these regulations are relevant in determing the minimum degree of care the State
is expected to observe. In order to determine the scope of the State’s duty of care
and the discretionary power it is entitled to, the court will therefore also consider
the objectives of international and European climate policy as well as the principles
on which the policies are based.’101
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands took the argument a step further. It
considered that in order for Articles 2 and 8 ECHR to be effective, under certain
circumstances, governments should make an active effort
‘to prevent human rights from being compromised by third parties or external
factors (such as natural disasters) 140 This means that a violation of positive
98 Ibid., para 102.
99 See more on the procedural rights in § 3.1.3.
100 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 45.
101 The State of The Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, The Hague Court of Appeal C/09/456689/
HA ZA 13-1396, Ruling of 9 October 2018, para 4.52. See more on this topic in § 7.3.2.
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obligations often involves multiple causality, in the sense that the human rights
violation is caused by a combination of factors, including negligence on the part
of the government.’102
The Supreme Court, therefore considers that, while the State has a margin
of apprecitaiton to decide on which measures to take, ‘the measures taken by
governments must be appropriate with a view to reducing the danger or the
environmental damage in question.’103 When whole regions or societys are
threatened, the Supreme Court considers that:
‘Articles 2 and 8 ECHR proportionally offer protection to the whole region or society
as a whole. This is in line with the principle of effective interpretation (see para
2.37 above): in this category of ‘untargeted’ dangers and environmental damage,
setting the requirement that potential victims must be identifiable would undermine
the protection offered by Articles 2 and 8 ECHR.‘104
The right to food
Environmental degradation in general and climate change in particular will
have potentially severe impacts on food security by reducing the availability
of food, changing access to food, worsening the stability of food supply and
affecting the utilization of food.105 Environmental degradation, and climate
change in particular, will place an additional burden on the resources available
to States. As a result, economic and social rights are likely to suffer, such as
the rights to food.106 The right to food107 is most comprehensively addressed
in Article 11 of the ICESCR. The right to food includes the availability of
adequate food (including through the possibility of feeding oneself from
natural resources) and accessible to all individuals under the jurisdiction of
a State.108 The right to adequate food, imposes three types or levels of obliga-
tions on States parties: (1) the obligation to respect existing access to adequate
102 The State of The Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, The Supreme Court 2019, Case ECLI:NL:
PHR:2019:1026 19/00135, 13 September 2019, para 2.38.
103 Ibid., para 2.63.
104 Ibid., para 2.61.
105 Aghazarm, Laczko 2009, p. 408.
106 For an extensive analysis on the impact of climate change on economic, social and cultural
rights see Jodoin, Lofts 2013, the UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/22/43, Report of the Independent
Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean,
healthy and sustainable environment, John H. Knox, 24 December 2012, and Humphreys
2008, p. 25.
107 CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food Art. 11, 12 May 1999. In
addition to a right to adequate food, the ICESCR also enshrines “the fundamental right
of everyone to be free from hunger”. Moreover, the UNFCCC underscores the importance
of ensuring the availability of food, requiring the stabilization of greenhouse gas in the
atmosphere to be achieved within a timeframe sufficient to ‘ensure that food production
is not threatened.’
108 Humphreys 2008, p. 9 and 10, para 25.
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food requires States parties not to take any measures that result in preventing
such access; (2) the obligation to protect requires measures by the State to
ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of their access
to adequate food; and (3) the obligation to fulfil (facilitate) means the State
must proactively engage in activities intended to strengthen people’s access
to and utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihood, including
food security. Finally, whenever an individual or group is unable, for reasons
beyond their control, to enjoy the right to adequate food by the means at their
disposal, States have the obligation to fulfil (provide) that right directly. Every
State is obliged to ensure for everyone under its jurisdiction access to the
minimum essential food which is sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe,
to ensure their freedom from hunger.109 This obligation also applies for per-
sons who are victims of natural or other disasters.110 The CESCR has recom-
mended the adoption of benchmarks and framework legislation, the develop-
ment of monitoring mechanisms, and the provision of effective judicial and
other appropriate remedies.111 Of particular relevance for climate change
related environmental degradation (that often places an additional burden
on resources available), is that the CESCR has stressed that ‘even where a State
faces severe resources constraints, whether caused by a process of economic
adjustment, economic recession, climatic conditions or other factors, measures
should be undertaken to ensure that the right to adequate food is especially
fulfilled for vulnerable population groups and individuals.112 States have
a general obligation under the ICESCR to cooperate with others to achieve the
full realization of this right.113 This obligation to cooperate is strengthened
by the UNFCCC, which requires State parties to give the specific needs of
developing countries full consideration and to ‘cooperate in preparing for
adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop and elaborate appropriate
and integrated plans for coastal zone management, water resources and
agriculture.’114
The ACmHPR held that the destruction and contamination of food sources,
both by Nigeria directly and by private parties with State authorization, had
violated the Ogoni’s right to food.115 The Social and Economic Rights Action
Centre vs Nigeria116 case, concerned exploitation by the Nigerian government
of oil reserves through the State oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum
Company (NNPC). These operations have caused environmental degradation
and health problems resulting from the contamination of the environment
109 CESCR, General Comment No 12, para 14.
110 Ibid., para 14 and Humphreys 2008, p. 9 and 10, para 25.
111 Ibid., para 29-35.
112 Ibid., para 28. Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 61.
113 CESCR, General Comment No. 15, para 30.
114 Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 63 and 64.
115 Knox 2009, p. 184 and 185.
116 ACmHPR, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria 2001.
80 Chapter 3
among the Ogoni People. The ACmHPR emphasised the interdependency and
applicability of human rights. The Court considers that: ‘The right to food is
inseparably linked to the dignity of human beings and is therefore essential
for the enjoyment and fulfilment of such other rights as health, education, work
and political participation‘ and it confirms that:
‘Clearly, collective rights, environmental rights, and economic and social rights
are essential elements of human rights in Africa. The African Commission will apply
any of the diverse rights contained in the African Charter. It welcomes this oppor-
tunity to make clear that there is no right in the African Charter that cannot be
made effective.‘117
The Commission found the government of Nigeria to be liable not only for
the destruction of food sources such as crops it had caused directly; but also
for the environmental degradation caused by private oil companies Such
liability was based on the government’s failure to regulate and oversee the
activities of oil companies within its territory – in breach of its obligation to
protect. The obligation to protect the right to food thus requires States to take
steps to ensure that action by private entities does not negatively affect
resources access for others, and thereby impair their ability to gain access to
food.118
The right to food is also strongly connected to the right to life, as it implies
a right to freedom from starvation. In the IACtHR case Yakye Axa (Indigenous
Community) v. Paraguay119 an indigenous community claimed land restitu-
tion after being unwillingly deprived of its ancestral lands in the nineteenth
century. The community’s lack of resource access due to the non-completion
of the restitution process, coupled with insufficient sources of livelihoods in
the area presently occupied by the community, had a negative impact on access
to food. The court found:
‘Essentially, this right [right to life] includes not only the right of every human
being not to be arbitrarily deprived of his life, but also the right that conditions
that impede or obstruct access to a decent existence should not be generated.‘120
States are obliged to:
‘inescapably undertake as guarantor, to protect and ensure the right to life, is that
of generating minimum living conditions that are compatible with the dignity of
the human person and of not creating conditions that hinder or impede it. In this
regard, the State has the duty to take positive, concrete measures geared toward
117 Ibid., para 65.
118 Art. 3 UNFCCC and Cotula 2008, p. 29 and 30.
119 IACtHR, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 2005.
120 Ibid., para 161.
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fulfilment of the right to a decent life, especially in the case of persons who are
vulnerable and at risk, whose care becomes a high priority.‘121
This connection is very beneficial, as the right to life is protected in the ICCPR
and therefore immediately binding and justiciable.
The right to food is also considered as a component of the right to an
adequate standard of living or the right to property. The right to food, however
goes beyond the protection offered by the right to property.
‘While the right to property requires compensation for assets lost (and in fact the
ACHPR does not contain any compensation requirements at all), the right to food
requires that those who lose access to resources be placed at least in the same food-
access position as they were before the loss.‘122
Cotula and others have rightfully emphasised that the obligation to fulfil the
right to food, allows States a large margin of appreciation in determining
strategies for ensuring access to food.123 This margin of appreciation is qual-
ified by the standard of ‘appropriateness’. Because of this broad margin of
appreciation, courts are unlikely to play a significant role, e.g. through judicial
review and other processes.124 Only under the most severe circumstances,
courts will hold States accountable for the violation of the right to food. This
limits the possibilities for environmental refugees to have their right to food
fulfilled. Especially in the context of anticipation to environmentally forced
migration or adaptation or mitigation for environmental degradation, this right
will not offer protection.
The right to water
The right to water may be at risk for example due to climate change,
desertification and development projects. Although, the right to water has not
been expressly mentioned in the original UN human rights documents, the
Economic and Social Council (ESC), in General Comment 15 on the Right to
Water, makes clear that they consider that the right to water is inherent in
many of the other explicit rights.125 They set out that the right to water
should be considered as part of Article 11 of ICESCR on the right to an adequate
standard of living.126 Various global environmental instruments have
121 Ibid., para 162.
122 Cotula 2008, p. 28.
123 This margin of appreciation is considerably broader for the obligation to fulfil than for
the obligations to respect and to protect which require respecting/protecting existing
resource access from undue interference, rather than improving access.
124 Ibid., p. 28.
125 CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water Art. 11 and 12, 20 January 2003.
126 Aghazarm, Laczko 2009, p. 408. For an extensive analysis if international law recognises
a human right to water see Scanlon, Cassar & Nemes 2004.
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recognised the right to water in various degrees, such as the Stockholm De-
claration127 (principle 1 and 2), Agenda 21 (para 18.2)128 and the Millennium
Declaration and Political Declaration of Johannesburg (para 18).129 The right
to water ‘entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible
and affordable water for personal and domestic uses.‘130 It also encompasses
freedoms, including
‘the right to maintain access to existing water supplies necessary for the right to
water, and the right to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from
arbitrary disconnections or contamination of water supplies’ and entitlements,
including ‘the right to a system of water supply and management that provides
equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the right to water.’131
The right to water, imposes three types or levels of obligations on States
parties: (1) the obligation to respect the right to water by refraining from
interfering with its enjoyment;132 (2) the obligation to protect the right to
water by preventing third parties from interfering in any way with its enjoy-
ment through the adoption of measures to restrain ‘third parties from denying
equal access to adequate water; and polluting and inequitably extracting from
water resources, including natural sources, wells and other water distribution
systems’, and through the establishment of an effective regulatory system to
govern the provision of water services by third parties;133 and (3), the obliga-
tion to fulfil the right to water by taking positive measures to assist individuals
and communities to enjoy the right; by taking steps to ensure that there is
appropriate education concerning the hygienic use of water, protection of water
sources, and methods to minimize water wastage; and by providing the right
when individuals or a group are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to
realize that right themselves by the means at their disposal.134 The obligation
includes, inter alia, according sufficient recognition of this right within the
national political and legal systems, preferably by way of legislative implemen-
tation; adopting a national water strategy and plan of action to realize this
127 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment UN
Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 3. The UNGA adopted the conference report with the Stockholm
Declaration on 15 December 1972, as Resolution 2994.
128 Agenda 21: United Nations Programme of Action for Sustainable Development UN Doc
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 Vol.I, Annex II.
129 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development 2002. UNGA Resolution 55/199:
Ten-year review of progress achieved in the implementation of the outcome of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc A/RES/55/199, GAOR
55th Session Supp 49 Vol 1, 271.
130 CESCR, General Comment No. 15, para 2.
131 Ibid., para 10. Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 58.
132 CESCR, General Comment No. 7, para 21.
133 Ibid., para 23-24.
134 Ibid., para 25.
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right; ensuring that water is affordable for everyone; and facilitating improved
and sustainable access to water, particularly in rural and deprived urban areas.
As with the right to food, States have a general obligation under the ICESCR
to cooperate with others to achieve the full realization of this right.135
The right to health
Environmental degradation (especially climate change) is projected to affect
the health status of millions of people, including through increases in malnutri-
tion linked to the deleterious effects of on food production and the loss of
certain wild plant and animal species, increased diseases and injury due to
extreme weather events, contaminated water and air pollution and health risks
linked to forced migrations.136 As such, environmental protection is a pre-
condition to the enjoyment of the right to health.137 Article 12 of the ICESCR
is dedicated to the realization of ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health‘. Paragraph 2
of that provision elaborates on the commitment by States to take steps to fully
realize this right.138 The CESCR, pointed out that the notion of ‘the highest
attainable standard of health’ in Article 12.1 takes into account both the indi-
vidual’s biological and socio-economic preconditions and a State’s available
resources.139 This is relevant in the context of environmentally forced migra-
tion, as the countries most affected by it are generally developing countries.
In the case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project140 the ICJ recalls
that:
‘it has recently had occasion to stress, in the following terms, the great significance
that it attaches to respect for the environment, not only for States but also for the
whole of mankind: “the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living
space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations
unborn. The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of
areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating
to the environment.” (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1996, pp. 241 -242, para 29.).’141
135 CESCR, General Comment No. 15, para 31. Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 63 and 64.
136 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61, para 32 and 33. For a more extensive analysis see Jodoin,
Lofts 2013, p. 80 and 81 and see also Humphreys, Robinson 2010, p. 243.
137 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 and 15, para 19; CRC, General Comment No. 4; Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 24;
HRC, General Comment No. 6.
138 UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2, Compilation and analysis of legal norms 1995, para 196.
139 CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para 9.
140 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v. Slovakia 1997, para 53.
141 Ibid., para 53.
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The inclusion of environmental protection under Article 11 was outlined by
the European Committee of Social Rights in its decision on complaint Marango-
poulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v. Greece.142 In this case, high
levels of pollution affected several villages gathering more than 200 000 inhabit-
ants, due to the discharge of industrial liquid waste into the River Asopos
and the groundwater in the Oinofyta region by a private mining company
for over 40 years. The European Committee of Social Rights (hereafter: ECSR)
found that the State has failed ‘to remove as far as possible the causes of ill-
health.’143 The Committee took the opportunity to reaffirm that the Charter
is a living instrument and that the rights and freedoms set out in the ESC
should therefore be interpreted in the light of current conditions. The Commit-
tee takes account of the growing link that States party to the Charter and other
international bodies now make between the protection of health and a healthy
environment, and interprets Article 11 of the Charter (right to protection of
health) as including the right to a healthy environment.144
The ECSR confirmed this interpretation in the International Federation for
Human Rights (FIDH) v. Greece case.145 In this case, dumping of waste in
the River Asopos and the subsequent harmful effects of largescale environ-
mental pollution on the health of the people concerned gives rise to a violation
of Article 11 of the Charter. The Committee ‘considers that the Greek State
has failed to take appropriate measures to remove as far as possible the causes
of ill-health and to prevent as far as possible’.146
The right to health has been given a broad interpretation for indigenous
communities. According to the CESCR:
‘[…] in indigenous communities, the health of the individual is often linked to the
health of the society as a whole and has a collective dimension. […] development-
related activities that lead to the displacement of indigenous peoples against their
will from their traditional territories and environment, denying them their sources
of nutrition and breaking their symbiotic relationship with their lands, has a
deleterious effect on their health.’147
For example in the Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria
case,148 the ACmHPR read the right to a general satisfactory environment
together with the right to health. But it also based duties directly on the right
to a satisfactory environment. In particular, the Commission said that it
requires the State ‘to take reasonable and other measures to prevent pollution
142 ECSR, Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights MFHR v. Greece 2006.
143 Ibid., para 202 and 221.
144 Ibid., para 194 and 195. See also, Council of Europe 2012, p. 123.
145 Ibid., para 49 and 50.
146 Ibid., para 153.
147 CESCR, General Comment No. 14.
148 ACmHPR, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria 2001.
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and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologic-
ally sustainable development and use of natural resources.’149
The right to an adequate standard of living
Environmental degradation poses several obvious challenges to the fulfilment
of the right to an adequate standard of living.150 The adequate standard of
living may be affected for example by extreme weather events, changes in the
suitability of arable land, fluctuations in water supply and access to food.151
The IPCC observes that climate change may generate a series of phenomena
provoking population migrations, including the disruption of settlements,
commerce, transport and societies due to flooding; pressures on urban and
rural infrastructure; loss of property; decreased freshwater availability due
to saltwater intrusion; power outages causing the disruption of public water
supply; contamination of water supply; and withdrawal of risk coverage in
vulnerable areas by private insurers.152
The right to an adequate standard of living has a broad meaning and
includes rights other than those listed in Article 11(1) of the ICESCR, such as
the rights to health, education, and transportation. In its approach to this right,
the CESCR has focused on other rights emanating from, and indispensable to,
the realization of the right to an adequate standard of living.153 Nevertheless,
the CESCR has yet to specifically define the notion of an adequate standard
of living, leaving to States a certain margin of appreciation in its concrete
definition and application.154 It is considered that the right to an adequate
standard of living implies rights to adequate food and water, and is clearly
affected where environmental degradation such as pollution, deforestation
or desertification affects the availability of clean and secure water supplies,
or limits a community’s ability to provide adequate food and nourishment.155
However, as the content and scope of this right are unclear, claims of rights
violations with regard to environmentally forced migration are understandably
often based on other rights.
The right to culture
Environmental degradation can threaten the enjoyment of the right to cult-
ure,156 particularly insofar the culture is linked to the natural environment.
For example, the culture of the Inuit is threatened by (amongst other things)
deteriorating ice conditions, decreasing quantity and quality of snow, unpre-
149 Ibid., para 52.
150 ICESCR, Art. 11; UDHR, Art. 25; CRC, Art. 27; CEDAW, Art. 14.
151 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 41.
152 Pachauri, Reisinger 2008, p. 53 and Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 65 and 66.
153 Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 54 and 55.
154 For a more detailed analysis see Ibid., p 54 and 55.
155 Lewis 2012, p. 38 and 39.
156 ICCPR, Art. 27.
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dictable and unfamiliar weather, and a transfigured landscape. Also mitigation
actions that result in the inundation of land or the displacement of commun-
ities and adaptation actions such as relocation in response to sea level rise
or other environmental factors can impact the right to culture, particularly
for Indigenous peoples, local communities and other vulnerable groups. For
example, relocation can have a particular impact on the right to culture of
Indigenous peoples whose cultural and spiritual practices are tied to the land,
or for local communities who might lose access to significant sites such as
ancestral burial grounds.157 The right to culture corresponds to the reality
that oftentimes groups are affected by environmental degradation. Neverthe-
less, individual decisions on migration affect the decisions of others, when
the land is able to sustain smaller groups of people, or when income divers-
ification and support from family members that migrated may allow them
to stay. It will therefore still be hard to determine which individuals are part
of the group that is entitled to protection.
The right to culture obliges States: (1) to refrain from interfering, directly
or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to take part in cultural life
(respect); (2) to take steps to prevent third parties from interfering in the right
to take part in cultural life (protect); and (3) to take appropriate legislative,
administrative, judicial, budgetary, promotional and other measures aimed
at the full realization of the right (fulfil). The CESCR has highlighted that:
‘States parties are obliged to [...] respect and protect cultural heritage of all groups
and communities, in particular the most disadvantaged and marginalized indi-
viduals and groups, in economic development and environmental policies and
programs.’158
The HRC has recognised that social and economic activities may be protected
as a part of culture, and, therefore, environmental harms that undermine such
activities may violate this right.159 In the decision in Bernard Ominayak and
the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada,160 the Committee recognised that Article
27 ICCPR protects the right of persons, in community with others, ‘to engage
in economic and social activities which are part of the culture of the commun-
ity to which they belong.’161 In this case, the Lubicon Lake Band, an abo-
157 Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 100.
158 For a more detailed analysis of the core obligations to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights see CESCR, General Comment No.
21, para 44 and 55. See also Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 100.
159 See for example HRC, General Comment No. 23.
160 HRC, Chief Bernard Ominayak and Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada 1990.
161 Ibid., para 32.2. However, in its individual opinion Mr. Nisuke Ando expressed his reserva-
tion to the categorical statement that recent developments have threatened the life of the
Lubicon Lake Band and constitute a violation of Article 27 as past history of mankind bears
out that technical development has brought about various changes to existing ways of life
and thus affected a culture sustained thereon.
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riginal band, alleged that their territory had been expropriated for private oil
and gas exploration, and that this had destroyed the environment, undermined
their economic base and threatened their survival as a people. The HRC issued
a decision that oil and gas exploration deprived the Band of its right to live
its traditional way of life and culture and thus violated Article 27 of the ICCPR.
In Länsman v. Finland162 the HRC placed limits on the protections of the
right to culture for reasons of economic development. In this case, an In-
digenous group of reindeer breeders of Sami ethnic origin in Finland brought
a complaint alleging that a government contract allowing a private company
to engage in stone quarrying in their traditional lands would disrupt their
traditional reindeer herding activities. The Committee held that:
‘The right to enjoy one’s culture cannot be determined in abstracto but has to be
placed in context. In this connection, the Committee observes that article 27 does
not only protect traditional means of livelihood of national minorities, as indicated
in the State party’s submission.’163
‘A State may understandably wish to encourage development or allow economic
activity by enterprises. The scope of its freedom to do so is not to be assessed by
reference to a margin of appreciation, but by reference to the obligations it has
undertaken in article 27.’164
Measures with a limited impact on the way of life are thus acceptable.
Measures that deny the right to culture are not allowed.165 Measures must
be taken ‘to ensure the effective participation of members of minority commun-
ities in decisions which affect them.’166
The best known example of how the right to culture is connected to en-
vironmental degradation is the 2005 petition presented by the Inuit
Circumpolar Conference against the United States of America before the
IACmHR.167 The petitioners claim that climate change has undermined their
traditional way of life and permanently damaged their culture.168 Among
other violations, the petitioners alleged that the United States was responsible
for the impact of climate change on the right to culture of the Inuit of the Cana-
162 HRC, Länsman et al. v. Finland 1994.
163 Ibid., para 9.3.
164 Ibid., para 9.4.
165 Ibid., para 9.4.
166 Ibid., para 9.5. See also Clark et al. 2007, p. 43 and 44.
167 IACmHR, Petition To The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief From
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused By Acts and Omissions of the United States
2005.
168 Ibid., para 35-67: ‘the deteriorating ice conditions, decreasing quantity and quality of snow,
unpredictable and unfamiliar weather, and a transfigured landscape have affected the Inuit’s
subsistence harvest, travel, safety, hunting, capacity to process and store food, capacity
to process hides, access to clean drinking water, health and diet, education, homes, cultural
sites, and communities.’
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dian and Alaskan Arctic under Article XIII of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man. On November 16th, 2006 the IACmHR, declared that:
‘the information provided does not enable [the IACmHR] to determine whether
the alleged facts would characterize a violation of rights protected by the
American Declaration.’169
The right to development
The relationship between environmentally forced migration and development
is very complex and understudied.170 Several studies have addressed parts
of the topic. Some have analysed the relationship between migration and the
Millennium Development Goals171 (hereafter: MDG’s) and others have studied
the effects of environmental degradation (such as climate change) on the
progress towards the MDG’s.172 The right to development173 is frequently
raised in the context of climate change however, partly because the preamble
of the UNFCCC makes an ambiguous reference to it.174 The Paris Agreement
Preamble also refers to the right to development. Gupta and Arts argue that:
‘the inclusion of the RtD [right to development] in the PA’s [Paris Agreement’s]
Preamble sets it higher than excluded elements certainly for those who have
accepted it under other international legal instruments and (b) that it is qualified
by the RtPSD [Right to Promote Sustainable Development] in the UNFCCC.’175
In the case of the Endorois against the Government of Kenya,176 the ACmHPR
clarified the scope of the right to development. The commission concluded
that the eviction of the Endorois community from their ancestral lands, without
provision for a durable solution in the form of proper relocation, violated,
inter alia, the right to development.177 The commission held that this right
169 Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 98 and 99. In 2013 another petition was filed to the IACmHR. In the
Petition to The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations
of the Rights of Arctic Athabaskan Peoples Resulting from Rapid Arctic Warming and
Melting caused by Emissions of Black Carbon by Canada, the petitioners claim that environ-
mental degradation violates their right to enjoy the benefits of their culture, their right to
property, and their right to health and well-being. This case still needs to be decided upon.
170 Milan, Areikat & Afifi 2011, p. 3 and 4.
171 Ibid., p. 13 and 14.
172 Gupta, Arts 2017 and Goodman et al. 2008.
173 ACHPR, Art. 22., Declaration on the Right to Development 1986, Brundtland Report, Art. 1,
clause 1, Declaration of the UN Rio Conference on Environment and Development 1992,
principle 1: ‘human beings are at the center of concerns for sustainable development. They
are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.’
174 Humphreys 2008, p. 73-78 and Scholtes, Hornidge 2009 for links between environmental
degradation and poverty.
175 Gupta, Arts 2017, para 2.1.
176 ACmHPR, Centre for Minority Rights Development Kenya and Minority Rights Group Inter-
national on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya 2010.
177 Kälin, Schrepfer 2013, p. 19.
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contains a procedural and a substantive element.178 States must fully inform
communities of the nature and consequences of the development process.179
States must adequately and effectively consult with them in a manner appro-
priate to the circumstances.180 And States must let them meaningfully parti-
cipate in all parts of the process of relevance to their lives, including in its
planning.181 Most notably, the commission draws from the right to develop-
ment the duty to obtain the free and informed consent of a community, in
accordance with its customs and traditions, if it will face a major impact on
its territory as a result of a development or investment project.182
The substantive part of the right to development is twofold. Development
processes should lead to the empowerment of a people and not be detrimental
to their choices, opportunities and wellbeing. A State is thus under a positive
obligation to improve the choices and capabilities of a community.183 As the
right to development will be violated if a development process negatively
impacts the wellbeing of a community, a second aspect of this right relates
to benefit-sharing.184 Communities that contribute to the development process
by giving up their lands not only have a right to just compensation for losses
suffered but also a right to receive an equitable share of the benefit of the
development process.185 In short, development processes should empower
pastoralist communities, and not be detrimental to their choices, opportunities
and wellbeing. This creates a positive obligation for authorities to improve
the choices and capabilities of a community.186 The case does not clarify to
what extent other communities may be recognized as ‘peoples’ within the
meaning of Article 22.187
A complication to the right to development is that the concept of sustain-
able development specifically limits the realization of some ‘rights’ to develop-
ment. For example, Principle 2 of the Declaration of the UN Rio Conference
on Environment and Development,188 notes the responsibility of States to
ensure that the sovereign right to resource exploitation does ‘not cause damage
to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.’ This implies limitation on carbon emissions and the damage it
potentially might cause by displacing vulnerable populations.189 Principle 3
178 ACmHPR, Centre for Minority Rights Development Kenya and Minority Rights Group Inter-
national on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya 2010, para 277.
179 Ibid., para 282 and 292.
180 Ibid., para 281 and 282.
181 Ibid., para 282 and 289.
182 Ibid., para 290-293.
183 Ibid., para 283.
184 Ibid., para 294.
185 Ibid., para 295-297. See also Kälin, Schrepfer 2013, p. 53.
186 Schrepfer, Caterina 2014, p. 29.
187 Kälin, Schrepfer 2013, p. 53.
188 Declaration of the UN Rio Conference on Environment and Development 1992.
189 Aghazarm, Laczko 2009, p. 409-411.
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of the Declaration of the UN Rio Conference on Environment and Development
indicates that the right to development ‘must be fulfilled so as to equitably
meet developmental and environmental needs of future generations.’ Again,
this requires that there be limits – for example, on emissions – that might
constrain the livelihoods of future generations: this could readily be construed
to include those who are compelled to migrate, and certainly those who remain
but whose livelihoods are depleted by the impacts of climate change on their
environments.190
The right to self-determination
The right to self-determination191 has especially been raised in the context
of low-lying SIDS. Sea level rise and extreme weather events are threatening
the habitability and, in the longer term, the territorial existence of a number
of low-lying island States. For example, McAdam applied the principle of self-
determination in the context of disappearing States, where she quoted Brownlie
on the right of self-determination: ‘at the core of the principle of self-deter-
mination “lies the right of a community which has a distinct character to have
this character reflected in the institutions of government under which it lives”.’
McAdam rightfully pointed out that this right does not give a community a
right to claim the land of an existing State if their own land is threatened.192
Equally, changes in the climate threaten to deprive indigenous peoples of their
traditional territories and sources of livelihood. Either of these impacts would
have implications for the right to self-determination.193 While there is no
clear precedence to follow, it is clear that insofar as climate change poses a
threat to the right of peoples to self-determination, States have a duty to take
positive action, individually and jointly, to address and avert this threat.194
While the right to self-determination is a collective right held by peoples
rather than individuals, its realization is an essential condition for the effective
enjoyment of individual human rights. The right to self-determination is a
fundamental principle of international law. The right to self-determination
is the only common human right stated in both of the two international Coven-
ants (ICESCR and the ICCPR), which stresses its importance to the international
community generally. Although the precise contours of the right to self-deter-
mination remain unclear, the Covenants explicitly state that it includes the
190 Ibid., p. 409-411.
191 ICCPR, Art. 11; ICESCR, Art. 11, ACHPR, Art. 20, 21, UN Charter, Art. 1, paragraph 2,
Art 55 and Art. 73, Declaration on the Right to Development 1986, Art. 1, para 2, Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous People 2007, Art. 3 and 4 CERD, General Recommendation
21 1996.
192 McAdam 2012, p. 147.
193 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights on the relationship between climate change and human rights,
para 40.
194 Ibid., para 39.
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right of all peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources,
and that in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence
and the obligation of a State party to promote the realization of the right to
self-determination, including for people living outside its territory.195
HRC General Comment No. 12 clarifies the right to self-determination as
to encompass the inalienable right of all peoples to freely ‘determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment.’196 It also affirms the right to ‘dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international
economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and inter-
national law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsist-
ence.’197 According to the Human Rights Committee (HRC) these State
obligations relate to ‘all peoples which have not been able to exercise or have
been deprived of the possibility of exercising their right to self-determination.’
All States parties to the Covenant should take positive action to facilitate
realization of and respect for the right of peoples to self-determination.198
The right to self-determination has been invoked on several occasions. The
Maldives have argued that Article 2 of the ICCPR imposes an obligation on
the international community to take positive action toward the realisation of
the right to self-determination, regardless of whether a people are located
within the territory or jurisdiction of a particular State. This is suggestive of
a positive obligation upon industrialised countries to protect the sovereignty
of Small Island States by taking meaningful action to cut greenhouse gases
before such States are rendered uninhabitable.199 The famous 2005 Inuit peti-
tion describes how climate change is affecting the Arctic environment on which
the Inuit depend and explains how the effects of climate change deprive them
of their means of subsistence in violation of their right to self-determina-
tion.200
The right to humanitarian assistance
When migration cannot be prevented humanitarian relief may be necessary
either in the form of an emergency response to a sudden disaster, or planned
in advance to accompany steady movements of migrants, or to assist resettle-
ment. Humanitarian relief should aim at ensuring the most basic rights of
environmentally induced migrants. Arguments have also been made that
victims of natural disasters can claim a right to humanitarian assistance when
195 Ibid., para 39.
196 HRC, General Comment No. 12 1984, para 2.
197 Ibid., para 5.
198 HRC, General Comment No. 12 1984, para 6.
199 Limon 2009, p. 456.
200 IACmHR, Petition To The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief From
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused By Acts and Omissions of the United States
2005, para 76, 92–93. See also Knox 2009, p. 31.
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in need pursuant to extant human rights.201 In its report to the Commission
on Human Rights the Representative of the Secretary-General, Deng, argued
that:
‘The right of internally displaced persons to request and receive protection and
assistance from their Government and the duty of their Government to provide
such services necessarily flow from the essential nature of the international law
of human rights as enshrined in the Article 1 (3) Charter of the United Nations,
the International Bill of Human Rights, and other universal and regional instru-
ments.’202
If the magnitude of the problem exceeds the States’ relief capabilities, it should:
‘call on the international community to perform these humanitarian functions. If,
however, a Government is unable or unwilling to provide these services and does
not request, or rejects, an offer of humanitarian relief by competent external organ-
izations, the questions arise whether internally displaced persons have a right under
international law to request and receive protection and assistance from the inter-
national community and/or international humanitarian and relief organizations
and whether the same have a right to obtain access to persons in need of protection
and assistance.’203
3.1.3 Procedural rights
As has been discussed before, the procedural rights play a central role in the
protection of human rights. Procedural human rights are well established under
both human rights law and international environmental law and policy.
Procedural human rights can help ensure respect for human rights and a more
effective response to specific vulnerabilities, and promote the empowerment
of affected persons as well as the full use of their capacities. Special Rapporteur
on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Beyani, emphasizes that
these procedural rights have a critical place in the context of climate change-
induced displacement, as individual and community resilience will largely
depend on the extent to which internally displaced persons are empowered
to adapt to change and included in decisions affecting their lives.204 Also
the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to
the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, Knox,
201 Kälin 2013, p. 128–129.
202 Economic and Social Council UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2, Compilation and analysis
of legal norms, 1995, para 361.
203 Ibid., See more in § 10.3.
204 UNGA Res. 66/285 2011, para 81. For a further analysis of procedural rights in the context
of climate change, see Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 38.
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has overseen an extensive research project to map the human rights obligations
relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment.
‘One of the most striking results of the mapping exercise is the agreement among
the sources reviewed that human rights law imposes certain procedural obligations
on States in relation to environmental protection. They include duties (a) to assess
environmental impacts and make environmental information public; (b) to facilitate
public participation in environmental decision-making, including by protecting
the rights of expression and association; and (c) to provide access to remedies for
harm.’205
These obligations have their bases in civil and political rights,206 but they
have been clarified and extended in the environmental context on the basis
of the entire range of human rights at risk from environmental harm.207
The first significant source is the Rio Declaration.208 Principle 10 refers
to access to information, participation in decision-making and access to justice.
This Principle received its fullest expression to date in the (European) 1998
Aarhus Convention.209 This Convention treaty is the first multilateral environ-
mental agreement that connects human rights with environmental conservation
and establishes comprehensive and binding standards in each of the three
procedural areas of its title. Many other texts emphasize the importance of
access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to
justice in environmental matters.210 In practice, the three elements work
together and depend on each other to be effective. Access to environmental
information is a prerequisite to public participation in decision-making.
The duty to assess environmental impacts and make environmental information public
The human right to information, as commonly codified in national legislation,
is helpful for informing people that they may be affected by environmental
degradation that may force them into migration. Informed people are better
205 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/25/53, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, 2013,
para 29.
206 UDHR, Art. 19 and ICCPR, Art. 19 state that the right to freedom of expression includes
the freedom “to seek, receive and impart information”. The right to participation in decision-
making is implied in ICCPR, Art. 25.
207 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/25/53, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, 2013,
para 29.
208 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio
Declaration) 1992.
209 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) 1998.
210 For an extensive analysis see Knox 2014. For an analysis of the consequences of the Aarhus
Convention in the field of European Union climate change law see Peeters, Nóbrega 2014.
See also Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 28.
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capable of taking decisions for themselves and possibly affect the decision-
making processes. The use of the right to information (as commonly codified
in national legislation) is however limited for environmental refugees. The
right to information only affirms the general public’s right to receive on request
information already held by public authorities. The right to information does
not extend to information that has not been collected.211 It is not a tool for
forcing governments into researching environmental degradation. However,
the Aarhus Convention contains a more far-reaching obligation, requiring States
to actively compile periodic reports on environmental risks, update them
systematically, and make them available to the public proactively.212 In
general, States are under a positive obligation to provide information for
special situations, such as industrial developments, granting permits, dangerous
activities and foreseeable threats to life. Most situations causing environmental-
ly forced migration will thus not oblige States to collect information and
making this information available to the public. Most of the information will
have to be actively requested, which in practice will prevent the most often
affected vulnerable people in developing countries from soliciting for informa-
tion.
Some human rights bodies have, in effect, closed the circle between the
(largely substantive) rights that are most likely to suffer environmental harm,
and the (largely procedural) rights whose implementation helps to ensure
environmental protection.213 The European Court has applied the principle
of access to information and remedies for harm to human rights amongst
others in the case Taşkin and others v. Turkey.214 The case concerned the
granting of permits to operate a gold mine in Ovacık. The applicants alleged
that, as a result of the Ovacık gold mine’s development and operations, they
had suffered and continued to suffer the effects of environmental damage;
specifically, these included the movement of people and noise pollution caused
by the use of machinery and explosives. In para 119 the Court considered:
‘Where a State must determine complex issues of environmental and economic
policy, the decision-making process must firstly involve appropriate investigations
and studies in order to allow them to predict and evaluate in advance the effects
of those activities which might damage the environment and infringe individuals’
rights and to enable them to strike a fair balance between the various conflicting
interests at stake.’215
211 Humphreys 2008, p. 50.
212 Aarhus Convention, Art. 5.
213 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/22/43, Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human
rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environ-
ment, 2012, para 40.
214 ECtHR, Taþkın and Others v. Turkey 2004.
215 Ibid., para 119.
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The Court emphasizes that: ‘the importance of public access to the conclusions
of such studies and to information which would enable members of the public
to assess the danger to which they are exposed is beyond question.’216
In the case of Öneryıldız v. Turkey,217 an explosion occurred on a muni-
cipal rubbish tip, killing thirty-nine people who had illegally built their
dwellings around it. The authorities had taken no action, although an expert
report had drawn the attention of the municipal authorities to the danger of
a methane explosion at the tip two years before the accident. The Court
criticised the authorities for not informing those living next to the tip of the
risks they were running by living there.218 In the context of dangerous activ-
ities, the State is under a positive obligation to safeguard life through putting
in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide
effective deterrence against threats to the right to life […].219 The Court con-
siders that:
‘Among these preventive measures, particular emphasis should be placed on the
public’s right to information, as established in the case-law of the Convention
institutions. The Grand Chamber agrees with the Chamber (see paragraph 84 of
the Chamber judgment) that this right, which has already been recognised under
Article 8 (see Guerra and Others, cited above, p. 228, § 60), may also, in principle,
be relied on for the protection of the right to life, particularly as this interpretation
is supported by current developments in European standards.’220
The Court considered that:
‘the knowledge necessary to elucidate facts such as those in issue in the instant
case is often in the sole hands of State officials or authorities. It thus held that, in
relation to fatal accidents arising out of dangerous activities which fall within the
responsibility of the State, Article 2 requires the authorities to carry out of their
own motion an investigation, satisfying certain minimum conditions, into the cause
of the loss of life.’221
The ACmHPR has explained the right to health and the right to a general satis-
factory environment to include:
216 Ibid., para 119.
217 See also § 3.1.2 right to life and right to property.
218 ECtHR, Öneryildiz v. Turkey 2004, para 73.
219 Ibid., para 89.
220 Ibid., para 90. The State has an obligation to inform the public about potential environmental
risks deriving from natural phenomena or human activities that could potentially affect
the right to private life and home Article 8 and to the right to life Article 2. This State’s
duty is not stemming from the freedom to receive information as this freedom cannot be
interpreted as imposing a general obligation to collect and disseminate information on
domestic authorities. Rather, this obligation represents a particular aspect of Articles 2 and
8 of the Convention.
221 Ibid., para 149.
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‘ordering or at least permitting independent scientific monitoring of threatened
environments, requiring and publicising environmental and social impact studies
prior to any major industrial development, undertaking appropriate monitoring
and providing information to those communities exposed to hazardous materials
and activities and providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard
and to participate in the development decisions affecting their communities’.
[emphasis added]222
In the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) case,223 Ar-
gentina brought a claim against Uruguay for breaching a long-standing bi-
lateral agreement by permitting the construction of water-polluting pulp mills
on the Uruguay River.224 The ICJ considered that:
‘the obligation to protect and preserve, under Article 41 (a) of the Statute, has to
be interpreted in accordance with a practice, which in recent years has gained so
much acceptance among States that it may now be considered a requirement under
general international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment where there
is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact
in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource. Moreover, due
diligence, and the duty of vigilance and prevention which it implies, would not
be considered to have been exercised, if a party planning works liable to affect
the régime of the river or the quality of its waters did not undertake an environ-
mental impact assessment on the potential effects of such works.’ [emphasis
added]225
The ICJ recognized that the lack of undertaking an environmental impact
assessment where there was a risk that the proposed industrial activity might
have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, would imply
lack of due diligence, and of the duty of vigilance and prevention.226 The
ICJ also observed that:
‘neither the 1975 Statute nor general international law specify the scope and content
of an environmental impact assessment. [...] Consequently, it is the view of the
Court that it is for each State to determine in its domestic legislation or in the
authorization process for the project, the specific content of the environmental
impact assessment required in each case, having regard to the nature and magnitude
of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the environment
as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment.
The Court also considers that an environmental impact assessment must be con-
ducted prior to the implementation of a project. Moreover, once operations have
222 ACmHPR, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria 2001, para 53.
223 ICJ, Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Argentina v. Uruguay 2010.
224 See also § 7.2.1.
225 Ibid., para 104.
226 See also § 7.3.1.
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started and, where necessary, throughout the life of the project, continuous
monitoring of its effects on the environment shall be undertaken.’227
The duty to facilitate public participation in environmental decision-making
In the context of environmentally forced migration, public participation228
implies that people (possible)affected by environmental degradation have a
say in the decision-making process and to either prevent forced migration or
to involve the people affected in the decision-making process of their re-
location.229 The term ‘public participation’ means the availability of opportun-
ities for individuals, groups and organizations to provide input in the making
of decisions which have, or are likely to have, an impact on the environment,
including in the enactment of laws, the enforcement of national laws, policies,
and guidelines, and Environmental Impact Assessment procedures.230 By
itself, the requirement of consultation leaves the final decision to the State.
The parties to the Aarhus Convention, recognize in the preamble that:
‘in the field of the environment, improved access to information and public parti-
cipation in decision-making enhance the quality and the implementation of de-
cisions, contribute to public awareness of environmental issues, give the public
the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public authorities to take due
account of such concerns.’
In Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention the conditions for public participation
in decisions on specific activities are specified. Paragraph 2 explicitly mentions
the duty to provide the public with the information necessary for their public
participation in the decision-making. Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention
dictates that:
‘Each Party shall make appropriate practical and/or other provisions for the public
to participate during the preparation of plans and programmes relating to the
environment, within a transparent and fair framework, having provided the
necessary information to the public.’
Article 8 of the Aarhus Convention dictates that:
‘Each Party shall strive to promote effective public participation at an appropriate
stage, and while options are still open, during the preparation by public authorities
227 Ibid., para 105.
228 UDHR, Art. 21, ICCPR, Art. 25. The need for public participation is also reflected in many
international environmental instruments, for example Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration,
Art. 6-8 of the Aarhus Convention, and several topic specific treaties, such as the Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants Art. 10, the Convention on Biological Diversity
Art.141, the UNCCD Art. 3 and 5, and the UNFCCC Art. 6a.
229 Humphreys 2008, p. 49-55.
230 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 79 para 5.
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of executive regulations and other generally applicable legally binding rules that
may have a significant effect on the environment.‘
In the context of climate change, States have long emphasized the importance
of public participation. Article 6 (a) of the UNFCCC requires its parties to
promote and facilitate public participation, and the UNGA has recognized:
‘the need to engage a broad range of stakeholders at the global, regional, national
and local levels, including national, subnational and local governments, private
businesses and civil society, and including youth and persons with disabilities,
and that gender equality and the effective participation of women and indigenous
peoples are important for effective action on all aspects of climate change. Similarly,
Article 12 of the Paris Agreement requires its parties to cooperate in taking appro-
priate measures to enhance public participation.’231
Human rights bodies have built on Article 21 UDHR and Article 25 ICCPR in
the environmental context, elaborating a duty to facilitate public participation
in environmental decision-making in order to safeguard a wide spectrum of
rights from environmental harm.232 Regional human rights tribunals agree
that individuals should have meaningful opportunities to participate in de-
cisions concerning their environment.233 For example, in the Maya Indigenous
Community case,234 the Commission found that Belize had violated the com-
munity’s right to property by failing to consult with it before granting oil and
logging concessions.235 The Commission’s country reports have sometimes
referred to the need to obtain prior consent from the affected communities
without making clear whether consent was an absolute requirement.236
As has been analysed by Knox, the IACmHR’s country reports have em-
phasized the importance of prior consultation with the affected communities
before States may allow development of natural resources.237 The IACtHR
231 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/31/52, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, 2016,
para 57.
232 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/25/53, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, 2013,
para 36.
233 Ibid., para 37.
234 IACmHR, Report on the Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District 2004.
235 Ibid., para 132.
236 The ILO Convention on the Rights of Indigenous People, Art. 152 requires states to consult
with indigenous peoples before exploiting resources pertaining to their lands, but it does
not require states to obtain their consent. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
People, Art. 322 ‘States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous
peoples concerned in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval
of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources.’, is stronger on this
point, although it may still fall short of stating a clear requirement of consent.
237 Knox 2009, p. 186.
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clarified whether consent is necessary in the Saramaka People v. Suriname
case.238 It held that although the protection of the right to property is not
absolute and should not be construed to prevent the State from granting any
concession at all for the extraction of natural resources within Saramaka
territory,239 the State must ensure that any restriction on the community’s
right to property does not deny their survival as a tribal people.240 To that
end, the State must consult with the community regarding any proposed
concessions or other activities that may affect their lands and natural resources,
ensure that no concession will be issued without a prior assessment of its
environmental and social impacts, and guarantee that the community receives
a reasonable benefit from any such plan if approved.241 Moreover, with
respect to large-scale development or investment projects that would have
a major impact within Saramaka territory, the State must obtain their free,
prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and traditions.242
As Rombouts pointed out, the Inter-American Human Rights Court and
Commission respectively ‘stress the need for effective mechanisms for the
participation of indigenous peoples and indicate the necessity to consult and
under certain conditions obtain consent from indigenous peoples in relation
to decisions that affect them through culturally appropriate processes.‘243
The ACmHPR has affirmed this view in a decision concerning the Endorois
community in Kenya).244
So far, no treaty body has explicitly clarified whether or not ‘free, prior
and informed consent‘ (hereafter: FPIC) provides ‘a veto power’ to the affected
community. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indi-
genous Peoples has taken the approach of emphasizing a meaningful consulta-
tion process with the aim of reaching consent rather than a veto power per
se.245 The CESCR has also stressed the significance of consent concerning
indigenous peoples and land, particularly in the context of forced eviction
due to commercial projects.246 According to Kanosue, States’ obligation to
seek FPIC means that:
238 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname 2007, para 172.
239 Ibid., para 126-127.
240 Ibid., para 128.
241 Ibid., para 129.
242 Ibid., para 134. See also Knox 2009, p. 186. FPIC is present in a variety of different inter-
national legal documents and is a key principle that guides decision-making processes
between indigenous peoples and other actors. For an extensive analysis see Rombouts 2014.
243 Rombouts 2014, p. 22.
244 ACmHPR, Centre for Minority Rights Development Kenya and Minority Rights Group Inter-
national on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 2010. See also § 3.1.2 the right to
development.
245 Kanosue 2015, p. 652.
246 Ibid., p. 652.
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‘governments are required to ensure an environment where consent is freely made
with adequate information and understanding. This in turn requires them to ensure
that other relevant rights are adequately respected and protected. Such responsibil-
ities include ensuring access to relevant information and protecting those suffering
abuse and intimidation in relation to their efforts to claim their rights. In other
words, states’ obligations to seek FPIC cannot be discussed in isolation from other
relevant rights critical to making the consent “free” and “informed”.’247
In practice, the ability of affected people to actually participate in the decision-
making is seriously hindered by the complexity of factors causing environ-
mental degradation. On top of that the people affected are generally the most
poor and vulnerable people, who are generally limited in their ability to
participate in decision-making.
The duty to provide access to remedies for harm
From the UDHR onward, human rights agreements have established the prin-
ciple that States should provide for an ‘effective remedy’ for violations of their
protected rights. Most human rights agreements have established the principle
that States should provide for an ‘effective remedy’ for violations of their
protected rights. International environmental instruments contain more specific
obligations.248 ‘Access to Justice’ refers to effective judicial and administrative
remedies and procedures available to a person (natural or legal) who is
aggrieved or likely to be aggrieved by environmental harm. The term includes
not only (a) the procedural right of appearing before an appropriate body but
also (b) the substantive right of redress for harm done.249 The right to
adequate and effective remedies, has been established in Article 9(4) Aarhus
Convention. This right is also supported by the more general right to a fair
trial.250
At the regional level, human rights bodies have applied the principle of
access to remedies for harm to human rights infringed by environmental harm.
On the procedural right, the European Court has stated in the case Taşkin
and Others v. Turkey251 that individuals must: ‘be able to appeal to the courts
247 Ibid., p. 644.
248 For example, Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration states: ‘Effective access to judicial and
administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.’ Many
environmental treaties establish obligations for States to provide for remedies in specific
areas, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Art. 235. Some agree-
ments even establish detailed liability regimes; such as the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. See UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/25/53 2013, para
43.
249 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 79 para 6.
250 Art. 14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Art. 10 UDHR, Art. 6 ECHR,
Art. 8 American Convention on Human Rights and Art. 18 American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man.
251 ECtHR, Taþkın and Others v. Turkey 2004. See also § 3.1.3 the duty to assess environmental
information.
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against any decision, act or omission where they consider that their interests
or their comments have not been given sufficient weight in the decision-making
process.’252 In the IACtHR Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Commun-
ity v. Nicaragua253 the Court concludes that there is no effective procedure
in Nicaragua for delimitation, demarcation, and titling of indigenous communal
lands.254 The Court also finds a violation of the Right to Judicial Protection:
‘The Court has also reiterated that the right of every person to simple and rapid
remedy or to any other effective remedy before the competent judges or courts,
to protect them against acts which violate their fundamental rights, “is one of the
basic mainstays, not only of the American Convention, but also of the Rule of Law
in a democratic society, in the sense set forth in the Convention”.’255
This protection must be effective.256 As such, ‘the State has the responsibility
to designate an effective remedy and to reflect it in norms, as well as to ensure
due application of that remedy by its judicial authorities.’257
The ACmHPR gives an indication on the difficulties for determining the scale
of the damage and the scope of people that are eligible for compensation.258
In the Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria case259 the Com-
mission holds that the Plaintiff failed to identify a single victim to whom the
requested pecuniary compensation could be awarded, even though the con-
tinuous environmental degradation in the Niger Delta Region produced
devastating impact on the livelihood of the population; that may have forced
some people to leave their area of residence in search for better living con-
ditions and may even have caused health problems.260 It further considers
that:
252 Ibid., para 119.
253 IACtHR, Mayagna Sumo Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua 2001 sometimes referred to
as: the Awas Tingni Mayagna Sumo Community v. Nicaragua Case. See also § 3.1.4 indi-
genous peoples and vulnerable groups.
254 Ibid., para 127.
255 Ibid., para 112.
256 Ibid., para 114.See also Ammer et al. 2010, p. 48.
257 Ibid., para 135.
258 ACmHPR, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria 2001, para 53. ‘Government
compliance with the spirit of Article 16 and Article 24 of the African Charter must also
include ordering or at least permitting independent scientific monitoring of threatened
environments, requiring and publicising environmental and social impact studies prior
to any major industrial development, undertaking appropriate monitoring and providing
information to those communities exposed to hazardous materials and activities and
providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to participate in the
development decisions affecting their communities.’
259 The Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS Court
of Justice), SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 2012.
260 Ibid., para 114.
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‘if the pecuniary compensation was to be granted to individual victims, a serious
problem could arise in terms of justice, morality and equity: within a very large
population, what would be the criteria to identify the victims that deserve com-
pensation? Why compensate someone and not compensate his neighbour? Based
on which criteria should be determined the amount each victim would receive?
Who would manage that one Billion Dollars?’261
The Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States
establishes that the obligation of granting relief for the violation of human
rights is a universally accepted principle.262 The Court decides as a general
rule that: ‘in case of human rights violations that affect indetermined number
of victims or a very large population, as in the instant case, the compensation
shall come not as an individual pecuniary advantage, but as a collective benefit
adequate to repair, as completely as possible, the collective harm that a viola-
tion of a collective right causes.’263 Also in the Yakye Axa Indigenous Com-
munity vs Paraguay case, the IACtHR granted reparations to the community
as a whole.264
For procedural rights in general, it can be concluded that if a State follows
its procedural obligations, its decisions as to how to strike the balance between
environmental protection and other interests receives deference. However,
human rights law protects a core of rights that society cannot decide to violate,
even if it does so through an inclusive, informed process , if environmental
harm to human rights were severe enough, it could give rise to duties that
States could not avoid, even if their decisions to allow such harm met all
procedural requirements. As a critical note, Boyle pointed out that the tribunals
have not always defined these standards clearly. Courts are well-suited to
safeguard procedural rights, but may lack the resources and expertise, as well
as the political mandate, to determine specific levels of environmental pro-
tection.265
3.1.4 Vulnerable groups
The HRC has recognized in various resolutions266 that environmental damage
is felt most acutely by those segments of the population already in vulnerable
situations. Environmental degradation can multiply existing vulnerabilities
and create new ones, the ‘multiplier effect’.267 For example, although climate
261 Ibid., para 115.
262 Ibid., para 118.
263 Ibid., para 116.
264 IACtHR, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 2005, para 188.
265 Knox 2009, p. 191 and 192.
266 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/RES/16/11 2011 and UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 2009.
267 See for example Environmental Justice Foundation 2009, p. 2 and UNHCR 2012, p. 26.
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change affects the entire world, the impacts or human costs vary widely. The
most vulnerable to changes in climate are developing countries where large
sections of the population live directly from agriculture and many of these
from subsistence farming. Wyman stated that:
‘Within developing countries, the people most likely to be affected by climate
change probably will be those who are impoverished. Poverty is associated with
greater dependence on climate sensitive resources such as local water and food
supplies. Poverty reduces resilience to environmental change. It also makes it more
difficult for persons to migrate, especially internationally, because migration is
facilitated by access to financial resources.’268
According to the Human Development Report, people living in urban slums
in low and medium Human Development Index countries face the greatest
risk from extreme weather events and rising sea levels, caused by a combina-
tion of high exposure and inadequate protective infrastructure and services.269
Particularly vulnerable to climate change are SIDS due to their small physical
size, exposure to natural disasters and climate extremes, very open economies,
and low adaptive capacity.270 The risk of injury and death from floods, high
winds and landslides has been systematically higher among children, women
and the elderly, especially the poor. Indigenous peoples may be especially
susceptible due to their connection to ecosystems as a place of ancestry, ident-
ity, language, livelihood and community. The High Commissioner for Human
Rights calls for special attention for the effects of climate change on women,
children, indigenous peoples and internally displaced persons.271 In response
to concerns about the unequal impact of climate change on vulnerable popula-
tions, the OHCHR has emphasized that ‘under international human rights law,
States are legally bound to address such vulnerabilities in accordance with
the principle of equality and non-discrimination.’272
As environmentally forced migrants are often part of vulnerable groups,
this can add a layer of protection to the human rights protection in general.273
268 Wyman 2013, p. 173 and 174.
269 Adelman, Ivaschenko 2014, p. 6.
270 McAdam 2011.
271 See UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 2009, para 42-60.
272 Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 30.
273 See for example a note by the Secretary-General on the Right of everyone to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health: ‘Whereas the right to water
applies to everyone, States parties should give special attention to those individuals and
groups who have traditionally faced difficulties in exercising this right, including women,
children, minority groups, indigenous peoples, refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced
persons, migrant workers, prisoners and detainees. In particular, States parties should take
steps to ensure that: (a) Women are not excluded from decision-making processes concerning
water resources and entitlements. The disproportionate burden women bear in the collection
of water should be alleviated.’ Similarly, the Special Rapporteur on the right to health has
stated that ‘even though women bear a disproportionate burden in the collection of water
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By framing environmentally forced migration as a breach of the rights of
vulnerable groups and minorities, States may be required to take positive
measures to help those categories of persons based on the well-established
principles of non-discrimination, as special protections for vulnerable groups
may be required for them to exercise their rights fully and equally with the
rest of the population (preferential treatment).274 In January 2018, the Special
Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment
of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment in consultation with
Governments, human rights mechanisms, civil society organizations and others
drafted 16 Framework Principles. Principle 14 urges States to ‘take additional
measures to protect the rights of those who are most vulnerable to, or at
particular risk from, environmental harm, taking into account their needs, risks
and capacities’. As an example of potential vulnerability it refers to natural
disasters and other types of environmental harm that ‘often cause internal
displacement and transboundary migration, which can exacerbate vulnerabil-
ities and lead to additional human rights violations and abuses.’275 This para-
graph gives a short overview for three important vulnerable populations and
minorities affected by environmentally induced migration: women, children
and indigenous peoples.
Women
Gender dimensions of natural disasters have gained increasing recognition
at the international level since the 1990s.276 Women are typically more vulner-
able than men to the effects of environmental degradation and forced migra-
tion, not only because of biological and physiological differences, but also
because of inequalities between women and men in the community, in the
economy, and before the law.277 As Acar and Ege pointed out:
‘Natural disasters and their aftermaths, create anxiety, insecurity, disruption of
normal life activities, scarcity of resources and/or inability to access existing
resources, make life harder for communities. Weaker, dependent and subordinate
and disposal of family wastewater, they are often excluded from relevant decision-making
processes. States should therefore take measures to ensure that women are not excluded
from decision-making processes concerning water and sanitation management.’ UNGA
UN Doc A/62/214 2007, para 84.
274 In the words of the CESCR, ‘States parties may be, and in some cases are, under an obliga-
tion to adopt special measures to attenuate or suppress conditions that perpetuate discrim-
ination’ Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 30.
275 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/37/59, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human
rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environ-
ment, 24 January 2018.
276 Ferris, Petz & Stark 2012, p. 73.
277 Vulnerability is exacerbated by factors such as unequal rights to property, exclusion from
decision-making and difficulties in accessing information and financial services. Ferris, Petz
& Stark 2012, p. 67 and 77.
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groups often have to bear the worst of the catastrophe. Such groups are likely to
suffer more from both the direct consequences of the natural disaster because they
are less well-informed, less wellprepared and less well-protected, and also from
its indirect impact in public and private life as the disaster is transferred and
compounded via economic, social, political and family relationships.’278
Rural women are particularly affected by effects on agriculture and deteriorat-
ing living conditions in rural areas.279 While risk factors are often pre-existing,
the disaster itself and its relief operations can exacerbate gender-based violence
occurrence.280 Due to their particular situation,281 responses to environ-
mental degradation should be considerate of the situation of women.
Special instruments have been developed for the protection of women in
the context of environmental degradation. In general, the Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence against Women, urges States ‘to pursue by all appropri-
ate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against
women’.282 More specific instrument, such as the Hyogo Framework for
Action and its successor the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
2015-2030 state that: ‘A gender perspective should be integrated into all disaster
risk management policies, plans and decision making processes, including
those related to risk assessment, early warning, information management and
education and training.’ In addition, the Beijing Agenda for Global Action on
Gender Sensitive Disaster Risk Reduction, calls for gender-sensitive approaches
to disaster prevention, mitigation and recovery strategies and natural disaster
assistance.283 The IASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons
in Situations of Disasters refers specifically to the protection of women (and
children).284 Also on the regional level, instruments were developed to protect
women against gender based violence.285 Many UN agencies and organiza-
tions have also developed guidelines and manuals for a gender-based approach
278 Acar, Ege 2001, p. 2.
279 Raworth 2008, p. 7.
280 Le-Ngoc 2015, p. 1.
281 For practical examples of vulnerability of women before, during and after disasters, see
Ibid., p. 7-14. For a Compilation of CEDAW Statements on Climate in 2018 see CIEL & GI-
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DEVAW, 20 December 1993, Art. 4.
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285 Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa, Art 11 African Protocol on Rights
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women and domestic violence, preamble European Convention on Violence Against Women,
African Union Convention on Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons
in Africa Kampala Convention, Art. 91d; the ACHR recognizes the right to life and to
humane treatment to all persons without discrimination based on sex, and the Inter-Ameri-
can Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women
specifically addresses the issue of violence against women, see Le-Ngoc 2015, p. 4.
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to disaster management.286 For example, the Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women has emphasized that States should ensure
that public participation in environmental decision-making, including with
respect to climate policy, includes the concerns and participation of women.287
The challenges lie in translating policy into effective practice.288
After the 2010 Haiti earthquake, there was an epidemic rise of sexual
violence faced by women and girls living in camps. On 22 December 2010,
the IACmHR granted precautionary measures.289 The decision required the
Haitian government to investigate and document the sexual abuse in the
displacement camps and to adopt a series of measures including: providing
medical and psychological services to victims of sexual violence, implementing
effective security measures, ensuring the training of public agents on how to
adequately respond to sexual violence complaints, promoting the creation of
special units within police forces in charge of investigating violence against
women, and ensuring women’s groups full participation and leadership in
planning and implementing policies to fight and prevent violence in camps.290
As Le-Gnoc pointed out:
‘This decision set a new precedent. It was the first time the IACHR [IACmHR] granted
precautionary measures to protect a group of unnamed women instead of specific
individuals. The decision also recognized that a State could be held accountable
for violence perpetrated by a third party because of the government’s failure to
prevent and act diligently to ensure security and prosecute perpetrators of violence.
It also highlighted the shared responsibility of the international community in post-
disaster settings.’291
It remains to be seen if granting precautionary measures to unnamed groups
of persons can develop into a customary law that would allow for the pro-
tection of vulnerable groups in the context of environmental degradation, such
as disasters.
286 Ferris, Petz & Stark 2012. See also the IASC Gender Handbook for Humanitarian Action
2017, the IASC Gender-based Violence GBV Guidelines 2015, and the Cancun Adaptation
Framework 2010, para 12.
287 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW/C/GC/37, gen-
eral recommendation No. 37 on Gender-related dimensions of disaster risk reduction in
the context of climate change, 2018, para 25 and 26. See also a report by the Independent
Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean,
healthy and sustainable environment, John H. Knox.
288 See also Ferris, Petz & Stark 2012.
289 Le-Ngoc 2015, p. 14 and 15.
290 Ibid., p. 14 and 15.
291 Ibid., p. 15.
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Children
Children are broadly recognised as a group entitled to extra protection.292
Studies show that climate change will exacerbate existing health risks and
undermine support structures that protect children from harm.293 The OHCHR
has examined the impacts of climate change on children and the related human
rights obligations and responsibilities of States and other actors, including the
elements of a child rights-based approach to climate change policies. It con-
cludes that children are disproportionately affected by changes in their environ-
ment, due to their unique metabolism, physiology and developmental needs.
Children in vulnerable situations are disproportionately affected.294 Overall,
the health burden of environmental degradation, and climate change in particu-
lar, will primarily be borne by children in the developing world. The Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights pointed out that:
‘For example, extreme weather events and increased water stress already constitute
leading causes of malnutrition and infant and child mortality and morbidity.
Likewise, increased stress on livelihoods will make it more difficult for children
to attend school. Girls will be particularly affected as traditional household chores,
such as collecting firewood and water, require more time and energy when supplies
are scarce. Moreover, children have a higher mortality rate as a result of weather-
related disasters.’295
The importance of children’s rights in the context of climate change is also
explicitly recognized in the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC, in which States
are called on to respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on,
among other things, the rights of the child and intergenerational equity when
taking action to address climate change.296
The CRC can be applied in the context of environmentally forced migra-
tion.297 It contains Articles on the right to health, the right to adequate nutri-
292 CRPD, Art 11; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art. 23 and 25.
293 For example Goodman et al. 2008 and Raworth 2008, p. 7 and 8.
294 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/35/13 2017, para 4. Changes in temperature, air and water quality
and nutrition are likely to have more severe and long-term impacts on children’s health,
development and well-being. Young children, because of their less developed physiology
and immune systems, will experience most intensely the effects of climate change-related
stresses. During childhood, alterations to the social and physical environment can have
far-reaching implications for children’s long-term physical and mental health and overall
quality of life. See also, para 6.
295 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 2009, para 48.
296 This is also reflected in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and
the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for
Development.
297 For an extensive analysis on the obligations of the CRC in the context of a healthy environ-
ment see: UNGA UN Doc , A/HRC/37/58, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue
of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustain-
able environment, 24 January 2018.
108 Chapter 3
tious food and clean drinking water, the prevention of accidents and the risks
of environmental pollution, and in the promotion of education designed to
develop respect for the natural environment. It also contains a protection
against discrimination.298 As discussed above, this may require positive dis-
crimination measures. In all decisions regarding children, the best interests
of the child, needs to be a guiding concern.299 States are held to promote
the child’s right to life, survival and development to the maximum extent poss-
ible300 and to respect the views of the child and the involvement of children
in decisions affecting their lives.301 The CRC also contains a right to (access
to) adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking water, taking into considera-
tion the dangers and risks of environmental pollution.302 Finally, all segments
of society, in particular parents and children, are to be informed, have access
to education and are supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health
and nutrition, environmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents.303
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights concludes that
impacts of climate change outlined undermine the effective enjoyment of the
rights enshrined in the CRC, including the rights to life, survival and develop-
ment,304 family relations and not to be separated from one’s parents against
one’s will,305 the highest attainable standard of health,306 adequate standard
of living,307 education,308 freedom from any form of violence or exploita-
tion,309 recreation and play310 and the enjoyment of one’s culture.311
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has identified four general
principles of a child rights-based approach to climate change: (a) As climate
policies and programmes are formulated, the main objective should be to fulfil
human rights, taking into account the specific risks faced by children, their
unique developmental needs, identification of their best interests and incorpor-
ation of their views, in accordance with their evolving capacities; (b) Children’s
participation in relevant decision-making processes, including those related
to climate adaptation and mitigation policies, must be ensured; (c) The obliga-
tions and responsibilities of duty bearers, such as States and private actors,
must be clarified; (d) Principles and standards derived from international
298 CRC, Art. 2.
299 Ibid., Art. 3.
300 Ibid., Art. 6.
301 Ibid., Art. 12.
302 Ibid., Art. 24, 2c.
303 Ibid., Art. 24, 2e.
304 Ibid., Art. 6.
305 Ibid., Art. 9-10.
306 Ibid., Art. 24.
307 Ibid., Art. 27.
308 Ibid., Art. 28.
309 Ibid., Art. 19, 32 and 34-36.
310 Ibid., Art. 31.
311 Ibid., Art. 30 and UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 2009, para 29.
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human rights law, especially the UDHR and the core universal human rights
treaties, should guide all policies and programming.312 National precedents
have demonstrated the potential role of the judicial system in protecting
children from harmful activities, including those that contribute to climate
change the State had an intergenerational responsibility to maintain a clean
environment.313
As Arts pointed out: ‘children’s rights [are] an important point of departure
both for conceptualising obligations, responsibilities and responses to climate
change, and for operationalising adaptation and mitigation measures.’ Within
the CRC, there is a strong emphasis on the need for international cooperation.
Therefore, it
‘formulates relatively clear obligations in this regard. At the end of the Preamble,
international cooperation is broadly recognised as important “for improving the
living conditions of children in every country, in particular in the developing
countries”.’314
The CRC may therefore be used to support the arguments for positive extra-
territorial State obligations.315
Indigenous peoples and vulnerable groups
As indigenous people often live off the land, environmental degradation has
a strong impact on their lives.316 When forced into migration, their way of
312 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 2009, para 32. For recommendations on the protection of
children in the context of climate change, see para 62.
313 See for example Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environmental and Natural
Resources. In this case a group of children, including those of renowned environmental
activist Antonio Oposa, brought this lawsuit in conjunction with the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. a non-profit organisation to stop the destruction of the fast disappearing
rain forests in their country. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the children, and made
several ground breaking and powerful statements, finding: The right to a clean environment,
to exist from the land, and to provide for future generations are fundamental. There is an
intergenerational responsibility to maintain a clean environment, meaning each generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that environment, and children may sue to
enforce that right on behalf of both their generation and future generations. In Juliana v.
United States, a group of 21 plaintiffs between the ages of 9 and 20 have filed suit against
the federal Government alleging that inadequate climate change mitigation measures
constitute a violation of their constitutional rights to life, liberty and property, among others.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the government’s failure to control CO2 emissions constituted
a violation of their constitutional right to equal protection before the law, as they were
being denied the fundamental rights afforded to prior and present generations. See also
Arts, Scheltema 2019, p. 76 and 77.
314 Arts 2019, p. 222.
315 See § 10.3.
316 Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 23. See also, Knox 2013.
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life and culture and possibly development are threatened.317 Indigenous
people318 are entitled to both individual rights as collective/group rights
that are essential to their existence (for example the right to self-determina-
tion,319 the right to self-management of their lands and natural resources,
and right to culture.320 Numerous instruments touch on the topic of indi-
genous peoples.321 The ILO Convention on the Rights of Indigenous People
and United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereafter:
UNDRIP) provide for a right to the conservation and protection of the environ-
ment of indigenous territories322 and a right to ‘own, use, develop and con-
trol’ the lands they currently possess.323 The ILO Convention on the Rights
of Indigenous People (Article 10) and UNDRIP call for: ‘effective mechanisms
for prevention of, and redress for‘ actions that: deprive indigenous commun-
ities of their ‘integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic
identities,’ dispossess them of their territories or resources, or force them to
move, assimilate, or integrate. States have the obligation to protect indigenous
people and other groups and communities with special attachment to and
dependency on their lands due to their particular culture and spiritual values
(such as minorities, peasants and pastoralists) from being displaced from these
lands. Articles 13 to 19 of the ILO Convention on the Rights of Indigenous
People deal with land issues in relation to indigenous and tribal peoples in
317 See for example UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/15/37, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya,
19 July 2010, para 71, or UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya. Extractive industries operating within
or near indigenous territories, 11 July 2011, para 57, or Raworth 2008, p. 7.
318 The scope of the term indigenous peoples is not completely clear. The IACtHR has not
provided an exhaustive definition, but it has emphasized that self-identification is important,
and has offered ‘characteristics that it finds significant: peoples who possess “social, cultural
and economic traditions different from other sections of the national community”, who
“identify themselves with their ancestral territories”, and who “regulate themselves, at
least partially, by their own norms, customs, and traditions”.’ In addition, when several
of these characteristics are demonstrated, the Court has considered certain ‘tribal’
populations to be equivalent to indigenous groups. In Antkowiak 2014.
319 In Art. 22 of the ACHPR, the collective right of ‘peoples to their economic, social and
cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal
enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind’ is acknowledged.
320 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 38 and Humphreys 2008, p. 17 and 18.
321 For example, the ILO Convention on the Rights of Indigenous People, Art. 29 c and d, CRC
Art. 30, UDHR, the ICESCR, the ICCPR, CERD, the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Art. 8 j, and Agenda 21, in particular chapter 26; and Part I, all recognise rights for indi-
genous peoples and the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention No.107, 1957. See
also the preamble and Art. 3 of the UNFCCC; and Art. 10 2 e of the UNCCD. Also para
20 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference
on Human Rights in 1993, states that States should take concerted positive steps to ensure
respect for all human rights of indigenous people, on the basis of non-discrimination.
322 ILO Convention on the Rights of Indigenous People, Art. 15 and UNDRIP, Art. 29. See
also Lewis 2012, p. 39.
323 Art. 26 UNDRIP.
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independent countries. Article 16 of the ILO Convention on the Rights of
Indigenous People dictates that: (1) when indigenous peoples are forced from
their lands. It provides, in part: ,these peoples shall have the right to return
to their traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist
whenever possible; (2) when such return is not possible these peoples shall
be provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least
equal to that of the lands previously occupied by them, suitable to provide
for their present needs and future development. The Kampala Convention
further requires states to ‘take all appropriate measures, whenever possible,
to restore the lands of communities with special dependency and attachment
to such lands upon the communities’ return, reintegration, and reinsertion.’324
Only compelling and overriding public interests can justify their displace-
ment.325 Relocation is allowed where considered necessary as an exceptional
measure.326 It has become a generally accepted principle in international law
that indigenous peoples should be consulted in any decisions affecting
them.327
The IACmHR and IACtHR have decided on several cases of indigenous and
tribal people. The Yanomami v. Brazil case,328 is one of the first reports in
which the IACmHR outlined the doctrine on the right of indigenous peoples
to receive special protection aimed at enabling the preservation of their cultural
identity. The Commission also acknowledged their lack of title over their
ancestral land as a key factor behind their situation of vulnerability.329 The
complaint alleged that the construction of a highway and the grant of con-
cessions to exploit resources brought an influx of newcomers to the lands of
the Yanomami, and that these new arrivals introduced influenza, tuberculosis
and measles, which devastated the Yanomami population.330 The Commission
found the State was responsible for failing to take timely and effective
measures to protect the Yanomamis’ human rights. The Commission concluded
such failure had led to alterations in the community’s well-being and violations
to the right to life, liberty, security, residence and movement, and to the
preservation of health and well-being.331 The Commission considered that
current international law acknowledges the right of indigenous groups to
special protection for the use of their language, their religion and, in general,
all elements essential to the preservation of their cultural identity. The IACmHR
recommended the State, in line with domestic legislation, to proceed to de-
324 Morel 2014, p. 105 and 106. See more on this topic in § 5.1.2 the 1969 OAU Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa.
325 Ibid., p. 105 and 106.
326 See more on this topic in § 4.5.
327 Art. 6 ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention.
328 IACmHR, Yanomami Community v. Brazil 1985.
329 Ibid., para 5.
330 Clark et al. 2007, p. 64.
331 IACmHR, Yanomami Community v. Brazil 1985, para 10.
112 Chapter 3
marcate the Yanomami Park, to continue adopting preventive and remedial
sanitary measures aimed at protecting the life and health of the Yanomami,
and to ensure education, health protection and social integration programs
aimed at the Yanomami were carried out in consultation with the indigenous
community, as well as expert scientific, medical and anthropological ad-
visors.332 This case is referred to as: ‘a significant precedent for addressing
environmental harms because it addressed a violation of the right to life
caused, not by a deliberate attack on the population, but by changes in their
environment and surroundings that affected their survival.’333
In the 1997 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador the IACmHR
states that: ‘within international law generally, and Inter-American law specific-
ally, special protections for indigenous peoples may be required for them to
exercise their rights fully and equally with the rest of the population. Addi-
tionally, special protections for indigenous peoples may be required to ensure
their physical and cultural survival – a right protected in a range of inter-
national instruments and conventions.’334
In the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua case,335
the IACtHR established that the States were obligated to provide effective
protection that took into account the particularities, economic and social
characteristics, and special situation of vulnerability of indigenous commun-
ities, as well as their common law, values and customs.336 The State had
granted a concession of 62,000 hectares of tropical forest to be commercially
developed by a company in communal lands. The Awas Tingni lacked official
title to their territory. The Court decided that as there is no effective mechan-
ism for delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the property of indigenous
communities, in accordance with their customary law, values, customs and
mores, the State must adopt one in its domestic law. The Court further decided
that until the delimitation, demarcation and titling has been done, the State
must abstain from any acts that might lead the agents of the State itself, or
third parties acting with its acquiescence or its tolerance, to affect the existence,
value, use or enjoyment of the property located in the geographic area where
the members of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community live and carry
out their activities. The State must invest, as reparation for immaterial damages,
a total sum of US$ 50,000 in works or services of collective interest for the
benefit of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, by common agree-
ment with the Community and under supervision by the IACtHR. The State
must submit a report on measures taken to comply with the Judgment to the
332 Ibid., recommendation para 3.
333 Clark et al. 2007, p. 64.
334 IACmHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador 1997. See also CERD, Art.
1.4 and CERD, General Recommendation No. 23 1997, para 4.
335 IACtHR, Mayagna Sumo Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua 2001.
336 Ibid., para 138.
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IACtHR every six months.337 This ruling on an indigenous right to communal
property was a first for an international human rights tribunal.338
In three cases against Paraguay: the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community,
the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous
Community339 indigenous communities had been unable to reclaim their
traditional lands owing to flawed administrative procedures. In each case, the
Court found violations of the rights to life, due process, judicial protection,
and property, among others. All three decisions ordered: the prompt return
of ancestral territories; the creation of ‘an effective mechanism for indigenous
peoples’ claims to ancestral lands, the provision of medical, nutritional, educa-
tional, and other basic services while the communities remain landless, and
the publication and dissemination of the judgments.’340
With respect to the right to life, the Court held in the Yakye Axa Indi-
genous Community v. Paraguay case that:
‘One of the obligations that the State must inescapably undertake as guarantor,
to protect and ensure the right to life, is that of generating minimum living condi-
tions that are compatible with the dignity of the human person and of not creating
conditions that hinder or impede it. In this regard, the State has the duty to take
positive, concrete measures geared toward fulfilment of the right to a decent life,
especially in the case of persons who are vulnerable and at risk, whose care becomes
a high priority.’341
The IACtHR then concludes that:
‘In the instant case, the Court must establish whether the State generated conditions
that worsened the difficulties of access to a decent life for the members of the Yakye
Axa Community and whether, in that context, it took appropriate positive measures
to fulfil that obligation, taking into account the especially vulnerable situation in
which they were placed.’342
The Court establishes that:
‘the State did not guarantee the right of the members of the Yakye Axa Community
to communal property. The Court deems that this fact has had a negative effect
on the right of the members of the Community to a decent life, because it has
deprived them of the possibility of access to their traditional means of subsistence,
as well as to use and enjoyment of the natural resources necessary to obtain clean
337 Ibid., Decision para 8.
338 Antkowiak 2014.
339 IACtHR, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 2005, IACtHR, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
Cmty. v. Paraguay 2006, and IACtHR, Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay 2010.
340 Antkowiak 2014, p. 31.
341 IACtHR, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 2010, para 162.
342 Ibid., para 163.
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water and to practice traditional medicine to prevent and cure illnesses. Further-
more, the State has not taken the necessary positive measures to ensure that the
members of the Yakye Axa Community, during the period in which they have been
without territory, have living conditions that are compatible with their dignity.’343
With regard to the right to property, the Court was of the view that the
restriction of private individuals’ right to private property might be necessary
‘to attain the collective objective of preserving cultural identities in a demo-
cratic and pluralist society’. On the other hand, the Court did not suggest that
the interests of indigenous communities always prevail over the interests of
private individuals:
‘When States are unable, for concrete and justified reasons, to adopt measures to
return the traditional territory and communal resources to indigenous populations,
the compensation granted must be guided primarily by the meaning of the land
for them.’344
In the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay case, the Court declared
with respect to the right to life:
‘The Court has emphasized that a State cannot be held responsible for every
situation that jeopardizes the right to life. Taking into account the difficulties
involved in the planning and adoption of public policies and the operational choices
that must be made based on priorities and resources, the positive obligations of
the State must be interpreted in such a way that an impossible or disproportionate
burden is not placed on the authorities. To give rise to this positive obligation, it
must be established that, at the time of the facts, the authorities knew or should
have known of the existence of a situation of real and immediate risk to the life
of an individual or group of specific individuals, and that they did not take the
necessary measures within their powers that could reasonably be expected to
prevent or avoid that risk.’345
The Court concludes that lack of access to their land and the impossibility
to achieve self-sufficiency and autonomous sustainability, together with the
State’s failure to provide adequate access to water, education, health services
and food, violated the community’s right to a life with dignity. When establish-
ing the non-pecuniary damage, the Court stresses the special meaning that
land has for indigenous peoples and considers that: ’any denial of the enjoy-
ment or exercise of property rights harms values that are very significant to
the members of those peoples, who run the risk of losing or suffering irrepar-
343 Ibid., para 168.
344 Morel 2014, p. 237-240.
345 IACtHR, Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay 2010, para 188.
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able harm to their life and identity and to the cultural heritage to be passed
on to future generations.’346
In the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay case, the IACtHR held
the State responsible for nineteen deaths of community members, most of them
children. The Court summarized in the Sawhoyamaxa case its jurisprudence
on the issue of property rights of indigenous communities:
‘The following conclusions are drawn from the foregoing: 1) traditional possession
of their lands by indigenous people has equivalent effects to those of a State-granted
full property title; 2) traditional possession entitles indigenous people to demand
official recognition and registration of property title; 3) the members of indigenous
peoples who have unwillingly left their traditional lands, or lost possession thereof,
maintain property rights thereto, even though they lack legal title, unless the lands
have been lawfully transferred to third parties in good faith; and 4) the members
of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly lost possession of their lands, when
those lands have been lawfully transferred to innocent third parties, are entitled
to restitution thereof or to obtain other lands of equal extension and quality.
Consequently, possession is not a requisite conditioning the existence of indigenous
land restitution rights. The instant case is categorized under this last conclusion.’347
Like in the Yakye Axa case, the Court found that adequate domestic measures
securing the effective use and enjoyment of the Sawhoyamaxa community’s
right to property were lacking. The State therefore violated Article 21 ACHR.
In addition, the State also violated Article 3 (right to recognition as a person
before the law), Article 4(1) (right to life), Article 8 (right to fair trial) and
Article 25 (right to judicial protection).348
In the Saramaka People v. Suriname case,349 the IACtHR ruled that a non-
indigenous community like the Saramakas can enjoy ‘indigenous rights’ if they
share some characteristics (such as spiritual relations with the land, distinct
culture, language, or traditions) and considered as a tribal community pro-
tected by the international law.350 The Court refers to earlier rulings, in which
it has held:
‘based on Article 1(1) of the Convention, that members of indigenous and tribal
communities require special measures that guarantee the full exercise of their rights,
particularly with regards to their enjoyment of property rights, in order to safeguard
their physical and cultural survival.’351
346 Ibid., para 321.
347 IACtHR, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay 2006, para 128. See also Morel 2014,
p. 240.
348 Morel 2014, p. 237-240.
349 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname 2007.
350 Ibid., para 79-86.
351 Ibid., para 85.
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The Court established that the indigenous peoples’ right to property is also
applicable to tribal peoples because both share distinct social, cultural, and
economic characteristics, including a special relationship with their ancestral
territories, that require special measures under international human rights law
in order to guarantee their physical and cultural survival (para 86). As a
consequence, they did not need a title in order to own the lands (possession
was sufficient) (para 87-96). The case also held that special measures of pro-
tection are owed to members of the tribal community to guarantee the full
exercise of their rights:
‘It is a well-established principle of international law that unequal treatment
towards persons in unequal situations does not necessarily amount to impermissible
discrimination. [...] In the context of members of indigenous and tribal peoples,
this Court has already stated that special measures are necessary in order to ensure
their survival in accordance with their traditions and customs [...].’352
The Court analyzed resource extraction from communal lands to a far more
detailed extent than in the Awas Tingni judgment. The petitioners had
denounced the State’s logging and mining concessions on their traditional
lands. These traditional lands had not been officially recognized by Suriname.
Despite this fact, the Court held that Suriname should not have granted various
concessions within Saramaka territory without complying with certain safe-
guards, including prior consultation, benefit-sharing, and impact assessments.
As a result, the Court found violations of the rights to property, juridical
personality, and judicial protection.353 As Knox pointed out, till this case,
the Commission’s country reports have sometimes referred to the need to
obtain prior consent from the affected communities without making clear
whether consent was an absolute requirement.354 In this case the Court clar-
ified that the protection of the right to property is not absolute and should
not be construed to prevent the State from granting any concession at all for
the extraction of natural resources within Saramaka territory.355 Limits to
the right to property are allowed, although States must ensure that any re-
striction on the community’s right to property does not deny their survival
as a tribal people.356 To that end, the State must consult with the community
352 Ibid., para 103.
353 Antkowiak 2014, p. 34.
354 The ILO Convention on the Rights of Indigenous People 1989, Art. 152, requires states to
consult with indigenous peoples before exploiting resources pertaining to their lands, but
it does not require states to obtain their consent. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples 2007 is stronger on this point, although it may still fall short of stating a clear
requirement of consent. It states that, ‘States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with
the indigenous peoples concerned in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior
to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources.’
355 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname 2007, para 126-127.
356 Ibid., para 128.
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regarding any proposed concessions or other activities that may affect their
lands and natural resources. States must also make prior assessments of its
environmental and social impacts, and guarantee that the community receives
a reasonable benefit from any such plan if approved.357 Moreover, with
respect to large-scale development or investment projects that would have
a major on indigenous peoples, the State must obtain their free, prior, and
informed consent, according to their customs and traditions.358
In its judgment concerning the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v.
Ecuador,359 the IACtHR, for the first time, held that the indigenous community
itself suffered human rights violations. In this case, an indigenous community
from the Ecuadorian Amazon had been granted by the State a communal
property title, while the State had reserved a number of rights, including rights
to subsurface natural resources. The granted a permit to a private oil company
to carry out oil exploration and exploitation activities in the territory of the
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku, without previously consulting them
and without obtaining their consent. Thus, the company began the exploration
phase, and even introduced high-powered explosives in several places on
indigenous territory.360 The Court found breaches of the rights to consulta-
tion, to indigenous communal property, and to cultural identity, the rights
to life and to personal integrity, and the right to judicial guarantees and to
judicial protection. As ‘measures of restitution and satisfaction and guarantees
of non-repetition’ the Court orders (1) the removal of explosives and refore-
station of the affected areas;361 (2) due prior consultation, regulation of prior
consultation in domestic law, and training of State officials on the rights of
indigenous peoples;362 and (3) a public act of acknowledgment of inter-
national responsibility and the publication and broadcasting of the judg-
ment.363 In order to establish pecuniary damage, the Court requires the
parties to provide clear evidence of the damage suffered, as well as the specific
relationship between the pecuniary claim and the facts of the case and the
violations alleged.364 In this case, the Court establishes the sum of
US$90,000.00 as compensation for pecuniary damage.365 For non-pecuniary
damage the Court establishes, the sum of US$1,250,000.00 as compensation
for the suffering caused to the People and to their cultural identity, the impact
on their territory, particularly due to the presence of explosives, as well as
the changes caused in their living conditions and way of life and the other
357 Ibid., para 129.
358 Ibid., para 134. See also Knox 2009, p. 186.
359 IACtHR, Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador 2012.
360 Ibid., para 2.
361 Ibid., para 289-295.
362 Ibid., para 296-302.
363 Ibid., para 303-308.
364 Ibid., para 309.
365 Ibid., para 317.
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non-pecuniary damage they suffered owing to the violations declared in the
Judgment. These sums must be paid to the Association of the Sarayaku People
(Tayjasaruta) within one year of notification of this Judgment, so that the
People may decide, in accordance with its own decision-making mechanisms
and institutions, how to invest the money, among other aspects, for the imple-
mentation of educational, cultural, food security, health and eco-tourism
development projects or other community infrastructure or projects of collective
interest that the People considers a priority (para 323). For the first time, the
Court loosened its paternalistic methodology, as full discretion was given to
the community, declaring that the fund ‘may be invested as the People see
fit, in accordance with its own decision-making mechanisms and institu-
tions.’366
The ACmHPR has also decided a case that is decided a landmark case for
indigenous peoples. In the case Centre for Minority Rights Development
(Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council)
vs Kenya,367 the Endorois claim that they are being forced from fertile lands
to semi-arid areas, and have also been divided as a community and displaced
from their traditional and ancestral lands for the creation of the Lake Hanning-
ton Game Reserve in 1973, and a subsequent re-gazetting of the Lake Bogoria
Game Reserve in 1978 by the Government of Kenya. The Endorios have not
been adequately involved in the development process and the State failed to
ensure the continued improvement of the Endorois community’s well-
being.368 The ACmHPR first has to establish if the Endorois are a distinct com-
munity and if they are indigenous peoples and thereby needing special pro-
tection.369 The Commission relies heavily on the case law of the IACtHR370
to conclude that the Endorois are a ‘people’, a status that entitles them to
benefit from provisions of the African Charter that protect collective rights.371
The ACmHPR clarifies the context of the right to development:
‘The African Commission is of the view that the right to development is a two-
pronged test, that it is both constitutive and instrumental, or useful as both a means
and an end. A violation of either the procedural or substantive element constitutes
a violation of the right to development. Fulfilling only one of the two prongs will
not satisfy the right to development. The right to development requires fulfilling
five main criteria: it must be equitable, non-discriminatory, participatory, account-
366 Antkowiak 2014.
367 ACmHPR, Centre for Minority Rights Development Kenya and Minority Rights Group Inter-
national on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya 2010.
368 Ibid., para 125.
369 Ibid., para 146.
370 The Court cites various Inter-American Court standards on reparations, compensation,
and benefit sharing. See for example, Ibid., para 159-162.
371 Ibid., para 162.
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able, and transparent, with equity and choice as important, over-arching themes
in the right to development.’372
The Court takes note of the report of the UN Independent Expert who under-
scores that freedom of choice must be present as a part of the right to develop-
ment.373 Additionally, the ACmHPR is of the view that any development or
investment projects that would have a major impact within the Endorois
territory, the State has a duty not only to consult with the community, but
also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, according to their cus-
toms and traditions.374 The Commission also gets into detail on what action
can be expected of the State: ‘The Respondent State bears the burden for
creating conditions favourable to a people’s development.’375 ‘Had the Re-
spondent State allowed conditions to facilitate the right to development, the
development of the Game Reserve would have increased the capabilities of
the Endorois, as they would have had a possibility to benefit from the Game
Reserve. However, the forced evictions eliminated any choice as to where they
would live.’376 The result of development should be empowerment of the
Endorois community. It is not sufficient for the Kenyan Authorities merely
to give food aid to the Endorois. The capabilities and choices of the Endorois
must improve in order for the right to development to be realised.377
In general, human rights bodies have reached congruent conclusions about
the obligations of States to protect against environmental harm to the rights
of indigenous peoples. Firstly, States have a duty to recognize the rights of
indigenous peoples with respect to the territory that they have traditionally
occupied, including the natural resources on which they rely. Secondly, States
are obliged to facilitate the participation of indigenous peoples in decisions
that concern them. Ambiguity remains, however, as to the extent and content
of the duty of consultation owed to indigenous peoples. In particular, there
is much debate as to whether indigenous peoples’ right to participation in
decisions affecting them, extend to a veto power over State action.378 Thirdly,
before development activities on indigenous lands are allowed to proceed,
States must provide for an assessment of the activities’ environmental impacts.
Fourthly, States must guarantee that the indigenous community affected
receives a reasonable benefit from any such development. In this respect, the
State bears a heavy burden of justification to ensure the indigenous peoples
372 Ibid., para 277.
373 Ibid., para 278.
374 Ibid., para 291.
375 Ibid., para 298. See also Schrepfer, Caterina 2014, p. 29.
376 Ibid., para 278.
377 Ibid., para 283
378 Economic and Social Council UN Doc E/C.19/2012/3, An Analysis on the Duty of the
State to Protect Indigenous Peoples Affected by Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises 2012.
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share in the benefits of the project, and must take measures to mitigate its
negative effects.379 Finally, States must provide access to remedies, including
compensation, for harm caused by the activities.380 While there is no clear
precedent to follow, it has been argued that insofar as climate change poses
a threat to the right of peoples to self-determination, States have a duty to
take positive action, individually and jointly, to address and avert this threat.
Equally, States have an obligation to take action to avert climate change
impacts which threaten the cultural and social identity of indigenous
peoples.381
3.2 THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS FRAMEWORK
Most of the environmental refugees will not cross international borders. As
a result, most of the environmental refugees are IDPs.382 Therefore, the host
State is primary responsible for the protection and assistance needs. This
responsibility can be taken over by international organizations on an ad hoc
basis if the home state is ‘unwilling or unable to guarantee the basic rights
and meet the needs of their internally displaced citizens.’383
The most obvious need of internally displaced persons is protection against
violations of the right to choose their own residence and to move freely within
their own region and country. Likewise, they need protection against forced
relocation and mass transfers. Furthermore, the displaced should be protected
against forced return to places with conditions dangerous to their health and/
or safety, and, thus, should be ensured the right to return voluntarily and in
safety to their place of residence or, if that is impossible, to a safe place.384
IDPs are entitled to the same international human rights and humanitarian
law guarantees as all citizens. However, their rights are more likely to be
violated due to their forced displacement. On top of that, already vulnerably
groups are more likely to be forcedly displaced. In order to protect the rights
of this vulnerable group, States will have to adopt national policies or strategies
on internal displacement. Over the past decade, significant progress has been
made in strengthening the international legal framework, and moving legal
protection from soft to hard law.385 In this paragraph the most influent inter-
379 Ibid.
380 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/25/53 2013, para 77 and 78.
381 Humphreys 2008, p. 14 and 15.
382 Abebe 2011. Both the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the
Protocol on the Rights of Women, for example, have explicit provision on internal displace-
ment.
383 Economic and Social Council UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2 1995, para 10.
384 Ibid., para 221.
385 UNHCR 2012, p. 20.
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national frameworks are addressed on their possibility to protect IDPs that are
forcedly displaced due to environmental degradation.
3.2.1 The Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons
The 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (hereafter: Guiding
Principles) create a framework for the protection of internally displaced per-
sons. The Guiding Principles do not constitute a legally binding instrument.386
However, the Guiding Principles are a synthesis of human rights law, refugee
law by analogy and international humanitarian law/laws of war. The Prin-
ciples both restate existing norms and seek to clarify grey areas and fill in the
gaps of in the protection and assistance of IDPs. As Kälin clarified in the
‘Annotations to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’, the purpose
of expressly stating a right not to be arbitrarily displaced is ‘to define explicitly
what is now only implicit in international law.’387 The Guiding Principles
are consistent with and reflect international human rights and humanitarian
law, as well as refugee law by analogy. The principles interpret and apply
these existing norms to the situation of displaced persons. Although not a
binding legal instrument, the principles have gained considerable authority
since their adoption in 1998. The UN General Assembly has recognised them
as an important international framework for IDP protection and encouraged
all relevant actors to use them when confronted with situations of internal
displacement.388 The Human Rights Council on several occasions has referred
to the Guiding Principles, for example in 2016.389 The added value of the
Guiding Principles consists inter alia of identifying rights and guarantees
relevant to the protection of persons from forced displacement and to their
protection and assistance during displacement as well as during return or
resettlement and reintegration. They establish their relevance to IDPs by setting
out in specific terms and in greater detail what these guarantees mean in the
context of displacement
The Guiding Principles address ‘persons or groups of persons who have
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual
386 Kälin, Schrepfer 2013, p. 17. However, they are recognized by all states as an important
international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons, see for example
UNGA UN Doc A/60/L.1, Draft resolution referred to the High-level Plenary Meeting
of the General Assembly by the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session. 2005 World
Summit Outcome, 20 September 2005.
387 Kälin 2008.
388 See for example, UNGA UN Doc A/56/168, Internally displaced persons Note by the
Secretary-General, 21 August 2001, which also contains an overview of the acceptance of
the Guiding Principles.
389 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/RES/32/11, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council
on 1 July 2016, para 14.
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residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural
or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recog-
nized State border.’390 This is a descriptive definition rather than a legal defi-
nition. It describes a factual situation without conferring a special legal status.
A legal status is not required, as IDPs are entitled to all the rights and guar-
antees as citizens or habitual residents of a particular State.391 On the other
hand, the definition does have an impact on the group of people for whom
their rights have been made explicit, even though the words ‘in particular’
indicate that the list of causes of internal displacement is not exhaustive. Some
commentators have argued that the description is too broad to be opera-
tional.392 On the other hand, it may be too narrow for some type of environ-
mental refugees due to the required forced nature of the flight and the multi-
causality of the decision to migrate, as especially migration as adaptation in
order to prevent environmentally-forced migration is not included under the
Guiding Principles. The description covers forced migration as a result of
sudden- or slow-onset (natural or human-made) disasters. Although the
description does not get into detail how to establish when and how slow-onset
disasters force people into migration.393 The description also addresses forced
migration due to conflicts, so this also covers forced migration due to conflicts
related to environmental degradation. The description does not get into detail
if environmental pollution and planned resettlement are covered under the
Guidelines.
The Guiding Principles support adaptation and mitigation to avoid environ-
mentally forced migration. The Guiding Principles recognize that all authorities
and international actors must ‘prevent and avoid conditions that might lead
to displacement of persons’ and guarantee that ‘every human being shall have
the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced.’394 Before any
decision on the necessity of displacement of persons is taken all feasible
alternatives must be explored by the authorities in order to avoid displace-
ment.395 To
‘discharge its obligations, responsible governance will need to develop capacities
to detect potential displacement situations early on, accountability mechanisms
to ensure that follow-up prevention and protection measures are taken, and more
effective systems of local and regional consultation which engage affected popula-
tions in decisions about their future.’396
390 Guiding Principles, Introduction – Scope and Purpose.
391 UNHCR Global Protection Cluster Working Group 2010, p. 8.
392 Koser 2008, p. 17.
393 See more in § 4.2.
394 Guiding Principles, Principle 5-9.
395 Morel 2010, p. 14.
396 UNGA Res. 66/285, Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons, 2011.
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When internal displacement is not prevented, home States bear the primary
responsibility to protect and assist IDPs both during and after displacement,
and providing humanitarian assistance to IDPs within their jurisdiction. In case
of failure they must accept the provision of protection and assistance by the
international community.397 The Guiding Principles outline principles of non-
discrimination, protection during displacement,398 and guidance on re-
turn,399 resettlement, and reintegration in cases where displacement is
unavoidable.400 Guiding Principles 7, 28 and 30 provide for specific pro-
cedural rights of internally displaced persons in relation to prevention of
displacement as well as guarantees of their participation in relocation and
durable solution processes.401
3.2.2 Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions
for Internally Displaced Persons
The Guiding Principles have served as a basis for developing further oper-
ational guidance, such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework
on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (hereafter: IDP Frame-
work).402 The IDP Framework aims to foster a better understanding of the
concept of durable solutions for the internally displaced and to provide general
guidance (primarily to international and non-governmental actors, but also
to governments and IDPs themselves) on the process and conditions necessary
for achieving a durable solution, and to assist in determining to what extent
a durable solution has been achieved following internal displacement in the
context of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of
human rights and natural or human-made disasters.403 The framework is
based on the needs of IDPs – rather than on resolution of the causes of displace-
ment. The framework asserts that: ‘a durable solution is achieved when inter-
nally displaced persons enjoy without discrimination: long-term safety, security
and freedom of movement, an adequate standard of living, access to employ-
397 Morel 2010, p. 14.and Ammer et al. 2010, p. 51.
398 Guiding Principles, Art. 10-27.
399 Ibid., Art. 28-30.
400 Williams 2008, p. 511.
401 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 11 and 12. According to the Guiding Principles, internally
displaced people have a right to be informed, consulted and to participate in decisions
affecting them see in particular Guiding Principles 7.3.c and d, 18.3 and 28.2. The affected
and the population at risk should be consulted and invited to participate in the process
from the start, including in exploring intervention measures to help them remain or move,
and in evacuation, relocation, resettlement and return decisions and design.
402 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/13/21/Add.4, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-
General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 2010.
403 IDP Framework, 2010.
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ment and livelihoods and access to effective mechanisms that restore their
housing, land and property or provide them with compensation.’404
Protection gaps for the IDP Framework are mainly identified at the ‘pro-
tection delivery at the field level, including in relation to the security and safety
of affected communities, particularly women, children, older persons and
persons with disabilities; access to emergency treatment and other health
services; replacement of identity documentation; access to shelter; and services,
programmes and resources for rehabilitation and reconstruction.’405
3.2.3 Regional regimes on IDP protection
As Kälin en Schrepfer pointed out, Africa is the continent with the largest
number of IDPs with almost 10 million people internally displaced (many of
these IDPs are displaced due to conflict). Under these circumstances, it is
understandable that Africa is the continent that has done most to develop a
sound normative framework to protect the rights of IDPs.406 The 2006 Pact
on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes and it protocols407
and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Inter-
nally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) form the basis of this
framework.
2006 Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region and
Protocols
The 2006 Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes
Region contains a series of protocols that form an integral part of the pact.408
Among the latter, the Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance
to Internally Displaced Persons (hereafter: IDP Protocol)409 and the Protocol
on the Property Rights of Returning Persons are particularly relevant to the
protection of IDPs.410
The key obligation under the legally binding IDP Protocol is to incorporate
the Guiding Principles into domestic law by enacting legislation to give them
the force of law at the internal level. As Morel pointed out, interestingly, the
404 Quick Reference Guide A-1 IDP Framework.
405 UNHCR 2011, p. 5 and 6.
406 Kälin, Schrepfer 2013, p. 10.
407 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Protocol on the Protection and Assist-
ance to Internally Displaced Persons, 30 November 2006.
408 The Great Lakes Pact, together with its protocols, went into force in June 2008 and has
since been ratified by all of the 11 states of the International Conference of the Great Lakes
Region. Consequently, the instrument and its protocols are legally binding upon those states.
409 IDP Protocol 2006.
410 Kälin, Schrepfer 2013, p. 18 and 19.
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IDP Protocol defines IDPs slightly differently from the Guiding Principles. In
addition to the Guiding Principles, the Protocol states that IDPs also mean:
‘persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave
their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order
to, avoid the effects of large scale development projects, and who have not crossed
an internationally recognized State border.’ [emphasis added].411
The addition in the IDP Protocol indicates that the States wished to give special
attention to development-induced displacement. This is also reflected in
Article 5, which is completely dedicated to this type of environmentally forced
migration.412 The IDP Protocol specifically addresses or emphasizes several
issues that are linked with the specific situation of internal displacement in
the Great Lakes Region, such as specific attention for communities whose mode
of livelihood depends on the land,413 and protection for families of mixed
ethnic identity.414
The IDP Protocol does not spell out in detail the obligations of State parties
and the corresponding rights of the displaced but refers instead to the detailed
provisions of the Guiding Principles and makes them binding by obliging
States to incorporate them into domestic law.415 Member States commit them-
selves to prevent and eliminate the root causes of displacement.416 For cases
where forced migration cannot be prevented, States have to adopt practical
assistance measures for protection during displacement and long-term solutions
in the form of supported return, relocation or compensation.417 The respons-
ibility for the protection lies with the member States. Where Governments of
Member States lack the capacity to protect and assist internally displaced
persons, such Governments shall accept and respect the obligation of the
organs of the international community to provide protection and assistance
to internally displaced persons.418
The (legally binding) Great Lakes Protocol on the Property Rights of
Returning Persons requires State parties to establish, adapt or amend national
laws, procedures, mechanisms and schemes to better protect the right to
property of IDPs during displacement and especially in the context of durable
solutions. It complements the IDP Protocol, in particular with respect to the
creation of conditions for durable solutions, as the restoration of property and
411 IDP Protocol, Art. 14 and 15.
412 Morel 2010, p. 9 and 10.
413 IDP Protocol, Art. 4(1)c.
414 Ibid., Art. 4 1h.
415 Kälin, Schrepfer 2013, p. 18 and 19, as reflected in IDP Protocol, Art. 2.
416 IDP Protocol, Art. 2(4).
417 Zetter 2011, p. 49 and 50.
418 IDP Protocol, Art. 3(10).
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land rights is considered one of the key conditions for achieving a solution
to internal displacement that is durable and sustainable.419
Kampala convention
The content of the Kampala convention is inspired by regional and inter-
national human rights law, international humanitarian law and analogical
refugee law. It reinforces the UN Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement
and therefore similarly underlines States’ primary responsibility for IDPs. Many
of the Convention’s provisions are incorporated directly, or with minor amend-
ment, from the Guiding Principles. The Kampala Convention’s definition of
IDP for instance, mirrors the Guiding Principles.420 There are, however some
key differences: (1) the Guiding Principles are soft laws whereas the Kampala
Convention is a binding instrument; (2) unlike the Guiding Principles which
enlists the needs and rights of IDPs, the Kampala Convention focuses on
elaborating State responsibility; (3) there are more detailed references to
environmental issues in the Kampala Convention than in the Guiding Prin-
ciples;421 and (4) the Convention also provides for an elaborate accountability
and monitoring mechanism.422 Unlike typical human rights conventions, the
Kampala Convention does not lay emphasis on the rights of IDPs but on the
corresponding obligations of governments and other actors.423 This clear
designation of duty bearers helps to ensure that rights do not remain in a kind
of legal vacuum where authorities do not really feel responsible for implement-
ing them.424 The Kampala Convention is unique insofar as it also spells out
obligations to be met by international organizations and agencies, civil society
organizations and African Union.425 The Convention innovatively provides
for the obligation of international organizations to provide protection and
assistance to IDPs (Article 6) and calls for discharging the obligations under
419 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Protocol on the Property Rights of
Returning Persons, 30th November 2006, Art. 4.
420 Asplet, Bradley 2012. Abebe argues that the definition of IDPs in Art. 1K also covers those
who flee or leave their homes in anticipation of or in order to avoid the effect of disasters
in Abebe 2011. However, the text of the Convention gives no basis for such an explanation.
421 For an overview, see Ferris 2012, p. 6-13.
422 Abebe 2011.
423 E.g. State parties shall ensure individual responsibility for acts of arbitrary displacement
in accordance with applicable domestic and international law Art. 31g, ensure the account-
ability of non-State actors including multinational companies and private military or security
companies Art. 31h, and ensure the accountability of non-State actors involved in the
exploration and exploitation of economic and natural resources Art. 31i. There is also a
collective responsibility for regional interventionist action in case of displacement associated
with grave breaches of human rights and humanitarian law.
424 Kälin, Schrepfer 2013, p. 17 and 18.
425 Even though State Parties bear the primary duty and responsibility for providing protection
and humanitarian assistance to IDPs within their territory and jurisdiction, State Parties
shall cooperate with each other upon request in protecting and assisting IDPs Art. 5
Kamapala Convention.
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the Convention with assistance from international organizations and human-
itarian agencies, civil society organizations, and other relevant actors.426
Article 8 reflects how the African Union shall support State Parties. Even
though, the organizations concerned are not (and cannot become) State Parties
and so are not, technically speaking, bound by its provisions. As guardian
of the convention, however, AU has an interest in supporting the efforts of
State parties to assist and protect IDPs by cooperating with such organiza-
tions.427
The Kampala Convention covers all stages of migration. The obligation
to prevent arbitrary displacement is reflected in Article 2 (a). This requires
States to prevent, mitigate, prohibit and eliminate the root causes of internal
displacement. This requirement of prevention and mitigation is further detailed
in Article 4(2), which obligates parties to develop an early warning system
in areas of potential displacement, disaster risk reduction strategies and emerg-
ency management measures, in addition to providing protection and assistance
if necessary. The Convention also addresses protection and assistance of IDPs
during displacement and focusses on durable solutions for the situation after
displacement.
The Convention also establishes monitoring mechanism and requires States
to report on their efforts under the Convention in their reports for the African
Peer Review Mechanism.428 This enforcement and implementation through
a monitoring system has been identified as a weak point, however, for lacking
an effective enforcement mechanism.429 States are also obligated to establish
an effective legal framework to provide just and fair compensation and other
forms of reparations to IDPs for damage incurred as a result of displacement,
in accordance with international standards.430 States shall be liable to make
reparation to IDPs for damage when such a State refrains from protecting and
assisting IDPs in the event of natural disaster.431 The violations for which
IDPs may seek redress may include housing, land and property rights, physical,
mental, and other types of harms. In addition, the Convention deepens the
pool of potential claimants to members of host and return communities that
are affected by displacement.432 However, whether and to what extent these
remedies are accessible in practice remains to be seen. In most countries there
is a major discrepancy between having a national instrument and implementing
it in a displacement situation due to a lack of will and/or a lack of resources
426 Article 9(3). See also Abebe 2011.
427 Kälin, Schrepfer 2013, p. 17 and 18.
428 Art. 14. Kampala Convention and Art. 62 ACHPR.
429 See for example Morel 2010, p. 11 and 12.
430 Art. 12 (2) Kampala Convention.
431 Art. 12 (3) Kampala Convention.
432 Art. 12(1) Kampala Convention.
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and/or an inadequate understanding and knowledge of how to develop and
later use such instruments in a practical way.433
433 Kälin, Schrepfer 2013, p. 19. See also Morel 2010, p. 11 and 12.
4 Specific protection possibilities for different
types of environmental refugees within the
rights-based approach
All displaced persons, whether internal or international, are entitled to funda-
mental human rights. It is immaterial to this entitlement what type of environ-
mental migration it is. Various types of forced migration within a country are
covered under the various internally displaced persons frameworks. Different
types of environmental refugees face different protection challenges, which
will be discussed subsequently per type in this paragraph. This paragraph
will get more into detail of the complexities as identified in chapter 2: the
complexity of determining who is entitled to protection, the multi-causality
of the decision to leave, and the distinction between voluntary and forced
migration.
4.1 SUDDEN-ONSET DISASTERS
When entire areas become uninhabitable due to sudden-onset natural disasters,
the migration is clearly forced and assistance often has the form of human-
itarian assistance.1 However, (a series of) small disasters also have the ability
to forcedly displace people, even though this is much harder to prove and
conceptualize due to the multiple factors influencing the decision to migrate.2
Affected people will often be in need for assistance to regain their property
or compensation for their losses or to get basic human needs. The effectiveness
and success of this response, recovery and rehabilitation efforts will affect their
need for international protection.
4.1.1 The human rights framework
Human rights apply to all people at all times. Environmental refugees do not
lose – as a consequence of their being displaced or otherwise affected by the
disaster – the rights of the population at large. They do however have specific
needs distinct from those of the non-affected population which call for specific
assistance and protection measures.3 The basic needs are covered by the
1 See also § 3.1.2 the right to humanitarian assistance.
2 See § 2.2.1.
3 Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2008, p. 7.
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human rights instruments. As most human rights instruments don’t explicitly
refer to natural disasters,4 the general rules thus have to be identified as rights
and guarantees relevant to the protection of persons from forced displacement
due to sudden onset disasters. Therefore, it needs to be determined what the
legal duty of the home State (and possibly third States) is.
In general, States must provide, at a minimum, subsistence needs to the
population under all circumstances. The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights has stated that:
‘the Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satis-
faction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is
incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any
significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of
education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.’5
unless it can ‘demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources
that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those
minimum obligations.’6 For a State party to attribute its failure to a lack of
available resources, it must demonstrate that it has made a maximum effort
to use all the resources at its disposal to satisfy the essential needs listed.7
States have positive duties to prevent, as much as possible, the displace-
ment of their people directly caused by disasters and to protect their people
from threats to the right to life by averting imminent and serious dangers to
the extent possible. With regard to the right to life in the context of sudden-
onset disasters, the case law so far has given us some guidelines. When sudden
onset disasters interfere with, or even destroy, the right to life of those harmed
by it, a violation of the right to life by the State can only be caused by a State
acting in violation of its legal obligations.8 In Budayeva v. Russia9 the ECtHR
ruled on the obligation of the home State to prevent the loss of life due to
multiple mudslides. The Court first established that a positive obligation only
results from foreseeable threats. The Court also placed another important
limitation on the obligation of the State:
‘[...] an impossible or disproportionate burden must not be imposed on the author-
ities without consideration being given, in particular, to the operational choices
4 Exceptions are Art. 11 of the CRPD and Art. 23 1, 23 4 African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child. These Articles explicitly refer to protection during situations/displace-
ment due to disasters. However, these instruments do not give a definition of a disaster,
so it is still unclear which situations of natural disasters will be covered.
5 CESCR General Comment No. 3 1990, para 10.
6 Ibid., para 10.
7 Ibid., para 10.
8 Knox 2009, p. 478.
9 ECtHR, Budayeva and others v. Russia 2008.
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which they must make in terms of priorities and resources; [...] This consideration
must be afforded even greater weight in the sphere of emergency relief in relation
to a meteorological event, which is as such beyond human control, than in the
sphere of dangerous activities of a man-made nature.’10
When there is a positive obligation, the State has a wide margin of appreciation
in the choice of means.11 When States refrain from protecting their people
in the event of disasters, they must make reparation for damage to the people
affected.12
At a bare minimum, the State could be expected to adhere to its procedural
obligations.13 As Kälin and Dalen summarize:
‘the relevant authorities must:
- enact and implement laws dealing with all relevant aspects of disaster risk
mitigation and set up the necessary mechanisms and procedures
- take the necessary administrative measures, including supervising potentially
dangerous situations
- inform the population about possible dangers and risks
- evacuate potentially affected populations
- conduct criminal investigations and prosecute those responsible for having
neglected their duties in case of deaths caused by a disaster
- compensate surviving relatives of victims killed as a consequence of neglecting
these duties. These human rights standards are of great practical import as
they empower actual and potential victims of natural disasters to demand that
authorities take the necessary measures to prevent deaths.’14
The Courts have been careful to decide on State obligations. For example, with
regard to the right to property, the ECtHR noted after a mudslide that there
had been no clear causal link between the State’s failure to take measures and
the extent of the physical damage. It also observed that the damage could not
be unequivocally attributed in its entirety to State negligence as the alleged
negligence had been no more than an aggravating factor contributing to the
damage caused by natural forces. The State is only held to account for the
damage it caused by its own actions. Additionally, the Court considered that
‘the positive obligation on the State to protect private property from natural
10 Ibid., para 135.
11 In the sphere of emergency relief in relation to a meteorological event, there is an even
wider margin of appreciation. ECtHR, Budayeva and others v. Russia 2008, para 134.
12 Morel 2014, p. 95.
13 For example the ECtHR considered that the State could be expected to ‘[...] show all possible
diligence in informing the civilians and making advance arrangements for the emergency
evacuation. In any event, informing the public about inherent risks was one of the essential
practical measures needed to ensure effective protection of the citizens concerned.’ ECtHR,
Budayeva and others v. Russia 2008, para 152.
14 Kälin, Dale 2008, p. 38 and 39.
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disaster cannot be construed as binding the State to compensate the full market
value of destroyed property.’15
Some extra obligations may fall upon States for vulnerable groups. For
vulnerable groups general rules can be identified as rights and guarantees
relevant to their protection and applied to the context of forced displacement
due to sudden onset disasters. In the aftermath of the tsunamis, hurricanes
and earthquakes, which hit parts of Asia and the Americas in 2004 and 2005,
the IASC developed the IASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of
Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters. These Guidelines have paid special
attention to the vulnerability of women in situations of natural disasters and
identified rules relevant to their protection.
Figure 10: Protecting women under the IASC Guidelines by the Brookings Institution16
IASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters
Protection of Women – Cross-References to Relevant Guidelines
Guideline(s) Topic
l.1 Non-discrimination
l.3 Participation and consultation
l.8 Protection activities to be prioritized on the basis of assessed needs
A.1.1. Protection of life, physical integrity and health of persons exposed to
imminent risks
A.4.1 Special attention to protection against violence, including in camps and
collective centers during and after the emergency
A.4.2 Protection against gender-based violence
A.4.3 Protection against trafficking, child labor, contemporary forms of slavery
A.5.2 Security and protection in camps and collective centers
B.1.1 - B1.2 Access to and adequate provision of humanitarian goods and services
B.1.4 Addressing gender-specific roles in humanitarian action
B.2.1 Including women in planning, design and implementation of food
distribution
B.2.2 Safety in accessing sanitation facilities in camps and collective shelters
B.2.3 Adequate shelter addressing the specific needs
B.2.5 Special attention to the health needs of women
B.2.6 Equal access to education
C.1.5 Assistance in (re-)claiming property and acquiring deeds in one's own
name
C.2.3 Consultation and participation in planning and implementation of
shelter and housing programs
C.3.1 - C.3.2 Access to livelihoods and shills training
D.1.1 Equal access to documentation issued in one's own name
D.4.1 Feedback on disaster response
15 ECtHR, Öneryildiz v. Turkey 2004, para 134 and 135 and ECtHR, Budayeva and others v. Russia
2008, para 172-182.
16 Ferris 2012, p. 75.
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For children similar rules can be identified.17 For indigenous peoples, their
special dependency on the land has swayed Courts to add a layer of protection
in the form of property rights and their rights to culture and development.18
These State obligations may be instrumental in situations of sudden-onset
disasters.
Inter-Agency Standing Committee Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and
Natural Disasters
To promote and facilitate a rights-based approach to disaster relief, the IASC
adopted the Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters
(hereafter: Operational Guidelines) in 2006.19 The Operational Guidelines are
informed by and draw on relevant international human rights law, existing
standards and policies pertaining to humanitarian action, and human rights
guidelines on humanitarian standards in situations of natural disaster.20 The
Operational Guidelines focus on what operational standards humanitarian
actors may be guided by in order to implement a rights-based approach to
humanitarian action in the context of natural disasters. As a non-binding
instrument, the Operational Guidelines do not offer legally enforceable rights.
The identified rights are however based on existing human rights principles,
so courts in future may well adopt the interpretations of the Operational
Guidelines.
The Operational Guidelines are a response to the human rights challenges
in the aftermath of natural disasters, that were identified by the IASC.21 For
example: lack of safety and security, gender-based violence, and unequal access
to assistance, basic goods and services. And also more procedural challenges
such as: inadequate law enforcement mechanisms and restricted access to a
fair and efficient justice system, lack of effective feedback and complaint
mechanisms, forced relocation, unsafe or involuntary return or resettlement.22
The purpose of the Operational Guidelines is to identify relevant needs and
interests of affected persons, to identify rights holders and duty bearers, to
identify the limitations of what people can demand and to ensure that human-
itarian action meets human rights standard.23 The Operational Guidelines
are accompanied by a Manual to help people in the field to understand the
17 For example, many of the rules identified for women can be applied for children as well:
1, I.8, A.1.1, A.4.1, A.4.3, A.5.2, B.1.1-B.1.2, B.2.2, B.2.3, B.2.6, C.3.1-C.3.2, D.1.1 A/HRC/35/13
2017.
18 See § 3.1.4 indigenous peoples and vulnerable groups.
19 IASC, Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters. IASC Operational Guidelines on
Human Rights and Natural Disasters 2006.
20 The Operational Guidelines are based on the full spectrum of the universal human rights
instruments, as far as appropriate, as well as on relevant regional human rights conventions
and other standards, such as the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
21 Ibid., p. 1.
22 Ibid., Introduction.
23 Ibid., p. 4 and 5.
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human rights dimensions of their work in disaster response while giving them
practical examples and operational steps about how some of these seemingly
abstract concepts may be implemented.24 These Guidelines were revised in
2011 after field-testing and expanded to include preparedness measures.25
International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event
of Disasters
The International Law Commission also adopted the Draft Articles on the
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters.26 For a sudden-onset disaster
to be qualified as a disaster under the ILC Draft Articles, there must be ‘a
calamitous27 event or series of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great
human suffering and distress, mass displacement, or large-scale material or
environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of so-
ciety’.28 In addition, reference is made to ‘event or series of events‘ in order
to cover those types of events, such as frequent small-scale disasters, that, on
their own, might not meet the necessary threshold, but that, taken together
would constitute a calamitous event for the purposes of the Draft Articles.29
Therefore, this Framework may provide a useful conceptualization of relevant
human rights in the disaster displacement context.
24 Operational Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights Protection in Situations of
Natural Disaster 2008.
25 IASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters
2011.
26 ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters 2016. The Draft
Articles may, in the future, be adopted as a treaty. Indeed, this has been the recommenda-
tion by the ILC to the General Assembly, to elaborate a convention on the subject, based
on the Draft Articles. However, a number of states rejected this idea at this point of time,
and it is by no means certain to occur. To date, the UNGA has taken note of the Draft
Articles, and invited governments to submit comments on the ILC recommendation.
27 The reference to a ‘calamitous’ event serves to establish a threshold, by reference to the
nature of the event, whereby a only extreme events are covered, that b causation require-
ments result in one or more of four possible outcomes: widespread loss of life, great human
suffering and distress, mass displacement or large-scale material or environmental damage
and, the nature of the event is further qualified by the requirement that any, or all, of the
four possible outcomes, as applicable, result in the serious disruption of the functioning
of society.
28 Art. 3a ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters 2016. The
Commission decided not to follow the contemporary thinking in the humanitarian assistance
community which conceptualized a disaster as being the consequence of an event, namely
the serious disruption of the functioning of society caused by that event. Instead, it decided
to shift the emphasis back to the earlier conception of “disaster” as being a specific event,
since it was embarking on the formulation of a legal instrument, which required a more
concise and precise legal definition, as opposed to one that is more policy oriented.
29 Art. 3 Ibid. No limitation is included concerning the origin of the event, that is whether
it is natural or human-made, in recognition of the fact that disasters often arise from
complex sets of causes that may include both wholly natural elements and contributions
from human activities.
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‘The purpose of the Draft Articles is to facilitate the adequate and effective
response to disasters, and reduction of the risk of disasters, so as to meet the
essential needs of the persons concerned, with full respect for their rights.’30
The Draft Articles don’t cover the question of how rights are to be enforced.
This question is left to be answered under the relevant rules of international
law themselves.31 The Draft Articles are based on principles of human dig-
nity,32 human rights (Article 5), and humanitarian principles (Article 6). The
Draft Articles also refer to cooperation in response to disasters, disaster risk
reduction, and the duty to seek and offer assistance. Under the principle of
human dignity, an affected State holds the primary role in the protection of
human dignity, by virtue of its primary role in the direction, control, coordina-
tion and supervision of disaster relief assistance. Furthermore, each State shall
be guided by the imperative to respect and protect the inherent dignity of the
human person when taking measures to reduce the risk of disasters.33 The
human rights obligation of States are not restricted to avoiding interference
with people’s rights (respect), but may extend, as required by the rules in
question, to protection of their rights by, inter alia, adopting a number of
measures varying from passive non-interference to active ensuring of the satis-
faction of individual needs, all depending on the concrete circumstances. In
light of the scope of the Draft Articles, set out in draft Article 2, such measures
also extend to the prevention and avoidance of conditions that might lead to
the violation of human rights.34 The ILC specifically refers to the obligations
under the right to life.35
4.1.2 The Internally Displaced Persons framework
The internally displaced persons framework focusses on displacement. As it
does not specifically focusses on displacement due to sudden-onset disasters,
this framework also has to be identified as rights and guarantees for this type
of internal displacement. In other words, it needs to be established in greater
detail what these guarantees mean in the context of sudden-onset disaster
displacement. Although many IDP principles refer explicitly to disasters, it is
not the cause of the displacement (the disaster) that entitles them to protection,
30 Art. 2 Ibid.
31 Art. 2 Ibid., commentary 8.
32 Art. 4 Ibid., commentary 1: ‘Human dignity is the core principle that informs and underpins
international human rights law. In the context of the protection of persons in the event
of disasters, human dignity is situated as a guiding principle for any action to be taken
in the context of the provision of relief assistance, in disaster risk reduction and in the
ongoing evolution of applicable laws.’
33 Art. 4. Ibid., commentary 6.
34 Art. 5. Ibid., commentary 4.
35 Art. 5. Ibid., commentary 6.
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but the fact that they are forcedly displaced. Protection is offered when IDPs
are forced or obliged to flee. This element of force will be easily met, when
whole areas are for example destroyed by typhoons or submerged. However,
small-scale disasters, or a series thereof, may also displace people in a less
visible way. These people are at risk not to be recognised as being forcedly
displaced.36 Several IDP instruments also contain a threshold of ‘widespread
human, material, economic or environmental losses’. It is debatable if (a series
of) small-scale disasters meets this threshold.
The Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons
Even though it is an instrument that focuses on displacement, the Guiding
Principles explicitly mention natural disasters in the (descriptive) definition
on IDPs. The UN and the Representative of the UN Secretary General on the
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons in particular, have also clarified
that this definition covers all climate change-related displacement.37 This
definition gives no minimum threshold for sudden-onset disasters.
Under the Guiding Principles, States have (positive) duties to prevent, as
much as possible, the displacement of their people directly caused by disasters.
In case of natural disasters, States are not allowed to forcibly evacuate (and
thus displace) parts of their population, unless such the safety and health of
those affected requires their evacuation and all feasible alternatives are
explored.38 Section 3 of the Guiding Principles requires protection for IDPs
during their displacement, where section 5 focusses on protection during return
or resettlement after the natural disaster.
One of the main protection gaps under the Guiding Principles is that those
moving pre-emptively, are not covered.39 This type of migration is often
considered voluntary and thus does not qualify as forced migration as required
under the Guiding Principles. As such, the Guiding Principles do not address
migration as a coping strategy, but only migration as a means of last resort.
In practice it can however be very beneficial to plan for relocation, as this will
allow for a safer and often more successful resettlement.
Kampala Convention and Great Lakes Protocols
The Kampala Convention also refers to natural or human-made disaster in
its definition on IDPs. As the Guiding Principles, it gives no minimum threshold
of loss due to the sudden-onset disaster. It offers further protection than the
Guiding Principles in the sense that it is legally binding. The Kampala Conven-
36 If frequent disasters prevent the possibility to earn a living and support the family, can
this still be framed as forced migration, or is this a voluntary economic type of migration?
This will have to be determined in future on a case to case basis.
37 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 10 and 11. See for example IASC Working Group 2008.
38 Guiding Principles, Art. 61d and 71. See also § 4.5.1.
39 Koser 2008, p. 17 and Gromilova 2015, p. 93.
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tion covers broadly the same obligations as the Guiding Principles, but also
requires States to establish a legal framework for preventing internal displace-
ment and protecting and assisting IDPS.40 It focuses on elaborating State re-
sponsibility and it provides for an elaborate accountability and monitoring
mechanism. When States refrain from protecting their people in the event of
disasters, they must make reparation for damage to the people affected.41
The clear designation of duty bearers helps to ensure that rights do not remain
in a kind of legal vacuum where authorities do not really feel responsible for
implementing them.42
The Kampala Convention contains several provisions specifically dealing
with displacement due to natural disasters: States Parties shall devise early
warning systems, in the context of the continental early warning system, in
areas of potential displacement, establish and implement disaster risk reduction
strategies, emergency and disaster preparedness and management measures
and, where necessary, provide immediate protection and assistance to internal-
ly displaced persons.43 The IDP Protocol lays down State duties in relation
to disaster emergency preparedness.44
Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solution for IDPs
The Inter Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for
IDPs applies for: ‘A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or
a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental
losses which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope
using its own resources.’45 Small scale disasters are thus not covered under
these Guidelines. For disasters that meet the threshold, the IDP Framework
can provide guidance on both the concept of a durable solutions and ways
to achieve it.
The IDP Framework focusses on the timeframe after the migration.46 It
aims to provide clarity on the concept of a durable solution and provides
general guidance on how to achieve it. The purpose of this Framework is: to
foster a better understanding of the concept of durable solutions for the intern-
ally displaced, to provide general guidance on the process and conditions
necessary for achieving a durable solution; and to assist in determining to what
40 Kampala Convention, Art. 2c.
41 Art. 12 (3) Kampala Convention.
42 Kälin, Schrepfer 2013, p. 17 and 18.
43 Morel 2010, p. 15 and 16 and Morel 2014, p. 95.
44 IDP Protocol to the Great Lakes Pact, Art. 35 and 64c as described in Morel 2014, p. 95.
45 IASC Framework on Durable Solution for IDPs, Annex I: Glossary.
46 IDPs need to be able to resume a normal life by achieving a durable solution. As articulated
in principle 28 of the Guiding Principles, IDPs have a right to a durable solution and often
need assistance in their efforts. Guiding Principles 28-30 set out the rights of IDPs to durable
solutions, the responsibilities of national authorities, and the role of humanitarian and
development actors to assist durable solutions.
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extent a durable solution has been achieved. Being of a generic character, the
Framework needs to be applied in light of the specific situation and context.
The Framework has not developed new rights, but maps the most relevant
actions that can be taken to achieve durable solutions, such as to inform those
displaced, provide access to actors supporting durable solutions and effective
monitoring, to support family reunification and to provide access to effective
remedies and justice.
4.1.3 Conclusion on sudden-onset disasters
As human rights instruments don’t explicitly refer to disasters, the general
rules thus have to be identified as rights and guarantees relevant to the pro-
tection of persons from forced displacement due to sudden onset disasters.
As they protect all people at all times, they in theory cover small scale disasters
and disasters that do not exceed the ability of affected communities. The
Operational Guidelines, the ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons
in the Event of Disasters and the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for
IDPs, have identified human rights in a disaster context. However, all these
instruments limit their applicability to serious disasters or calamitous events.
Even though, in theory, a series of small-scale disasters may be considered
a serious disaster or calamitous event, most small-scale disasters will be
excluded from the protection offered under these instruments. Therefore, even
though sudden-onset disaster forced displacement is recognised and protected
under various instruments, there are still some protection gaps. Many disasters
will not meet the threshold of a serious disruption of the functioning of a
community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or
environmental losses. These environmental refugees will have to fall back on
protection under the general human rights framework that suffers from a lack
of clarity with respect to displaced people and often struggles with the enforce-
ment in general.
Another protection gap is caused by the requirement of an element of force,
such as in the Guiding Principles. As only forced displacement is covered,
those migrating due to sudden-onset disasters need to demonstrate that the
migration is forced. As has been discussed above, oftentimes small-scale
disasters lead to early migration as adaptation and lack clarity on the element
of force. The element of force is also adopted in regional instruments such
as the Kampala Convention. Evidently these instrument should not protect
those moving voluntary, but in practice it may be very difficult to differentiate
between voluntary and forced migration.
Finally, the instruments for displacement within States lies the burden of
protection with the home State. Even though this is a logical consequence of
the principle of State sovereignty, in practice it is often developing States that
are hit hardest by environmental degradation. The burden of protection will
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therefore mainly lie with those States least able to carry this burden. When
sudden-disasters are caused by climate change, the States burdened with
protection responsibilities are often the States that have contributed the least
to the (anthropogenic) climate change (see chapter 7).
4.2 SLOW-ONSET DISASTERS
Most of the instruments that apply to sudden-onset disasters also apply to
slow-onset disasters.47 However, the protection possibilities are far more
limited. In the literature, those migrating due to slow-onset disasters are
generally considered to suffer from the biggest protection gap. Part of this
protection gap results from the fact that those who move primarily due to
gradual environmental degradation are often less visible than those who move
due to sudden-onset disasters. The decision to migrate is complex and multi-
causal, therefore there is a lack of a clear causal relation between the environ-
mental degradation and the reason to migrate. This is highly relevant from
a legal perspective, as many IDP protection regimes are limited to protection
for a certain cause. Another reason for the protection gap is the lack of a clear
element of force in the decision to migrate because the element of force is only
obvious at the latest stages of degradation.48 Therefore, those moving as a
result of slow-onset degradation are more likely to be unjustly considered
economic or voluntary migrants.
In practice, the legal requirements of causality and force, do not concur
with the reality of displacement as a rational adaptation response. Migration
as adaptation can be a very rational strategy that can prevent unplanned and
emergency migration and can allow others to stay in the area. Planned migra-
tion could also minimize the negative consequences, including loss of life or
property, and the risk of provoking instability in host areas.49 Migration
therefore should be considered as covering both a form of adaptation, as well
as a sign that other types of adaptation have failed.
47 An example of a convention that deals specifically with gradual environmental degradation
is the UNCCD.
48 For a more detailed analysis, see Aghazarm, Laczko 2009, and Kolmannskog 2008. In this
paper, Kolmannskog gives the example of small-scale farmer, who finally abandons his
land due to gradual soil degradation, who leaves because there is an increasing lack of
opportunities of livelihood. In this aspect he or she is like the so-called economic migrant.
Gradual environmental degradation can cause significantly more far-reaching and permanent
migration than sudden disasters. The question of choice is linked to the degree of severity.
When is the soil so degraded that the farmer is forced leave? At what stage in this gradual
process are we dealing with forced migration rather than voluntary migration? These are
questions that are best answered on a case-by-case basis, and there is a risk that many
migrants will be treated as economic migrants in a liberal-political interpretation of law.
49 See for example UNGA Res. 66/285, Protection of and assistance to internally displaced
persons 2011.
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4.2.1 The human rights framework
In an annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-
General on ‘The Slow onset effects of climate change and human rights protec-
tion for cross-border migrants’, it is recognized that slow onset events can
negatively impact an array of internationally guaranteed human rights. These
rights include the rights to adequate food, water, health, and housing, as well
as the rights to participation and information.50 It also considers that:
‘These risks are linked to human mobility in at least two general ways. First, risks
to human rights in situ contribute to vulnerability, which in turn can act as a driver
of migration or displacement. Second, there are specific impacts to the human rights
of migrants and displaced persons that need to be addressed.’51
Those displaced within national borders are entitled to the full range of human
rights guarantees by a given State, irrespective of the reason for migration.
A human rights-based approach can:
‘shift the focus to the risks slow onset events pose to human rights, enabling States
to take action before severe harm occurs and ensure meaningful participation of
those affected by climate change. Such an approach strengthens arguments for
proactive measures, to prevent displacement by enabling people to stay in condi-
tions under which their human rights are respected, to allow for migration within
conditions that protect human rights as a means of adaptation, or to facilitate
human rights responsive planned relocation.’52
However, in order to demonstrate human rights violations, the causality
between the effect on the human rights and State behaviour has to be con-
structed. This will be very complex due to the slow and invisible process of
degradation. Only in the very last instance, threats to life and other rights will
be visible. As slow-onset degradation will regularly lead to displacement before
the situation becomes life threatening, this seriously limits the benefits of
human rights protection.53 Also, for those affected by slow-onset disasters,
50 HRC UN Doc A/HRC/37/CRP.4, The Slow onset effects of climate change and human
rights protection for cross-border migrants, 22 March 2018, para 5.
51 Ibid., para 5.
52 Ibid., para 10.
53 The Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–30 highlights the need to develop
disaster risk reduction policies based on information on ‘persons and communities parti-
cularly exposed to disaster risks, and to formulate ‘public policies, where applicable, aimed
at addressing the issues of prevention […] of human settlements in disaster risk zones’
It also calls for the promotion of ‘transboundary cooperation […] to build resilience and
reduce disaster risk, including […] displacement risk.’
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it will be hard to bring an individual complaint to for example the ICCPR, as:
‘he or she must show either that an act or an omission of a State party has
already adversely affected his or her enjoyment of such right, or that such
an effect is imminent.’54 So far, it is unlikely that the Committee will accept
threats to the right to life by climate change as an imminent threat.55
Apart from obligations of States not to intervene unduly in the enjoyment
of a particular right (respect) or to prevent third parties from unduly inter-
fering in the right-holder’s enjoyment of a particular right (protect), human
rights also imposes obligations on a State to, as appropriate, facilitate, provide
or promote access to economic, social and cultural rights (fulfil). Human rights
can therefore provide with positive obligations for States to guarantee
minimum standards of living that should be reached for all humans. In this
context, the Secretary-General pointed out that, movements triggered by slow-
onset disasters, may require more emphasis on the positive obligations of
States. States need ‘to anticipate, plan ahead and take measures to prevent
or mitigate conditions likely to bring about displacement and threaten human
rights. This precautionary role is based on positive obligations and actions,
rather than the negative obligation of non-interference in human rights.’56
When minimum standards are provided for all people, this may prevent forced
migration. This prevention of forced displacement is an achievable option,
as gradual degradation takes place over a longer period of time. This means
there is actually time to prevent migration. States could take for example
‘environmental adaptation measures to minimize degradation (e.g. soil erosion)’
or they could ‘address a wide range of social issues at the local level. These
can include pre-emptive measures such as economic diversification, the devel-
opment of alternative forms of livelihoods, addressing issues related to the
management of natural resources and putting in place appropriate social safety
nets for the most vulnerable sectors of the population.’57
Procedural obligations include informing the population about possible
dangers and risks. If Environmental Impact Assessments demonstrate possible
risks, people affected should be included in the process of determining
Zetter 2008, p. 16 and 17. One could argue that many of the effects of climate change are
already imminent, even though they may not happen for years, because their causes are
occurring now and they will soon be difficult or impossible to forestall. Knox 2009, p. 489-
490.
54 HRC, Aalbersberg and 2,084 other Dutch Citizens v. The Netherlands 2006, para 6.3. This case
is cited in McAdam 2011, p. 51.
55 McAdam 2011, p. 50 and 51. However, at the national level, the Dutch Court of Appeal
ruled that ‘the State fails to fulfil its duty of care pursuant to Articles 2 and 8 ECHR by
not wanting to reduce emissions by at least 25% by end-2020.‘ The State of The Netherlands
v. Urgenda Foundation, The Hague Court of Appeal C/09/456689/ HA ZA 13-1396, Ruling
of 9 October 2018, para 73.
56 UNGA Res. 66/285, Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons 2011,
para 54.
57 Ibid., para 55.
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measures to prevent, mitigate or compensate negative effects. At a bare
minimum, the State should inform those potentially affected, so they can make
well-informed decisions. In the final stages, when the degradation has become
a source of forced migration, States should actively evacuate potentially
affected populations.
Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2011 Operational Guidelines on the Protection
of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters
The Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of
Natural Disasters58 have been drafted with the consequences of quick-onset
natural disasters in mind and focusses on disaster relief.59 These rules can
also be relevant for slow-onset disasters, as they can provide with Guidelines
of how States should act. However, an important limitation is the low visibility
and the problems of identification of those affected by slow-onset disasters.
As a result, disaster relief and recovery efforts for gradual disasters are often
not conducted or only at the very last instant when the risk to life is actual
or imminent.
Another important limitation of the Operational Guidelines it that it applies
only for: ‘A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society
causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which
exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own
resources.’60 Small scale disasters are thus not covered under these Guidelines.
However, a range of small slow-onset disasters may force people into displace-
ment. Also, even for bigger events, slow-onset disasters naturally evolve slowly
and only in the last instance, it will be possible to demonstrate a widespread
loss that exceeds the capacity of the community. This will leave the entire
timeframe of possible adaptation, mitigation and planning for migration
underutilized.
ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters
As mentioned in § 4.1.1 on the ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons
in the Event of Disasters, a disaster is considered a calamitous event or series
of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great human suffering and
distress, mass displacement, or large-scale material or environmental damage,
thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of society. For the gradual environ-
mental degradation to be considered ‘calamitous’ in the sense required by the
Draft Articles, it has to result in one or more of four possible outcomes: wide-
spread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, mass displacement or
large-scale material or environmental damage. This will often be hard to
58 IASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters,
January 2011.
59 See § 4.1.1 sudden-onset disasters IASC Operational Guidelines.
60 Ibid., Annex I: Glossary.
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demonstrate, as most people leave before that stage will be reached. There
won’t be a sudden mass displacement of people, as most of them will leave
when they see an opportunity and only the most vulnerable stay behind.
At the same time, the commentary on the Draft Articles explains that ‘the
draft articles apply equally to sudden-onset events (such as an earthquake
or tsunami) and to slow-onset events (such as drought or sea-level rise), as
well as frequent small-scale events (floods or landslides).’61 Future practice
must demonstrate how this instrument will be applied. Especially in the
context of slow-onset disasters, high levels of protection could be reached by
preventing displacement through adaptation or mitigation. At this stage of
prevention, the situation would not be calamitous.
4.2.2 The Internally Displaced Persons framework
To the extent that movement has been forced, persons would also qualify for
increased assistance and protection as a vulnerable group in accordance with
the framework on Internal Displacement.
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
The Guiding Principles explicitly include disasters in the definition and include
slow-onset disaster displacement.62 However, causality and force may be
difficult to construct in individual situations due to the slow-onset character.
Many people may be unjustly qualified as voluntary migrants. Especially for
those moving pre-emptively, the Guiding Principles will often not apply due
to the absence of force in the reason to migrate.63 As force is a prerequisite,
the presence of force needs to be decided on a case-to-case basis at the moment
of migration. However, slow-onset degradation is often not linear. Areas may
for example be too dry for human habitation in one year, but may be habitable
the next. It is conceivable that someone who leaves voluntarily can be con-
sidered forcedly displaced when return is impossible due to aggravated
circumstances of environmental degradation. It is also conceivable that some-
one left under stress, but can now return due to improved circumstances. It
is for those reasons that Zetter concludes that: ‘it is less clear if slow-onset
61 ILC, Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, with commentaries,
2016.
62 Kolmannskog 2008, p. 10 ad 11. See for example IASC Working Group 2008. The same
approach is taken by the UNHCR. One of the ‘Main messages’ is that ‘The Guiding Prin-
ciples on Internal Displacement, as a reflection of existing international law, apply to
situations of internal displacement caused by climate-related processes. Thus, there is no
need for a new set of principles in relation to internal displacement in the context of climate
change.’ UNHCR 2011.
63 Koser 2008, p. 17 and Gromilova 2015, p. 93.
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climate change – and thus the displacement impacts – would be interpreted
as a “disaster” under the Guiding Principles.’64
Kampala convention and IDP Protocol
The Kampala Convention’s definition of IDP for instance, mirrors the Guiding
Principles, so the limitations of the Guiding Principles on including slow-onset
related displacement in their protection sphere, also apply for the Kampala
Convention. The Kampala Convention does explicitly refer to climate change65
that – as a type of gradual degradation – indicates that gradual degradation
is meant to be covered by the Convention. Even with this intention, gradual
environmental degradation is often not visible and often not perceived as a
reason for migration or protection. This type of environmental degradation
is often only considered as a ground for protection at the very last instance.
IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons
The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons
refers to the Guiding Principles, so the same comments that were made on
its applicability under the Guiding Principles apply here. The Framework on
Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons aims to provide clarity on
the concept of a durable solution and provides general guidance on how to
achieve it. This Framework promotes durable solutions by restoring the human
rights of IDPs, including their rights to security, property, housing, education,
health and livelihoods. As the instrument is based on the characteristic of being
displaced, there is no substantial difference between sudden-onset and slow-
onset disasters.
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa
The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (hereafter: UNCCD)
stresses in its preamble the significant affectation of sustainable development
through desertification-induced displacement and migration. The objective
of this Convention is:
‘to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought in countries experienc-
ing serious drought and/ or desertification, particularly in Africa, through effective
action at all levels, supported by international cooperation and partnership arrange-
ments, in the framework of an integrated approach which is consistent with Agenda
21, with a view to contributing to the achievement of sustainable development in
affected areas.’
64 Zetter 2011, p. 21.
65 Kampala Convention, Art. 54 ‘States Parties shall take measure to protect and assist persons
who have been internally displaced due to natural or human made disasters, including
climate change.‘ [emphasis added]
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The UNCCD refers in several Articles to migration and creates additional
obligations in its Regional Implementation Annexes. For Africa, it defines that
National action programmes shall define and apply population and migration
policies to reduce population pressure on land.66 It also defines that Sub-
regional action plans ‘shall focus on: [...] (f) early warning systems and joint
planning for mitigating the effects of drought, including measures to address
the problems resulting from environmentally induced migrations.’67 For Asia,
the UNCCD emphasises that, ‘the Parties shall, as appropriate, take into con-
sideration [...]: (d) the significant impact of conditions in the world economy
and social problems such as poverty, poor health and nutrition, lack of food
security, migration, displaced persons and demographic dynamics.’ [emphasis
added]68 For Latin America and the Caribbean, the UNCCD emphasises that:
‘the parties shall take into consideration (c) a sharp drop in the productivity of
ecosystems being the main consequence of desertification and drought, taking the
form of a decline in agricultural, livestock and forestry yields and a loss of bio-
logical diversity; from the social point of view, the results are impoverishment,
migration, internal population movements, and the deterioration of the quality of life;
the region will therefore have to adopt an integrated approach to problems of
desertification and drought by promoting sustainable development models that
are in keeping with the environmental, economic and social situation in each
country.’69 [emphasis added]
This Convention can therefore be instrumental in the protection of those
forcedly displaced by slow-onset disasters. The strong focus on prevention
can create possibilities for mitigation and adaptation.
The Paris Agreement
The Paris Agreement includes language in its preamble that acknowledges
both human rights and migrants and calls on Parties to ‘respect, promote and
consider’ the human rights of migrants when taking measures to address
climate change.70 The Paris Agreement explicitly recognizes the importance
of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the
adverse effects of climate change. Accordingly, it calls for cooperation and
facilitation to enhance understanding, action and support, for slow-onset
events.71 Parties also
66 UNCCD, Art. 8(2).
67 Ibid., Art. 11.
68 Ibid., Art. 2.
69 Ibid., Art. 2.
70 Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21 2015 FCCC/CP/2015/L9/Rev1 preamble.
71 Art. 8(4c) Paris Agreement, 2015.
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‘recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage
associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather
events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing
the risk of loss and damage.’ [emphasis added]72
These obligations and further developments will be more broadly discussed
under the responsibility approach.73
4.2.3 Loss of State territory and the legal framework
All types of loss of territory may pose a threat to human rights. For example
a threat to cultural survival for those societies whose territories and ways of
life are threatened.74 Such societies may also face challenges in using migra-
tion as a coping strategy as a result of discrimination in receiving locations.
Apart from the right to culture, the right to self-determination75 may be
threatened.76 Based on the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slova-
kia)77 judgement of 25 September 1997, Zetter claims that some environmental
issues could give rise to successful protection claims under international human
rights law. For example, a person whose house will be imminently and per-
manently submerged in water may be able to claim a right to protection under
international law in that their right to life is at risk.78 The obligations on States
to protect these rights may be invoked in such circumstances of actual and
immediate threats. A failure to offer the necessary protection would thereby
be in breach of such a State’s international human rights obligations to its own
citizens.79 As for other types of slow-onset disasters it will be hard to demon-
strate when and if these rights are violated.
72 Art. 8(1) Paris Agreement, 2015.
73 See § 7.2.5.
74 UNGA UN Doc A/64/350, Report of the Secretary-General on Climate change and its
possible security implications 2009.
75 The Maldives provided ‘a legal brief for the position that states have duties under human
rights treaties and customary international law to take steps to protect the human rights
of those outside their territory as well as within it. In particular, the Maldives’ submission
argued that the right to self-determination, by its nature, imposes duties on states outside
their own territory, that the text and authoritative interpretations of the ICESCR establish
that its parties have extraterritorial duties of international assistance and cooperation to
promote its rights, and that even the ICCPR, which has been interpreted to impose duties
on states only to respect the rights of those within their ‘effective control’, applies with
respect to effects of climate change so drastic as to place the residents of small island states
under the effective control of the states causing the harm.’ Knox 2009, p. 494 and 495.
76 UNGA UN Doc A/64/350, Report of the Secretary-General on Climate change and its
possible security implications 2009.
77 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v. Slovakia 1997, para 53.
78 Zetter 2011, p. 17.
79 Vliet van der 2014, p. 156.
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Violations of human rights may also lead to non-refoulement obligations
for host States. However, the obligations of these States appear to be more
limited than one would consider. The New Zealand Immigration and Pro-
tection Tribunal has decided on cases that involve inundation due to sea-level
rise. The tribunal considered that the disasters that occur in Tuvalu derive
from vulnerability of natural hazards such as droughts, hurricanes, and inunda-
tion due to sea-level rise and storm surges. The content of Tuvalu’s positive
obligations to take steps to protect the life of persons within its jurisdiction
from such hazards must necessarily be shaped by this reality. Accordingly,
an affected State would be faced with ‘an impossible burden’ were it required,
as a matter of law, to mitigate the underlying environmental drivers of these
hazards in order to comply with the obligation to protect against the arbitrary
deprivation of life.80
In 2020, the HRC for the first time explicitly ruled that where somebody’s
life is at risk or where the adverse impact of climate change means they will
be living in inhumane or degrading conditions, host governments have a legal
obligation not to send them back.81 However, while recognising that a general
situation of violence can develop in future, the HRC ruled that the situation
in the Republic of Kiribati has not reached that threshold yet.82 The author
(i.e. complainant) also fails to demonstrate that the the obligation of non-
refoulement would apply on an individual basis.The Committee considers
that the author failed to demonstrate that: ’supply of fresh water is inaccessible,
insufficient or unsafe so as to produce a reasonably foreseeable threat of a
health risk that would impair his right to enjoy a life with dignity or cause
his unnatural or premature death.’83 Further, with regard to the claim of being
deprived of his means of subsistence, the Committee considered that ‘the
author has not established that the assessment of the domestic authorities was
clearly arbitrary or erroneous in this regard, or amounted to a denial of
justice.’84 Finally, with regard to the argument that the Republic of Kiribati
will be uninhabitable in 10 to 15 years due to overpopulation and frequent
and increasingly intense flooding and breaches of sea walls,85 the Committee
is of the view that it ‘is not in a position to conclude that the assessment of
the domestic authorities that the measures by taken by the Republic of Kiribati
would suffice to protect the author’s right to life under article 6 of the Cov-
enant was clearly arbitrary or erroneous in this regard, or amounted to a denial
80 AC Tuvalu [2014] NZIPT 800517–520, para 75. See also § 5.2.1 life.
81 HRC, Views adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol,
concerning communication No. 2728/2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, 7 January
2020, para 9.3 and 9.4.
82 Ibid., para 9.7.
83 Ibid., para 9.8.
84 Ibid., para 9.9.
85 Ibid., para 9.10.
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of justice.’86 As the time-frame mentioned by the author allows for national
and international efforts to prevent a violation of the right to life, the Commit-
tee considers it premature to conclude that the right to life has been violated.
Interstingly though, in a separate dissenting opinion, Committee member
Vasilka Sancin regards that due to expert reports on a lack of implementation
of national policy’s to guarantee safe drinking water, ‘it falls on the State Party,
not the author, to demonstrate that the author and his family would in fact
enjoy access to safe drinking (or even potable) water in Kiribati, to comply
with its positive duty to protect life from risks arising from known natural
hazards.’87 She therefore disagreed ‘with the Committee’s conclusion that
the facts before it do not permit it to conclude that the author’s removal to
Kiribati violated his rights under article 6 (1) of the Covenant.’88 If this indi-
vidual dissenting opinion will be followed in future, this would place a much
bigger burden upon returning States to prove that returning people to Kiribati
and neigbouhring countries is not in violationg with the right to life, as long
as there are expert reports that justify such a shift of the burden of proof.
The other individual dissenting opnion by Committee member Duncan
Laki Muhumuza addresses the high threshold to constitute a violation of the
right to life. He considered that:
‘Whereas the risk to a person expelled or otherwise removed, must be personal
– not deriving from general conditions, except in extreme cases, the threshold
should not be too high and unreasonable. Even as the jurisprudence of the Commit-
tee emphasises a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that
a real risk of irreparable harm exists; it has been critical to consider all relevant
facts and circumstances, including the general human rights situation in the author’s
country of origin. As a necessary corollary to the high threshold, the Committee
has been careful to counterbalance a potentially unreachable standard, with the
need to consider all relevant facts and circumstances, which comprise among other
conditions – the grave situation in the author’s country.’89
The Committee member, therefore concluded that: ‘the author faces a real,
personal and reasonably foreseeable risk of a threat to his right to life as a
result of the conditions in Kiribati.’90 Even though the island has not been
submerged yet, he consideres that the threshold to a violation of the right to
life has been met. He argued that:
‘It would indeed be counterintuitive to the protection of life, to wait for deaths
to be very frequent and considerable; in order to consider the threshold of risk
86 Ibid., para 9.12.
87 Ibid., Annex 1, para 5.
88 Ibid., Annex 1, para 6.
89 Ibid., Annex 2, para 3.
90 Ibid., para 5.
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as met. It is the standard upheld in this Committee, that threats to life can be a
violation of the right, even if they do not result in the loss of life. […] Considering
the author’s situation and his family, balanced with all the facts and circumstances
of the situation in the author’s country of origin, reveals a livelihood short of the
dignity that the Convention seeks to protect.’91
Duncan Laki Muhumuza therefore pleads for a ‘human-sensitive approach
to human rights issues’. States should not place ‘an unreasonable burden of
proof on the author to establish the real risk and danger of arbitrary depriva-
tion of life – within the scope of Article 6 of the Covenant. […] the Committee
needs to handle critical and significantly irreversible issues of climate change,
with the approach that seeks to uphold the sanctity of human life.’92 He con-
sidered possible actions taken by Kiribati are currently insufficient to be
consistent with the standard of a dignified life.93
4.2.4 Conclusion on slow-onset disasters
Slow-onset disasters suffer from several legal complications: the degradation
must be considered a disaster; the degradation is often invisible; and the
migration is often considered voluntary. Even though the human rights frame-
work applies to everybody at all times, the general rules thus have to be
identified as rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of persons from
forced displacement due to slow onset disasters. Also, actual, human rights
violations will be hard to demonstrate. And rights affected are generally
difficult to enforce. For forced internal displacement, the Guiding Principles
apply. The benefit of the Guiding Principles is the explicit inclusion of disasters
in the definition, as a recognition that persons displaced by disasters also have
human rights and protection needs requiring international attention.94 It
provides with a more customized framework. However, its use is limited by
the difficulties of demonstrating that the displacement is forced. The Guiding
Principles have provided a basis for the creation of subsequent frameworks
and operational guidelines at the international, regional and national levels.
Many of these instruments require a substantial impact on the society that
exceeds their capability to deal with the damage on its own. This may be hard
to demonstrate for slow-onset disasters that take place over a longer period
of time and are not linear.
91 Ibid., para 5.
92 Ibid., Annex 2, para 1.
93 Ibid., Annex 2, para 6.
94 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009.
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4.3 ARMED CONFLICT
From a legal perspective, there is little benefit in framing conflict as a result
of environmental degradation.95 Apart from problems establishing causality
between environmental degradation and conflict, legal protection regimes are
more inclined to protect those who are forced to migrate due to conflict than
those who are forced to migrate due to environmental degradation.96 There-
fore, there is no benefit in framing conflict as being caused by environmental
degradation.
4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
Sometimes environmentally forced migration is caused by (industrial) pollution.
A big difference with other types of environmentally forced migration is that
there is a clear man-made cause for the migration.97 As the disasters are man-
made, there is a general opportunity for humans to prevent or reduce the
probability to prevent industrial disasters.98
4.4.1 The human rights framework
Industrial catastrophes and/or pollution clearly have effects on human rights.
For example, the HRC has affirmed that illicit traffic in, and improper manage-
ment and disposal of, hazardous substances and wastes constitute a serious
threat to a range of rights, including the rights to life and health and also ‘such
fundamental rights as the right of peoples to self-determination and permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, the right to development, the rights to […]
adequate food’.99 Under the ICCPR, ECHR, ACHR and ACHPR States have
accepted the duty to refrain from taking actions that directly violate the rights
of persons within the treaties‘ coverage. At a minimum, this would require
95 Bates also includes ecocide as a source of environmentally forced displacement Bates 2002.
This type of forced migration is not included in this research.
96 Conflict is also explicitly included in the scope of the IDP Guidelines. Human rights apply
always, so also in the context of conflict.
97 Sometimes it can be a mix of man-made and natural causes, for example with the 2011
Tsunami that contributed to the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Secondary impacts of natural
disasters can encompass impacts by the initial disaster on industrial installations and
infrastructure, e.g. damage to hydro dams or damage to pipelines and chemical factories
that may cause spills of hazardous materials which pose a threat to human health and lives,
Operational Guidelines.
98 Hens 2012.
99 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/22/43, Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human
rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environ-
ment 2012, para 21.
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a State to make sure that its own facilities do not emit pollutants or otherwise
cause environmental harm at levels that would infringe the enjoyment of the
protected rights. As Knox pointed out also private conduct must be regulated
to protect the environment.100 Knox argues that the treaties ‘seem to require
states to take the steps necessary to restrict private actors from causing environ-
mental harm that interferes with protected rights.’ And on the procedural level:
‘Finally, states might have other positive duties, such as ensuring adequate
remedies, in the event that these measures were not sufficient to prevent harm
from occurring.’101 With respect to State responsibility under the ICESCR, the
CESCR has made clear that the Covenant obliges States to refrain from ‘unlaw-
fully polluting air, water and soil, e.g. through industrial waste from State-
owned facilities’ and to refrain from ‘unlawfully diminishing or polluting
water.’102
The obligation to protect human rights from environmental harm does not
require the cessation of all activities that may cause any environmental de-
gradation.103 The ACmHPR, for example, has made it clear that the ACHPR does
not require States to forego all oil development.104 The Court of Justice of
the Economic Community of West African States has stressed the need for
the State to hold accountable actors who infringe human rights through oil
pollution, and to ensure adequate reparation for victims. In the case SERAP
v. Nigeria,105 the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West Afri-
can States ruled that the State authority failed to prevent the oil extraction
industry from doing harm to the environment, livelihood and quality of life
to the people of the region. The State has adopted legislation, created agencies
and allocated funds, but fell short of compliance with international obligations
in matters of environmental protection as these measures just remained on
paper and were not accompanied by additional and concrete measures aimed
at preventing the occurrence of damage or ensuring accountability, with the
effective reparation of the environmental damage suffered. The court ordered
the Federal Republic of Nigeria to: ‘i. Take all effective measures, within the
shortest possible time, to ensure restoration of the environment of the Niger
Delta; ii. Take all measures that are necessary to prevent the occurrence of
100 Knox 2009, p. 172.
101 Ibid., p. 172.
102 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 2000, para 34, CESCR, General Comment No. 15 2003,
para 21 and UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/25/53, Promotion and protection of all human rights,
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development 2013.
103 See more on this topic § 7.3.2.
104 ACmHPR, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria 2001, para 54.
105 The Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS Court
of Justice, SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 2012. See also § 3.1.2 the right to life, the
right to health, the right to food, the right to water and § 3.1.4 indigenous peoples and
vulnerable groups.
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damage to the environment; iii. Take all measures to hold the perpetrators
of the environmental damage accountable.’106
The ECtHR subsequently has held that States have discretion to strike a
balance between environmental protection and other issues of societal import-
ance, such as economic development and the rights of others.107 But the bal-
ance cannot be unreasonable, or result in unjustified, foreseeable infringements
of human rights. Similarly, the ECtHR has decided cases in which it held that
States failed to strike a fair balance between protecting rights from environ-
mental harm and protecting other interests.108 The ECtHR ruled that the right
to life was applicable in cases concerning toxic emissions from a fertiliser
factory.109 In the Zander v. Sweden Case, the ECtHR ruled that Article 6 ECHR
(right to property) was violated due to pollution of a drinking water well from
a nearby dump.110 In the majority of the cases, the ECtHR considered pollution
a violation of Article 8 ECHR. In Lopez Ostra v. Spain, the ECtHR found that
the State had not succeeded in striking a fair balance between the interest of
the town’s economic well-being – that of having a waste-treatment plant –
and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right to respect for her home
and her private and family life.111 In Taşkin and Others v. Turkey, the ECtHR
found that Turkey had failed to discharge its obligation to guarantee the
applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life. The Court noted
in particular that the authorities’ decision to issue an operating permit for the
gold mine had in May 1997 been annulled by the Supreme Administrative
Court, which, after weighing the competing interests in the present case against
each other, based its decision on the applicants’ effective enjoyment of the right
to life and the right to a healthy environment and concluded that the permit
did not serve the public interest. However, the gold mine was not ordered
to close until February 1998.112 In Fadayeva v. Russia, the ECtHR noted that
the Russian authorities had authorised the operation of a polluting enterprise
in the middle of a densely populated town. Since the toxic emissions from
that enterprise exceeded the safe limits established by domestic legislation
and might have endangered the health of those living nearby, the authorities
had established that a certain territory around the plant should be free of any
dwelling. However, those legislative measures had not been implemented in
practice.113 In this case, the ECtHR bases it’s finding of a violation on the fact
that Turkey had not enacted its own national laws. In the Case of Giacomellyi
106 ECOWAS Court of Justice, SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 2012.
107 Council of Europe 2012, p. 20.
108 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/25/53, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development 2013.
109 ECtHR, Guerra and Others v. Italy 1998, para 60 and 62.
110 ECtHR, Zander v. Sweden 1993.
111 ECtHR, López Ostra v. Spain 1994.
112 ECtHR, Taþkın and Others v. Turkey 2004, para 121 and 122.
113 ECtHR, Fadeyeva v. Russia 2005 para 11-19.
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v. Italy the violation of Article 8 ECHR was based on the lack of supervision
of potentially dangerous situations. The plant for the treatment of toxic indus-
trial waste was not asked to undertake a prior environmental-impact assess-
ment (IEA) until 1996, seven years after commencing its activities involving
the detoxification of industrial waste.114 The ECtHR also based its ruling on
the fact that the Ministry of the Environment had found on two occasions that
the plant’s operation was incompatible with environmental regulations on
account of its unsuitable geographical location and that there was a specific
risk to the health of the local residents.115 In Tãtar v. Romania, the ECtHR
also focused on the duty to assess, to a satisfactory degree, the risks that the
activity of the company operating the mine might entail. Based on that assess-
ment, the State must take suitable measures in order to protect the rights of
those concerned to respect for their private lives and homes, and more gen-
erally their right to enjoy a healthy and protected environment. The State can
comply with this obligation by regulating the authorising, setting-up, operating,
safety and monitoring of industrial activities. The ECtHR also noted that the
absence of certainty with regard to current scientific and technical knowledge
could not justify any delay on the part of the State in adopting effective and
proportionate measures.116 In Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine, the ECtHR
found a violation of Article 8 ECHR as the State had not resettled the applicants,
nor found a different solution to diminish the pollution to levels that were
not harmful to people living in the vicinity of the industrial facilities, despite
its knowledge of the adverse environmental effects of the mine and factory.117
The ECSR has ruled that in the most serious cases of pollution where areas
become uninhabitable States can be held to violate Article 11 if they didn’t
take enough measures to show that they are making progress and making
best possible use of the resources at their disposal to overcome the pollu-
tion.118 The Council of Europe pointed out that: ‘Several Committee con-
clusions on State reports regarding the right to health, specifically indicate
that the measures required under Article 11, paragraph 1 should be designed
to remove the causes of ill health resulting from environmental threats such
as pollution.’119 It also considers that: ‘States are responsible for activities
which are harmful to the environment whether they are carried out by the
public authorities themselves or by a private company.’ and that: ‘Overcoming
pollution is an objective that can only be achieved gradually. Nevertheless,
States must strive to attain this objective within a reasonable time, by showing
measurable progress and making best possible use of the resources at their
114 ECtHR, Case of Giacomellyi v. Italy 2006, para 87 and 88.
115 Ibid., para 89.
116 ECtHR, Tatar v. Romania 2009.
117 ECtHR, Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine 2011.
118 ECSR, Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights MFHR v. Greece 2006.
119 Council of Europe 2012, p. 26.
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disposal.’120 Where there are threats of serious damage to human health,
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
appropriate measures. This is especially relevant in the context of climate
change where some effects are still being disputed.121
The IACmHR found in its Report on the Human Rights Situation in
Ecuador,122 that inhabitants were exposed to toxic by-products of oil exploita-
tion in their drinking and bathing water, which jeopardised their lives and
health. The commission stated that where environmental contamination and
degradation pose a persistent threat to human life and health, the right to life,
to physical security and integrity are implicated.123 The commission stated
that States must take reasonable measures to prevent the risk of harm to life
and health.
Even though various tribunals have found violations of human rights due
to pollution, this are mainly cases where the harm does not cross an inter-
national boundary. As Knox pointed out:
‘In that context, deference to a state‘s decision as to how much environmental harm
to allow is justifiable because the benefits and the costs of the actions causing the
harm are felt within a single polity. If that polity follows procedural safeguards
to ensure that all those affected are able to participate fully in the decision-making
process, then the resulting decision is entitled to a presumption of legitimacy.’124
In the context of climate change however, the situation is different as the
benefits are frequently felt in another State then the State in which the damage
occurs. So far, there is no clear extraterritorial application of human rights
law.125 However, human rights law still imposes duties on States to address
the internal effects of climate change and constrains their possible responses
to it.126 This includes a duty to regulate private conduct.127
International human rights bodies have confirmed that it is necessary to
protect the environment in order to protect rights to a healthy environment,
to life, to health, to property, and to an adequate standard of living. Central
in this protection are procedural rights, such as the obligration to provide
rights of access to environmental information, the obligation to facilitate
participation in environmental decision-making, for example by means of
consultation with those affected and the obligation to provide access to judicial
120 Ibid., p. 26.
121 Trilsch 2009.
122 IACmHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador 1997.
123 Scanlon, Cassar & Nemes 2004.
124 Knox 2009, p. 169.
125 See § 10.3.
126 Knox 2009, p. 169.
127 See § 12.2.
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recourse for claims alleging the violation of human rights as a result of en-
vironmental pollution.128
ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters
The Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters apply
to: ‘calamitous event or series of events resulting in widespread loss of life,
great human suffering and distress, mass displacement, or largescale material
or environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of
society.’129 This also covers environmental pollution. This pollution may be
sudden-onset or slow-onset in nature. The same comments that have been
made in the context of sudden-onset and slow-onset disasters also apply in
the context of pollution.130 In the context of pollution in particular Draft
Article 9 that focusses on disaster risk reduction is relevant. It requires States
to: ‘reduce the risk of disasters by taking appropriate measures, including
through legislation and regulations, to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for
disasters.’ If pollution is prevented, this will also prevent forced migration
due to environmental pollution.
4.4.2 The Internally Displaced Persons framework
When disasters are defined in legal instruments on IDPs, they are often referred
to as: a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society
causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses.131
It will depend on the scale of the industrial accident whether this threshold
will be met. If the standard is met, environmental pollution is covered under
this framework, even though the internally displaced persons frameworks don’t
make explicit reference to industrial accidents or pollution.
Under the Guiding Principles, the State has the duty to order and imple-
ment evacuations under the right to life where the safety or health of the
people affected is at risk. However, States are not allowed to forcibly evacuate
128 See for a more extensive overview Knox 2014.
129 Draft Art. 3a.
130 See § 4.1.1. and 4.2.1 ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Dis-
asters.
131 See for example the ASEAN 2005 Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency
Response of the Association of South East Asian Nations and the United Nations Inter-
national Strategy for Disaster Reduction UNISDR (currently operating under the name
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR)) defines disaster as a ‘serious
disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human,
material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the
affected community or society to cope using its own resources’ and natural hazards as
‘[n]atural process or phenomenon that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts,
property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or
environmental damage.’
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(and thus displace) parts of their population if this is not required by the safety
and health of the people affected or when all feasible alternatives have not
been explored. As the pollution may have either a sudden-onset or a slow-onset
character, the protection possibilities for sudden-onset disaster (§ 4.1.2) and
slow-onset disasters (§ 4.2.2) also apply in this context.
4.5 PLANNED RESETTLEMENT
Natural hazards will likely affect more people in the future. In this context,
moving and settling people in new locations might become an increasingly
viable protection option.132 Planned resettlement can be seen as a strategy
to reduce population pressures in areas with a fragile environment and it is
being understood as inevitable for seriously affected populations (displacement
out of harm’s way). In particular, resettlement as a strategy to mitigate harm
related to floods or sea-level rise is increasingly integrated in National Adapta-
tion Programmes of Action (NAPAs) resulting in concrete programmes to protect
affected populations. Planned resettlement can also take place in emergency
situations (for example after sudden-onset disasters), or when development
programmes or environmental conservation programmes make area’s unsuit-
able for human habitation.
Many governments are already contemplating and implementing measures
to move vulnerable populations out of harm’s way. However, the relocation
of at-risk populations to protect them from disasters and the impacts of en-
vironmental change, including the effects of climate change carries serious
risks for those it is intended to benefit, including the disruption of livelihoods
and loss of cultural practices.133 At the same time, in the context of climate
change, planned relocation may serve as an effective adaptation strategy.134
Planned resettlement can potentially affect various human rights. For
example: the right to an adequate standard of living,135 the right to culture,
the right to education, the right to food, the right to freedom from cruel
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to freedom of
movement and choice of residence, the right to freedom of opinion and ex-
pression, the right to health and well-being, the right to housing, the right
to information, the right to life, the right to participation, the right to peaceful
assembly and association, the right to private and family life, the right to
property, the right to religion, the right to remedy, the right to self-determina-
132 Brookings, Georgetown University & UNHCR 2015, p. 3.
133 Brookings, Georgetown University & UNHCR 2015, p. 3.
134 Ibid., p. 4.
135 Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, Annex
1 of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right
to an adequate standard of living, UN Doc A/HRC/4/18, 5 February 2007.
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tion, the right to water and sanitation, the right to work, the rights of the child,
and the equal rights of women and men to the enjoyment of their human
rights.136
The right of freedom of movement protects people against arbitrary dis-
placement. The obligation of States to refrain from, and protect against, forced
evictions from home(s) and land arises from several international legal instru-
ments that protect the human right to adequate housing and other related
human rights.137 The prohibition on arbitrary displacement extends to cases
of disaster and means that the safety and health of those affected must require
the forced evacuation or relocation.138 All feasible alternatives must have
been explored in order to avoid displacement altogether.139 ‘If planned re-
location is necessary – as is likely in the wake of certain climate and disaster
events – then those who are relocated should be given, amongst other things,
access to shelter and housing that is away from hazardous areas and in condi-
tions of safety, health, and family unity.’140 ‘The process must fully comply
with human rights law and should include the restoration or improvement
of living standards.’141
When planned resettlement involves whole populations or communities,
particular attention would need to be given to rights to enjoy and practice
one’s own culture and traditions and to continue to exercise economic rights
in their areas or countries of origin.142 The same protection must be offered
to categories of persons who have a special attachment to their lands, such
as indigenous people, peasants and pastoralists.143 With respect to the re-
location of indigenous people, the ‘ILO Convention on the Rights of Indigenous
people’ determines that relocation is allowed where considered necessary as
an exceptional measure. The free and informed consent of the people must
in such case be obtained, but where impossible, the relocation can still take
136 Ploeg van der, Vanclay 2017, p. 35. See also UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/4/18, Basic Principles
and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, Annex 1 of the Report
of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate
standard of living 2007, para 6.
137 These include the UDHR, the ICESCR (Article 11(1)), the CRC (Article 27(3)), the non-
discrimination provisions found in Article 14(2)(h), of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and Article 5(e) of the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/
4/18, Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement,
Annex 1 of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of
the right to an adequate standard of living 2007, para 1.
138 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 1998 E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, principle 6.2.d.
139 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 1998, principle 7.1.
140 HRC UN Doc A/HRC/37/CRP.4, The Slow onset effects of climate change and human
rights protection for cross-border migrants, 22 March 2018, para 43. Based on Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement 1998, principles 7 and 18.
141 Ibid., para 43.
142 UNHCR 2011, p. 6 and 7.
143 Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 99.
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place on the condition that appropriate procedures established at the national
level are followed that provide the opportunity for effective representation
of the people.144 Indigenous peoples must have the right to return to their
traditional lands as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist. In case
such return is impossible, the people must be provided with lands of quality
and legal status at least equal to that of the lands previously occupied by them.
Alternatively, compensation in money or in kind can be provided where the
people prefer so. In addition, relocated persons who have suffered loss or
injury must be fully compensated.145 The Declaration on the Rights on Indi-
genous People in addition requires that States must: ‘provide effective mechan-
isms for prevention of, and redress for any form of forced population transfer
which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights.’146
4.5.1 Out of harm’s way
When a family’s or community’s homes are no longer viable in residential
terms due to environmental degradation, internal relocation or international
resettlement may often be the only remedies available. Opposite to the right
of freedom of movement, policy makers now have to support the relocation
and resettlement of people as a durable remedy. The State’s duty to protect
people entails an obligation to help people move from zones where they face
a danger. A failure to assist people who cannot leave such zones on their own
may amount to a human rights violation if competent authorities knew or
should have known about the danger and had the capacity to act. The ECtHR
has ruled in the Öneryildiz v. Turkey and Budayeva and others v. Russia cases
that a failure to act resulted in a breach of a positive obligation under the right
to life.147 Non-discrimination may require that distinctions are made in the
State’s duty to protect in order to take into account special protection
needs.148
144 ILO Convention on the Rights of Indigenous People, Art. 16.
145 Ibid., Art. 16.
146 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, Art. 82. See also Morel 2014, p. 105 and
106.
147 It can be argued that in many areas it is foreseeable that climate change and disasters may
result in the need for relocation. See for example Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 11.
See § 3.1.2 the right to life.
148 After Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, the HRC received reports that the poor, and
in particular African-Americans, were disadvantaged because the rescue and evacuation
plans were based on the assumption that people would use their private vehicles, thus
disadvantaging those not owning a car. In the context of Hurricane Katrina, the HRC
highlighted the importance of ensuring that the rights of the poor, and in particular African-
Americans, are fully taken into consideration in the reconstruction plans with regard to
access to housing, education and healthcare Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 11 and 12.
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Resettlement outside emergency situations
From a legal perspective, resettlement outside emergency situations is compli-
cated, as there is no internationally-accepted definition as to when an area
is determined to be a) uninhabitable, and b) when the cause of the uninhabitab-
ility is the result of the effects of environmental degradation. As Ferris pointed
out, uninhabitability may be a bidirectional continuum rather than an end-
State. It is also unclear who decides when an area is uninhabitable: for
example, authorities that decide that relocation is necessary or the community
that resists relocation and calls for support for adaptation. With regard to the
cause, it is likely that the causes of the uninhabitability are the result of
multiple factors.149 Ferris explains that: ‘while it may be relatively easy to
identify uninhabitability in some cases – for example, if sea levels rise, as
projected, and coastal communities are inundated – it will be more difficult
to determine when extended periods of decreased rainfall cause permanent
changes to the environment (rather than normal climatic variation) and when
these periods are caused by climate change.’150 The difficulty to determine
uninhabitability may harm protection possibilities. This may be problematic
in the context of environmental degradation. Ferris therefore proposes that
‘an area will be considered as uninhabitable necessitating relocation when the
habitat has been irreversibly changed such that the majority of the affected
population could not survive and adaptation strategies have been exhausted
or are not feasible.’151
Forced relocation – as a measure of last resort – outside emergency situ-
ations requires a specific decision by an appropriate State authority. Those
forcedly displaced must be provided with full information on the reasons and
procedures for the displacement, the place of relocation and compensation;
and their free and informed consent must be sought. Moreover, authorities
must endeavour to involve affected persons in the management and planning
of the relocation (effective participation) and ensure that the right to an effect-
ive remedy, including the review of decisions, is respected.152
In a consultative process through a series of meetings between 2011 and
2015 which brought together representatives of States, international organiza-
tions, and experts from a wide range of disciplines and experiences, a ‘Guid-
ance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through
Planned Relocation’153 was developed. This Guidance described that the legal
and policy framework for planned relocation should, inter alia:
149 Ferris 2012a, p. 24-27.
150 Ibid., p. 24-27.
151 Ibid., p. 24-27.
152 Guiding Principle 7.
153 Guidance on protecting people from disasters and environmental change through planned
relocation 2015.
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‘a. provide a legal basis, in national law, for undertaking Planned Relocation;
b. articulate a national policy for undertaking Planned Relocation;
c. establish an institutional framework for undertaking Planned Relocation;
d. identify, define, and authorize roles and responsibilities at each relevant level
of government, including at the national, sub-national and local levels;
e. provide accountability mechanisms for Planned Relocation, acknowledging that
ultimate responsibility and accountability for a Planned Relocation should rest with
designated and competent State authorities;
f. define and explain the criteria for making decisions throughout a Planned Re-
location, including the foundational decision to initiate a Planned Relocation;
g. define actions that persons or groups of persons should take to initiate a Planned
Relocation and receive technical assistance from the State;
h. provide Relocated Persons and Other Affected Persons access to impartial and
equitable grievance, review, conflict resolution, and redress mechanisms throughout
a Planned Relocation;
i. provide for timely, sufficient, and sustainable funding for Planned Relocation;
and
j. ensure Planned Relocation is incorporated into other intersecting and crosscutting
issues and activities, including development and land-use frameworks and
plans.’154
Resettlement in emergency situations
In emergency situations, when consultation and participation of affected people
are difficult or even impossible, it is particularly important, with regard to
return, resettlement and recovery that special efforts are made to ensure the
full participation of internally displaced persons in the planning and manage-
ment of their return or resettlement and integration (Guiding Principle 28.2).
Guiding Principle 15(d) stipulates the right of internally displaced persons
to be protected against forcible return or resettlement to places where their
life, safety, liberty or health would be at risk. Returning a person to an area
that was recently struck by disaster, is generally disaster-prone or severely
environmentally degraded, may be in breach of the prohibition on forced
return reflected in Guiding Principle 15(d).155
4.5.2 Development displacement
Large development projects may require the resettlement of the people current-
ly living in the area. These Large-scale projects would create people who
qualify as being IDPs in any situation where expropriation or involuntary
resettlement was enacted and there was not a compelling case of public interest
154 Brookings, Georgetown University & UNHCR 2015, Principle 21.
155 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 12.
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or due process.156 The Guiding Principles define development induced dis-
placement as the involuntary displacement and resettlement of people and
communities by large-scale infrastructure and other projects (Principle 6(2)(c)).
Development displacement, differs from other types of climate refugees because
the timing of displacement is fixed and planned. The large majority of the
resettlements will be internal. The movement is clearly forced, but the main
distinguishing feature is that somebody or some institution is responsible for
a correct execution of the resettlement. The emphasis of the regulation of forced
resettlement is that the rights of the people forcedly displaced are re-
spected.157
As reflected in para 21 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Develop-
ment-based Evictions and Displacement:
‘States shall ensure that evictions only occur in exceptional circumstances. Evictions
require full justification given their adverse impact on a wide range of international-
ly recognized human rights. Any eviction must be (a) authorized by law; (b) carried
out in accordance with international human rights law; (c) undertaken solely for
the purpose of promoting the general welfare; (d) reasonable and proportional;
(e) regulated so as to ensure full and fair compensation and rehabilitation;158 and
(f) carried out in accordance with the present guidelines. The protection provided
by these procedural requirements applies to all vulnerable persons and affected
groups, irrespective of whether they hold title to home and property under domestic
law.’159
These Basic Principles cover obligations prior to evictions (para 37-44), during
evictions (para 45-51), and after an eviction (para 52-58). Prior to evictions,
the process should:
‘involve all those likely to be affected and should include the following elements:
(a) appropriate notice to all potentially affected persons that eviction is being
considered and that there will be public hearings on the proposed plans and
alternatives; (b) effective dissemination by the authorities of relevant information
in advance, including land records and proposed comprehensive resettlement plans
specifically addressing efforts to protect vulnerable groups; (c) a reasonable time
period for public review of, comment on, and/or objection to the proposed plan;
(d) opportunities and efforts to facilitate the provision of legal, technical and other
156 Ploeg van der, Vanclay 2017, p. 36.
157 For an analyses of the underlying principles of development displacement, see Ferris 2012a,
p. 4 and 5 and Ploeg van der, Vanclay 2017, p. 36.
158 For an analyses on the complications of compensation, see Ploeg van der, Vanclay 2017,
p. 42.
159 Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, Annex
1 of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right
to an adequate standard of living, UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/4/18, Basic Principles and
Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, 5 February 2007, para 21.
For an analyses, see Morel 2014, p. 94 and 95. See also Ploeg van der, Vanclay 2017, p. 35.
162 Chapter 4
advice to affected persons about their rights and options; and (e) holding of public
hearing(s) that provide(s) affected persons and their advocates with opportunities
to challenge the eviction decision and/or to present alternative proposals and to
articulate their demands and development priorities.’160
During evictions, human rights standards should be respected and supervision
by government officials is mandatory. After evictions authorities:
‘shall ensure that evicted persons or groups, especially those who are unable to
provide for themselves, have safe and secure access to: (a) essential food, potable
water and sanitation; (b) basic shelter and housing; (c) appropriate clothing; (d)
essential medical services; (e) livelihood sources; (f) fodder for livestock and access
to common property resources previously depended upon; and (g) education for
children and childcare facilities. States should also ensure that members of the same
extended family or community are not separated as a result of evictions.’161
Although unlikely for development and infrastructure projects, if restitution
and return, States should prioritize these rights of all persons, groups and
communities subjected to forced evictions. However, persons, groups and
communities shall not, however, be forced against their will to return to their
homes, lands or places of origin.162
These principles have also been reflected in several guidelines, such as
the Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement
in Development Projects (OECD), the Final Report of the (former) UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights and Population Transfer,163 the Comprehensive
Human Rights Guidelines on Development-Based Displacement,164 the World
Bank Operational Policy statement on Involuntary Resettlement, and the UN
Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displace-
ment.165 Also several regional agreements cover the topic. For example, the
IDP Protocol to the 2006 Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the
Great Lakes Region, the Kampala Convention and the Guiding Principles
explicitly include large scale development projects in their scope.166
160 Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, para
37.
161 Ibid., para 52.
162 Ibid., para 64.
163 Economic and Social Council E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/23, Freedom of movement. Human rights
and population transfer, 27 June 1997.
164 Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines On Development-Based Displacement 1997.
165 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/4/18, Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based
Evictions and Displacement, 2007.
166 IDP Protocol to the Great Lakes Pact, Art. 14 and 15. For an analyses of the obligations,
see Morel 2010, p. 18 and 19.
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Responsibilities of private operators in project-induced displacement and resettlement
Sometimes, development displacement is executed by private companies. van
der Ploeg stated that: ‘Whereas under international law, governments are the
duty-bearers with the primary obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human
rights, in project-induced resettlements most human rights responsibilities tend
to be transferred to (private) project operators.’167 The Basic Principles and
Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement are more
conservative. They underline that: ‘States bear the principal obligation for
applying human rights and humanitarian norms,‘ but ‘This does not, however,
absolve other parties, including project managers and personnel, international
financial and other institutions or organizations, transnational and other
corporations, and individual parties, including private landlords and land-
owners, of all responsibility.‘168 The human rights obligation for businesses
is also reflected in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights.169
Private actors have a corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Even
if the private actor has obtained legal rights over the land, private actors still
have to fully respect the human rights of the (displaced) families and commun-
ities on this land.170
Conservation programmes
The Guiding Principles, the Protocol on IDPs and the Kampala Convention
do not contain any explicit reference to displacement related to environmental
conservation programmes, even though each of the provisions could be
relevant to victims of conservation-induced displacement. In particular for
traditional communities like pastoralists and forest dwellers, environmental
conservation programmes can have a very negative effect on their lives, due
to their dependency on their lands. States have a special duty to protect those
traditional communities as a vulnerable group. The Guiding Principles apply
‘in situations other than during the emergency stages of armed conflicts and
disasters’. States are for example obliged ‘to provide the persons concerned
with information (on the reasons of displacement, procedures, compensation
and relocation), the duty to seek their consent and the duty to provide them
the possibility to be involved in the management of their relocation.’171
For those displaced that fall within the scope of the Kampala Convention
and the Protocol of IDP’s, States are held to ‘take all appropriate measures,
whenever possible, to restore the lands of communities with special depend-
167 Ploeg van der, Vanclay 2017, p. 37.
168 Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, Annex
1 of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right
to an adequate standard of living, UN Doc A/HRC/4/18, 5 February 2007, para 11.
169 Ploeg van der, Vanclay 2017, p. 34.
170 Ibid., p. 35.
171 Morel 2010, p. 20 and 21.
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ency and attachment to such lands upon the communities’ return, reintegration,
and reinsertion.’172 And ‘States are under a particular obligation to protect
against the displacement of indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoral-
ists and other groups with a special dependency and attachment to their
lands.’173
In the Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights
Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) vs Kenya,174 the Endorois
claim that they are being forced from fertile lands to semi-arid areas, and have
also been divided as a community and displaced from their traditional and
ancestral lands for the creation of the Lake Hannington Game Reserve in 1973,
and a subsequent re-gazetting of the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve in 1978 by
the Government of Kenya. In this case the African Commission held that:
‘denying the Endorois access to the Lake is a restriction on their freedom to
practice their religion, a restriction not necessitated by any significant public
security interest or other justification.’ and find a violation of the right to
religion (para 173). The Commission also finds a violation of the right to
property, as: ‘the Property of the Endorois people has been severely encroached
upon and continues to be so encroached upon. The encroachment is not
proportionate to any public need and is not in accordance with national and
international law.’ (para 238). The Commission also found violations on the
rights to: culture, free disposition of natural resources, and development.175
4.5.3 Forced evictions
The CESCR has paid particular attention to the protection against forced
evictions, which it defines as: ‘the permanent or temporary removal against
their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or
land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate
forms of legal or other protection.‘176 Interpreting Article 11 of the ICESCR,
the CESCR has affirmed that: ‘instances of forced eviction are prima facie
incompatible with the requirements of the Covenant’177 and that the practice
of forced evictions manifestly breaches the rights enshrined in the ICESCR and
may also result in violations of civil and political rights.178 In 1993, the Com-
mission on Human Rights opined that the ‘practice of forced eviction consti-
tutes a gross violation of human rights, in particular the right to adequate
172 Art. 11 (5) Kampala Convention.
173 Principle 9 Protocol of IDPS.
174 ACmHPR, Centre for Minority Rights Development Kenya and Minority Rights Group Inter-
national on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya 2010.
175 See more in § 3.1.4 indigenous peoples and vulnerable groups.
176 CESCR, General Comment No. 7 1997, para 3. Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 56 and 57.
177 CESCR, General Comment No.4 1991. See also Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 57.
178 CESCR, General Comment No. 7 1997 and Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 57.
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housing.’179 In the case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and
Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria180 where the Commission
found, inter alia, that forced evictions by government forces and private
security forces is an infringement of Article 14 and the right to an adequate
housing which is implicitly guaranteed by Articles 14, 16 and 18 (1) of the
Charter.
In the Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights
and Evictions (COHRE) v. Sudan case,181 the Complainants allege gross,
massive and systematic violations of human rights by the Republic of Sudan
against the indigenous tribes in the Darfur region. The Complainants allege
that violations being committed in the Darfur region include large-scale
killings, the forced displacement of populations, the destruction of public
facilities, properties and disruption of life through bombing by military fighter
jets in densely populated areas. The African Commission agrees with the UN
Committee Against Torture ‘that forced evictions and destruction of housing
carried out by non-State actors amounts to cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment, if the State fails to protect the victims from such
a violation of their human rights’ (para 159). The Commission also considers
that: ‘the right to protection from displacement is derived from the right to
freedom of movement and choice of residence contemplated in the African
Charter and other international instruments. Displacement by force, and
without legitimate or legal basis, is a denial of the right to freedom of move-
ment and choice of residence’ (para 189). ‘By not ensuring protection to the
victims, thus allowing its forces or third parties to destroy homes and forcedly
evict the victims, the Republic of Sudan is held to have violated 18 (1) of the
African Charter [right to family life]’ (para 216).182
4.5.4 Conclusion
Planned resettlement can potentially affect a broad range of human rights.
Many topic specific agreements have been developed to protect people against
arbitrary displacement and the potentially negative human rights consequences
of resettlement. However, while people may be protected relatively well on
paper against forced evictions, this framework considers planned resettlement
as a measure of last resort. Only when all feasible alternatives have been
explored, planned resettlement may be allowed. In practice planned resettle-
ment is often problematic both for those resettled and the receiving community.
179 UN Commission on Human Rights Res. 1993/77, Forced evictions, 1993.
180 ACmHPR, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria 2001, para 63.
181 ACmHPR, Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions COHRE
vs Sudan, Comm. No. 279/03-296/05 2009.
182 Ibid., at para 159. Jodoin, Lofts 2013, p. 56 and 57.
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Another shortcoming of the framework, especially in the context of slow-
onset degradation, is that is does not recognise planned resettlement as an
adaptation strategy. In this form, planned resettlement would not be something
people would have to be protected from, but a strategy that should be sup-
ported. Currently planned resettlement as an adaptation strategy is mainly
supported through labour migration schemes and therefore only covers a small
fraction of the people that may benefit from it. Although the concept of migra-
tion as adaptation has gained acceptation, the legal frameworks are insufficient-
ly capable of supporting such movements.183 Before any legal frameworks
can be put in place so support migration as an adaptation strategy, an in debt
knowledge of this type of migration must be acquired. Also the outcome and
purpose of these systems must be carefully considered to avoid situations
where the most vulnerable people are trapped and those most beneficial to
societies leave to other places.
183 See more in § 6.5.
5 The security approach
The security approach traditionally focusses on the consequences of environ-
mentally forced migration for States. Especially in the context of climate
change, security analysts and academics have warned that it threatens water
and food security, the allocation of resources, and coastal populations; threats
which in turn could increase forced migration, raise tensions and trigger
conflict.1 The interest of developed States in the security approach is tradi-
tionally rooted in the fear of mass-influx of environmentally forced migrants.
The legal focus therefore primarily lies with cross-border protection obligations
and secondary with ‘human security’ risks (such as limited access to resources)
(see § 2.3.2). To address human security issues, many branches of international
law can be instrumental for stronger global or multilateral governance and
management. As Saul pointed out, this can cover:
- economic law and the law of development to ensure a more rational,
equitable and timely global international distribution of scarce resources.
- international environmental law.
- the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation not to
cause significant harm, the protection and preservation of ecosystems, and
the ‘precautionary approach’ could be instrumental for transnational
governance of freshwater resources such as transboundary watercourses
and groundwater aquifers. Also more specific, the principle of sustainable
development needs to be modified to include the long-term and global
effects of climate change in judgments about the sustainability of particular
development projects.
- international trade law, to regulate global agricultural trade and realize
fair prices for developing countries.
- international intellectual property law, for better sharing and improved
transfer of technology across a range of areas essential to human develop-
ment, whether in the patenting of medicines against disease, new energy
technologies, or genetically modified organisms and gene technology.
- climate change adaptation and mitigation measures could be made con-
ditions of finance or assistance for international loans and assistance, and
multilateral or bilateral foreign aid.
1 Brown, Hammill & McLeman 2007.
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- in the area of international investment law, measures should be taken to
prevent private investment patterns to aggravate the conflict risks asso-
ciated with climate change. And,
- the international law of the sea, to determine maritime borders.2
It goes beyond the scope of this research to visit all these legal regimes to
assess their possibility to limit the security risks of climate change and other
types of environmental degradation and the prevention of forced migration
due to these circumstances. Instead, this chapter focusses on the protection
possibilities for those forcedly displaced.3
5.1 CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION
Cross-border migration takes place in broadly two patterns: (a) short-term
immediate movements across a contiguous land border by individuals fleeing
or directly affected by environmental degradation (most often by persons living
in a part of the country from which the border is accessible); and (b) longer-
term movements, often towards more distant countries (by individuals from
across a country very severely affected by environmental degradation).4 These
types of cross-border migration require different responses. From an inter-
national law perspective both types of migration are only marginally regulated.
International law is limited to narrow and specialised interventions in areas
such as refugees or migrant workers and it is mostly the sovereign States that
decide whether or not to allow access and stay to people willing to enter their
territory. International law recognises a narrow category of those who are
forced to migrate as being entitled to international protection. The leading
convention to determine who is considered a refugee is the 1951 Refugee
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter: Refugee Convention).
This Convention is supported by regional instruments, such as the 1969 OAU
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa
(hereafter: OAU Convention) and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees
(hereafter: Cartagena Declaration). This paragraph first analyses protection
obligations for longer-term movements based on refugee instruments and
complementary forms of protection. Short term immediate movements will
be discussed under § 5.2.2.
2 Saul 2009.
3 The need for these rules to be valued in the migration context is for example reflected in
the Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons to the Pact
on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region.
4 See for an analysis in the context of natural disasters Cantor 2016, p. 2.
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5.1.1 The Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
The Refugee Convention is often considered in the context of environmental
refugees, as it is the main international instrument to protect people that are
forced to migrate. Being qualified as a refugee under this Convention, comes
with the collective commitment by States to guarantee admission on to their
territory and to provide substitute protection in lieu of the country of origin.
This therefore sets them apart from ‘regular’ migrants that move in search
for better living conditions. The element of force resonates with the reality
that environmental refugees are not entirely free in their choice to leave, as
they are urged by the environmental degradation, but at the same time it does
not reflect the reality of the multi-causality of the decision to leave. The legal
definition of a ‘refugee’ is set out in the Refugee Convention, read in con-
junction with its 1967 Protocol.5 A ‘refugee’ is defined as someone who:
‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’6
Therefore, for refugee status to be recognized under the Geneva Refugee
Convention, the following criteria must apply:
1. a well-founded fear of persecution;
2. the persecution must be for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion;
3. the person must be outside the country of his or her nationality or, if
stateless, outside the country of his or her former habitual residence;
4. the person must be unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail him
or herself of the protection of that country.
As the Refugee Convention was not drafted with environmental refugees in
mind, this paragraph analyses whether the Refugee Convention can reasonably
be interpreted to include those persons.
Well-founded fear of persecution
There is no general definition of persecution. However, the UNHCR has ident-
ified some (non- exhaustive) general categories of situations that will amount
to persecution:
5 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees International Refugee Convention, 28 July
1951.
6 Refugee Convention, Art. 1A2, read in conjunction with Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees.
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‘(a) a threat to life or liberty on account of one of the listed grounds; (b) other
serious infringements of human rights on account of one of those grounds; (c)
discrimination leading to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for
the person concerned, such as serious restrictions on the right to earn his or her
living, right to practice his or her religion, or access to normally available edu-
cational facilities; (d) discriminatory measures not amounting as such to persecution,
but that produce, in the mind of the person concerned, a feeling of apprehension
and insecurity as regards his/her future existence; (e) criminal prosecution or fear
of it for one of the grounds enlisted in the refugee definition or excessive punish-
ment or fear of it for a criminal offence.’7
Environmental refugees do not easily fit any of these categories
In general, environmental refugees will have a hard time establishing that they
are suffering from persecution, because environmental factors do not and
cannot readily be construed to ‘persecute’ someone, as environmental degrada-
tion affects everybody indiscriminately. Even though, some authors argue that
forced migration due to environmental degradation can be considered per-
secution based on serious infringements of human rights,8 this opinion is not
widely shared. I agree with the main stream opinion that this interpretation
of persecution would stretch the meaning too much. Also, to be recognised
as persecution, the lack of protection must be based on one of the grounds
mentioned in the definition of refugee, which is generally not the case (see
analyses on convention grounds below).
It would also be hard to qualify the home State as a ‘persecutor’. Home
States might have contributed little (e.g. developing States to climate change)
or nothing (natural disasters not caused by humans) to the environmental
degradation, and therefore cannot be considered a persecutor. Some academics
point to the inaction of home States to base a claim of persecution upon.
Williams refers to the examples of the desertification of the African Sahel where
it is claimed the governments of the Sahel region ‘could have enacted policies
and programs to cut population growth, to improve agricultural techniques,
or to heighten food production’ and the Chernobyl disaster where the impacts
of which were argued to be accentuated by the Soviet government’s delayed
response to the accident and apparent disregard to safety and environmental
considerations in the country’s quest for nuclear power.9 I agree with Williams’
conclusion that given the object and purpose of the agreement and the narrow
applicability of the Refugee Convention intended by the parties, it is highly
7 Frigo 2011, p. 44. See also Art. 9 EP and Council Directive 2011/95/EU 2011 on standards
for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for sub-
sidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted.
8 See § 3.1.
9 Williams 2008, p. 508-510.
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unlikely that this argument is to be accorded any significant credibility even
if one adopts the most liberal approach to treaty interpretation.
In the context of climate change it has been argued that the international
community and industrialized countries in particular could be qualified as
persecutor for their failure to cut greenhouse gas. As McAdam rightfully
pointed out, this is quite different from the traditional concept where refugees
need protection against their own government. On the contrary, protection
is sought in countries that have contributed to climate change.10 It is highly
unlikely that this interpretation of the Refugee Convention would be accepted
in any court.
Convention grounds
The Refugee Convention also requires persecution to be on account of an
individual’s race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a
particular social group. As environmental degradation generally affects every-
body indiscriminately, this standard will be very hard to meet, even if govern-
ments to not act to protect their citizens. When only government responsibility
or negligence can be established, without any reason based on the five Conven-
tion grounds, this is not considered persecution within the scope of the Refugee
Convention as defined by present interpretations.11 For persecution on account
of convention grounds, some extra circumstances need to be considered. So
for example, when the national government has consciously withheld or
obstructed assistance in order to punish or marginalize environmental refugees
on one of the five Convention grounds.12
Kolmannskog suggest that – even though a highly controversial interpreta-
tion13 – the ground ‘social group’ offers some possibilities. He pointed out
that there are two main theories regarding what constitutes a social group;
one arguing that it is crucial that the group has fundamental or inherent
protected characteristics, the other emphasising (external) social perception.
This second interpretation could be argued to encompass environmental
refugees. Kolmannskog suggests that environmental refugees may constitute
‘a social group composed of persons lacking political power to protect their
own environment.’14 Some have argued that the combination of being an
10 McAdam 2011, p. 12 and 13.
11 Williams 2008, p. 508-510.
12 Kolmannskog 2009, p. 32 and UNHCR 2011, p. 3 and 4. In most cases such an element
of an attitude or motivation that can be considered persecution for reasons of the Refugee
Convention is absent. McAdam refers to an Australian case in which the Tribunal stated:
There is simply no basis for concluding that countries which can be said to have been
historically high emitters of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases, have any element
of motivation to have any impact on residents of low lying countries such as Kiribati, either
for their race, religion, nationality, membership of any particular social group or political
opinion. McAdam 2011, p. 14.
13 Kolmannskog 2008, p. 25 and 27.
14 See for example Art. 10 1d EP and Council Directive 2011/95/EU.
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environmental refugee and a member of a vulnerable group15 can form the
basis for the acknowledgement of a social group. As vulnerable groups are
considered to be affected disproportionately by environmental degradation,
it is argued that this combination of environmentally forced migration and
being a member of a vulnerable group, constitutes and a social group.16 How-
ever, even if this controversial interpretation were to be accepted, it would
still be hard to make the argument that they are being persecuted for reasons
of belonging to this group. Only combined with discriminatory measures this
could attribute to the qualification as refugee.
Outside the territory of the national State
The refugee definition only applies to people who have already crossed an
international border. The growing body of empirical research shows that in
most cases, movement is likely to be predominantly internal and/or gradual,
so either international borders have not been crossed or the nature of the
movement will not be one of ‘flight’.17 Therefore, the majority of environ-
mental refugees clearly falls outside the scope of the refugee convention. They
either migrate internally or are qualified as ‘economic’ migrants. This again
demonstrates the extent to which the traditional approach to refugee protection
is ill suited to address the contemporary challenge of environmental
refugees.18
Unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the national State
While traditional refugees could not avail themselves of the protection of their
country, as States were often the source of persecution, environmental refugees
can, in theory, rely on the protection of their national government.19 In line
with the principle of sovereignty, it is the national States obligation to protect
those people. The governments of environmental refugees will likely not have
abandoned them and indeed may be actively trying to assist them.20 There-
fore, there is no need to transfer this obligation to protect to other States, as
is the basis of the Refugee Convention.
Conclusion on the refugee convention
The factual reality of environmentally forced migration does not translate easily
into the protection possibilities offered by the Refugee Convention. Environ-
mental refugees in general do not meet the requirements to be defined as
refugees under the Refugee Convention. Even when environmental refugees
15 See § 3.1.4.
16 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 64.
17 McAdam 2011, p. 8.
18 Williams 2008, p. 508-510.
19 Ibid., p. 508-510.
20 Wyman 2013, p. 179 and 180.
The security approach 173
have a well-founded fear of threats to their life due to environmental degrada-
tion, and seem deserving of international sanctuary, they generally do not fall
within the scope of the Refugee Convention as defined by present interpreta-
tions.21 The Refugee Convention, was designed to answer a particular pro-
tection gap for refugees after the World War II in Europe. Not only was en-
vironmental degradation not considered by the drafters (and it therefore needs
interpretation to include them), but the solutions that can be offered through
the Convention are ill suited to address the contemporary challenge of environ-
mental refugees. This is a strong argument not to base protection on the refu-
gee framework.
Only for a very narrow group of environmental refugees the Convention
offers protection. This covers those of whom the national government has
consciously withheld or obstructed assistance in order to punish or marginalize
them on one of the five Convention grounds and who have crossed an inter-
national border and those that flee from conflicts that are (also) caused by
environmental degradation, and qualify as ‘war refugees’.22 This discrepancy
between the Refugee Convention and the different types of environmental
refugees was presented in a diagram by Vogel et al.
Figure 11: Climate-induced migration within the continuum of the Refugee Convention
definition of refugee23
21 McAdam 2011, p. 13.
22 ‘One example would be where government policies target particular groups reliant on
agriculture for survival, where climate change is already hampering their subsistence.
Another example would be if a government induced famine by destroying crops or poison-
ing water, or contributed to environmental destruction by polluting the land and/or water.’
McAdam 2011, p. 14 and 15. See more in § 6.3.



















































However, despite the legal arguments, in the aftermath of a 2010 earthquake,
Panama and Peru recognised some Haitians as refugees based on a well-
founded fear of non-State actor persecution and a lack of governmental author-
ity in Haiti. If a State is unable to protect a person from non-State persecution
in an area plagued by slow onset processes or following a sudden onset event,
this can in practice serve as a basis for a refugee claim.24
5.1.2 Regional refugee instruments
Several regional instruments provide a definition of refugee wider than that
in the Refugee Convention. However, the regions that are most likely to
experience massive displacement because of the impact of climate change
– Asia and the Pacific – have no regional convention or instrument on refugees
and many Asian States have not ratified the global Refugee Convention.25
The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem
in Africa
Article 1.2 of the OAU Convention extends refugee protection to: ‘every person
who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country
of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence
in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nation-
ality.’ The reason for the broader definition is that the OAU Convention wanted
to include those displaced by wars of independence.26 Theoretically, this broad
definition, may provide protection to persons fleeing their countries as a result
of at least certain forms of environmental degradation. However, as with the
Refugee Convention, the OAU Convention was not designed to protect environ-
mental refugees, and therefore needs interpretation to offer protection.
It has been argued that environmentally forced migration can be qualified
as events seriously disturbing the public order. While some commentators
stress that the OAU Convention could apply to environmental refugees, most
think not.27 Even if this interpretation is accepted, the threshold for seriously
disturbing the public order is very high and would apply only to the most
severe disasters, leaving most environmental refugees without protection.28
Okello argues that the real value of the OAU Convention lies in the ‘focus
(in the definition) on the objective circumstances which compel flight and not
24 HRC UN Doc A/HRC/37/CRP.4, The Slow onset effects of climate change and human
rights protection for cross-border migrants, 22 March 2018, para 70.
25 Manou et al. 2017, chapter 2.
26 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 67.
27 Kraler, Nack & Cernei 2011, p. 39 and 40.
28 See for this threshold § 4.1.2 and 4.2.2.
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linking the flight to the individual asylum seeker’s subjective interpretation
of danger arising from events around his or her person.’29 This focus away
from the individual asylum seeker corresponds much better with the reality
of environmentally forced migration that often affects groups of people. It is
almost impossible to determine who is forced into migration and who can
stay when the land still supports some people to remain behind. In practice
it is often those most vulnerable that stay behind (and which are most in need
for protection). On the other hand, Lackzo and others argue that, even though
regional practice allows people fleeing natural disasters to cross international
borders and temporary residence is offered, this is considered a voluntary
gesture of humanitarian protection as opposed to a convention obligation.30
Ammer et al. argue that, at best, these humanitarian gestures can point to a
development of common law towards an obligation of humanitarian pro-
tection.31 Therefore, at present, State practice shows little scope for regional
instruments to offer protection against environmental forced migration.32
Cartagena declaration
In Latin America, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration includes in the refugee
definition: ‘persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression,
internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances
which have seriously disturbed public order.’33 This Declaration, while not
reflecting treaty obligations, has been endorsed and implemented in national
legislation by many Latin American States and has been endorsed by the
Organisation of American States (OAS), by UNHCR and by the Conference of
the States Parties to the Geneva Refugee Convention.34
It has been argued that environmental refugees can be included in the
category of those who fled their country because of massive violations of
human rights. Rohl describes that in theory, it could be argued that violations
of human rights (including economic and social rights) that can be ascribable
to a failure of States to prevent or remedy such violations could amount to
massive violations of human rights. She refers to Shacknove to argue that the
negative consequences of weather related environmental degradation are often
29 Okello 2014.
30 Aghazarm, Laczko 2009, p. 413.
31 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 67. See more in § 5.2.2 humanitarian asylum/discretionary forms
of protection.
32 Aghazarm, Laczko 2009, p. 413.
33 Cartagena Declaration, Section III3.
34 Frigo 2011, p. 69 and 70.
176 Chapter 5
to a greater extent attributable to State negligence or indifference than to the
weather.35
Other authors argue that environmental refugees can be included in the
category ‘other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order‘.
However, a mayor argument against this extension is that the International
Conference on Central American Refugees does not understand the ‘other
circumstances‘ to include natural disasters.36 The Conference has determined
that: ‘circumstances seriously disturbing public order must result from human
acts and not from natural disasters.‘37 Of course it could be argued that
human actions have an impact on the need for protection and that environ-
mental degradation may be caused by humans (e.g. anthropocentric climate
change), but these strings of causality are very complex and difficult to prove.
Also (as with the OAU Convention) the threshold for seriously disturbing the
public order is very high and would apply only to the most severe disasters,
leaving most environmental refugees without protection.38 It is therefore not
very likely that jurisprudence and doctrine will include environmental refugees
under the protection scope of the Cartagena Declaration.
5.2 COMPLEMENTARY FORMS OF PROTECTION
Complementary protection may be more promising in providing protection
to (certain categories of) environmental refugees. Complementary protection
is the generic name given to that protection which results from international
legal obligations not to return a person to serious ill-treatment such as torture,
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. The non-refoulement
principle, and other complementary protection mechanisms can provide
building blocks for new ways of affording protection, particularly regarding
the concept of return.39 Complementary protection does not supplant or
compete with protection under the 1951 Convention; by its nature, it is comple-
mentary to refugee status determination done in accordance with the 1951
Convention.40 This paragraph analyses the possibilities under non-refoule-
ment, temporary protection for reasons of mass-influx or humanitarian reasons
and subsidiary protection based on generalised violence.
35 ‘When starvation occurs not because of drought or flood but because of the hoarding of
grain or the corrupt distribution of material aid, deprivation is no longer the result of natural
conditions. [Rather,] the state has left unfulfilled its basic duty to protect the citizen from
the actions of others.’ in Rohl 2005, p. 5.
36 Kolmannskog 2009, p. 32.
37 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 67.
38 See for this threshold § 4.1.2 and 4.2.2.
39 Kolmannskog, Trebbi 2010, p. 729 and 730.
40 Zetter 2011, p. 19 and 20.
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5.2.1 Non-refoulement
The principle of non-refoulement is the prohibition for States to expel or return
a person to a country where he or she risks being subjected to serious human
rights violations. Non-refoulement is a fundamental principle of international
law and one of the strongest limitations on the right of States to control entry
into their territory and to expel aliens as an expression of their sovereignty.
It has its origin in international refugee law and international regulations on
extradition.41 In Article 33 of the Refugee Convention (where the obligation
is codified) this obligation is limited to a prohibition to expel or return (‘re-
fouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.42
This limitation of the protection scope to threats for reasons of the Convention
grounds limits the protection possibilities based on non-refoulement in the
same way as it is limited for regular Refugee Protection.43 The non-refoule-
ment principle of the Refugee Convention is therefore of a very limited use
for environmental refugees.
Complementary protection based on human rights law
By contrast, complementary protection based on human rights law, applies
without a link to a particular status (race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group, or political opinion), and thus broadens the
protection offered by the Refugee Convention.44 ‘The legal basis of the
principle of non-refoulement lies in the obligation of all States to recognise,
secure and protect the human rights of all people present within their juris-
diction, and in the requirement that a human rights treaty be interpreted and
applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective.’45 Here, con-
sideration is given as to whether returning a national to its country of origin
raises an obligation for the host State to prevent a breach of fundamental
human rights.46 While only the Convention against Torture explicitly states
41 Frigo 2011, p. 95-97.
42 Morel 2014, p. 101 and 102.
43 Ibid., p. 101 and 102. See § 5.1.1.
44 Gil-Bazo 2015, p. 25.
45 ‘It is widely accepted that the risk of serious human rights abuses does not necessarily
have to come from State agents in order to trigger the protection of non-refoulement. It
can also originate from non-State actors when the State is unwilling or unable to protect
the person at risk.’ In Frigo 2011, p. 113 and 114.
46 The HRC held that ‘the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure
the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control
entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from
their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk
of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant.’ CCPR,
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the principle, it is implicit in the obligation of States to protect certain rights
of people within their jurisdiction which will otherwise be violated in another
jurisdiction.47 Some prohibitions of returning someone are absolute. Currently,
the risk of arbitrary deprivation of life and torture, or cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment are considered absolute. The consequence
is that these violations do not allow for a balancing test between the interests
of the individual and the State.48 However, the threshold for these non-refou-
lement obligations is high.
Life
For the principle of non-refoulement to apply, the risk of arbitrary deprivation
of life faced on return must be real. To demonstrate that a risk to an individual
subject to transfer is ‘real’, ‘the standard of proof is that substantial grounds
have been shown for believing that the person risks being subject to a serious
violation of his or her human rights. This must be assessed on grounds that
go beyond mere theory or suspicion. More precisely, the risk need not be high-
ly probable, but it must be personal and present.’49 ‘To establish that the risk
following transfer is ‘personal’ it must be shown that the applicant risks as an
individual to be subject to a serious violation of his or her human rights if
transferred. However, the person does not have to demonstrate that he or she
is being individually targeted.’ [emphasis added]50
For States to be obliged to protect environmental refugees, the threats of the
environmental degradation must be actual and immediate.51 With Zetter,52
I agree that persons whose house will be imminently and permanently sub-
merged in water may be able to claim a right to protection under international
law in that their right to life is at risk.53 It is debatable however whether the
same protection is owed to people displaced across international borders for
other reasons of environmental degradation or in anticipation of their houses
being submerged.54 Even though the positive obligations to ensure mere
‘survival’ have been considered by the UN Human Right Committee as falling
General Comment No. 31 [80] 2004, para 12. See also McAdam 2011, p. 17 and 18 and UK
Climate Change and Migration Coalition 2014, p. 7.
47 Frigo 2011, p. 98 and 99. See also Wyman 2013, p. 180 and 181.
48 The ECtHR has consistently affirmed that it cannot be balanced against the public interest
or any other matter, irrespective of the applicant’s criminal or personal conduct. In McAdam
2011, p. 23-29.
49 Frigo 2011, p. 114 and 115.
50 Ibid., p. 115. See also § 3.1.2 the right to life.
51 McAdam 2011, p. 17 and 18.
52 Zetter 2011, p. 17.
53 Ibid., p. 17. See also § 6.2.5.
54 The ECHR jurisprudence also shows that when the cause of the harm is natural, the burden
placed on states is lower, as it must be reasonable, therefore a breach of human rights by
the home state is harder to construct. See § 3.1.2. the right to life. It might therefore be even
counter-productive to frame migration as disaster related. See § 6.2.
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under the right to life which is protected by Article 2 ECHR and Article 6
ICCPR,55 the UN HRC applied a strict test in a case on the potential use of
nuclear weapons. In this case, the UN HRC held that for a person to be con-
sidered a ‘victim’ of a violation of the ICCPR: ‘he or she must show either that
an act or an omission of a State party has already adversely affected his or
her enjoyment of such right, or that such an effect is imminent , for example
on the basis of existing law and/or judicial or administrative decision or
practice.’56 As McAdam has pointed out, the refusal of the Committee to find
a claim on the potential use of nuclear weapons admissible – despite the very
strong statement of the Committee in General Comment 14 that: ‘the designing,
testing, manufacture, possession and deployment of nuclear weapons are
among the greatest threats to the right to life which confront mankind today’57
and that: ‘the production, testing, possession, deployment and use of nuclear
weapons should be prohibited and recognized as crimes against humanity’58
‘does not augur well for a successful claim on the basis of potential, slow onset
environmental degradation climate change impacts, especially given the far
less forceful comments of the Committee about the links between climate
change and the right to life.’59 For most types of environmental degradation,
a threat to life only becomes imminent at the very last stage of the most serious
environmental degradation. Especially slow-onset disasters force people into
migration long before the situation is imminent.
Another difficulty for environmental refugees to demonstrate a risk of
arbitrary deprivation of life faced on return is that the risk must be personal.
As McAdam pointed out:
‘this traditional Western approach of individualized decision-making about pro-
tection on technical legal grounds seems highly inappropriate to the situation of
climate-induced displacement, in which the responsibility for displacement is highly
diffuse (attributable to a large number of polluting States over many years, rather
than to direct ill-treatment of a particular person by a certain government) and
the numbers of those displaced may require group-based rather than individualized
solutions.’60
55 The HRC has noted that ‘The right to life enunciated in Art. 6 of the Covenant has been
dealt with in all State reports. It is the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted
even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation Art. 4. However,
the Committee has noted that quite often the information given concerning Art. 6 was
limited to only one or other aspect of this right. It is a right which should not be interpreted
narrowly.’ UN International Human Rights Instruments, Compilations of General Comments
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 29 July 1994
at 6. See also Rohl 2005, p. 21.
56 HRC, E.W. et al. v. The Netherlands 1993, para 6.4. See also HRC, Vaihere Bordes and John
Temeharo v. France 1996, para 5.5-5.7.
57 CCPR, General Comment No. 14 1984, at para 4.
58 Ibid., at para 6.
59 McAdam 2011, p. 50-53.
60 McAdam 2011, p. 52.
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The right to life for environmental refugees is jeopardised not so much as a
result of generalised or targeted violence, but because basic subsistence needs
can no longer be met due to environmental degradation, such as natural or
man-made disasters or a combination of both. Therefore, to demonstrate
sufficient, objective characteristics that ‘justify’ movement, is a very high
threshold.
The jurisprudence on non-refoulement has been developed most thoroughly
in Article 2 of the ECHR.61 Recently, it has also been addressed by the HRC.62
Existing jurisprudence relating to socio-economic-based protection and environ-
mental claims requires some individual factor that makes the situation intoler-
able for the particular applicant. A considerable relaxation of this requirement
would be needed if the ECHR is to protect against return to climate change-
related harms63 So far, under the European Convention on Human Rights
no removal case has succeeded solely on Article 2 ECHR (right to life). Article 2
ECHR is generally raised in conjunction with Article 3 ECHR, and if a violation
of the latter is found, then the analysis of Article 2 ECHR typically falls away.64
The positive obligations imposed on a State by Article 3 must go beyond
Article 2, given that Article 3 is designed to ensure the protection not just of
mere survival, but of a life in dignity, as far as the State’s responsibility is
concerned.65
Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
The non-refoulement obligation for torture and other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment offers absolute protection against torture and inhuman
treatment ‘whatever the source’.66 Article 3(1) of the CAT States that: ‘no State
Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.’ Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman
61 Much of the analysis about the nature and scope of the rights applies equally to the
universal and regional context. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR is the most developed in
this area and provides the most extensive reasoning about the scope and content of human
rights-based non-refoulement in McAdam 2011, p. 17 and 18.
62 HRC, Views adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol,
concerning communication No. 2728/2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, 7 January
2020. See also § 4.2.3.
63 McAdam 2011, p. 52.
64 Ibid., p. 52.
65 Rohl 2005, p. 21.
66 ‘Originally, ‘inhuman treatment’ has been defined by the Commission as covering “such
treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular
situation, is unjustifiable”. With time, the Court’s case-law evolved and it has now estab-
lished that a state may be held responsible for a violation of Article 3 even in the absence
of any deliberate treatment by the authorities. The question whether the purpose of the
treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is “a factor to be taken into account”, but
not essential.’ For an extensive analysis of the jurisprudence on this topic, see Rohl 2005,
p. 14.
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or degrading treatment or punishment. On the regional level, Article 3 of the
ECHR prohibits torture, and ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.
As Kolmannskog rightfully points out: ‘No matter how much a disaster has
been induced or created by humans, it is doubtful, to say the least, if it can
meet the international definition of torture as the infliction of severe pain or
suffering by a public official for an enumerated purpose such as punishment
or obtaining a confession.’67 Even the severest environmental catastrophe
would be unlikely to amount to torture.68 This paragraph therefore focusses
on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Scott made a meaningful classification in types of harm due to climate
change,69 which is also very useful for other types of environmental degrada-
tion in this context. His classification will be discussed below.70
– Type 1 cases: Direct and intentional infliction of harm
These are types of environmental degradation where the receiving State or
non-State actors directly and intentionally inflict serious harm (exemplified
by Soering v. United Kingdom). Since the case of Soering v. United King-
dom,71 Article 2 and Article 3 of the ECHR have been recognized as precluding
removal to a place where an applicant would face a real risk of being subjected
to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (the implied
principle of non-refoulement).72 This type of environmental degradation might
arise for example where State authorities removed barriers that had prevented
flooding to an inhabited area. The scope of this category is heavily circum-
scribed and the point somewhat hypothetical.73
– Type 2 cases: Purely naturally occurring harm
The most common type of environmental degradation will be the one where
the receiving State is not considered to be responsible for harm that results
from ‘purely’ naturally occurring phenomena. Scott argues that: ‘Individuals
facing expulsion from a European host State to a receiving State during or
in the aftermath of a ‘pure’ natural disaster will generally struggle to engage
host State non-refoulement obligations under the ECHR.’74
67 Kolmannskog 2009, p. 34 and 35. See also McAdam, Saul 2008.
68 Zetter 2011, p. 20.
69 Scott 2014, p. 412-416.
70 As the jurisprudence on non-refoulement has been developed most thoroughly in Art. 3
of the ECHR, this paragraph focusses on this case law Much of the analysis about the nature
and scope of the rights applies equally to the universal and regional context. in McAdam
2011, p. 17 and 18.
71 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom 1989, para 85-91.
72 For a historical overview of the development of The principle of non-refoulement in
international human rights law see Gil-Bazo 2015, p. 16-18.
73 Zetter 2011, p. 20.
74 Scott 2014, p. 404.
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Generally, courts have carefully circumscribed the meaning of ‘inhuman
or degrading treatment’ so that it cannot be used as a remedy for general
poverty, unemployment, or lack of resources or medical care except in the
most exceptional circumstances. The standard for inhuman and degrading
treatment for this type of naturally occurring harm (such as HIV) is exemplified
by the cases of D v. United Kingdom75 and N v. United Kingdom.76 In these
cases, the Court considered that in cases where the alleged future harm ‘would
emanate not from the intentional acts or omissions of public authorities or
non-State bodies, but instead from a naturally occurring illness and the lack
of sufficient resources to deal with it in the receiving country,’77 a high thres-
hold must be maintained. This standard of ‘very exceptional’ and ‘compelling
humanitarian considerations’ would likely apply for victims of natural dis-
asters.
In the case of D v. the United Kingdom, the concept of ‘inhuman treatment’
has been interpreted rather progressively. In this case the ECtHR considered
that returning an HIV-infected person to St. Kitts would amount to ‘inhuman
treatment’, due to inter alia the lack of sufficient medical treatment, social
network, a home or any prospect of income.78 The European Court stressed
that it was the exceptional combination of factors that made the applicant’s
removal incompatible with Article 3. In the latter case of N. v. United King-
dom, the Court observed that at no time since that judgment (over 10 years
later) had the court found the proposed removal of an alien on the grounds
of the applicant’s ill health to constitute a violation of Article 3.79 The court
extrapolated several principles, in particular:
‘Aliens who are subject to expulsion cannot in principle claim any entitlement to
remain in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from
medical, social or other forms of assistance provided by the expelling State. The
fact that the applicant’s circumstances, including his life expectancy, would be
significantly reduced if he were to be removed from the Contracting State is not
sufficient of itself to give rise to a breach of Article 3. The decision to remove an
alien who is suffering from a serious mental or physical illness to a country where
the facilities for treatment of that illness are inferior to those available in the
contacting State may give rise to a violation under Article 3, but only in a very
exceptional case, where the humanitarian grounds against the removal are com-
pelling.’80
75 ECtHR, D. v. The United Kingdom 1997.
76 ECtHR, N. v. United Kingdom 2008.
77 Scott 2014, p. 414.
78 ECtHR, D. v. The United Kingdom, para 49-54. See also McAdam 2011, p. 50-53.
79 ECtHR, N. v. United Kingdom 2008, para 34.
80 N. v. United Kingdom 2008, para 42. See also Burson 2010, p. 165. McAdam noted that ‘By
contrast, the dissenting judges in that case regarded the removal of a person on their death
bed as being, in and of itself, inconsistent with article 3. Accordingly, they regarded the
additional grounds in D.’s case – lack of medical and palliative care – as “equally relevant
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This is also a political consideration, as a finding to the contrary would place
too great a burden on the Contracting States.81
Following the case of D v. the United Kingdom the ECtHR further clarified
wat should be understood under ‘exceptional circumstances’ in the case of
Paposhvili v. Belgium.82 The Court determines that:
‘the “other very exceptional cases” within the meaning of the judgment in N. v.
the United Kingdom (§ 43) which may raise an issue under Article 3 should be
understood to refer to situations involving the removal of a seriously ill person
in which substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he or she,
although not at imminent risk of dying, would face a real risk, on account of the
absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to
such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his
or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction
in life expectancy. The Court points out that these situations correspond to a high
threshold for the application of Article 3 of the Convention in cases concerning
the removal of aliens suffering from serious illness.’83
Although the Court clarifies the content of ‘exceptional circumstances’, it
maintains the high threshold for Artcile 3 violations of previous case-law. This
leaves little protection possibilities for envirmental refugees, as it only covers
the most exceptional cases. A key factor in determining the extent of non-
refoulement under Article 3 is the existence of a ‘real risk’ of ill-treatment. While
certainty is not required, the ECtHR has on the other hand held that a mere
possibility of ill-treatment is not in itself sufficient to give rise to a breach of
Article 3.84 A real risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment must be a foreseeable consequence of the transfer,
and personal, i.e. it must concern the individual person claiming the non-
refoulement protection.85 Rohl pointed out that the case-law of the ECtHR ‘is
to the finding of a separate potential violation of Article 3 of the Convention.”’ in McAdam
2011, p. 23-29.
81 Scott 2014, p. 414.
82 ECtHR, Paposhvili v. Belgium 2016.
83 Ibid., para 183.
84 ECtHR, Vilvarajah and Others v. UK 1991, para 111: ‘The evidence before the Court concern-
ing the background of the applicants, as well as the general situation, does not establish
that their personal position was any worse than the generality of other members of the
Tamil community or other young male Tamils who were returning to their country. Since
the situation was still unsettled there existed the possibility that they might be detained
and ill-treated as appears to have occurred previously in the cases of some of the applicants
see paragraphs 10, 22 and 33 above. A mere possibility of ill-treatment, however, in such
circumstances, is not in itself sufficient to give rise to a breach of Article 3.’
85 To demonstrate that a risk to an individual subject to transfer is ‘real’, the standard of proof
is that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person risks being subject
to a serious violation of his or her human rights. This must be assessed on grounds that
go beyond mere theory or suspicion. More precisely, the risk need not be highly probable,
but it must be personal and present, although international human rights bodies may, in
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ambiguous as to whether an applicant has to demonstrate that the risk which
he or she is running of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 is
significantly higher than that of other persons in similar circumstances. In some
cases […] the Court has used existing patterns of ill-treatment in the country
of origin as supporting evidence for a real risk to the applicant.’86 In other
cases, the Court ‘has demanded that the applicant demonstrates that his or
her situation upon return would be significantly worse than that of the average
population. This stands in stark contrast to ‘domestic’ cases […], where no
such ‘singling out’ of an applicant has been an issue.’87 As a minimum, a
‘mere possibility’ of victimhood is not sufficient. An applicant certainly has
to show that he or she, in particular, is at risk. Generalised violence, statistics
of incidences of ill-treatment, or authoritative reports pointing to the
vulnerability of certain groups of which the applicant might be a member,
have been regarded as insufficient to engage Article 3 responsibility.88 In the
case of Paposhvili v. Belgium the Court considered that ‘it is for the applicants
to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds
for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, they
would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to
Article 3’.89 However, the Court lifts some of the burden of proof by consider-
ing that:
‘In this connection it should be observed that a certain degree of speculation is
inherent in the preventive purpose of Article 3 and that it is not a matter of requir-
ing the persons con cerned to provide clear proof of their claim that they would
be exposed to proscribed treatment […]. Where such evidence is adduced, it is
for the authorities of the returning State, in the context of domestic procedures,
to dispel any doubts raised by it.’90
In conclusion, Article 3 ECHR might protect those who: ‘a) successfully reach
or already are on European territory; b) can demonstrate that their expected
suffering upon return would be exceptionally severe according to the high
threshold established in European jurisprudence, and; c) can demonstrate an
extreme circumstances, ‘recognise non-refoulement protection for mere general situations
of violence in the country of destination. This will occur only where there is a real risk
simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to such violence on return.’ Frigo 2011,
p. 115 and 116.
86 Rohl 2005, p. 28.
87 Ibid., p. 28.
88 See for example ECtHR, Case of Venkadagalesarma v. The Netherlands 2004. For cases concern-
ing the applicants’ membership in persecuted minority groups. In Rohl 2005, p. 18 and
26.
89 ECtHR, Paposhvili v. Belgium 2016, para 186.
90 Ibid., para 186 and 187.
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– equally strictly applied – high probability of the anticipated harmful treat-
ment or suffering.’91
Scott considers that: ‘although it is not inconceivable that a natural disaster-
related non-refoulement claim could succeed even where the impacts are seen
as resulting from “purely natural” phenomena, the circumstances would have
to be very exceptional, involving extreme deprivation without relief.’92
– Type 3 cases: Predominant cause
The final type of environmental degradation is where actors in the receiving
State are seen as being the predominant cause of a humanitarian crisis, ex-
emplified by Sufi & Elmi v. United Kingdom.93 In this case, the Court con-
sidered that it was reasonably likely that returnees who either had no close
family connections or could not safely travel to an area where they had such
connections would have to seek refuge in an Internally Displaced Persons or
refugee camp. The conditions in these camps, were dire. The Court ruled on
the applicable standard for determining degrading or inhumane treatment
that:
‘If the dire humanitarian conditions in Somalia were solely or even predominantly
attributable to poverty or to the State’s lack of resources to deal with a naturally
occurring phenomenon, such as a drought, the test in N. v. the United Kingdom
may well have been considered to be the appropriate one. However, it is clear that
while drought has contributed to the humanitarian crisis, that crisis is predominant-
ly due to the direct and indirect actions of the parties to the conflict.’94
The Court consequently considered the approach adopted in N. v. the United
Kingdom not to be appropriate. It adopted the approach as taken in M.S.S.
v. Belgium and Greece.95 In this case, the Court stated that it had not excluded
the possibility that the responsibility of the State under Article 3 might be
engaged in respect of treatment where an applicant, who was wholly de-
pendent on State support, found himself faced with official indifference in
a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity.96
Scott pointed out, it is unclear if all these factors must be met. She concluded
that in the light of expected resource conflicts due to climate change, it is likely
that the interpretation of Article 3 as developed in Sufi & Elmi will be
applied.97
91 Rohl 2005, p. 31.
92 Scott 2014, p. 414 and 415.
93 ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom 2011.
94 Ibid., para 282.
95 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 2011, para 283.
96 Ibid., para 253.
97 Scott 2014, p. 404.
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Importantly, for the present context, inhuman treatment for type 2 and 3
cases does not need to be deliberate. Also a lack of intent to humiliate will
not conclusively rule out a violation of Article 3.98 This means that in principle
the non-refoulement principle based on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment could apply in the context of environ-
mentally forced migration, where the environmental degradation is often not
deliberate and is often not intended to humiliate anyone. In the context of
climate change, McAdam claims that: ‘In principle there is no reason why a
person suffering from the impacts of climate change could not seek to argue
that those impacts – collectively or separately – violate article 3, however it
is doubtful that an applicant could presently substantiate a claim according
to the level of severity of harm mandated by the European Court of Human
Rights.’99 She extrapolates the case law on protection based on general
situations of violence to the climate change context and convincingly concludes
that:
‘Even though the impacts of climate change may ultimately render basic survival
in a particular location impossible, Article 3 (and, by extension, Article 7 of the
ICCPR) would only assist a person once conditions were already very extreme. This
mechanism does not allow for pre-emptive movement where conditions are anti-
cipated to become dire, and thus would not assist people trying to move before
the situation becomes intolerable.’100
On top of that, often internal flight alternatives are available, which would
exclude protection obligations of host States.
Other human rights and the obligation of non-refoulement
Environmental degradation also effects other human rights than torture and
certain ill-treatment such as the right to food, the right to water, the right to
health and the right to adequate housing.101 Ever since the case of Soering
v. United Kingdom,102 the court has accepted that ‘the same obligation [of
98 McAdam 2011, p. 23-29.
99 Ibid., p. 23-29.
100 Ibid., p. 25.
101 McAdam has pointed out that the UN HRC, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,
the ECtHR, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ‘have all
recognized that the principle of non-refoulement may extend beyond protection of the right
to life Art. 6 ICCPR, Art. 2 ECHR and the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment Art. 7 ICCPR, Art. 3 ECHR, Art. 37 CRC. The
Committee on the Rights of the Child has made clear that the non-refoulement obligation
applies in any case where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real
risk of “irreparable harm” if the person is removed. The language of “irreparable harm”
has been used by the HRC to describe harm that is comparable to that contemplated by
Art. 6 and 7 ICCPR. However, so far, no other provision has independently given rise to
a non-removal claim.’ Ibid., p. 32-35.
102 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom 1989, in particular para 88-92.
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implicit non-refoulement] may be implicit in other ECHR rights’.103 However,
even though, in theory, any human rights violation may give rise to a non-
refoulement obligation, the non-absolute rights permit a balancing test between
the interests of the individual and the State.104 In most cases it will be virtual-
ly impossible for an applicant to establish that control on immigration was
disproportionate to any breach of a human right. So far, no other human rights
provision has independently given rise to a non-removal claim.
Adverse social and economic conditions may in principle constitute valid
grounds for claims of an Article 3 violation. In fact, it would be difficult to
visualise a case in which a sufficiently flagrant violation of other human rights
would not also involve treatment in violation of Article 3.105 This is why
analysis typically begins with Article 3, and only if a violation is not made
out, other Articles are even considered.106 If a violation of a socio-economic
rights can be re-characterized as a form of inhuman treatment, this would give
rise to an absolute international protection obligation.107
In her analysis of the cases of Ullah v. United Kingdom108 and Razgar
v. United Kingdom,109 McAdam considered that the court held that, as a
matter of principle, any provision of the ECHR could found a non-removal
claim, but that the threshold in such cases would be very high. The applicant
would need ‘to establish at least a real risk of a flagrant violation of the very essence
of the right.’ A ‘flagrant denial’ of a right is effectively a complete denial or nullifica-
tion of the right (the exceptionality test).110 The ECtHR has suggested that the
applicant must demonstrate ‘an added ‘measure of persecution, prosecution,
deprivation of liberty or ill treatment’ beyond a ‘mere’ violation of the
103 McAdam 2011, p. 33.
104 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 19. ‘The reasons for a tendency to regard implicit non-
refoulement as only applying to violations of ‘fundamental rights’ must be found in the
tension between human rights treaties and the sovereign right of states to control their
territory. While human rights treaties are designed to limit the power of states to a signi-
ficant extent, states’ rights under international law such as the right to border control in
turn limit human rights to some extent. In fact, what might be called the ‘mutual restriction
principle’ often informs the interpretation of human rights treaties, in the attempt to strike
a “fair balance […] between the general interests of the community and the interests of
the individual”’ in Rohl 2005, p. 8 and 9.
105 For example, in ECtHR, Z. and T. v. United Kingdom 2006 the ECtHR stated that ‘it would
be difficult to visualise a case in which a sufficiently flagrant violation of Article 9 would
not also involve treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.’ in McAdam 2011,
p. 33.
106 Ibid., p. 32 and 33.
107 McAdam 2010. For an extensive analysis of case law on Art. 3 and socio-economic conditions
see Rohl 2005, p. 23 and 24.
108 Ullah v. Special Adjudicator; Do v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal 2004.
109 Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) ex parte Razgar (FC) (Respondent)
2004.
110 McAdam 2011, p. 33 and Burson 2010, p. 166.
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right.111 ‘Again, the justification for this appears to be a policy one: the ECtHR
does not make Contracting States the “indirect guarantors of freedom of
worship for the rest of the world”, and thus a higher threshold of harm
(beyond the absolute, non-derogable rights of Articles 2 and 3) must be
met.’112
Environmental refugees would therefore have to meet the exceptionality
test in order to be protected under the non-refoulement obligation for non-
absolute human rights. In exceptional circumstances of environmental degrada-
tion it may be demonstrated a right is violated if the very essence of the right
is destroyed or nullified. By requiring in extremis impacts, this approach to
protection from non-refoulement would tend to favour those whose migration
is a clear result of force. This limits protection to all but the most severe cases,
as many effects will take years to manifest at a sufficiently harmful level to
engage Article 3 protection. ‘Furthermore, those with the foresight and means
to migrate before such threshold of harm is reached, that is, those who migrate
voluntarily to avoid the worst, would not be protected.’113
To what extent it needs to remain ‘exceptional’ to qualify is unclear. Mc-
Adam pointed out ‘a distinguishing feature that makes the lack of such services
particularly deleterious on the applicant – would appear to be necessary.’114
If ‘exceptional circumstances‘ are required, this bodes not well for environ-
mental degradation that is likely to affect groups of people at the same time.
At the same time, the internal flight alternative applies. Only when environ-
mental refugees cannot return to any part of the country, the principle of non-
refoulement will apply. Apart from the low-lying SIDS115 it will be unlikely
that entire countries become uninhabitable for a longer period of time. Only
in the period directly following the most severe natural disasters, whole
countries may be unsuitable for return. Under this scenario the effects would
only be temporary, therefore they do not render return unlawful.116
Conclusion on non-refoulement
In theory any human rights violation could give rise to a non-refoulement
obligation. However, for now, human rights violations caused by environ-
mental degradation are as such highly unlikely to give rise to a non-refoule-
ment obligation. Up till now, the principle of non-refoulement has not been
accepted by any Court in cases of environmental displacement.117
111 ECtHR, Z. and T. v. United Kingdom 2006.
112 McAdam 2011, p. 32-35.
113 Burson 2010, p. 167.
114 McAdam 2011, p. 27.
115 See § 6.2.5.
116 McAdam 2011, p. 23-29.
117 There has been a lot of media coverage about the June 4, 2014 decision of the New Zealand
Immigration and Protection Tribunal AD Tuvalu. This case was claimed to be the first
successful claim for asylum based on environmental degradation due to climate change.
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The protection possibilities under the principle of non-refoulement are
limited by the facts that: (1) most environmental refugees will have an internal
flight alternative, which would exclude non-refoulement obligations; (2) to
take advantage of the non-refoulement principle, a claimant already must be
outside of his or her home country (where environmentally forced migration
is mostly internal); and (3) even if a non-refoulement obligation is accepted,
the principle of non-refoulement does not provide the applicants with a legal
residence status. ‘The principle of non-refoulement does not clarify whether
persons which cannot be returned, are entitled to legal residency, leaving these
individuals often in an illegal residence status.’118
5.2.2 Other forms of complementary protection
Apart from the non-refoulement principle, protection possibilities can also arise
from subsidiary protection. However, very few universally accepted sources
of subsidiary protection exist to address the needs of people fleeing for reasons
other than political persecution and if they have emerged, it is largely on an
ad hoc and unpredictable basis that varies between countries and regions.119
In some regions, temporary protection is offered for reasons of mass-influx,
or humanitarian reasons. In other regions, protection is based on generalised
violence. This paragraph analyses the protection possibilities of subsidiary
protection frameworks for environmental refugees.
Temporary protection
In general, temporary protection is either granted when return to the country
of origin is impossible due to the conditions in that country (humanitarian
asylum/discretionary forms of protection) or when the host State is unable
to process all those coming in through a Refugee Status Determination Proced-
ure and therefore allows temporary protection to all of them (mass-influx).
Mass-influx
Temporary protection constitutes ‘a specific provisional protection response
to situations of mass influx providing immediate emergency protection from
refoulement’,120 both under international refugee law and international human
However, the decision was based on purely humanitarian and discretionary grounds –
not on any domestic or international legal obligation. For an analysis of the case see
McAdam 2014a.
118 Moor de, Cliquet 2010, p. 59-66.
119 Betts, Kaytaz 2009, p. 5.
120 UNGA UN Doc A/AC.96/1021 2005, p. 13, para l.
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rights law, without formally according refugee status.121 ‘It is a kind of
“interim protection” for people who may prima facie qualify as refugees, but
whose conditions of arrival mean that they cannot proceed immediately
through an ordinary RSDP [Refugee Status Determination Procedure].’122 The
basis for protection lies in a practical consideration: ‘In situations of mass
influx, the additional protection is necessary, not because of a ‘deficiency’ of
refugee protection, but due to factual circumstances, which may prevent the
State from providing immediate access to the ordinary procedure for
asylum.’123 It is assumed that prima facie refugees are refugees in the spirit
of the Refugee Convention until the time when it has been proven that the
recognition was made in error or there is a ground for exclusion.124
Protection of environmental refugees based on ‘mass-influx‘ is a sub-optimal
decision. First, most environmental refugees will migrate internally, and
therefore are not covered under the regimes of cross-border migration. Second,
most environmental refugees will not qualify as a refugee, and it would be
undesirable that they require a status due to the overburdening of the system
(taking into consideration that they will be excluded when it becomes clear
they are not refugees). Third, an individual may be in need of protection even
though he or she does not arrive as part of a ‘mass influx’. This is particularly
problematic for slow-onset disasters where migration takes place over a longer
period of time. Where temporary protection can be a sufficient protection for
those temporarily displaced, protection needs are often extended over longer
periods of time. Either because the environmental degradation still takes place
(e.g. desertification) or because the response of the home State to temporary
environmental degradation is inadequate (e.g. insufficient support for rebuild-
ing a society after a typhoon). Temporary protection therefore does not meet
the needs of people who may need to stay longer or permanently.125
EU Temporary Protection Directive
On the regional level the Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on
minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass
influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts
between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the conse-
quences thereof (hereafter: EU Temporary Protection Directive) is an exceptional
measure to provide displaced persons from non-EU countries and unable to
return to their country of origin, with immediate and temporary protection.
‘It applies in particular when there is a risk that the standard asylum system
121 However, some states have argued that this does not derive from any obligation, but is
purely a matter of states’ discretion and therefore a discretionary form of protection. Rohl
2005, p. 5 and 6.
122 Frigo 2011, p. 77.
123 Ibid., p. 76.
124 Ammer et al. 2010, para 2.1.5.1.5.
125 Kolmannskog, Trebbi 2010, p. 727 and 728.
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is struggling to cope with demand stemming from a mass influx that risks
having a negative impact on the processing of claims.’126
Kolmannskog and Trebi note that: ‘Arguably, temporary protection can
be applicable to some cases of environmentally forced displacement. Article
2(c) of the Temporary Protection Directive specifies those persons who ‘in
particular’ qualify for temporary protection, though it does not provide an
exhaustive list.’127 It includes persons who have fled areas of armed conflict
or endemic violence or persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims
of, systematic or generalised violations of their human rights. In some occasions
environmentally forced degradation will coincide with conflict or ‘generalized
violations’ of human rights can occur, and in such cases the displaced fall
within an explicitly recognized category.128 However, even if environmentally
forced migration is included in the category of persons who have fled areas
of armed conflict or endemic violence or persons at serious risk of, or who
have been the victims of, systematic or generalised violations of their human
rights, the practical use will be limited. For the Temporary Protection Directive
to apply, a qualified majority of the EU needs to decide that it applies. Mobiliz-
ing the political consent and will to do so would, however, be challenging.
So far, the Temporary Protection Directive mechanism has never been used.129
It remains uncertain whether the EU would ever be faced by a ‘mass influx’
due to environmentally forced migration sufficient to overwhelm the regular
asylum processing procedures and warrant the exceptional grant of temporary
protection on a prima facie basis.
Humanitarian asylum/discretionary forms of protection
There are situations where neither international human rights law nor the
Refugee Convention requires protection, but where the State has devised
systems of protection for ‘humanitarian’ or ‘compassionate’ reasons, for
example in response to the existence of crises such as famine, or natural
disasters. According to UNHCR, ’it has become common practice or custom
to offer temporary protection to persons who cross an international border
to escape the effects of natural disasters.’130 These forms of protection,
although sometimes inspired by international human rights law, are in general
126 European Commission on Migration and Home Affairs, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/
home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/temporary-protection_en.
127 Kolmannskog, Trebbi 2010, p. 727.
128 The Finnish delegation explicitly promoted the inclusion of an express reference to persons
displaced by natural disasters in the negotiations on the Temporary Protection Directive,
but this was not supported by other Member States, with Belgium and Spain noting that
‘such situations were not mentioned in any international legal document on refugees’ in
McAdam 2011, p. 39.
129 See also Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 54 and 55.
130 UNHCR 2011, p. 4.
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not mandated by it and remain at the sovereign discretion of the State.131
The ‘Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights of internally
displaced persons has suggested that a person who cannot be reasonably
expected to return (e.g. if assistance and protection provided by the country
of origin is far below international standards) should be considered a victim
of forced displacement and be granted at least a temporary stay.’132
Humanitarian assistance is mostly a national matter. So far, the right to
humanitarian assistance as a human right still remains controversial.133 ‘For
various reasons, States may prefer ad hoc humanitarian responses that permit
them to determine on a situation-by-situation basis whether they wish to
provide ‘protection’, for what duration and in what form. Typically, though,
this is emergency protection after a particular event, rather than pre-emptive
protection for projected longer term impacts.’134 The UNHCR stresses that there
is a trend at the national level to ‘provide various forms of “humanitarian”
or other statuses to persons who, at the time of a natural disaster, were already
within their jurisdiction but cannot be returned to their countries of origin
owing to the destruction caused by the natural disaster.’ And that ‘This shows
a trend at the national level to accept such persons on an individual basis.”135
In 2009 Kolmannskog already referred to this practice and suggested that this
practice can be built upon to address the normative protection gap.136 How-
ever, States often limit protection to those already in their country to avoid
the ‘pull factor’ of humanitarian regulations.137
Although discretionary protection offers some protection for environmental
refugees, Rohl pointed out that a problem of this approach is that discretionary
frameworks are ‘intransparent and vague about the coverage of persons
supposed to benefit from this form of complementary protection. It entails
a disconcerting insecurity’138 for those protected with regard to the duration
of the protection. These protection frameworks are very vulnerable for political
pressure and public opinion. Also the level of protection is discretionary. As
Rohl illustrates:
131 Frigo 2011, p. 65-69.
132 McAdam, Limon 2015, p. 19 and Humphreys 2008, p. 18-22.
133 For example Kuit argues that ‘Looking solely to the international and regional treaties’,
the human right to humanitarian assistance ’has quite clearly not been independently
incorporated on a large scale. The UDHR, ICESCR and ICCPR do not explicitly mention
the notion of humanitarian assistance at all.’ Determining the existence of a customary right
to humanitarian assistance ‘requires the establishment of both opinio juris and state practice
on this matter. In recent years, no developments have taken place at the interstate level
that can immediately or directly be related to evidence of such an emerging right in
customary international law.’ Kuijt 2015, p. 174-178. See also § 10.3.2.
134 McAdam 2011, p. 41 and 42.
135 UNHCR 2011, p. 4.
136 Kolmannskog 2009, p. 36.
137 See for example Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 46 and 47.
138 Rohl 2005, p. 5.
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‘beneficiaries are mostly granted less rights than Convention refugees. In some
States, a stay of expulsion on humanitarian grounds is not complemented with
any residence rights, the right to family reunion, or to obtain work permits. Immi-
grants are thus left in a legal limbo and vulnerable to economic exploitation, often
with dramatic consequences.’139
These kinds of responses are not sustainable long term.140 Also, as mentioned
before, many environmental refugees do not arrive as part of a ‘mass influx’,
which seriously hampers their recognition as environmental refugees and limits
their chances of humanitarian protection.
Subsidiary protection based on generalised violence
Some environmental refugees will be exposed to generalised violence, for
example when conflicts arise over scarce resources. Regional instruments like
the OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration include as refugees persons
fleeing from ’generalised violence’. Within the European Union, the EC Direct-
ive on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country
Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need
International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, 2011/95/EU
(herafter: EU Qualification Directive) extends subsidiary protection if there is
‘a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict’
(Article 2 e, cf. 15 c).141 But, apart from those that have adopted the OAU
Convention or the EU directives, many countries do not yet recognize people
fleeing generalised violence as refugees or persons qualifying for comple-
mentary protection.142 Also many environmental refugees will not face
generalised violence.
EU Qualification Directive
On the regional level, the EU Qualification Directive is the first legal instrument
of a supranational nature containing a separate status for individuals protected
under international human rights law that is to be complementary to the
Refugee Convention, rather than to the adoption of a single status for all
persons granted asylum, whether on Refugee Convention grounds or on
international human rights law grounds.143 Protection is granted to those
139 Ibid., p. 5 and 6.
140 McAdam 2011, p. 41 and 42.
141 Kolmannskog 2009, p. 38.
142 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 10.
143 Gil-Bazo 2015, p. 25. This regional approach seems to have later been endorsed globally
by UNHCR, which considered complementary protection in its 2000 Global Consultations.
The Executive Committee ‘encourages the use of complementary forms of protection for
individuals in need of international protection who do not meet the refugee definition under
the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol.’ UNGA UN Doc A/AC.96/1021 2005, p. 13,
para i.
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who face a real risk of suffering serious harm. Serious harm is limited to: (a)
‘death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious and
individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict (Article 15).
From this exhaustive list, only paragraph ‘b’ might be applicable.144 Many
authors argue against the inclusion of environmental refugees under this
category. For example, De Moor and Cliquet pointed out that during the
drafting process, the inclusion of a ‘violation of a human right, sufficiently
severe to engage the Member State’s international obligations’ that may be
interpreted to include environmental refugees was not supported by the
Member States.145 Even if environmental refugees are to be included in the
scope, still an ’internal flight alternative’ will usually be available which would
exclude those environmental refugees from protection.146
5.2.3 Conclusion on cross-border migration
The current legal and normative distinction between refugees and voluntary,
economic migrants fails to recognize the diversity of reasons why people may
be forced to cross borders. For environmental refugees that flee cross-border
the refugee framework often does not apply, while in reality they are in need
of substitute protection by another State if their own State is unable or unwill-
ing to protect them against marked environmental disruptions (natural and/or
triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected
the quality of their life. Therefore, there is a role to play for the international
community. Unlike economic migrants that look for better opportunities
elsewhere, environmental refugees move away from a situation that jeopard-
ized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life. They
move because they have to and (may) require assistance from third States to
offer them protection.
For environmental refugees that crossed a border and cannot return home
due to the circumstances in their home country, complementary protection
based on the principle of non-refoulement might offer protection. However, no
court has currently granted protection against return for reasons of environ-
mental degradation. And even if it were granted, it would only protect against
the most extreme situations of environmental degradation, where return would
threat the right to life, would put the environmental refugee in danger of being
subjected to torture and/or other human rights violations that are sufficiently
144 Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 51-54.
145 Moor de, Cliquet 2010, p. 61-66.
146 Article 8. See also Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 51-55.
The security approach 195
flagrant to give rise to a non-refoulement obligation. This system would need
to be developed before it would encompass environmental refugees.
In some situations, States have offered temporary protection. These instru-
ments are however of limited use, as they only apply at the exceptional and
most extreme circumstances of mass-migration. The system also only offers
temporary protection and does not respond to permanent protection needs.
Humanitarian or discretionary protection are in general not mandated by
international human rights law and remain at the sovereign discretion of the
State. Although it offers some protection for environmental refugees, discretion-
ary frameworks are (often) ad hoc, intransparent and vague about the coverage
of persons supposed to benefit from this form of complementary protection
and the beneficiaries are mostly granted less rights than Convention refugees.
This type of protection therefore is not sustainable for the long term.
Some countries protect people fleeing generalised violence as refugees or
persons qualifying for complementary protection. It is doubtful whether this
protection would be extended to environmental refugees, and if it does, only
a very small group of environmental refugees would face generalised violence
in their home country.
In general, cross-border protection instruments are unable to address the
underlying causes of environmental displacement. The instruments focus on
the output: forced migration. However, many cases of forced migration due
to environmental degradation may be prevented when the underlying cause
(environmental degradation) is addressed. The instruments only respond to
migration that is evidently forced. This element of force is often not easy to
demonstrate and at the same time it rules out migration as adaptation strategy
in the form of pre-emptive movement.147 Finally, in most occasions of
environmental refuge, internal flight alternatives will be available, therefore
excluding the applicability of these instruments. At this point from a legal
perspective, the security approach offers little protection for cross-border
environmental migrants.
5.3 INTERNAL MIGRATION
Traditionally, internal displacement is perceived primarily as a humanitarian
and human rights issue. Lately, internal migration is beginning to be acknow-
ledged as a security challenge, both as a traditional security issue and as a
human security issue, where human security focuses both on the interest of
States to minimise threats and on ethical duties of States.148 Academic
147 Protection is premised on having already been compelled to leave because of an actual
threat. The OAU Convention and Cartagena Declaration seem to require evidence of an
actual threat. McAdam 2012, p. 15.
148 See more on this issue Commission on Human Security 2003.
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research supports that mass displacement carries the risks of internal conflicts,
including due to political sensitivities about migration control, the inflamma-
tion of ethno-centric political agendas, and increasing isolationism. Host
communities can be heavily burdened by the environmental refugees and the
environmental refugees can be frustrated by the lack of possibilities and
integration in the host community. Conflicts can arise over scarce resourced
or over resource abundance, such as for example claims for mineral or energy
extraction in the Arctic region that become accessible due to reclining ice.149
As has been mentioned in the introduction, many branches of international
law can be instrumental for stronger global or multilateral governance and
management in order to prevent conflicts. These instruments can also be
helpful in preventing forced migration due to environmental degradation,
when general living conditions are better and individuals are better capable
to adapt or mitigate to environmental degradation. However, the main respons-
ibility will lie with the home State and will be subjected to the sovereignty
of that State. From a political perspective, however the security approach may
spark the interest of States in global peace and security and the importance
of minimum standards of living for all people to achieve human security (this
will be further discussed in part IV).
From a legal perspective, internal migration is broadly covered by the
internally displaced persons framework as discussed under § 3.2. The Guiding
Principles on Internally Displaced Persons and IDP Framework (sometimes
supported by regional regimes) provide a roadmap of State obligations towards
internally displaced persons. The legal obligations for the home States are quite
clear. The problems arise when large numbers of people are displaced within
developing countries that are unable to carry that burden and to provide the
protection required under the internally displaced persons framework. As
Mayer rightfully pointed out, assistance and protection measures generate
expenses and divert resources, possibly straining public services and environ-
mental resources, especially within poor countries or communities. In extreme
cases, mass arrivals may affect the availability of basic commodities and
threaten public order or political institutions. Despite some international
humanitarian assistance, most of the economic and non-economic costs of
hosting large populations of migrants – refugees, in particular – has generally
been sustained by host communities themselves.150 As mentioned before,
developing countries will be hit the hardest by climate change. Therefore,
situations where the need for protection will supersede the ability of the State
to protect will rise. Other States than the home State may be obliged to support
these affected States. This obligation may be based on positive extraterritorial
149 See for example Schubert et al. 2008, p. 133.
150 Mayer 2017, p. 249.
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State obligations.151 Support may also be based on considerations of peace
and stability in vulnerable regions.152
151 See § 10.3.
152 See § 13.3.

6 Specific protection possibilities for different
types of environmental refugees within the
security approach
6.1 SUDDEN-ONSET DISASTERS
Natural disasters are often small-scale and displace people within the direct
region. These small local natural disasters are not considered under the security
approach. It is the big disasters that seriously disturb public order and may
lead to cross-border migration that are usually considered. In these situations
return to affected countries may be (temporary) unreasonable. This paragraph
will analyse the available options for protection.
6.1.1 Refugee protection
The Refugee Convention is considered to apply for two situations where people
that take flight are affected by natural disasters. First, when convention refu-
gees flee in the context of disasters while the well-founded fear of persecution
exists independently and second, when the victims of natural disasters flee
because their government has consciously withheld or obstructed assistance
in order to punish or marginalize them on one of the five grounds in the
definition.1 For these scenario’s, there is no added value in framing them as
environmental refugees, as the ‘traditional refugees’ are better protected and
nothing is gained from a legal perspective to incorporate the environmental
conditions.2 However, these two types of victims of disaster cover only a very
small segment of the people affected by disasters.
Regional refugee instruments
The OAU Convention and Cartagena Declaration extend protection to those
who are affected by events seriously disturbing public order. These refugee
instruments are potentially more open to including those displaced due to
natural disasters. However, the drafters of these agreements did not envision
1 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 16 and 17 and UK Climate Change and Migration
Coalition 2014, p. 9. In the latter situation, it may be however be problematic to show
individual fear for persecution.
2 From a policy perspective this may be different, as framing this type of migration as caused
by environmental degradation may spur action to address the environmental degradation.
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their inclusion in the refugee definition.3 So far, these Articles have not been
used for environmentally forced migration, however one might imagine that
a massive sudden-onset disaster could be the basis for granting a stay under
this Article.
It has become common practice or custom in some regions to offer tempor-
ary protection to persons who cross an international border to escape the
effects of natural disasters.4 However, as Edwards rightfully pointed out:
‘receiving States rarely declare that they are acting pursuant to their OAU
Convention obligations. This is significant because the explanation a State gives
for acting in a particular way is relevant to ascertaining whether it supports
or rejects a liberal interpretation of the treaty.’5 Kälin also sees the theoretical
possibility to include sudden-onset disaster induced displacement in the ‘events
seriously disturbing the public order’. However, he sees it as ‘rather unlikely
that the states concerned would be ready to accept such an expansion of the
concept beyond its conventional meaning of public disturbances resulting in
violence.’6 A major argument against the wide interpretation of ‘events serious-
ly disturbing the public order’ to include natural disasters is that the Inter-
national Conference on Central American Refugees does not understand the
‘other circumstances’ to include natural disasters.7 The Conference has deter-
mined that: ‘”circumstances seriously disturbing public order” must result
from human acts and not from natural disasters.’8 It may be argued however,
that the rise in disasters caused by anthropogenic climate change has a root
cause in human acts.
Okello pointed at the practice of African States to offer temporary pro-
tection to persons who cross an international border to escape the effects of
natural disasters as proof for a development of the OAU Convention. He argues
that the OAU Convention has operated as a human rights protection safety
net for those who would otherwise ordinarily be denied it, although the
Convention is silent as to whether victims of natural disasters can legitimately
be considered as refugees. He further argues that the real added value of the
OAU Convention is that it focussed on the objective circumstances which
compel flight and not linking the flight to the individual asylum seeker’s
subjective interpretation of danger arising from events around his or her
person.9 This much better suits the reality of environmental refugees that flee
as a result of the situation instead of an attack on their person. However,
without receiving States declaring that they accepted these environmental
refugees as a result of a legal obligation, it is in my opinion too early to
3 Cohen, Bradley 2010.
4 UNHCR 2011, p. 4.
5 McAdam 2011, p. 15.
6 Ibid., p. 15.
7 Kolmannskog 2009, p. 32.
8 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 67.
9 Okello 2014, p. 73.
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consider this practice of offering temporary protection as a basis for a legal
obligation.
6.1.2 Non-refoulement
In theory, sudden onset environmental degradation can be covered by the
principle of non-refoulement. Acute disasters that impact the whole country
may give rise to (temporary) obligations of non-refoulement. However, if
internal flight alternatives are available – which is often the case – it is allowed
to return the asylum seekers to their home State. Also, the individualistic
interpretation of non-refoulement claims does not correspond well with the
reality of disasters that affect groups of people. The need for protection is
impacted by the group. For example, small communities may be able to find
enough food and shelter after a flood, where large communities may not. The
migration of some will allow others to stay. This effect is enlarged when those
who migrate are able to send remittances necessary for example to build
houses. The individualistic interpretation of non-refoulement obligations does
not reflect this reality.
In order for non-refoulement obligations to arise, the harm faced must be
found to be sufficiently severe and ‘imminent’. The threshold of harm to be
considered ‘sufficiently severe’ and ‘imminent’ still has to be developed.
European courts have carefully circumscribed the meaning of ‘inhuman or
degrading treatment’ so that it cannot be used as a remedy for general poverty,
unemployment, or lack of resources or medical care except in the most ex-
ceptional circumstances. In this light, the inability of States to protect its
inhabitants against natural disasters might be excluded from a progressive
development of Article 3 in which sending environmentally-displaced persons
back to a region where they can no longer survive, amounts to an inhuman
or degrading treatment. However, the ECtHR has accepted that ‘Article 3 ECHR
can be applied in new contexts which might arise in the future, irrespective
of the responsibility of the public authorities.’10 De Moor and Cliquet have
argued that severe environmental disruptions caused by natural disasters or
climate change where vital infrastructure is destroyed and provision of basic
services such as clean water, food and electricity is hindered, could result in
a similar situation as the case of N. v. United Kingdom.11 It remains to be
seen whether or not Articles 2 and 3 ECHR will be applied by the ECtHR for
the protection of environmentally displaced persons arriving in Europe. As
for the protection possibilities based on other human rights violations, under
the balancing test between the interests of the individual and the State, it will
be virtually impossible for an applicant to establish that control on immigration
10 Moor de, Cliquet 2009, p. 7.
11 Ibid., p. 7.
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was disproportionate to any breach’ of a human right. So far, no other human
rights provision has independently given rise to a non-removal claim. Non-
refoulement instruments therefore need to be substantially developed before
environmental degradation would clearly fall within the scope of inhuman
treatment.
6.1.3 Temporary protection
Protection based on mass-influx only covers situations in which receiving States
are unable to immediately assess asylum claims through their ordinary proced-
ure for asylum. In certain regions in cases of mass-influx, environmental
refugees have been allowed access.12 States are however reluctant to accept
any obligation for allowing access and therefore are much more likely to adopt
humanitarian measures that allow for flexibility.
As was mentioned in the The Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-
Border Displacement:
‘Some States, particularly in the Americas, selected regions in Africa and a few
States in Europe, have developed a amultitude of tools that allow them to admit
or not return disaster displaced persons on their territory on an individual or group
basis. These humanitarian protection measures are generally temporary, and may
be based on regular immigration law, exceptional immigration categories, or
provisions related to the protection of refugees or similar norms of international
human rights law.’13
These forms of protection, although sometimes inspired by international human
rights law, are in general not mandated by it and remain at the discretion of
the State.
Obligations of subsidiary protection for generalised violence are not likely
to be applicable for sudden-onset degradation forced migration. Natural
disaster are not included in the scope of the EU Qualification Directive, and
this is unlikely to change in the near future. Only for natural disasters coincid-
ing with conflict, this type of protection might offer some protection.14
12 ‘Although the legal possibilities are limited, in practice, considerations based on the principle
of non- refoulement have been applied in case of natural disasters. For example, in the
aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami, UNHCR called for the suspension of returns to the affected
regions, which was widely respected.’ See Moor de, Cliquet 2009 and Kolmannskog and
Myrstad 2009. It remains to be seen whether such practices could lead to a generally
accepted practice, or even a binding norm. For other examples of ad hoc disaster protection
regulations see Aghazarm, Laczko 2009, p. 415.
13 The Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement 2016. Agenda for
the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate
Change, p. 8.
14 See § 6.3.
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6.1.4 Internal migration
The protection of those internally displaced due to sudden-onset disasters is
often not considered under a security approach. Only in unstable areas, this
type of migration may for example lead to tension between different ethnic
groups, which in turn may lead to violent conflict.15 Also the situation
migrants find themselves in can be a reason for concern, as it is generally
accepted that basic human rights are a prerequisite for peace and stability.
6.2 SLOW-ONSET DISASTERS
The challenge of distinguishing between forced and voluntary movement is
also relevant under a security approach, as this distinction leads to different
(cross-border) protection regimes, as forced migrants may be granted protection
by the host State. In practice, this distinction is problematic. As Zetter pointed
out, migration might start as a partially voluntary process, but may become
involuntary or forced where permanent depletion of resources render live-
lihoods impossible. ‘In these scenarios a progressive form of rights protection
norms needs to be invoked. In the case of external displacement, initially, this
could be in the form of subsidiary or temporary protection status and then
scaled up to more permanent rights protection measures.’16
6.2.1 Refugee protection
For cross-border migration, the same instruments apply for sudden-onset and
slow-onset disasters. However, the protection possibilities for slow-onset
disasters are more limited. As the degradation takes place over a longer period
of time, migration often does not take the shape of ‘flight’. Therefore, slow-
onset disaster migration is much less likely to be recognised as forced migra-
tion. This is because most people leave before the situation becomes evidently
lethal. Economic circumstances often drive people away before the environ-
mental condition does. For example if the ground does not provide for enough
food, family members are likely to move to the city to generate income. Only
in the very last moments, slow-onset degradation evidently forces people into
migration. It is generally accepted that the Refugee Convention does not cover
those forcedly displaced by slow-onset disasters. And even if those people
were covered by the Refugee Convention, the instrument does not correspond
with the non-flight type of movement. The Refugee Convention does not
adequately address the time dimension of pre-emptive and staggered move-
15 See § 6.3.
16 Zetter 2011, p. 14.
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ment. As McAdam rightfully pointed out: ‘Even though it is the severity of
harm, and not the timing of it, determines a protection need, the two are
necessarily interrelated. Since the impacts of slow-onset processes may take
some time before they amount to sufficiently serious harm, the timing of a
protection claim is crucial.’17 Also, slow-onset degradation often affects only
parts of the country, therefore leaving the rest of the country available as an
internal flight alternative. Under these circumstances, asylum will not be
granted
Regional refugee instruments
The biggest obstacle for receiving protection under regional refugee instru-
ments may be that these instruments require an ‘actual threat‘. Therefore, – in
the context of slow-onset migration – these instruments only apply in the very
last instance and do not allow for adaptation or mitigation. The regional
instruments do not correspond well with the reality of slow-onset migration.
However, as Okello pointed out, the OAU Convention in practice has surrepti-
tiously covered even those fleeing slow-onset degradation such as drought
and famine.18 Even though the receiving States do not confirm that this was
an obligation under the OAU Convention (and therefore it might just as well
have been for humanitarian reasons as a way of discretionary protection), at
least these migrants were offered access to neighbouring countries.
6.2.2 Non-refoulement
Slow-onset environmental degradation is not likely to give rise to (temporary)
obligations of non-refoulement. Again, the harm faced must be found to be
sufficiently severe and ‘imminent’, which corresponds poorly with the gradual
character of the disaster. Furthermore, these mechanisms don’t allow for
planned movement where conditions are anticipated to become dire.19 The
applicability of complementary protection ‘would depend on the point in time
at which protection is sought, based on the severity of the immediate impacts
on return.’20 Complementary protection has therefore been argued to be
inadequate for addressing the complexities of slow-onset degradation forced
migration.21 At least for now, human rights violation caused by slow-onset
environmental degradation are as such highly unlikely to give rise to a non-
17 McAdam 2011, p. 50-53.
18 Okello 2014 and McAdam 2011, p. 15.
19 Anderson 2012.
20 McAdam 2011, p. 50-53.
21 Mence 2013.
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refoulement.22 On top of this, internal flight alternatives will often be avail-
able, therefore excluding non-refoulement obligation. However, ‘There is no
doubt that, in certain cases of severe environmental disruption, the victims
cannot return to their region of origin, either temporarily or permanently. The
most infamous example are the “sinking” island States in the Indian and Pacific
Ocean.’23 This particular category of slow-onset degradation forced migration
will be discussed in § 6.2.5.
6.2.3 Temporary protection
Where temporary protection possibilities are already problematic for sudden-
onset disaster displacement, for slow-onset disasters this type of protection
is even more problematic, as migration takes places over a longer period of
time and is way more difficult to identify as forced migration. Only the most
severe and large scale of slow-onset disasters, such as widespread famine might
urge States to adopt humanitarian protection measures. Temporary protection
instruments in particular do not correspond with the gradual character of the
movement and the evolution of migration that may start as voluntary and
end up to be forced (because situations in the homeland have worsened since).
In conclusion, temporary protection offers little possibilities for those displaced
by slow-onset disasters. In general it can be concluded that the situation of
those who have crossed an international border due to slow-onset disasters,
represents a major gap in the protection framework.24
6.2.4 Internal migration
From a security perspective internal migration due to slow onset disasters has
not received much attention, apart from the possibility of these situations to
develop into conflicts. It has been accepted that slow onset degradation,
provides a rare opportunity to plan for responses, rather than relying on a
remedial instrument. This possibility of organised migration resonates well
22 In the case AC Tuvalu [2014] NZIPT 501370-371 the Immigration and Protection Tribunal
New Zealand has accepted that exposure to the impacts of natural disasters can, in general
terms, be a humanitarian circumstance that could make it unjust or unduly harsh to deport.
Nevertheless, in such a case the appellant must establish not simply the existence of a matter
of broad humanitarian concern, but exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature
such that it would be unjust or unduly harsh to deport the particular appellant from New
Zealand. See also § 6.2.5.
23 Moor de, Cliquet 2010, p. 64.
24 Kälin, W. 2008, ”Displacement caused by the effects of climate change: who will be affected
and what are the gaps in the normative framework for their protection?”, Brookings Institu-
tion.
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in the security community, however this has not yet been translated in sound
international legal obligations (on the national level protection possibilities
are improving by the adoption of national adaptation plans).
6.2.5 Low-lying small island States
In the literature, the example of the Pacific ‘SIDS has gained a lot of attention.
In November 2012 an ILA Committee on International Law and Sea Level Rise
was established. The Committee was tasked with a two-part mandate to: ‘study
the possible impacts of sea-level rise and the implications under international
law of the partial and complete inundation of State territory, or depopulation
thereof, in particular of small island and low-lying States’; and ‘to develop
proposals for the progressive development of international law in relation to
the possible loss of all or of parts of State territory and maritime zones due
to sea level rise, including the impacts on Statehood, nationality, and human
rights.’ In 2018 at an ILA Conference in Sydney two ILA resolutions on inter-
national law and sea-level rise, including a Sydney Declaration of Principles
were adopted at the conference by acclamation as resolutions no 5/2018 and
6/2018.25
Apart from duty and responsibility of States to provide protection and
assistance to persons with habitual residence in territories under their juris-
diction who are affected by sea level rise,26 the Resolution aims to avert,
mitigate, and address displacement, and if necessary to protect and assist
persons displaced. The Resolution requires that: ‘States should, in particular:
(a) adopt adequate normative frameworks and operational measures to imple-
ment them; (b) assign powers and responsibilities to competent authorities
and institutions or, where they do not exist, create such authorities and institu-
tions endowed with appropriate powers and responsibilities; and (c) provide
adequate resources to such authorities and institutions.’27 The Resolution
entails a duty to:
‘respect, on a non-discriminatory basis, the human rights of persons under their
jurisdiction who move in the context of sea level rise, including: (a) their right to
liberty of movement and freedom to choose their residence; (b) the freedom to leave
and return to their own country; (c) their right to be protected against refoulement;
(d) their right to be informed and consulted, and to participate in decisions affecting
them; (e) the cultural and land rights of indigenous peoples and local communities.’
25 ILA Conference (78th) Res 5/2018 and Res 6/2018 Committee on International Law and
Sea Level Rise, Sydney, Australia, 19-24 August 2018.
26 Principle 1 of the Resolution 6/2018 of the Committee on International Law and Sea Level
Rise 2018.
27 Principle 32 Ibid.
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Apart from this, the Resolution also contains a duty to cooperate (principle 4),
and to evacuate (principle 5) or relocate (principle 6).
In the context of cross-border migration, principle 9 of the Resolution
requires that:
‘1. States should admit persons displaced across borders in the context of disasters
linked to sea level rise if they are personally and seriously at risk of, or already
affected by, a disaster, or if their State of origin is unable to protect and assist them
due to the disaster (even if temporarily). States should ensure that they have
adequate laws and policies in place to facilitate this protection.
2. States of refuge should not return persons to territories where they face a serious
risk to their life or safety or serious hardship, in particular due to the fact that they
cannot access necessary humanitarian assistance or protection. In all cases, States
must observe the prohibition on forcible return to situations of persecution or other
forms of serious harm, as provided for by applicable international law.
3. States that have admitted cross-border disaster-displaced persons should co-
operate with States of origin to find durable solutions for such persons. This may
include return where possible, or permanent admission and stay in the host State.
4. States ready to admit cross-border disaster-displaced persons should strive to
harmonise their practices regarding the admission and protection of cross-border
disaster-displaced persons at the regional and/or sub-regional levels.’
So far, these obligations are not sufficiently reflected in international and
national law.
Refugee protection
As has been discussed in § 5.1.1 it is unlikely that the Refugee Convention
applies. The conclusion of national tribunals of New Zealand and Australia
confirm this interpretation. In her extensive and leading research, McAdam
pointed out two cases that illustrate the reasoning. In New Zealand, the
Refugee Status Appeals authority explained:
‘This is not a case where the appellants can be said to be differentially at risk of
harm amounting to persecution due to any one of these five grounds. All Tuvalu
citizens face the same environmental problems and economic difficulties living
in Tuvalu. Rather, the appellants are unfortunate victims, like all other Tuvaluan
citizens, of the forces of nature leading to the erosion of coastland and the family
property being partially submerged at high tide.’28
In Australia, the Refugee Review Tribunal stated:
‘In this case, the Tribunal does not believe that the element of an attitude or motiva-
tion can be identified, such that the conduct feared can be properly considered
28 Refugee Appeal No 72189/2000, NZ Refugee Status Appeals Authority 17 Aug 2000 para
13 in McAdam 2010b.
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persecution for reasons of a Convention characteristic as required. […] There is
simply no basis for concluding that countries which can be said to have been
historically high emitters of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases, have any
element of motivation to have any impact on residents of low lying countries such
as Kiribati, either for their race, religion, nationality, membership of any particular
social group or political opinion.’29
Based on these cases, it is safe to conclude that even if the situation becomes
very urgent, the Refugee Convention offers no ground for protection of en-
vironmental refugees (except when it coincides with conflict or when people
are targeted by their governments).
Non-refoulement
A non-refoulement obligation based on human rights seems more promising.
The legal basis of the principle of non-refoulement lies in the obligation of
all States to recognise, secure and protect the human rights of all people
present within their jurisdiction, and in the requirement that a human rights
treaty be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and
effective.30 Here, consideration is given as to whether returning a national
to their country of origin raises an obligation for the host State to prevent a
breach of fundamental human rights.31
The research of McAdam however identifies that the obligations of States
appear to be more limited than one would consider.32 With regard to the
non-refoulement obligation based on the risk of arbitrary deprivation, the New
Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal gave a strong message that the
risk for the loss of life due to natural hazards does not result in a positive
obligation to protect the life. The Tribunal considered that:
‘The disasters that occur in Tuvalu derive from vulnerability of natural hazards
such as droughts and hurricanes, and inundation due to sea-level rise and storm
surges. The content of Tuvalu’s positive obligations to take steps to protect the
29 0907346 [2009] RRTA 1168 10 Dec 2009 para 51 Australian Refugee Review Tribunal in
McAdam 2010b.
30 Frigo 2011, p. 95 – 98. Frigo clarifies that it is widely accepted that the risk of serious human
rights abuses does not necessarily have to come from State agents in order to trigger the
protection of non-refoulement. It can also originate from non-State actors when the State
is unwilling or unable to protect the person at risk. Frigo 2011, p. 100.
31 UK Climate Change and Migration Coalition 2014, p. 7. See also McAdam 2011, p. 17 and 18.
32 ‘The potential of this [humanitarian] ground to provide protection to those displaced by
climate change has been significantly overstated in recent media coverage of the IPT decision
in AD Tuvalu, which heralded the case in which a Tuvaluan family successfully appealed
a decision for their deportation on humanitarian grounds as “the first legal recognition
of ‘climate refugees’”. This characterisation is however “wildly off the mark”. While climate
change was one of the matters taken into account by the IPT when considering whether
humanitarian circumstances existed, the finding of such circumstances was based for the
most part on the fact that deportation in this case would have amounted to an “unusually
significant disruption to a dense network of family relationships”.’ See Farquhar 2015, p. 36.
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life of persons within its jurisdiction from such hazards must necessarily be shaped
by this reality. While the Government of Tuvalu certainly has both obligations and
capacity to take steps to reduce the risks from known environmental hazards, for
example by undertaking ex-ante disaster risk reduction measures or though ex-post
operational responses, it is simply not within the power of the Government of
Tuvalu to mitigate the underlying environmental drivers of these hazards. To equate
such inability with a failure of state protection goes too far. It places an impossible
burden on a state.’33
Accordingly, an affected State would be faced with ‘an impossible burden’
were it required, as a matter of law, to mitigate the underlying environmental
drivers of these hazards in order to comply with the obligation to protect
against the arbitrary deprivation of life.34
The Immigration and Protection Tribunal New Zealand has accepted that
in general terms, exposure to the impacts of natural disasters can be a human-
itarian circumstance that could make it unjust or unduly harsh to deport. In
such a case the appellant must establish exceptional circumstances of a human-
itarian nature such that it would be unjust or unduly harsh to deport the
particular appellant from New Zealand. It does not suffice to establish the
existence of a matter of broad humanitarian concern.35 It will be hard to meet
this threshold, especially because in practice groups of people are affected.
One person leaving may allow another person to stay behind. Under these
circumstances, it does not do justice to reality to decide these cases on an
individual level.36
Statehood
At some point, island States will be completely submerged. This paragraph
analyses what will happen to the legal status of the State and its people.
Although there is no internationally agreed definition of what constitutes
a State,37 there is agreement in the existing doctrine that there must be terri-
tory inhabited by a permanent population under the control of an effective
government.38 As McAdam pointed out: ’While all four criteria would
seemingly need to be present for a State to come into existence, the lack of
33 AC Tuvalu [2014] NZIPT 800517–520, para 75.
34 Farquhar 2015, p. 35 and 36.
35 AC Tuvalu [2014] NZIPT 501370-371, para 32. See also Vliet, 2014, p. 170 and Kälin 2008,
p. 7 and 8.
36 See also: Anderson 2012.
37 See for an extensive analysis Crawford 2006, Part I: The Concept of Statehood in Inter-
national Law.
38 The classic formulation of statehood is contained in Art. 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Conven-
tion on the Rights and Duties of States, which is regarded as reflecting customary inter-
national law. For an analysis see Malanczuk 2002, 7th revised edition, p. 75-79, 88, and
152-154. Additionally, independence has been cited by publicists as a central criterion of
statehood.
210 Chapter 6
all four may not mean the end of a State. This is because of the strong
presumption of continuity of existing States.’39 Furthermore, the international
law rules on the extinction of countries have never been tested in this way
before, so the result is unclear.40
– Defined territory
In the literature, ‘the loss of all territory has been cited most frequently as a
possible ground for loss of statehood. It appears, however, unlikely to occur
before the end of the century, even with the upwardly revised rates in rising
sea-levels announced by scientists recently.’41 Once the State exists, ‘there
is no minimum amount of territory that needs to be held, and loss of some
territory at least should not affect the legal status of the entity, since it is not
necessary for a State to have precisely defined boundaries.’42
– Permanent population
‘The general requirement that States have “a certain coherent territory effective-
ly governed” assumes that there remains a population on that territory to be
governed.’43 In this context, a ‘permanent’ population simply means that it
cannot be transitory. There the relevant question is whether a State would
still be considered to have a permanent population when (a large proportion
of) its population lives outside the State’s territory.44 Low-lying island popula-
tions will decline before the islands are submerged, but international law does
not require a minimum population. When no people remain, perhaps by
retaining an outpost on the territory or elsewhere as a government in exile
or on territory that another State permits it to use, the State can continue to
exist.45
– Effective government
There is a strong presumption in international law that States continue to exist
even if there is a period without a (or an effective) government. If (most of
the) island is submerged, it is possible that a government will be situated in
another country as a government in exile. McAdam pointed out that ‘over
time, the function of the government in exile will wane. In particular, if the
government in exile over time merged with the organs of the host State,
especially if done voluntarily, then this would normally result in the first
39 McAdam 2010, p. 6.
40 ‘International law contemplates the formal dissolution of a country in cases of absorption
by another country, merger with another country and dissolution with the emergence of
successor countries’, in McAdam 2010, p. 5.
41 UNHCR 2009, p. 2.
42 McAdam 2010, p. 6 and 7.
43 Ibid., p. 7.
44 Ibid., p. 8.
45 Ibid., p. 8.
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State’s extinction (provided there is no other perceived international interest
in asserting the continuity of the State).’46 The presumption of continuity will
likely apply until States no longer recognise the government (which may be
in exile).47
– Control
The strong presumption of continuity of existing States means that other States
may continue to treat it as such despite a lack of effectiveness, or even a ‘very
extensive loss of actual authority’.48 So, even
‘when a government operates in exile, the State continues to exist but its govern-
mental functions are (the assumption is, temporarily) unable to be performed from
within its own territory. Since the principle of territorial sovereignty means that
a government may only act as a government in exile with the consent (express
or implied) of the State in which it is located, the powers of such a government
are necessarily more circumscribed than when it operates within its own terri-
tory.’49
To conclude, it is unlikely that small island States will readily relinquish their
claims to Statehood. As the situation is simply so new, no clear international
legal framework appears to apply.50 The international community might ’be
willing to continue to accept maintenance of the status quo (recognition of
on-going Statehood) even when the facts no longer seem to support the State’s
existence.’51
Statelessness
Even if statehood would be lost, it remains unclear whether the nationals of
that State would be considered stateless. According to Article 1 of the 1954
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, a stateless person is
‘not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law’.
Kollmanskog refers to McAdam and Saul to argue that the Convention would
not apply to environmental refugees: ‘According to McAdam and Saul, how-
ever, the island citizens would not be protected because the definition of
statelessness is premised on the denial of nationality through the operation
of the law of a particular state, rather than through the disappearance of a
state altogether.’52 The instruments’ tight juridical focus leaves little scope
46 Ibid., p. 12.
47 Ibid., p. 9.
48 Ibid., p. 10.
49 Ibid., p. 10.
50 UNGA UN Doc A/67/299 2012.
51 UNHCR 2011, p. 7.
52 Kolmannskog, Trebbi 2010, p. 718.
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for arguing for a broader interpretation that would encompass people whose
State is at risk of disappearing.53
Apart from the Convention, there is no general right to nationality in
customary international law, although there is certainly ‘a strong presumption
in favour of the prevention of statelessness in any change of nationality,
including in a State succession.54 However, even if the people of the sub-
merged small island States were to be considered stateless, this legal frame-
work is of limited help, as it does not automatically allow a stateless person
to enter a third State.55
Conclusion
Most communities likely to be adversely affected by the impacts of climate
change and disasters want to remain in their homes for as long as they can.
However, it is clear that some people have no option but to move.
McAdam also pointed out that there is much more to relocation than
simply securing territory. When planned resettlement involves whole popula-
tions or communities, particular attention would need to be given to rights
to enjoy and practice one’s own culture and traditions and to continue to
exercise economic rights in their areas or countries of origin.56 Those who
move need to know that they can remain and re-enter the new country, enjoy
work rights and health rights there, have access to social security if necessary,
be able to maintain their culture and traditions, and also what the status of
children born there would be.57 Along the same lines, Ammer et. al. raise
the question as to whether citizenship also has a collective dimension (eg the
right to live together with other citizens or the right to govern themselves)
and what implications this would have for a potential receiving State. In the
special case of indigenous peoples, there are further ambiguities: can they
continue to be regarded as an indigenous group in the host State (even though
they are not ‘indigenous’ in the host State)? Would indigenous groups have
a right to demand land on which they live in community? Are they entitled
to receive the same assistance as refugees? Do you have the right to be a citizen
(fast-track procedure) or is there at least an obligation to issue documents?
All these questions of international law are not yet clarified.58
53 Kolmannskog, Skretteberg 2009, p. 15 and 16. The UN General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion in which it stated at para 72: ‘In view of the fact that statelessness has not yet arisen,
however, the international law principle of prevention of statelessness would be applicable
and the threats implied by mass statelessness for the concerned populations could be
minimized. Multilateral comprehensive agreements would be the ideal preventive mechan-
ism, providing where, and on what legal basis, affected populations would be permitted
to move elsewhere, as well as their status.’ UNGA UN Doc A/64/350 2009.
54 McAdam 2010.
55 UNGA UN Doc A/67/299 2012, para 68.
56 McAdam 2012, p. 149.
57 McAdam 2010, p. 16.
58 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 71 and 72.
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Kelman pointed out that many practical and ethical questions remain:
‘Who pays for the move and the construction of new communities or new land?
How will any territorial or jurisdictional disputes be resolved? How will those to
be displaced retain significant control over these aspects? If an island country is
entirely evacuated but the islands are submerged only at the highest tides, who
owns the fishing rights in the surrounding seas? Could those rights be sold, with
oil and other mineral resources potentially being more valuable than fish? If a state
is disbanded because of displacement rather than re-created, how do the answers
to these questions change?’59
6.3 ARMED CONFLICT
In the literature many conflicts have been attributed to conflicts over energy
sources, fertile land and fresh water. An example often referred to is the crisis
in the Darfur region. Environmental degradation is projected to become a more
direct and common driver of conflicts. Another possible source for conflict
is changing coastlines and submerging territorial markers due to sea-level rise
that may lead to changing territorial boundaries and to conflict over maritime
boundaries and exclusive economic zones. These type of conflicts can be dealt
with in tribunals that are topic specific, such as the international tribunal for
the law of the sea.60 Also conflicts between countries over for example shared
waters can be dealt with in bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements.61
The Refugee framework and complementary protection frameworks provide
protection against conflicts irrespective of the underlying cause of the conflict.
Humanitarian law provides internal protection and generalised violence62
generally suffices for access to third countries based on regular national
migration laws. International flight from a conflict affecting a particular social
group over access to environmental resources – such as scarce water resources
or agricultural land could potentially form the basis of a refugee claim.63
Sometimes the element of conflict is not so clear. It has been argued that ‘riots
in the aftermath of a disaster, triggered by the government’s failure to provide
59 See also Kelman 2008, p. 20-22 for an analysis on self-governance in free association with
another State.
60 UNGA UN Doc A/64/350, Report of the Secretary-General on Climate change and its
possible security implications, 2009.
61 See Rüttinger et al. 2015, p. 51-58 for an analysis of the risks of climate change for shared
water resources.
62 Art. 15 c of the EU Qualification Directive provides protection against serious and individual
threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of
international or internal armed conflict [emphasis added].
63 Zetter 2011, p. 19.
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assistance’ would suffice for a claim for protection based on the OAU Conven-
tion of Article III (3) of the Cartagena Declaration.64
For environmentally induced conflict, there is no added value from a legal
perspective in framing a conflict as caused by environmental degradation.
However, from a political perspective, framing the conflict as caused by
environmental degradation can be beneficial, as these conflicts can sometimes
be prevented by concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements on the use
of resources. In general, existing international law is sufficient to protect
persons displaced by armed conflict triggered by the effects of environmental
degradation whether or not they cross an internationally recognized State
border.65
6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
Environmental pollution is typically not considered under a security
approach.66 However, in practice, States may allow access for humanitarian
reasons to victims of catastrophes, such as has been demonstrated in the case
of Chernobyl and Fukushima. There are however no clear legal obligations
to protect those people, not even for the most serious events, as generally there
will be an internal flight alternative. It could be argued that where vital infra-
structure is destroyed and provision of basic services such as clean water, food
and electricity is hindered, this could amount to the obligation of non-refoule-
ment.67 Also for the non-refoulement obligation, internal flight alternatives
will be considered first.
6.5 PLANNED RESETTLEMENT
Planned resettlement generally does not involve migration to other countries.
Only in a limited number of cases, such as the low-lying small island States
and the loss of territory for the Inuit, migration to other countries is considered.
McAdam has argued in the context of low-lying island States, that to prevent
statelessness one option would be that territory elsewhere would be ceded
to the affected State to ensure its continued existence. This would be a volun-
tary action of the ceding State, as the right to self-determination does not
operate so as to give the inhabitants of these States a right to claim land in
64 McAdam 2011, p. 15.
65 Kälin 2008, p. 6.
66 An example of one of the few anlysis in the security context is Perrow 2011.
67 See for example Moor de, Cliquet 2010, p. 64.
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other States.68 The acquisition of land alone does not secure immigration or
citizenship rights, but is simply a private property transaction. ‘It is only with
formal cession of land at the State-to-State level that one State acquires the
lawful international title to it and nationals can move to that area as part of
their own national territory. The likelihood of this happening today is
remote.’69 It is also possible to form an Union with another State. In such
a case, any contracting State to which territory is transferred shall grant its
nationality on persons who would otherwise be stateless.70
In general, resettlement will not take place in the context of cession of State
territory of the host State to another State, but will often take place through
voluntary mechanisms such as voluntary migration schemes. These mechan-
isms operate on a voluntary basis and it is up to the receiving State to deter-
mine which people (often skilled labourers) it will allow access and stay to
their country.
Planned resettlement can potentially have troublesome knock-on effects
when the resettled people or the communities where they are resettled into
face problems such as access to resources, food, water or energy. This may
fuel inter-ethnic resource competition in new settlement areas and clashes
between different groups (such as agro-pastoralists and working migrants).71
Even though this effect is widely acknowledged, there is no specific legal
protection framework (apart from in a very basic sense, the internally displaced
persons framework) that addresses these type of threats.
68 McAdam 2010a, p. 16: ‘Theoretically, too, it would be possible for one State to ‘lease’
territory from another, although one might query the extent to which power could then
be freely exercised sufficiently to meet the other requirements of statehood in such a case.’
69 Ibid., p. 16.
70 UNHCR 2009, p. 1. See also § 6.2.5.
71 Rüttinger et al. 2015.

7 The responsibility approach
Each State has the sole competence to regulate its environmental matters.
Sometimes, activities within one State can have negative effects in other States
or on the global commons. While environmental legislation and international
instruments lay down norms and procedures aimed at preserving the environ-
ment, liability is a necessary complement to ensure that persons responsible
for non-compliance resulting in environmental damage face the prospect of
having to pay for restoration of the affected environment or compensating
for the damage caused.1 Liability can therefore be instrumental in providing
States with incentives to comply with environmental obligations and to avoid
damage. In the context of environmentally forced migration this may result
either in: (1) the prevention of forced migration when environmental degrada-
tion is limited or prevented; or (2) planned resettlement or support for affected
people from the perspective of preventing damage; and/or (3) compensation
for those forcedly displaced. Under the first category, migration can be a form
of adaptation or a way to mitigate injuries caused by a wrongful act, namely,
excessive greenhouse gas emissions in breach of the no-harm/preventive
principle.2
This chapter seeks to explore legal responsibility for environmental de-
gradation leading to forced migration. The concept of State responsibility will
be mainly analysed with regard to the legal consequences of State conduct
for anthropogenic climate change,3 as this will be the biggest cause of migra-
tion due to human (in)activities. As there are very little practical examples
of international courts or tribunals dealing with litigation related to
anthropogenic climate change in the international sphere, this chapter mainly
analyses future possibilities. Thereto, this chapter focusses on the core of the
law on State responsibility. The chapter first focusses on responsibilities under
specific relevant regimes and under general principles of international law
(§ 7.1-7.4). It then analyses the complications of invoking responsibility and
1 According to Douhan, ‘Liability for environmental damage, despite its novelty and fragment-
ary treaty regulation, could be viewed as an emerging norm of customary international
law.’ Douhan 2013.
2 See § 7.4.1.
3 For an overview of climate change and its impacts on human and natural system, see for
example Verheyen 2005, chapter 2. See also Allen 2012.
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compensation (§ 7.5).4 It finishes with a softer form of responsibility: the
responsibility of States to support other States in their development (§ 7.6).
7.1 RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CLIMATE REGIME
In 1992, 154 States signed the UNFCCC. The objective of the UNFCCC is to tackle
the negative effects of climate change. The Convention’s stated aim is to
achieve: ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient
to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed
in a sustainable manner.’ (Article 2). However, the apparent clarity of this
formulation masked several points of scientific contention, including the extent
to which climate change is human-induced, the point at which climate change
is ‘dangerous’, and the levels at which greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere would have to be stabilized to prevent reaching that point.5 It
is also unclear within what timeframe action must be taken. The UNFCCC leaves
this to be determined politically. The UNFCCC does incorporate some general
principles, that are clarified in the context of climate change:
- The precautionary principle as reflected in Article 3.3 UNFCCC aims at two
objectives in the UNFCCC: (1) the prevention of climate change and, (2) the
mitigation thereof. However, the Precautionary principle does not mandate
any specific form of action or standard and therefore does not impose a
specific obligation upon the parties. Christiansen, raises a critical note to
the application of this principle, as it obliges States to take adaptation
measures on the domestic level and also bear the costs thereof when and
as soon as they know about the anticipated damage. This potentially shifts
the responsibility from the polluters to the affected States.6
- With respect to common but differentiated responsibilities (hereafter: CBDR),
Article 2 ICESCR: ‘emphasizes that responsibilities for mitigation and adapta-
tion should be allocated in a manner that will result in the greatest degree
of human rights protection. State should expeditiously mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions to the maximum extent possible, and the international
community should cooperate in making funding available to ensure that
human rights are protected as States transition to less carbon-intensive
4 It will not discuss methods of allocating the costs of addressing climate change among
nations e.g., by cap-and-trade schemes and/or carbon taxes, trade law regimes, criminal
persecution or domestic climate change litigation. For more information on these topics
see Vandenbergh, Ackerly & Forster 2009 and Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 5 and 76 and Johnston
2009 and Metcalf, Weisbach 2009.
5 Brunnée, Toope 2010, p. 180.
6 Christiansen 2016, p. 63-69.
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economies. The international community must also cooperate to provide
resource transfers, assistance with resettlement of displaced populations,
and other forms of adaptation assistance to ensure progress on human
rights as climate change impacts accrue.’7 The Convention also encom-
passes the result of the principle. It aims at developed countries to take
the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof
(Paragraph 3 of the preamble).8 The principle, as applied in the UNFCCC,
does not distinguish between countries according to the potential impact
that climate change might have on them.9 This may put a (too) heavy
burden on heavily affected developing States.
- The Principle of Sustainable Development, as reflected in Article 3.4
UNFCCC, sets conditions for what is meant with ‘sustainable development’
in the context of climate change. Protection measures should (a) be appro-
priate for the specific conditions of each party (b) be integrated with
national development programs and (c) take into account that economic
development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change.
As it stands, this text remains vague; it can be said that the concept may
not give rise to an international right to sustainable development but is
rather a guiding principle for further development. Christiansen concludes
that ‘It is not possible to characterize it as a primary rule from which
violation compensation for damage may derive.’10
Even though the UNFCCC does not contain provisions that define climate change
damages or questions of compensation, the awareness of damages is reflected
in the preamble of the UNFCCC. It reiterates that States ‘have the responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.’11 However, ‘During the negotiation process of the FCCC
industrialised nations emphasised that they would not accept any treaty
provisions hinting at State responsibility.’12 This caused several States, upon
signature of the UNFCCC (and the Kyoto Protocol), to make the following
declaration, which refers to State responsibility: ‘signature of the Convention
7 Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 37.
8 All states will possess some ability to contribute to global efforts to reach the stabilisation
objective. However, such capability will vary. Countries with large populations but low
development levels have the potential ability to contribute by adopting policies and meas-
ures that restrict certain aspects of their development e.g. transport. Often, these same
countries have not contributed to the problem and so it seems unjust to impose such a
burden on them. Concern that ability-based distribution may, even after historical contribu-
tion is taken into account, nevertheless result in an unjust distribution of burden is reflected
clearly in Art. 32 of the UNFCCC in Christiansen 2016, p. 63-69.
9 Christiansen 2016, p. 63-69.
10 Ibid., p. 63-69.
11 Voigt 2008, p. 3 and 4.
12 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1114.
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shall in no way constitute a renunciation of any rights under international
law concerning state responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change.’13
States that have only ratified the UNFCCC and not the Kyoto Protocol
For countries that have only ratified the UNFCCC and not the Kyoto Protocol,
it is generally considered that the UNFCCC, being a framework agreement, is
merely setting out a shared vision of the common goals and interests of the
international community and that it contains no primary obligations.14 Many
authors agree that Article 2 UNFCCC does not contain primary international
obligations and that ‘it is evident that the creators of the Convention clearly
and intentionally used a language which does not include an obligation that
may be legally binding for them. Instead, they chose a very careful and
noncommittal language.’15 Christiansen argues that: ‘the only obligation that
can be clearly detected in Article 2 UNFCCC is that the parties have to officially
acknowledge an intention to prevent dangerous climate change.’16 However,
Voigt argues that the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC (reflected in Article 2)
is to provide a duty of prevention with regard to dangerous climate change
and ‘it is possible to interpret and operationalize this duty of preventing
dangerous interference with the climate system on the basis of current scientific
and legal standards of protection.’17
It could also be debated whether Article 4 UNFCCC contains an obligation
that may constitute a sufficient basis for State liability. Article 4.1 establishes
common but differentiated obligations for all parties, but these ‘are so vague
that it is doubtful that violating these obligations would constitute a sufficient
basis for State liability.’18 Article 4.2 UNFCCC contains specific obligations for
Annex 1 parties. According to Article 4.2 each Annex I Party shall adopt
national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate
change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and
protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. Voigt
pointed out that, when interpreted in a teleological way, Article 4.2 UNFCCC:
13 Declarations made by the Governments of Nauru. Tuvalu, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea.
See Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1114.
14 Christiansen 2016, p. 63-71 and. p. 93. A strong argument for this is: ‘the difficulty would
be the crushingly vague nature of the obligations, invariably drafted in such a way as to
make it impossible to argue that any particular provision gives rise to a cause of action
one of the most notable provisions of that Convention is the footnote added to Art. 1 entitled
‘Definitions’, which provides that ‘Titles of articles are included solely to assist the reader’:
this footnote is aimed at the title to Art. 3 entitled ‘Principles’, to make it clear that although
the content of the five sub-paragraphs of Art. 3 are called principles, they are in fact not
to be treated as legal principles, and not of a nature to give rise to an actionable remedy.’
See Sands 2016, p. 28 and Voigt 2008, p. 3 and 4.
15 Christiansen 2016, p. 62.
16 Ibid., p. 62.
17 Voigt 2008, p. 5.
18 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 143.
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‘sets forth an “obligation of conduct” to reverse the long term trend of ever-
increasing greenhouse gas emissions. This conduct is required in order to stabilize
atmospheric concentrations. Article 4.2 UNFCCC in conjunction with Article 2,
therefore, obliges parties to take action to adopt policies and measures to secure
the stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. These Articles
together could, therefore, be understood as a primary rule that when breached
establishes a wrongful act. Such a breach is committed where a State is taking no
or insufficient measures to modify upward emission trends.’19
Faure and Nollkaemper share the view that the rather vague obligation ‘does
stipulate a commitment for Annex I countries to at least take corresponding
measures for the mitigation of climate change by limiting their anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases and arguably could be the basis of a liability
claim.’20 Voigt concludes that ‘if an Annex I Party has increased its emissions
continually since its ratification of the UNFCCC, this could amount to a breach
of treaty. Nevertheless, this continues to be a controversial topic and no
consensus exists on the interpretation of Article 2 of the UNFCCC in conjunction
with Article 4.2.’21
States committed to the obligations of both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
For countries that have committed to the obligations of both the UNFCCC and
the Kyoto Protocol,22 the situation is different. Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol
contains very specific quantified emission limitation or reduction commitments
for every separate country specified in a percentage of the base year or
period.23 ‘In this case, there is a clear obligation on the parties that have
accepted the Kyoto Protocol. A breach of these very specific quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments could thus be considered a
breach of a treaty obligation that potentially could give rise to State liability
(provided other conditions are met).’24
19 Voigt 2008, p. 5-8.
20 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 143. On the national level, in the Dutch case The State of The
Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, The Hague Court of Appeal C/09/456689/ HA ZA 13-
1396, Ruling of 9 October 2018, the Court partially based its decision about the Duty of
care under Art. 2 and 8 ECHR in relation to climate change on the UNFCCC and the
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.
21 Voigt 2008, p. 7.
22 For a historical overview of the key stages in climate change convention regime up to the
Kyoto Protocol see Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 112.
23 However, ‘countries such as Brazil, China and India which rank among the top ten GHG
emitters are parties to the Kyoto Protocol, they did not take on binding emissions targets
of their own, in line with the CBDR principle. As a result, the Kyoto Protocol in fact only
covered 27 percent of current global energy-related CO2 emissions in 2012, likely to be
now even less.’ Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 63.
24 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 144. Verheyen and Zengerling argue that the concept of
compliance control can be relevant in the context of the Kyoto Procotol. See Verheyen,
Zengerling 2013, p. 765 and 766, and more in detail p. 771-777. ‘The extent to which a
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Both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol contain some unique provisions
relating to adaptation and funding for adaptation. The UNFCCC contains a
substantive obligation to formulate and implement national or regional adapta-
tion programmes (Article 4.1 (b)). There is however uncertainty as to what
constitute ‘adequate’ adaptation measures and when and exactly how the
obligation must be met. The UNFCCC also entails a general obligation to assist
developing countries in meeting the costs of adaptation under certain circum-
stances.25 With the Kyoto Protocol a special adaptation fund has been estab-
lished. However, the treaty only foresees partial funding of adaptation
measures by Annex II countries and funding pledges made for the adaptation
fund are not directly connected to any concrete assessment of the actual
aggregate adaptation needs of developing countries. So far, funding is made
available on a political basis without attaching it to legal responsibilities.26
The Paris Agreement
The Paris Agreement27 of December 2015 also obligates all parties to ‘prepare,
communicate and maintain successive (non-legally binding) ‘nationally deter-
mined contributions’ (hereafter: NDCs). The Agreement includes a global
stocktake every five years starting in 2023, and a facilitative dialogue in 2018.28
As Brunnee pointed out: ‘The NDCs themselves are ‘housed’ outside of the
agreement – they are to be communicated to the UNFCCC secretariat and will
be published on the UNFCCC website. As it turns out, this blend of lawmaking
and standard setting approaches has shown more potential to achieve collective
climate action than the binding emission reduction regime enshrined in the
Kyoto Protocol.’29 At the same time, obligations contained in the UNFCCC and
the Paris Agreement boil down to little more than an obligation to do some-
thing, not necessarily to make substantial efforts.30 Countries have a legal
obligation to submit NDCs under the Agreement and ‘pursue domestic mitiga-
tion measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions’
country can be legally bound under an international treaty is an interesting subject of debate.
The US could not be forced or cajoled into participating in the Kyoto Protocol. […] Although
Canada was within legal boundaries to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, withdrawal
proved to be virtually costless and without any serious repercussions. There was no question
of sanctions, embargoes or “retorsions” against Canada or the US’ in Sharma 2017, p. 37.
25 See for example Art. 4.3, 4.4, 4.8, 4.9 and 11 UNFCCC.
26 Voigt 2008, p. 3 and 4.
27 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.21, ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ 29 January 2016 UN Doc
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Annex Paris Agreement.
28 Sharma 2017, p. 36. However, as in the case of the mitigation ambition, Sharma argues
that ‘the global stocktake process provides hope for enhancing adaptation action in the
future: the adaptation communications provided by countries will form part of the stocktake,
which is tasked with enhancing implementation of action, reviewing the adequacy of
adaptation and support provided for adaptation and reviewing the overall progress made
in achieving the global goal on adaptation’ in Sharma 2017, p. 38 and 39.
29 Brunnée 2018, p. 26 and 27.
30 Mayer 2017, p. 243.
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(Article 4.2 UNFCCC), but have no real obligation to fulfil them.31 The Paris
Agreement relies on nationally determined, rather than internationally nego-
tiated, emission reduction commitments returns to a ‘mechanism to facilitate
implementation and promote compliance.’32 Whereas the Kyoto Protocol
subjected only a small number of parties accounting for a small share of global
emission to reduction commitments, a substantial part of global emissions is
covered under the Paris Outcome.33 As a critical note, Sharma argues that
‘the Agreement’s two-track approach, where some countries submit five-year
NDCs and others ten-year NDCs, currently makes it difficult to aggregate
contributions and assess collective ambition to compare it with where we
should be to meet the Agreement’s temperature goals.’34 Sharma also refers
to the Emissions Gap Report 2015 of the UN Environment Programme to argue
that ‘ambition will have to increased considerably even in the first NDCs.’35
Currently, the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions do not translate
into a below 2°C world, let alone to efforts to reduce warming to 1.5°C but
rather to global average warming in the magnitude of 2.7°C by 2100.36
The Paris Agreement includes significant provisions on adaptation37 and,
for the first time, a self-standing Article dealing with loss and damage.38
However, paragraph 51 of the decision adopting the Agreement states that
the Article ‘does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensa-
tion’. Instead, Article 8 ensures the continuation of the Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage and calls for cooperation and facilitation
on areas such as, inter alia, early warning systems, emergency preparedness,
insurance solutions and comprehensive risk assessment and building the
resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems.39 Nevertheless, in the
text of Article 8 are significant indications that the parties to the Agreement
at least hope that the voluntary attitude to the Warsaw International Mechan-
ism will extend further such that ‘action and support’ are facilitated, albeit
on a ‘cooperative’ basis. Lees rightfully criticizes, that:
31 Sharma 2017, p. 37.
32 Brunnée 2018, p. 29 and 30.
33 As of February 4, 2016, the Paris Outcome had generated NDCs representing 188 countries
and accounting for close to 98.7% of global carbon emissions. See World Resources Institute
WRI, Climate Data Explorer; at http://cait.wri.org/indc/.
34 Sharma 2017, p. 36.
35 Ibid., p. 36.
36 Roberts, Pelling 2018, p. 4.
37 Art. 7 Paris Agreement.
38 Art. 8 Ibid.
39 Sharma 2017, p. 39. See also Roberts, Pelling 2018, p. 5.
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‘whilst the Paris Agreement is fundamentally premised on the concept of differ-
entiated responsibilities,40 it does not, in relation to loss and damage, provide
for tools for assessing these divergent responsibilities for fear of providing a
foundation for liability. Whilst this failure is apparent throughout the Agreement
(there is similarly no attempt to allocate responsibility in relation to mitigation and
adaptation, for example), it is particularly significant in the context of loss and
damage.’41
Instead, Article 2, reads: ‘2. This Agreement will be implemented to reflect
equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.’ Further,
Article 4, on mitigation reads:
‘3. Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a
progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution
and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circum-
stances.
4. Developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by undertaking
economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. Developing country Parties
should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move
over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the
light of different national circumstances.’
A huge disadvantage is that ‘there were no additional funds made available
to deal with loss and damage, despite concerns expressed by developing
countries that dipping into the already limited finance pool available for
adaptation would shrink it further.’42 Even though Article 7.6 acknowledges
the importance of ‘support for and international cooperation on adaptation
efforts […] especially those that are most vulnerable’ and Article 7.6 and 7.13
state: ‘continuous and enhanced international support shall be provided to
developing country Parties, to strengthen cooperation, engage in national
planning processes and implementation of actions and to submit and update
adaptation communications’, Sharma concludes that: ‘The existing provisions
of the Agreement on adaptation, it would appear, do not constitute a strong
enough precautionary or post-cautionary response to the uncertainties and
certainties of climate impacts.’43
40 The preamble to the Paris Agreement refers to ‘the principle of equity and common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national
circumstances’. Decision 3/CP.19 which forms the basis of the WIM too refers to the need
to take account of differentiated responsibility for loss and damage.
41 Lees 2017, p. 61 and Roberts, Pelling 2018, p. 5. Also point to the political character of the
scope of loss and damage.
42 Sharma 2017, p. 39 and 40.
43 Ibid., p. 38 and 39.
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Lees pointed out that another important disadvantage of the current regime
is that allocation of responsibility for climate change poses a number of signi-
ficant problems: (1) interpretative problems (what is loss and damage?);44
(2) problems of justification for liability; and (3) relatedly, the issue of retro-
spective liability provisions; and (4) finally, problems of causal allocation and
proof.45 These underlying difficulties have meant that agreement relating to
loss and damage responsibility and liability has been hard to achieve to date,
and explains in part the history of such liability which has been heavily
focused on voluntary or symbolic approaches. In part too this is due to the
reluctance of developed nations to accept that they should bear the burden
of consequences for historical sources of climate change.46 Roberts and Pelling
pointed out that: ‘While attribution has a role to play in Loss and Damage,
it should not be a pre-requisite for global action to help developing countries
address loss and damage.’ Instead they pointed at the ethical obligation of
the international community to help build resilience and institutional capacity
to address weather-related risks.47
7.1.1 Human mobility in the climate change negotiations
Apart from addressing climate change as a cause of migration, the climate
regime has incorporated more and more references to the migration itself. The
most essential developments and their implications are discussed hereafter.
The Cancún Adaptation Agreement
The agreements, reached on December 11 in Cancún, Mexico, at the 2010
United Nations Climate Change Conference,48 represented key steps forward
in capturing plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and to help developing
nations protect themselves from climate impacts and build their own
sustainable futures. The Cancún Adaptation Framework is the first instrument
that explicitly concerns itself with climate induced migration.49 Paragraph
14 invited all States parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Frame-
44 ‘Although the UNFCCC uses the term “loss and damage associated with climate change
impacts”, the fact that it defines loss and damage as arising from both extreme events and
slow onset processes naturally leads to the question of how loss and damage can be
attributed to anthropogenic climate change.’ In Roberts, Pelling 2018, p. 5.
45 See also § 7.5.
46 Lees 2017, p. 64.
47 Roberts, Pelling 2018, p. 6.
48 UNFCCC, Cancun Agreement, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth
session, held in Cancun from 29 November-10 December 2010, Cancun, 2011. FCCC/CP/
2010/7.
49 For an extensive account of attempts at the international level to develop a normative
framework relating to climate change and migration from late 2010 to mid-2013 see McAdam
2014, p. 12.
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work by undertaking, inter alia: ‘measures to enhance understanding,
coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displace-
ment, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate at the national,
regional and international levels.’ [emphasis added]. In the Conference of
Parties, it was also explicitly acknowledged that: ‘owing to historical respons-
ibility, developed country Parties must take the lead in combatting climate
change and the effects thereof.’ This is a reflection of responsibility in the
common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC regime.50
Although the inclusion of migration in the adaptation framework is an
indication that States accept the connection between climate change and
migration, and may be a first step in developing a coherent migration strategy,
it contains no binding obligations. As McAdam pointed out:
‘From a legal perspective, the provision is very weak. It is couched within a non-
binding “decision” of the state parties to the UNFCCC and imposes no formal
obligations on them, instead simply “inviting” them to undertake measures that
assist “understanding, coordination and cooperation” on climate change–related
mobility. It requires states neither to implement migration programs nor to “protect”
people displaced by climate change. Arguably, this is appropriate in this context:
while the climate change regime provides a high-profile “hook” for consideration
of the protection and assistance concerns arising from migration and displacement,
it is not a suitable forum in which to examine the complexity of these issues in
a structured or comprehensive way.’51
The Doha Decision
Climate induced migration, displacement and planned relocation was also
recognized in the Doha Decision on loss and damage.52 At COP18 in Doha,
Qatar, in 2012, human mobility dimensions were included under the loss and
damage work programme of UNFCCC. In paragraph 7(a) (VI) the Doha Decision:
‘7. Acknowledges the further work to advance the understanding of and expertise
on loss and damage, which includes, inter alia, the following:
(a) Enhancing the understanding of:
(vi) How impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement
and human mobility;’
COP19 Warsaw
At the COP19 in Warsaw, the ‘Warsaw International Mechanism‘ (WIM) was
established. It was designed to address loss and damage associated with the
adverse effects of climate change in developing countries particularly vulner-
50 Winkler, Rajamani 2014, p. 105.
51 McAdam 2014, p. 13.
52 UNFCCC, Doha Decision, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its eighteenth session,
held in Doha from 26 November – 8 December 2012, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1.
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able to climate change.53 One of the Action Areas of the Working Plan fo-
cussed on migration.54
The Paris Agreement
The COP21 Paris Agreement (adopted by world governments on 12th December
2015 and entered into force on 4 November 2016) covering the period from
2020 onwards is the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal.
It sets out a global action plan to limit global warming to well below 2°C. In
addition, 185 intended nationally determined contributions were submitted
and 20% of them mention migration.55 The Paris Agreement also made a
major step in acknowledging climate induced migration. Since the basic
acknowledgement in the Cancún decision on adaptation, and the Doha De-
cision on loss and damage, the Paris Agreement laid down in its preamble:
‘Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, parties
should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and con-
sider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights
of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabil-
ities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as
gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.’56
In Paragraph 49 of the Paris COP Decision referring to Loss and Damage, the
Conference of the Parties ‘requests the Executive Committee of the Warsaw
International Mechanism to […] develop recommendations for integrated
approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse
impacts of climate change.’ [emphasis added].57
COP22 Marrakech
During COP22, over 35 events addressing human mobility dimensions were
organized by UNFCCC Parties and stakeholders.58 The Decision of the Confer-
ence of the Parties (Decision 3/CP.22 ‘Warsaw International Mechanism for
53 See Decision UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its nineteenth session,
held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, 31
January 2014.
54 See Annex II Initial two-year workplan of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw Inter-
national Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts in
accordance with decisions 3/CP.18 and 2/CP.19: ‘Action area 6: Enhance the understanding
of and expertise on how the impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration,
displacement and human mobility; and the application of such understanding and expertise.’
55 Ionesco 2015.
56 UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 21st Session, held
in Paris from 30 November-11 December 2015, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1.
57 Ibid., Decision 1/CP.21 Adoption of the Paris Agreement; Addendum Part two: Action taken
by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 para
49, available at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf.
58 IOM, Platform on Disaster Displacement 2018, p. 5.
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Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts’) stated that it:
‘9. Encourages Parties to incorporate or continue to incorporate the con-
sideration of extreme events and slow onset events, non-economic losses,
displacement, migration and human mobility, and comprehensive risk management
into relevant planning and action, as appropriate, and to encourage bilateral
and multilateral entities to support such efforts’59 [emphasis added].
COP23 Bonn
At the COP23 in Bonn, the five year Workplan of the ‘Executive Committee
of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage’ was
approved.60 In this Workplan, Action area 6: Enhance the understanding of
and expertise on how the impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of
migration, displacement and human mobility; and the application of such
understanding and expertise are relevant for environemental refugees. The
Conference of the Parties invites the task force on displacement to ‘take into
consideration both cross-border and internal displacement, in accordance with
its mandate, when developing recommendations for integrated approaches
to averting, minimizing and addressing displacement related to the adverse
impacts of climate change’.61
COP24 Katowice
At COP24, the Task Force on Displacement62 has delivered on its mandate,
and the recommendations on integrated approaches have been forwarded by
the Executive Committee for consideration by Parties. The countries ‘welcomed’
the guidelines as submitted by the Task Force on Displacement and agreed
to include them in their final report:
‘The Conference of the Parties, […]
1. Welcomes: […]
(c) The report of the Task Force on Displacement63 and its comprehensive
assessment of broader issues of displacement related to climate change in
response to decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 49; […]
59 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-second session, held in
Marrakech from 7 to 18 November 2016 Addendum Part two: Action taken by the Confer-
ence of the Parties at its twenty second session. FCCC/CP/2016/10/Add.1.
60 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-third session, held in Bonn
from 6 to 18 November 2017, FCCC/CP/2017/11/Add.1, 8 February 2018.
61 Ibid.
62 The Task Force on displacement is composed of the International Labour Organization,
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, IOM, PDD, the United
Nations Development Programme, UNHCR, and the Civil society group as represented
by the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, the UNFCCC NGO
constituency group ‘Local government and municipal authorities’, the Adaptation Committee
of the UNFCCC, the Least Developed Countries Expert Group of the UNFCCC, Parties
of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism of the UNFCCC.
63 The report of the Task Force on Displacement is available at http://unfccc.int/node/285.
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2. Notes with appreciation the work undertaken by the organizations6 comprising
the Task Force on Displacement in response to decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 49;
3. Invites Parties, bodies under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, United
Nations agencies and relevant stakeholders to consider the recommendations
contained in the annex when undertaking relevant work, as appropriate;
4. Welcomes the decision of the Executive Committee to extend the mandate of
the Task Force on Displacement64 in accordance with terms of reference to
be elaborated by the Executive Committee at its next meeting;
5. Encourages the Executive Committee: […]
(b) To continue its work on human mobility under strategic workstream (d) of
its five-year rolling workplan, including by considering the activities set out
in paragraphs 38 and 39 of its report referred to in paragraph 1(a) above;’65
[emphasis added].
Based on the work of the Task Force on Displacement, the ‘Executive Commit-
tee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated
with Climate Change Impacts’ among other things invites parties:
‘(g)(i) To consider formulating laws, policies and strategies, as appropriate, that
reflect the importance of integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change and in the broader
context of human mobility, taking into consideration their respective human rights
obligations and, as appropriate, other relevant international standards and legal
considerations’
‘(g)(iii) To strengthen preparedness, […] to avert, minimize and address
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change;’
‘(g)(v) To recall the guiding principles on internal displacement and seek to
strengthen efforts to find durable solutions for internally displaced people’
‘(g)(vi) To facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility
of people’
‘(g)(ii) To support and enhance regional, subregional and transboundary coopera-
tion, in relation to averting, minimizing and addressing displacement related to
the adverse impacts of climate change, including for risk and vulnerability assess-
ments, mapping, data analysis, preparedness and early warning systems;’66
With the ‘welcoming’ of the guidelines, it seems that at a minimum climate
migration has become a mainstream topic in the climate change negotiations.
The protection of environmental refugees can benefit from the integrated
approach as applied in the climate change negotiations, particularly through
a quickly growing understanding of the complex causal relationships and
through a rising political will to address the topic. However, there is still a
64 UNFCCC, Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism
for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts, Un Doc FCCC/SB/2018/1,




lack of formal obligations on the protection of environmental refugees. As
migration is just one of many elements that are considered under the climate
change negotiations, there is no possibility to deal with environmentally forced
migration in a structured and comprehensive way.
7.2 RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
So far, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (hereafter: ITLOS) has
not dealt with climate change litigation. However, as Verheyen and Zengerling
pointed out: ‘more than half of the 20 cases ITLOS has dealt with since it took
up its work in 1996 relate in some way to the protection of the marine environ-
ment. Considering that climate change has a crucial impact on the world’s
seas, ITLOS might be in a position to contribute to the interpretation and further
development of climate change law.’67 Climate change, and in particular sea
level rise, may lead to the disappearance of territory and may have an impact
on maritime zones under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter:
UNCLOS). If for example an island disappears, it can no longer serve for baseline
determination and the potential loss of maritime zones is quite substantial
in some instances. And if an island State disappears altogether, it may lose
its maritime zones and accordingly all sovereign rights.68 The ‘shift of EEZ
could also be defined as a damage. If such damage would occur due to
anthropogenic climate change, Article 194.2 would apply as a general pro-
hibition against such damage ‘by pollution’ to other States.’69 Article 194.2
UNCLOS implicitly prohibits unlimited emissions of greenhouse gases by
obliging States to: ‘ensure that activities under their jurisdiction and control
are so conducted as to not cause damage by pollution to other States and their
environment.’70
Climate change can also affect the maritime environment, for example by
temperature changes in the ocean. Based on Articles 193 and 207 UNLCOS States
have the obligation to protect and preserve the maritime environment by
adopting law and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the
marine environment from land-based sources. For climate change to be
regarded as maritime pollution, indirect pollution (through emitting green-
house gasses) should be included in the definition of pollution. Tol and Ver-
heyen argue that it is included as:
‘indirect polluting activities such as emitting greenhouse gases [...] over time “results
or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to the living resources and
67 Verheyen, Zengerling 2013, p. 782.
68 See also § 6.2.5 statelessness.
69 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1116.
70 Ibid., p. 1117 and 1118.
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marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including
fishing and other legitimate use of the sea, [...]” (Article 1.1). This is supported by
the fact that States explicitly addressed pollution “from or through the atmosphere”
(Article 212) and that, during the negotiations, States were aware of the potential
threat of climate change to marine life.’71
The UNCLOS provides additional primary for States that are relevant for pre-
venting or minimizing climate change damage.72 Articles 192 and 194 state
that States shall prevent, control, and reduce marine pollution (no-harm
principle). It also provides obligations of specific conduct (Articles 204-212),
such as monitoring risks, assessing potential effects (Article 204), and adopting
laws to prevent, control, and reduce pollution (Article 207). Article 212 applies
these obligations to pollution introduced from or through the atmosphere.73
Article 235 UNCLOS stresses that State responsibility is triggered if States do
not fulfil their environmental duties under UNCLOS: ‘States are responsible for
the fulfilment of their international obligations concerning the protection and
preservation of the marine environment. They shall be liable in accordance
with international law.’74
The ITLOS, regards the precautionary ‘approach as an integral part of the
due diligence rule under UNCLOS. This is relevant for situations in which
scientific evidence concerning the scope and potential negative impact of the
activity is unclear but the possibility of risk is given.’75 In the Southern Bluefin
Tuna (hereafter: SBT) cases,76 the ITLOS has ‘made the most extensive indirect
use of the precautionary principle. Both plaintiffs argued that Japan had
violated its obligations under UNCLOS and the precautionary principle, follow-
ing unilateral experimental fishing of SBT which resulted in Japan exceeding
its national quotas set by the ad hoc Commission.’77 The ITLOS considered:
‘that there is scientific uncertainty regarding measures to be taken to conserve
the stock of southern bluefin tuna and that there is no agreement among the
parties as to whether the conservation measures taken so far have led to the
improvement in the stock of southern bluefin tuna;’ (para 79). It also con-
sidered that: ‘although the Tribunal cannot conclusively assess the scientific
evidence presented by the parties, it finds that measures should be taken as
a matter of urgency to preserve the rights of the parties and to avert further
deterioration of the southern bluefin tuna stock;’ (para 80). Faure and Vos note
that: ‘plaintiffs to the concerned disputes did rely upon the precautionary
principle as customary international law. In turn, this may be considered as
71 Ibid., p. 1117 and 1118.
72 Kysar 2013, p. 24 and 25.
73 Center for Climate Change Law and the Republic of the Marshall Islands 2011, p. 9.
74 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1117 and 1118.
75 Christiansen 2016, p. 88-92.
76 ITLOS, Southern Bluefin Tuna Case Australia and New Zealand v. Japan 1999.
77 Faure, Vos 2003, p. 92.
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an illustration of a recognition among States of the relevance and the legal
status of such a principle on the international level.’78
In its Order of 3 December 2001 in the MOX Plant Case,79 the ITLOS con-
sidered the duty to cooperate in exchanging information concerning environ-
mental risks a ‘fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the
marine environment’ (para 82). This indicates that the duty to cooperate may
be legally enforceable.80 The MOX Plant dispute finds its origins in UK’s de-
cision to set up a mixed oxide fuel, or MOX facility in Sellafield, near the coast
in Cumbria, England. This facility would reprocess spent nuclear fuel into
MOX, which could then be used for other light water energy generation reactors.
Marine transport of radioactive waste that would be required from this plant
potentially affected the Irish sea coast, prompting Ireland to start two inter-
national arbitrations against the UK.81 The Tribunal shifted the burden of proof
onto the State willing to enter into an environmental-sensitive activity (UK),
based on the Precautionary principle. Although ITLOS did not explicitly pro-
nounce the status on the precautionary principle, it did consider that: ‘A state
interested in undertaking or continuing a particular activity has to prove that
it will result in no harm, rather than the other side having to prove that it will
result in harm.‘82 As Dam pointed out: ‘The Tribunal used “prudence and
caution” as a legal basis for imposing an obligation on parties to exchange
information concerning risks or effects from the operation of a radioactive
plant.’83
ITLOS advocated a broader application of the preventive approach in the
Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits
of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore).84 ITLOS considered that: ‘given the possible
implications of land reclamation on the marine environment, prudence and
caution require that Malaysia and Singapore establish mechanisms for ex-
changing information and assessing the risks or effects of land reclamation
works and devising was to deal with them in the areas concerned.’85
78 Ibid., p. 94. ‘However, defending parties generally rejected such arguments. According to
the position of several parties, one may also insist on the fact that several judges emitted
dissenting or separate opinions in which they acknowledged the existence and the legal
status of the precautionary principle.’ In Faure, Vos 2003, p. 94.
79 ITLOS, Mox Plant Case Ire. V. U.K. 2001.
80 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 33.
81 Kysar 2013, p. 72 and 73.
82 See ITLOS, Mox Plant Case Ire. V. U.K. 2001, Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, p. 4 in
Christiansen 2016, p. 66.
83 Dam-de Jong 2013, p. 142.
84 ITLOS, Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor Malaysia
v. Singapore, Request for provisional Measures, 2003.
85 Ibid., para 99.
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In the Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area,86 the
Council of the International Seabed Authority requested an opinion regarding
legal responsibilities and obligations and possible liability of States sponsoring
exploration and exploitation activities in the Area. The opinion built on the
ICJ’s Pulp Mills decision, by highlighting the contextual nature of the due
diligence standard (para 111, 115, and 147). The Chamber emphasized: ‘due
diligence is a variable concept. It may change over time as measures considered
sufficiently diligent at a certain moment may become not diligent enough in
light, for instance, of new scientific or technological knowledge. It may also
change in relation to the risks involved in the activity.’ (para 117) Brunnée
argues that ‘The requirement of due diligence furthermore served as a bridge
between the duty to prevent environmental harm and the proposition that,
even in the absence of ‘full scientific certainty,’ states must take precautionary
measures to ‘prevent environmental degradation.’87 The Chamber opined
that:
‘The due diligence obligation of the sponsoring States requires them to take all
appropriate measures to prevent damage that might result from the activities of
contractors that they sponsor. This obligation applies in situations where scientific
evidence concerning the scope and potential negative impact of the activity in
question is insufficient but where there are plausible indications of potential risks.
A sponsoring State would not meet its obligation of due diligence if it disregarded
those risks. Such disregard would amount to a failure to comply with the pre-
cautionary approach.’88
The Chamber stresses that the obligation to conduct an environmental impact
assessment is a direct obligation under the Convention and a general obligation
under customary international law (para 145). On that basis, Verheyen and
Zengerling conclude that:
‘This case points to a progressive interpretation of customary environmental law
by the Chamber which might be used in the climate context as there is a certain
parallel between the sea bed as a common heritage of mankind (Article 136 UNCLOS)
and the UNFCCC referring to a similar concept as a first item of its preamble (ack-
nowledging that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a “common
concern of humankind”). While, naturally, much could be written on the difference
between “common heritage of mankind” and “common concern of humankind”,
as well as the parallels in detail, this case law of ITLOS could provide a starting
86 ITLOS, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect
to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion 2011.
87 Brunnée 2018, p. 19.
88 Para 131. However, the ICJ did not engage with the Chamber’s opinion in its discussion
of the EIA obligation in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua / Nicaragua v. Costa Rica see Brunnée 2018,
p. 20.
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point of interpretation of the pollution prevention duties under UNCLOS with respect
to the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.’89
7.3 RESPONSIBILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
This section will analyse the possibility of filing a human rights-based claim
at the international level to assess State responsibility. It will assess the po-
tential of rights-based claims in a climate change context. The question of how
and whether human rights law can be applied to assess State responsibility
for climate change is a complex one that has only just begun to receive analysis
in the international law community. As has been discussed under the rights-
based approach (chapter 3), individuals can have a claim under international
law against the State under whose jurisdiction they are if their affected interests
are protected under human rights law.90 This ‘requirement that the victims
should be under the jurisdiction of the wrongdoing State, however substantially
limits the relevance of this scenario for ‘transboundary’ climate change cases.91
However, the Advisory Opinion from the IACtHR as requested by Colombia
on the environment and human rights ((Obligaciones Estatales en Relación
con el Medio Ambiente en el Marco de la Protección y Garantía de los
Derechos a la Vida y a la Integridad Personal – Interpretación y Alcance de
los Artículos 4.1 y 5.1, en Relación con los Artículos 1.1 y 2 de la Convención
Americana sobre Derechos Humanos)92 confirms the possibility of ‘diagonal’
human rights obligations, i.e. obligations capable of being invoked by
individual or groups against States other than their own. The Advisory
Opinion ‘opens a door – albeit in a cautious and pragmatic way – to cross-
border human rights claims arising from transboundary environmental
impacts.’93 Feria-Tinta and Milnes argue that the acceptance of
‘diagonal human rights obligations can be based on the argument that a State
should not be able to use national boundaries to escape responsibility for human
rights violations which it actually committed: e.g., the U.N. Human Rights
Committee has said, with reference to the ICCPR, that: “[i]t would be unconscionable
to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State
89 Verheyen, Zengerling 2013, p. 786.
90 See for example ECtHR, Banković v. Belgium, 2001, para 56-61 and 75. On human right claims
related to environmental harm, see Boyle, Anderson 1998.
91 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 130.
92 IACtHR, Environment and human rights Obligaciones Estatales en Relación con el Medio Ambiente
en el Marco de la Protección y Garantía de los Derechos a la Vida y a la Integridad Personal –
Interpretación y Alcance de los Artículos 4.1 y 5.1, en Relación con los Artículos 1.1 y 2 de la
Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, Advisory Opinion 2017.
93 Feria Tinta, Milnes 2018.
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party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State,
which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory”.’94
The IACtHR held that:
‘As regards transboundary harms, a person is under the jurisdiction of the State
of origin if there is a causal relationship between the event that occurred in its
territory and the affectation of the human rights of persons outside its territory.
The exercise of jurisdiction arises when the State of origin exercises effective control
over the activities carried out that caused the harm and consequent violation of
human rights.’95
Feria-Tinta and Milnes pointed out that the Advisory Opinion alters the
meaning of ‘effective control’. From something which had to be exercised over
the territory where the victim was, or over the individual victim, effective
control is now understood as whether the source State has effective control
over the activities that caused the transboundary harm.96
Another hurdle is that human-rights litigation demands evidence that an
injury has been caused to the rights of identifiable people (standing), by an
identifiable actor (causation and attribution) as well as evidence that the injury
could be redressed. ‘Thus, climate change cases can only be successfully
brought before court if significant damage has already occurred.’97 With
regard to admissibility, Esrin and Kennedy pointed out that it will be hard
to link a general climate policy to a particular human rights violation.98 And
maybe more importantly, they pointed out that – apart from the African
Charter – ‘human rights instruments make few concessions to “group rights”,
instead requiring that in order to have standing, each individual in a group
must be able to prove that they have been a victim of an individual rights
violation.’99 In practice, climate change often affects groups of people. For
example, when an area becomes too dry to sustain all people living there, it
may still sustain some of the people living there. In this example it would not
94 Ibid.
95 IACtHR, Environment and human rights Obligaciones Estatales en Relación con el Medio Ambiente
en el Marco de la Protección y Garantía de los Derechos a la Vida y a la Integridad Personal –
Interpretación y Alcance de los Artículos 4.1 y 5.1, en Relación con los Artículos 1.1 y 2 de la
Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, Advisory Opinion 2017, para 104. ‘En virtud
de todas las consideraciones anteriores, de conformidad con los párrafos 72 a 103 y en
respuesta a la primera pregunta del Estado solicitante, la Corte opina que: [...]. Los Estados
deben velar porque su territorio no sea utilizado de modo que se pueda causar un daño
significativo al medio ambiente de otros Estados o de zonas fuera de los límites de su
territorio. Por tanto, los Estados tienen la obligación de evitar causar daños transfronterizos.‘
For a translation of the Advisory Opinion see Feria Tinta, Milnes February 26, 2018.
96 Feria Tinta, Milnes February 26, 2018.
97 Verheyen, Zengerling 2013, p. 792 and 793.
98 Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 68 and 69.
99 Ibid., p. 68 and 69.
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make sense to argue that only those who are leaving are affected. Also some
rights only exist as group rights, such as the right of indigenous peoples to
claim that climate change threatens their way of life. As the International Bar
Association has argued:
‘Despite these challenges, international human rights law may provide an avenue
for individuals and communities to seek redress for harms caused by global climate
change. Possible avenues of redress may include class actions, targeting major
groups of emitters, or holding public officials responsible for failures of due
diligence. Many of these strategies are currently being explored.’100
Human rights fora in heavily affected areas might well see more cases, es-
pecially in the African system – while an international system will not be at
the disposal of other affected regions such as Southeast Asia.101
So far, human rights courts and commissions have dealt with climate
change litigation on a very small scale. Two Inuit Petitions submitted to the
IACmHR against the USA102 and Canada103 ‘for failing to adopt adequate
mitigation and adaptation measures have not produced any appreciable
results.’104 In the case against the USA, the ‘petitioners alleged that the United
States is responsible for violating the human rights of the Inuit people by virtue
of its role as “the world’s largest contributor to global warming,” its obscuring
of climate science, and its failure “to cooperate with international efforts to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”’105 The ‘Petition suggested that a human
rights lens can help to apportion a State’s responsibility for mitigation measures
and extraterritorial adaptation assistance by virtue of both its historical and
its present greenhouse gas emissions.’106 As the IACmHR found that the
information submitted did not enable it to determine whether the alleged facts
could be characterized as a violation of the American Convention on Human
Rights, it did not consider the claim.107 The Commission did however hold
hearings and receive testimony on the relationship between human rights and
climate change from representatives for the Inuit in 2007. Questions posed
100 Ibid., p. 68 and 69. These avenues fall outside the scope of this research, just as self-regula-
tion of MNE’s and Public interest litigation.
101 Verheyen, Zengerling 2013, p. 792 and 793.
102 Inuit, Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, seeking relief from
violations resulting from global warming caused by acts and omissions of the United States,
7 December 2005.
103 Arctic Athabaskan Council, Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
seeking relief from violations of the rights of Arctic Athabaskan peoples resulting from
rapid Arctic warming and melting caused by emissions of black carbon by Canada, 23 April
2013.
104 Quirico 2018, p. 186.
105 Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 38.
106 Ibid., p. 37 and 38.
107 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 130-133.
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by the Commission in the course of that limited proceeding reflect the full
complexities posed by climate change related issues. According to Sands, the
questions illustrate the challenges that lie ahead:
‘- how should the responsibility among States in the region (or even States that
are not members of the OAS) be attributed or divided?
- could violations allegedly suffered by the Inuit be tied more closely to concrete
acts or omissions of specific States?
- had the petitioners exhausted domestic remedies?
- what examples of good practices undertaken by States could guide the Commis-
sion in making its recommendations.’108
In conclusion, even though the IACmHR did not consider the claim, the case
has drawn public attention to the question of cross border damage and State
liability.109
The Advisory Opinion from the IACtHR as requested by Colombia on the
environment and human rights110 can have implications for climate change
damage. With Feria-Tinta and Milnes I agree that:
‘some of the Court’s observations on States’ duties (see especially § 242) are clearly
pertinent to this ultimate example of transboundary pollution. Moreover, the Court’s
reasoning on the “jurisdiction” issue could be used to support an argument that
a State’s contribution to the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
should result in State responsibility and accountability under the ACHR to victims
living in other States, e.g. persons whose lands have become submerged or uncultiv-
able due to rising sea levels.’111
The possibility for national remedies seems a more realistic scenario since the
2015 the Dutch District Court decision on the Urgenda Foundation v. The State
of The Netherlands case.112 In the Case the Urgenda Foundation commenced
a lawsuit against the State of the Netherlands for not adequately regulating
GHGs, based, inter alia, on the rights to life and to private and family life under
Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).113
As Quirico pointed out, ‘Although the decision of the Court is only indirectly
based on human rights, since it primarily focuses on a general duty to prevent
environmental damage, and is still under appeal, the Court effectively enjoined
108 Sands 2016, p. 24.
109 Raworth 2008, p. 9 and 10.
110 IACtHR, Environment and human rights Obligaciones Estatales en Relación con el Medio Ambiente
en el Marco de la Protección y Garantía de los Derechos a la Vida y a la Integridad Personal –
Interpretación y Alcance de los Artículos 4.1 y 5.1, en Relación con los Artículos 1.1 y 2 de la
Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, Advisory Opinion 2017.
111 Feria Tinta, Milnes February 26, 2018.
112 Urgenda Foundation v. The State of The Netherlands, Hague District Court 2013.
113 Ibid., paras. 72–80, 88–89.
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the State of the Netherlands to improve its climate change mitigation
policies.‘114 In appeal, the Hague Court of Appeal has ruled that under Dutch
law, Urgenda may invoke Articles 2 and 8 ECHR on behalf of the individuals
that will be directly affected.115 The Court of Appeal reconfirms that:
‘the State has a positive obligation to protect the lives of citizens within its juris-
diction under Article 2 ECHR, while Article 8 ECHR creates the obligation to protect
the right to home and private life. This obligation applies to all activities, public
and non-public, which could endanger the rights protected in these articles, and
certainly in the face of industrial activities which by their very nature are
dangerous. If the government knows that there is a real and imminent threat, the
State must take precautionary measures to prevent infringement as far as possible.
In light of this, the Court shall assess the asserted (imminent) climate dangers.‘116
The Court of Appeal further opines that: ‘the State fails to fulfil its duty of
care pursuant to Articles 2 and 8 ECHR by not wanting to reduce emissions
by at least 25% by end-2020.‘117 The Court also opines that: since ‘there are
clear indications that the current measures will be insufficient to prevent a
dangerous climate change, even leaving aside the question whether the current
policy will actually be implemented, measures have to be chosen, also based
on the precautionary principle, that are safe, or at least as safe as possible.‘118
The Court does not follow the argument of the State of the Netherlands that
this decision falls within the domain of the ‘margin of appreciation‘, as this
margin of appreciation applies to the measures it takes to achieve the target
of a minimum reduction of 25% in 2020.119 The Urgenda case also made a
paradigm shift in establishing causality under the ‘duty of care‘.120
The Supreme Court upheld the decision by the Court of Appeal and uses
the principle of effective interpretation to apply positive obligations from
Articles 2 and 8 ECHR. ‘The idea is that effective protection of human rights
not only requires the government to refrain from violating these rights, but
under certain circumstances also requires it to make an active effort to prevent
human rights from being compromised by third parties or external factors
(such as natural disasters).’121 The Supreme Court further considers that:
114 Quirico 2018, p. 187.
115 The State of The Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, The Hague Court of Appeal 2018, para
36.
116 Ibid., para 43.
117 Ibid., para 73.
118 Ibid., para 73.
119 Ibid., para 74. The currently pending Lluiya v. RWE AG, Essen Regional Court is another
pioneer case in the field of climate change litigation.
120 See § 7.4.1.
121 The State of The Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, The Supreme Court 2019, para 2.38.
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‘in the international climate debate, increasing emphasis is being placed on the
role which human rights play in protecting the climate. In our opinion, the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) offers sufficient points of
reference for the State’s duty of care as assumed by the Court of Appeal in this
case. The substantiation of the reduction order in terms of human rights is in line
with the analysis used by the ECtHR to assess against Articles 2 and 8 ECHR. How-
ever, this case is unique, and the issue of the threat to the human rights of the
residents of a state that is party to the ECHR as a result of climate change has never
been discussed in the case law of the ECtHR. This is why the Court of Appeal of
The Hague was forced in this case to extend the existing lines of the ECtHR’s case
law – as explained in Chapter 2 – and apply it to a new situation. In our opinion,
the Court of Appeal was entitled to do so (see Chapter 3), and its opinion is
supported by the facts and the existing case law (see Chapter 4 on grounds for
cassation 8.2-8.4), but obviously the manner in which the ECtHR itself would rule
in a case like the present is uncertain.’122
Therefore, it remains to be seen if the ECtHR will develop it’s case law on
climate change related threats in line with the national jurisprudence of the
Netherlands.
A similar development can be found in the Ashgar Leghari v. Federation
of Pakistan case.123 In this case,an ‘agriculturalist’ with a livelihood dependent
on farming used public interest litigation to complain of inadequate imple-
mentation of the country’s National Climate Change Policy 2012 and support-
ing Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014–2030).
The Lahore High Court ruled that:
‘Climate Change is a defining challenge of our time and has led to dramatic al-
terations in our planet’s climate system. For Pakistan, these climatic variations have
primarily resulted in heavy floods and droughts, raising serious concerns regarding
water and food security. On a legal and constitutional plane this is clarion call for
the protection of fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan, in particular, the
vulnerable and weak segments of the society who are unable to approach this
Court.’ (para 6)124
Even more notable, the Court ruled that:
‘Fundamental rights, like the right to life (article 9) which includes the right to a
healthy and clean environment and right to human dignity (article 14) read with
constitutional principles of democracy, equality, social, economic and political justice
include within their ambit and commitment, the international environmental
principles of sustainable development, precautionary principle, environmental
impact assessment, inter and intra-generational equity and public trust doctrine.
122 Ibid., para 6.7.
123 Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, Lahore High Court Green Bench 2015.
124 See also Arts, Scheltema 2019, p. 77.
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Environment and its protection has taken a center stage in the scheme of our
constitutional rights. It appears that we have to move on. The existing environ-
mental jurisprudence has to be fashioned to meet the needs of something more
urgent and overpowering i.e. Climate Change. From Environmental Justice, which
was largely localized and limited to our own ecosystems and biodiversity, we need
to move to Climate Change Justice. Fundamental rights lay at the foundation of
these two overlapping justice systems. Right to life, right to human dignity, right
to property and right to information under articles 9, 14, 23 and 19A of the Consti-
tution read with the constitutional values of political, economic and social justice
provide the necessary judicial toolkit to address and monitor the Government’s
response to climate change.’ (para 7)
The Court thus identified a principle of climate change justice. The Court takes
an activist approach, and did not only find breaches of legal provisions regard-
ing fundamental rights but also goes on and orders the establishment of an
expert climate change commission comprising representatives of the key
government ministries, NGOs, and technical experts (para 8). As Peel and
Osofsky pointed out: ‘These features of the Leghari case point to its potential
as a model for future rights-based, adaptation-focused litigation, although
whether courts in other jurisdictions would be as receptive to such claims as
Pakistan’s traditionally activist judiciary is more open to question.’125
Peel and Osofsky, pose the question if these cases (and some other recent
domestic climate litigation cases) are the ‘beginnings of a novel transnational
climate change jurisprudence that gives a significant role to rights-based claims
in efforts to address climate change?’ They answer that, although these cases
‘are hardly statistically significant’ and were ‘originated in a very different
socio-legal context, which inevitably shaped the resulting decisions’, they may
be the beginning of a novel transnational climate change jurisprudence.126
They argue that prominence in strategic litigation efforts ‘is often based less
on science than on litigators’ perception of what is currently “fashionable”
and what might gain favour in judicial eyes at any particular moment.’127
Of course, these cases would have to overcome the difficulties in invoking
State responsibility.128
Apart from climate change litigation, Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi pointed
out another important function of human rights for environmental degradation:
‘human rights law may also help to operationalize general principles, such as the
polluter pays principle. While human rights law applies most directly to State
actors, it also charges States with safeguarding the welfare of their people and their
125 Peel, Osofsky 2018, p. 52. For an analyses of other recent domestic climate litigation invoking
rights arguments, see also p. 55-61.
126 Ibid., p. 61.
127 Ibid., p. 61.
128 See § 7.5.
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natural environment (positive obligation). States that participate in environmental
contamination, including by facilitating pollution by private actors, are responsible
under human rights law for preventing ongoing violations.’129
In this sense, human rights can be instrumental in remediating contamination
and providing communities with the means for adaptation.130 An example
is the Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria131 case, where
the ACmHPR found that the Federal Republic of Nigeria was in violation of
seven Articles of the ACHPR.132
7.4 RESPONSIBILITY UNDER GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW
From the analyses above, it can be concluded that particular treaty regimes
such as the climate regime, the law of the sea and the human rights regime,
do not suffice to prevent, minimize or restore climate change damage. Inde-
pendently from these regimes, general principles of international law may
provide protection. Therefore, this subparagraph analyses other international
law principles133 on their ability to address environmentally forced migration.
The analyses consecutively addresses some general complications for environ-
mentally forced migrants to rely on these general principles. Finally, some
relevant general principles and their evolution will be assessed on their ability
to protect environmental refugees.
The relevance of these general principles of public international law was
underscored by Murase in his recommendations to include ‘Protection of the
Atmosphere’ in the programme of work of the ILC. He argued that for the
protection of the atmosphere (‘as the planet’s largest single natural resource,
and indispensable for the survival of humankind’):
‘Applicability of the well-known principles including the following will have to
be considered: general obligations of States to protect the atmosphere; obligations
129 Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 37.
130 Ibid., p. 37.
131 ACmHPR, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria 2001.
132 Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 37 and 38. See also § 3.1.2.
133 The legal status of these principles and concepts is varied. ‘Some principles are firmly
established in international law, while others are emerging. Some principles are more in
the nature of guidelines or policy directives which do not necessarily give rise to specific
legal rights and obligations, while others are embodied or specifically expressed in global
or regionally binding instruments, and others are predominantly based in customary law.
In many cases it is difficult to establish the precise parameters or legal status of a particular
principle, as the manner in which each principle applies to a particular activity or incident
typically must be considered in relation to the facts and circumstances of each case.’ In
Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 24, para 7.
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of States vis-à-vis other States not to cause significant harm to the atmosphere; the
principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas to be applicable to the activities
under the jurisdiction or control of a State; general obligations of States to cooperate;
the principle of equity; the principle of sustainable development; and common but
differentiated obligations.’134
However, despite Murase’s proposal the ILC returned with an extremely limited
mandate.135 Mayer goes as far as to argue that: ‘By evading any substantive
discussion within the ILC, developed states ensured that climate change govern-
ance would follow a political logic where power dominates, rather than the
guidance of general principles of law and justice.’136
7.4.1 The ‘no-harm’ principle
The duty of prevention is central to the obligation to prevent damage to the
environment of other States and to areas beyond national jurisdiction.137 This
obligation only concerns the prevention of damage that exceeds a minimum
threshold.138 ‘The principle of prevention, as a customary international rule,
has its origins in the due diligence that is required of a State in its terri-
134 ILC Report of the Sixty-third session (2011), para. 365 and Annex II, Protection of the
atmosphere, available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2011/english/annex.pdf, para
19.
135 The International Law Commission included the topic ‘Protection of the atmosphere’ in
its programme on the understanding that: ‘(a) Work on the topic will proceed in a manner
so as not to interfere with relevant political negotiations, including on climate change, ozone
depletion, and long-range transboundary air pollution. The topic will not deal with, but
is also without prejudice to, questions such as: liability of States and their nationals, the
polluter-pays principle, the precautionary principle, common but differentiated responsibil-
ities, and the transfer of funds and technology to developing countries, including intellectual
property rights; (b) The topic will also not deal with specific substances, such as black
carbon, tropospheric ozone, and other dual-impact substances, which are the subject of
negotiations among States. The project will not seek to ‘fill’ gaps in the treaty regimes; (c)
Questions relating to outer space, including its delimitation, are not part of the topic; (d)
The outcome of the work on the topic will be draft guidelines that do not seek to impose
on current treaty regimes legal rules or legal principles not already contained therein. The
Special Rapporteur’s reports would be based on such understanding.’ Official Records of
the General Assembly, Sixty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/68/10), para. 168.
136 Mayer 2017, p. 191 and 192.
137 Dam-de Jong 2013, p. 132.
138 In 1957 the Lac Lanoux arbitral award Arbitrational Tribunal, Lac Lanoux Arbitration France
v. Spain, 1957 12 R.I.A.A. 281; 24 I.L.R. 101 November 16, 1957 – which settled a dispute
between France and Spain concerning the use of the waters of Lac Lanoux – confirmed
the principle not to cause substantial damage to the environment of other States or to areas
beyond national jurisdiction. The tribunal understands the no harm principle which it does
not mention explicitly as meaning that any damage to the environment of another State
must be serious. In Epiney 2006.
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tory.’139 As to its legal status, Schwarte confirms: ‘While it has been ques-
tioned whether state practice conforms with the principle of prevention, its
existence has been authoritatively confirmed by the International Court of
Justice.’140 In the advisory opinion on the threat or use of nuclear
weapons141 the ICJ explicitly stated that: ‘the existence of the general obliga-
tion of states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control
respect the environment of other states or of areas beyond national control
is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment’.
In the 1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration,142 ‘the Court affirmed that no State
has the right to use its territory or permit it to be used to cause serious damage
by emissions of the territory of another State or to the property of persons
found there.143 This Arbitration involved a dispute between Canada and the
United States over sulphur dioxide pollution from a Canadian smelter in the
town of Trail, British Columbia. The SO2 emissions were carried cross-border
by the prevailing winds, damaging trees and crops on the American side of
the border. The tribunal declared that: ‘under principles of international law,
as well as the law of the United States, no state has the right to use or permit
the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to
the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case
is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.’144 As Christiansen pointed out, the Trail Smelter arbitral trial:
‘recognizes the responsibility of a state for acts of pollution having their origin on
its territory and causing damage on a territory of other states, even if the polluting
acts are not imputable to the state itself or its organs. This entails a responsibility
of the polluting state to enact legislation which sufficiently provides for certain
pollution targets. If the state fails to do so, it is responsible for this omission, and
in effect terminating illegal activity carried out within its jurisdiction or control
or for not sanctioning the person responsible for it.’145
Canada was not held to stop operating the smelter, but is was ordered to
implement regulations controlling the future operation of the smelter in order
to avoid the continuation or repetition of harm.146
139 Dam-de Jong 2013, p. 132. See for example ICJ, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay, Argentina v. Uruguay 2010, para 101.
140 Schwarte, Frank 2014, p. 206.
141 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996, para 29.
142 Arbitral Tribunal, Trail Smelter Case United States v. Canada 1941.
143 Christiansen 2016, p. 95 onwards.
144 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 53-56 and Voigt 2008, p. 7-10.
145 Christiansen 2016, p. 83-87.
146 Duvic-Paoli 2018, p. 20 and 21.
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In 1949 in the Corfu Channel case,147 the ICJ affirmed that no State may
utilize its territory contrary to the rights of other States.148 This case con-
cerned damage to British warships caused by mines placed in Albanian waters
and the failure of the Albanians to notify the British warships. The Court
declared that: it was the obligation of every State ‘not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states’.149 ‘The
ICJ firmly established the obligation to not knowingly injure another State (sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas). It impliedly rejected a theory of strict liability
for harms emanating from territory under exclusive control. Instead, it adopted
de facto a general theory of tort liability based on a general duty of care.’150
Recent national jurisprudence on the duty of care in the Netherlands supports
the argument that a duty of care of a State towards citizens within its juris-
diction can be based on human rights obligations.151 It is unclear if this ob-
ligation has extraterritorial consequences, as the extraterritorial obligations
of human rights are limited.152
Applicability of the no-harm principle to climate change
I agree with Brunnee that the ‘no harm rule could be a potentially powerful
tool in the context of climate’. As Brunnee pointed out:
‘Rather than having to prove, for example, that a given state’s greenhouse gas
emissions have caused or will cause specific harmful impacts, such as sea level
rise, concerned states could focus on the preventive dimension of the no harm rule,
holding the emitting state to its procedural duties. The emphasis would shift from
a relatively amorphous “negative” duty to avoid harm to a “positive” duty to take
concrete steps to protect the environment.’153
Before discussing the scope of obligations under the duty to prevent trans-
boundary harm, it first needs to be establishes if anthropogenic climate change
can be considered legally prosecutable transboundary harm. Brunnée et al
captured the essence of the complexity of dealing with climate change:
‘Climate change is often seen as an environmental issue, but it is not easy to classify,
and differs from many classic environmental problems in a number of respects
that are relevant to liability. Specifically: (i) GHGs, and especially CO2 , are not
pollutants in the conventional sense, with CO2 being an inert gas with little direct
effect on the environment other than acidification of water; its effect is indirect
147 ICJ, Corfu Channel U.K. v. Alb. 1949.
148 Christiansen 2016, p. 95 onwards and Wold, Hunter & Powers 2009, p. 1-4.
149 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 53-56.
150 Waibel 2013.
151 The State of The Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, The Hague Court of Appeal 2018, para
43. See further § 7.3.
152 See § 10.3.
153 Brunnée 2018, p. 14.
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in terms of radiative forcing; (ii) the effect of CO2 is not localised so that, on the
one hand, every tonne of CO2 contributes to every instance of climate change any-
where in the world and, on the other hand, the contribution of that tonne is very
small; (iii) a consequence of this delocalised effect is that physical proximity
between emission source and “victim” is neither a necessary nor a sufficient con-
dition in terms of showing causal connection; and (iv) CO2 has a long-term effect
and there is a significant time lag between emission and its effect in climate change
terms.’154
This type of pollution seriously differs from toxic pollutants that are carried
across borders to cause measurable damage in the receiving country. Therefore,
Zahar comes to the conclusion that the rule that governs liability for trans-
boundary harm cannot be extended to govern climate change.155 He sub-
stantiates his conclusion with the argument that:
‘climate change is a case of cumulative, not mediated, environmental damage. A
state’s release of greenhouse gases in the here-and-now does not cause “serious
environmental harms” to any other state. Yesterday’s greenhouse gas emissions
from the Vatican did not cause any harm to Italy. Last week’s aggregate emissions
from Italy did not cause any harm to the Vatican or to Kiribati or to any other state.
Kiribati no doubt has been suffering damage from sea-level rise which can be traced
to our collective exacerbation of the greenhouse effect on Earth, but the cause of
that phenomenon is not any action by the Vatican or Italy – the cause is the com-
bined, indivisible, action of the entirety of the world’s population, including that
of the citizens of Kiribati past and present, over the course of an historical period
that spans a hundred or more years.’156
Zahar further states that: the formulation of the general obligation
‘to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environ-
ment of other States or of areas beyond national control’ ‘does not capture all the
operative elements explicit or implicit in the principle (in particular, it does not
capture that “one state” actually means one state, or maybe two or three states,
but does not mean every state in the world at the same time – or else the notion
of “respect” in the Nuclear Weapons’ version of the principle becomes meaning-
less.’157
He also denounces the possibility of applying the principle based on obliga-
tions under the Paris Agreement. He argues that – in order for the general
obligation of prevention of transboundary damage to apply – it should be
shown that the Paris Agreement has the same purpose as the obligation to
prevent transboundary damage or the rule’s purpose in one would not be





served by extending it to the other.158 In his assessment, Article 2 of the Paris
Agreement is: ‘to keep global greenhouse gas emissions to a level that makes
climate change worse than it is today but not so worse that it spirals out of
control and makes the world uninhabitable.’159 This differs from the aim of
the obligation of prevention to lower the risk of inter-State conflict, and there-
fore the principle cannot be applied in the climate context.
However, according to Duvic-Paoli, the principle has evolved to the pro-
tection of human livelihoods. She argues that: ‘No-harm gives little regard
to natural resources and the environment per se, but the closely related good
neighbourliness principle can open the door to its environmentalization. It
encourages States to cooperate to best accommodate their interests – be it
preserving their sovereign rights or, more progressively, achieving common
environmental objectives.’160 Mayer argues that: ‘If sovereign equality pre-
cludes a State from causing harms affecting a small part of the territory of
another State, it does a fortiori prohibit the conduct of a State which interferes
with multiple planetary systems in ways that not only affect the prosperity
of many States and the very physical existence of some, but also possibly our
survival as a civilization, if not as a species.’161 Therefore, the no-harm prin-
ciple does apply to climate change. Schwarte argues that anthropogenic ghg
emissions lead to environmental change (e.g. sea-level rise, increase in extreme
weather events or draughts) which results in serious quantifiable (and other)
damage. This leads him to the conclusion that:
‘It appears difficult to argue against the application of the principle of prevention
or “no harm” in its contemporary form, at least in parts, to climate change. In
comparison to traditional cases of transboundary pollution, however, it will be
more challenging to link cause and effect in order to establish some form of legal
liability. But this should not put in doubt the application of the legal principle.
It merely reflects the various complex legal and scientific questions pertaining to
climate change. For example: the attribution of damages, causation, the standard
of proof, striking a balance between sovereign rights to exploit natural resources
and protecting the global environment, possible justifications or whether states
can be held jointly and severally liable.’162
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 Duvic-Paoli 2018, p. 19.
161 Mayer 2017, p. 246.
162 Schwarte 2012, p. 6.
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These opinions are supported by the ILA Articles on Legal Principles Relating
to Climate Change163 (hereafter: ILA-Climate Change Principles) that have
explicitly included the no-harm principle. Article 3.5 declares that:
‘Where social and economic development plans, programs or projects may result
in significant emissions of GHGs or cause serious damage to the environment
through climate change, States have a duty to prevent such harm or, at a minimum,
to employ due diligence efforts to mitigate climate change impact.’ [Also art 7A
(1) declares that:] ‘States have an obligation to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, including damage through
climate change.‘164
Also the UNFCCC (in recital 8 of its preamble) repeat Principle 21 of the Stock-
holm Declaration165 on the no harm principle almost verbatim, which is a
suggestion that the applicability of the no harm principle in the context of
climate change is accepted by States.
As it can be concluded that the obligation of prevention of transboundary
harm applies to climate change, it is further explored what obligation this
entails in the context of climate change. In general, States are required to adopt
regulations and measures as soon as they are aware of the possibility of
impacts on the environment.166 In the case of actual harm, the no-harm rule
entails the obligation to compensate States that are directly or indirectly
aflected. However, ‘Under the foundational “no harm” rule, States’ rights to
use their territories and resources are limited by the obligation to avoid signi-
ficant transboundary harm, but neighbouring States must tolerate harm that
remains below that threshold.’167 Because of the probabilistic nature of the
concept of climate, it is difficult to pinpoint any particular concrete pheno-
163 In November 2008 the ILA established a committee on the Legal Principles Relating to
Climate Change. Over the following five-and-a-half years the committee developed a set
of Draft Articles and commentary that reflect the committee members’ combined juris-
prudential analysis and research into state practice, international treaties, and jurisprudence.
The ILA-Climate Change Principles were adopted by the ILA at a joint conference with
the American Society of International Law in Washington in April 2014. The Draft Articles
reflect existing and emerging international law, and summarize the fundamental legal
principles that should guide states in their attempts to address climate change.
164 See also Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 66.
165 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment Stockholm
Declaration, UN Doc A/CONF/48/14/REV1, Principle 21.
166 ‘Prevention is to be distinguished from precaution in the sense that States have the duty
to prevent damage from occurring, which may result from an activity or substance whose
potential actual or future environmental detrimental effects have been identified and
assessed […] a precautionary measure cannot qualify as preventive, since the precautionary
principle relates to cases where a State may have a duty to adopt protective measures, even
in the absence of evidence of the existence, nature and scope of the risk.’ Faure & Vos 2003,
p. 65. See § 7.2.2.
167 Brunnée 2018, p. 7 and 8.
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menon of which it could conclusively be asserted that it would not have
occurred if anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions had not taken place.
‘While climate change as a whole is obviously serious and significant, the
conduct of a particular State, when taken in isolation, may not always reach
this de minimis threshold. However, it is unlikely that the conduct of the major
greenhouse gas emitters […] would fall under this de minimis threshold.’168
The general no-harm rule does not provide any guidance for (un)allowed
behaviour.169 ‘According to the majority view amongst legal scholars, it
would be necessary to prove a breach of a due care duty, or negligence.’170
Due diligence
The due diligence obligation in general:
‘implies that States are to use all means at [their] disposal or to take all appropriate
measures to prevent transboundary damage. For this purpose, States are not only
to adopt rules and procedures, but also to take on a “certain level of vigilance in
their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public
and private operators […]. In addition to these obligations, the due diligence
obligation entails several other procedural obligations, including an obligation to
notify and inform the affected States of the potential damage, an obligation to
consult with them on actions to be taken and an obligation to conduct a so-called
“Environmental Impact Assessment (IEA)” in order to determine the risk and extent
of the damage.’171
Case law, State practice, treaties and the writings of jurists do not provide
conclusive answers on how to define due diligence. The ILA Study Group on
Due Diligence in International Law provided a summary of the history of due
diligence in international law, the development of due diligence in the context
of State responsibility, and the role of due diligence in several specific areas
of international law.172 The term due diligence amounts to a framework con-
cept which must be given legal meaning for specific activities and risks. It has
168 Mayer 2017, p. 246.
169 Voigt 2008, p. 7-10 and Christiansen 2016, p. 92 and 105 and Schwarte 2012, p. 1-7. Some
scholars argue that is it not simply prohibited to cause transboundary environmental harm,
but that it is the failures to regulate and control the source of harm that leads to responsibil-
ity. In Christiansen 2016, p. 92. ‘However, if the no-harm rule is not about whether the
relevant activity as such is unlawful but whether the home State has done everything in
its means to avoid causing transboundary harm, then the approach by the ILC seems to
be fundamentally misconceived and, to a certain extent, superfluous. The second alternative
– that harm per se is prohibited – seems to be preferable. This view is in line with inter-
national jurisprudence.’ Voigt 2008, p. 8.
170 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1118.
171 Dam-de Jong 2013, p. 133.
172 ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law First Report Duncan French Chair
and Tim Stephens Rapporteur 7 March 2014, available at ILA Study Group on Due Diligence
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been described as ‘the conduct that can be expected of a good government.’173
What constitutes the appropriate standard of care is determined by looking
at a State’s means and capacities at its disposal in an international context.
To determine this, (i) opportunity to act or prevent, (ii) foreseeability of harm
and (iii) proportionality of the choice of measures to prevent harm or to
minimize risk need to be assessed.174
Opportunity to act or prevent
A State can fail to act with due diligence if it does not act where it otherwise
could have. The standard set is to do the best one can. ‘However, a clear
obligation is not set forward, which dilutes the duty to act.’175 ‘Where private
persons or enterprises conduct harmful activities, the obligation of the State
is limited to establishing an appropriate regulatory framework. It is, however,
irrelevant whether or not the action taken by a State will eventually prevent
certain harm.’176
Determining a due diligence standard for anthropogenic climate change,
presents a particular legal challenge. As climate change is a matter of accu-
mulation, only the accumulated actions of multiple States over a long time
are causing the increased climate change. Reduction efforts by one State would
not effectively reduce the risk of harm, as other States may continue their
pollution or even pollute more. Tol and Verheyen argue that: ‘in instances
of several polluters, the question must be whether States were and are able
to take action to significantly reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, which
would significantly reduce their contribution to future climate change damage.
in International Law First Report Duncan French Chair and Tim Stephens Rapporteur
7 March 2014. For an analysis on Due Diligence in International Environmental Law, see
p. 24-30.
173 Verheyen, 2005, p. 174. For example, Art. 194 of the UNCLOS requires that: ‘States shall
take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent with this Convention
that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from
any source, using for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in
accordance with their capabilities, and they shall endeavour to harmonize their policies
in this connection.’ See also Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-
boundary Context, Art. 21, done Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 800, 803 providing that ‘the Parties
shall, either individually or jointly, take all appropriate and effective measures to prevent,
reduce and control significant adverse transboundary environmental impact from proposed
activities’. Other Conventions link the general principle to avoid harm to one that requires
due diligence in environmental management. The Basel Convention, for example, requires
the ‘environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes and other wastes,’ which
is defined as ‘taking all practicable steps to ensure that hazardous wastes or other wastes
are managed in a manner which will protect human health and the environment against
the adverse effects which may result from such wastes.’ Basel Convention, Art. 28. See Wold,
Hunter & Powers 2009, p. 8.
174 Voigt 2008, p. 9 and 10.
175 Christiansen 2016, p. 90.
176 Ibid., p. 89 and 90.
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Otherwise, there would, per definition, not be any legal responsibility in
instances where several actors cause an injury.’177 The defence that States
cannot effectively reduce the risk of harm, ‘is not accepted in national legal
systems and could be a general legal principle applicable also in international
law.’178 Voigt agrees that, due diligence requires a State to do the best it can,
and therefore any of the highly emitting (industrialized) countries would be
able to substantially reduce this risk, even if other nations continue to emit.179
In practice this can be demonstrated by preventing GHG emissions as far as
possible and preserving carbon sinks, and (politically) by signing and ratifying
the UNFCCC and its Protocols.180 States still argue that their actions alone will
not affect climate change and that actions from a single State will seriously
harm their economy.181
Foreseeability of harm
The criterion of foreseeability is also referred to as the criterion of ‘normality’
and ‘predictability’. The criterion demands that: ‘The state has firstly to foresee
the harm itself, and secondly the State must or should have known that the
activity in question may lead to significant harm.’182 It does not require com-
plete clarity on the precise magnitude or location of the harm.183 ‘Under the
criterion of normality, an injury is sufficiently linked to an unlawful act when-
ever the normal and natural course of events indicates that the injury is a
logical consequence of the act. Under the criterion of predictability, an injury
is linked to an unlawful act whenever the author of the unlawful act could
have foreseen the damage it caused.’184
In the context of anthropogenic climate change the damage must be con-
sidered foreseeable, as it is objectively known that an increase in GHG con-
centrations will lead to increased average temperatures, which will result in
climate change damages.185 ‘However, it is unclear whether the knowledge
of climate change that could result from greenhouse gas emitting activities
fulfils this criterion.’186 ‘Is it enough to establish fault in this context that
177 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1117.
178 Ibid., p. 1117 and 1118.
179 Voigt 2008, p. 10 and 11 The standard applied may change over time, and it is the state’s
obligation to adjust. In Christiansen 2016, p. 88-92.
180 Christiansen 2016, p. 89.
181 This argument has been denied in at least one case of national tort law: the Dutch case
The State of The Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, The Hague Court of Appeal C/09/456689/
HA ZA 13-1396, Ruling of 9 October 2018, para 61-64.
182 Christiansen 2016, p. 90.
183 Ibid., p. 90. For example, in the Corfu Channel case, the ‘ICJ did not require that Albania
knew exactly which ships might be damaged by the mines. What was foreseeable was that
damage would be caused to ships using the Channel.’ In Voigt 2008, p. 11 and 12.
184 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 158 and 159.
185 Voigt 2008, p. 11 and 12.
186 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1117.
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States knew of the risks or is it only now, that scientific certainty has grown
to virtual consensus that States are responsible for failing to react to these
findings?’187 It could for example be argued that this is since the first IPCC
Report in 1990, or the signing of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.188 Of
course it could also be argued that the knowledge dates back to before the
IPCC report, for example when big oil companies (Exxon in particular) con-
ducted their investigations in the 1970s and ‘80s confirming the risks posed
by greenhouse gasses. For determining this moment of foreseeability, a parallel
may be sought with the lead paint cases, asbestos cases or tobacco litigation
of the 1990s.189 The determination of this moment of foreseeability will have
a big effect on the attribution of damage. ‘Another methodology to determine
negligence seems to look at the risk involved. If the risk is obvious, States must
prove that they have taken all necessary measures to prevent the risk from
materialising into actual damage. The quantity or severity of risk thus sets
the threshold for the due care duty.’190
Proportionate Measures
Defining the standard of due diligence includes a balancing of interests. As
Christiansen rightfully pointed out:
‘The measures required to take from a State to prevent or minimize transboundary
harm have to be proportioned. The measures a State must take relate to the national
circumstances and to the risk involved. A State has discretion over the measures
it chooses to take. In order to determine whether a State has taken proportionate
measures to prevent or minimize the risk of damage, the technical and economic
abilities of the State controlling the risk have to be taken into account.’191
This ‘renders the definition of an objective standard almost impossible. Thus,
a heavy burden of proof is placed on the State which has to establish a failure
to act with due diligence.’192 Voigt pointed out that: ‘This leads to a problem
of inequity in the present law: it is presumed inequitable to leave the burden
with the injured State merely because it cannot prove that the source State
failed to act with due diligence. The injured State can neither control the
activities which cause harm nor does it necessarily benefit from them; however
socially or economically desirable they may be to the source State.’193
With Voigt I agree that: ‘In terms of preventing climate change damages,
acting with due diligence requires, at the least, that climate policies and
187 Ibid., p. 1118.
188 Christiansen 2016, p. 88 -92 and for more examples Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1117 and 1118.
189 See for example Shearer 2015.
190 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1117 and 1118.
191 Christiansen 2016, p. 91. See also Voigt 2008, p. 17.
192 Voigt 2008, p. 21.
193 Ibid., p. 20-23.
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respective regulations are in place which aim at reversing the trend of ever
increasing GHG emissions.’194 ‘The choice of means to reduce GHG emissions
lies generally within a State’s discretion. Determining whether a measure is
proportionate requires a balancing of legitimate interests. This involves […]
the reconciliation of the territorial sovereignty of the emitting State with the
territorial integrity of the injured State.’195 As the damage likely to be caused
by climate change could result in the loss of land, damage to peoples, health
and property and potential casualties, it may be argued that the risk involved
for some States (in particular Small Island States and low-lying coastal States)
‘is so great that only significant reduction measures of GHGs could be con-
sidered proportionate.’196 As not all States have the same abilities and
capacities to reduce the amount of their GHG emissions, ‘accordingly, differ-
entiated standards with regard to the type, stringency and effectiveness of
climate mitigation measures have to be applied to different States based on
their level of economic development and historic emission levels. States must
exercise due diligence to reduce their net GHG emissions as is appropriate
under the circumstances of each country.’197 The ILA-Climate Change Prin-
ciples,198 Article 7A (2) reflect that:
‘States shall exercise due diligence to avoid, minimise and reduce environmental
and other damage through climate change, as described in draft Article 7A.1. In
exercising due diligence, States shall take all appropriate measures to anticipate,
prevent or minimise the causes of climate change, especially through effective
measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and to minimise the adverse effects
of climate change through the adoption of suitable adaptation measures.’
There are different obligations and rights for industrialised and developing
countries. Like the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capacities, they allow developing countries a degree of flexibility
in their climate change response measures. In order to establish the standard
of care required, the ILA-Climate Change Principles refer to the ‘economic
development and available resources, scientific knowledge, the risks involved
in an action, and the vulnerability of affected States’ to be taken into
account.199 The commentary on the ILA-Climate Change Principles States that:
‘the more serious and likely the risks, the greater the need for measures to
be taken’. Schwarte concludes that the ILA-Climate Change Principles ‘mark
a paradigm shift in favour of ‘victim states’ that are particularly exposed to
194 Ibid., p. 10.
195 Ibid., p. 12.
196 Ibid., p. 13.
197 Ibid., p. 12-16.
198 ILA Committee on Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, Declaration of Legal Principles
Relating to Climate Change 2014.
199 Art. 7A (3) ILA-Climate Change Principles.
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the negative effects of climate change.’200 According to Schwarte, for develop-
ing countries, ‘early actions taken to limit emissions, even at the expense of
further economic growth, might well be considered proportionate’ ‘in view
of the risks related to global warming and the potential impacts on particularly
vulnerable countries and society.’201
When States act with due diligence, they will not be liable. So, liability
will not cover damage resulting from events that are either unforeseeable or
unavoidable using reasonable diligence.202 As Faure and Nollkaemper right-
fully pointed out: ‘In these circumstances the loss will not be recoverable in
international law. If the State has been diligent in regulating and controlling
the harmful activity, yet transboundary damage still occurs, recourse against
private actors is the only option left. That avenue, […] depends on domestic
law’ (this falls outside the scope of this research).203
The standard of due diligence is a little bit different for hazardous activities.
The International Law Commission adopted the Draft Articles on Prevention
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (hereafter: ILC-DAPTH)204
in 2001. In 2007, the UN General Assembly commended the text of the Draft
Articles and Draft Principles to the attention of governments without prejudice
to any further action.205 In 2010, the General Assembly, commended once
again the Articles on prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous
activities to the attention of Governments. And it invited once again Govern-
ments to submit further comments on any future action.206
The ILC-DAPTH centres on the question whether an activity poses ‘foresee-
able risk of causing significant transboundary harm.’207 or at any event to
minimize the risk thereof’, and States concerned ‘shall cooperate in good faith
and, as necessary, seek the assistance of one or more competent international
organizations in preventing significant transboundary harm or at any event
in minimizing the risk thereof.’208 The ILC commentaries on the ILC-DAPTH
200 Schwarte, Frank 2014, p. 201.
201 Schwarte 2012, p. 6.
202 See on this topic, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law Second Report,
July 2016 , p. 7 onwards.
203 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 143-147.
204 ILC-DAPTH, text adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001 Final
Outcome International Law Commission [ILC] UN Doc A/56/10, 370, [2001] II UNYBILC
146.
205 UNGA UN Doc A/RES/62/68, Consideration of prevention of transboundary harm from
hazardous activities and allocation of loss in the case of such harm, 6 December 2007.
206 UNGA UN Doc A/RES/65/28, Consideration of prevention of transboundary harm from
hazardous activities and allocation of loss in the case of such harm, Resolution adopted
by the General Assembly on 6 December 2010.
207 ‘“Harm” includes harm caused to persons, property or the environment and “transboundary
harm” means “harm caused in the territory of or in other places under the jurisdiction or
control of a state other than the state of origin, whether or not the states concerned share
a common border”.’
208 Christiansen 2016, p. 86.
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specify that ‘due diligence in ensuring safety requires a State to keep abreast
of technological changes and scientific developments. This could involve, inter
alia, taking such measures appropriate by way of abundant caution, even if
full scientific certainty does not exist, to avoid or prevent serious or irreversible
climate damage.’209 Article 2(c) of the ILC-DAPTH defines ‘transboundary harm’
as harm caused in the territory of another State ‘whether or not the States
concerned share a common border.’ Therefore, it potentially can cover global
problems.
For the purposes of liability, an activity could be viewed as hazardous
when at the time it was carried out an operator was aware or ought to have
been aware of the risk (Article 1 ILC-DAPTH). The activities included under the
ILC-DAPTH have not been specified. ‘States threatened by significant environ-
mental harm resulting from activities on the territory of another State, have
the right – depending on the likelihood of damages – to demand the removal
of the risk. In the case of possible “disastrous” damages” a “low probability”
is already sufficient to justify such a request. If, however, (only) “significant”
damage may occur, “high probability” is required to trigger the duty of
prevention.’210 ‘The damage is to be established by clear and convincing
evidence measured by factual and objective criteria and have a real detrimental
effect on human health, life, industry, property, environment, forestry, or
agriculture of/in another State.’211
In the context of liability for damage associated with climate change, many
scholars argue that – as the damages are disastrous – low probability is a
sufficient basis to demand the removal of the risk by controlling GHG
emissions.212 According to Kysar, the outcome of a balancing test between
the harms and the lawful activities (such as is required under the ILC-DAPTH)
is uncertain.213 The harm due to climate change has to be weighed against
huge (economic) benefits from mainly lawful activities.214 Voigt is more op-
209 Ibid., p. 88-92. See also § 7.4.2.
210 Frank 2014.
211 Douhan 2013. See for example, Draft Articles with Commentaries 151 para 16; Draft
Principles with Commentaries 134 para 24.
212 See for example, Frank 2014, para 2.1.
213 See for example, Kysar 2013, p. 36.
214 However, in the Urgenda case see also paragraphs international human rights law and
causality, the Hague District Court ordered the State to limit the joint volume of Dutch
annual greenhouse gas emissions, or have them limited, so that this volume will have
reduced by at least 25% at the end of 2020 compared to the level of the year 1990. It
considered ‘the State cannot postpone taking precautionary measures based on the sole
reason that there is no scientific certainty yet about the precise effect of the measures.
However, a cost-benefit ratio is allowed here.’ para 4.76 and ‘To all these principles it applies
that if the State wants to deviate from them, it will have to argue and prove sufficient
justification for the deviation. A justification could be the costs. The State should not be expected
to do the impossible nor may a disproportionately high burden be placed on it. However, as has
been considered above, it has neither been argued, nor has it become evident that the State has
insufficient financial means to realise higher reduction measures. It can also not be concluded
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timistic and argues that it would suffice that if States are able to demonstrate
that a country continued to increase its emissions continually since its ratifica-
tion of the UNFCCC (despite Article 4.2 UNFCCC ‘aim’ of returning Annex I
countries’ emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the year 2000), this
could amount to a breach of treaty and liability.215
7.4.2 The precautionary principle
Climate change, is surrounded by scientific uncertainties.216 ‘One could argue
that the precautionary principle217 might be used to construct a liability suit
against a state by arguing, for example, that not taking adequate measures
to reduce the risks of climate change could be considered a breach of the
precautionary principle or, more properly, of the obligation to refrain from
harmful activities, as interpreted by the precautionary principle.’218 It is very
uncertain however if this argument would be accepted by the relevant
courts.219
The precautionary principle is one of the most controversial principles of
international environmental law, ‘because of disagreements over its precise
meaning and legal status and because of concern that it may be misused for
trade-protectionist purposes.’220 A central element of the principle is that
possible revisions on the basis of changes in scientific knowledge need to be
anticipated, reflecting the need for effective environmental measures.221 ‘The
precautionary principle has developed on the basis of the acknowledgement
that from a macro economic point of view there are obstructions to choosing a higher
emission reduction level for 2020.’ para 4.77 (emphasis added). Urgenda Foundation v. The
State of The Netherlands, Hague District Court, Case C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396, Summons,
28 November 2013.
215 Voigt 2008, p. 6.
216 With regard to climate change, there is for example, uncertainty about future global emission
scenarios, down to the exact response of nature’s capacity to absorb CO2 in relation to the
range of possible reaction of the climate system, the regional changes in the climate, and,
more particularly, the exact scope, timing and likelihood of possibly damaging impacts
become more and more difficult to predict. Climate change uncertainties mainly result from
the fact that it is not clear how a system of such complexity and subject to natural variability
and randomness will evolve per se in the future. In addition, uncertainty is increased by
the varying extents of human interference in the form of GHG emissions as a result of
changing energy policy choices and consumption behaviour, determined by different risk
perceptions, changes in population patterns and technological innovations. In Haritz 2010,
p. 231.
217 For an historic overview of the development of the principle see Faure, Vos 2003.
218 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 159.
219 Several national cases, such as The State of The Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, The Hague
Court of Appeal C/09/456689/ HA ZA 13-1396, Ruling of 9 October 2018 and the German
Lliuya v. RWE case may provide more guidance in future.
220 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 30, para 44.
221 Ibid., p. 32, para 55.
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that science cannot always keep the pace and bring about conclusive evidences
on the existence, nature and scope of medium and long-term risks, and in the
light of alarming environmental reports.’222 Probably the most widely
accepted articulation of precaution is Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. ‘In
order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.’223 While the principle of prevention applies to significant dam-
age, the precautionary principle sets a higher standard. It applies only to
situations where potential damage is either serious or irreversible. In addition,
precautionary action is required only when the measures to be taken are cost-
effective and is dependent on the respective capabilities of States.224
In practice, the precautionary principle has proved to be more than a mere
guideline for State behaviour, as it has been successfully invoked before the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (even though it did not explicitly
pronounce on the status of the precautionary principle).225 On the regional
level, the European Court of Justice has adopted the precautionary approach,
particularly in respect to environmental risks that pose dangers to human
health. For example, in a case on the ‘mad cow’ crisis the Court considered:
‘At the time when the contested decision was adopted, there was great un-
certainty as to the risks posed by live animals, bovine meat and derived
products. Where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to
human health, the institutions may take protective measures without having
to await the reality and seriousness of those risks to become fully appar-
ent.’226 The ICJ in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v. Slovakia
case,227 ruled that: ‘in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and
prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character of dam-
age to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism
of reparation of this type of damage.’228 The Court left it to the parties to
decide what standard parties should adopt in this respect.229 In the Pulp Mills
222 Faure, Vos 2003, p. 51.
223 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 30, para 45.
224 Dam-de Jong 2013, p. 137.
225 See ITLOS, Southern Bluefin Tuna Case Australia and New Zealand v. Japan 1999, para 77. In
this case, the Court held that Japan has failed to comply with its obligations under Articles
64 and 118 of the Convention para 72. See also Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 32, para
54. See § 7.5.2 ITLOS.
226 ECJ, The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Commissioners of Customs
& Excise, ex parte National Farmers’ Union and Others, 1998 and ECJ, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland v. Commission of the European Communities, 1998 in Kurukulasu-
riya, Robinson 2006, p. 32, para 53.
227 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v. Slovakia, 1997.
228 Ibid., para 140.
229 Dam-de Jong 2013, p. 140.
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on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) case,230 Argentina brought
a claim against Uruguay for breaching a long-standing bilateral agreement
by permitting the construction of water-polluting pulp mills on the Uruguay
River. The ICJ ruled that: ‘a State is thus obliged to use all the means at its
disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any
area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of
another State.’231 Verheyen and Zengerling pointed out that: ‘While this case
turned on environmental law, it offers little insight into a potential climate
case. In parts, it could even be said to obstruct such a case given its reluctance,
for example, to use the precautionary principle as an argument to reverse the
burden of proof.’232
Even if the principle is applied, there is little guidance on what action it
requires. Generally, a wide array of measures can be justified on the grounds
of the precautionary principle. Haritz distinguishes three versions of the
principle which have evolved at the national level: the first moderate inter-
pretation allows for action in the face of uncertainty, granting those who
invoke it a right to act; the second, more proactive version can be regarded
as an obligation to actively counteract in the face of a possible threat, both
granting decision-makers a right to act and also, equally, placing them under
a duty to act; and finally, the activity involving the risk in question can be
prohibited in a risk-minimising manner unless the surrounding uncertainty
is proven to be as close to a certainty of non-harmfulness as possible.233 These
different interpretations hugely affect the action required.
The precautionary principle is reflected in Article 3.3 UNFCCC and aims
at two objectives in the UNFCCC: (1) the prevention of climate change and, (2)
the mitigation thereof. However, ‘the Precautionary principle does not mandate
any specific form of action or standard’234 and therefore does not impose
a specific obligation upon the parties. The precautionary principle is also not
expressly included in the Paris Agreement. Draft Article 7 ILA-Climate Change
Principles, however demonstrates the relevance of the precautionary principle
in the climate change context:
‘Draft Article 7B. Precautionary principle
1. Where there is a reasonably foreseeable threat of serious or irreversible damage,
including serious or irreversible damage to States vulnerable to the impacts of
climate change, measures to anticipate, prevent or adapt to climate change shall
be taken by States without waiting for conclusive scientific proof of that damage.
230 ICJ, Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Argentina v. Uruguay 2010, para
101.
231 Ibid., para 101. See also Schwarte 2012, p. 1-7.
232 Verheyen, Zengerling 2013, p. 781.
233 Haritz 2010, p. 233 and 234.
234 Christiansen 2016, p. 66.
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2. Precautionary measures for the purposes of draft Article 7B.1 shall include
proactive and cost-effective measures which enable sustainable development,
maintain the stability of the climate system and protect the climate system against
human-induced change.
3. As new scientific knowledge relating to the causes or effects of climate change
becomes available, States must continuously assess their obligation of prevention
and the necessity for precautionary measures. Where scientific knowledge about
damage from climate change improves sufficiently, protective measures shall be
continued by States pursuant to their obligation to prevent environmental damage,
as described in draft Article 7A.1 above.
4. In light of new scientific knowledge, States must strengthen their emission
reduction standards and other preventative and adaptation measures, taking into
account the factors listed in draft Article 7A.3.
5. Where there is a reasonably foreseeable threat that a proposed activity may cause
serious damage to the environment of other States or areas beyond national juris-
diction, including serious or irreversible damage through climate change to vulner-
able States, an environmental impact assessment on the potential impacts of such
activity is required.
6. If the assessment indicates a reasonably foreseeable threat of such serious damage,
the State under whose jurisdiction or control the activity takes place shall notify
and consult with States likely to be affected, shall make available relevant informa-
tion, and cooperate with a view to reaching a joint decision.’
7.4.3 The polluter pays principle
‘It is often said that an additional goal of liability is the implementation of
the polluter-pays principle.’235 In other words, the one responsible for causing
pollution should bear the cost. ‘The polluter-pays principle can be seen as a
variant of the prevention-objective, since cost-internalization would lead to
a change in behaviour.’236 The polluter pays principle is widely accepted
as a policy principle, but difficulties with its exact definition cause debate
whether or not the polluter pays principle has grown into customary inter-
national law.237 At a minimum, the principle is recognized as a guideline
for environmental legislation.238 ‘Without elaboration, it should be noted that
the principle has also been increasingly accepted and applied at national level
including in statutes in many countries in the developing world, and in their
national supreme courts.’239 and has been reflected in various conventions.240
235 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 141.
236 Ibid., p. 141 and 142.
237 Christiansen 2016, p. 94.
238 Ibid., p. 94.
239 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 34, para 69.
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The polluter-pays Principle is reflected in Principle 16 of the Rio De-
claration: ‘National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization
of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of
pollution, with regard to the public interest and without distorting international
trade and investment’. However, it has been argued by Christiansen that: ‘The
vague and non-committing wording, does not impose duties upon a party’.241
Over the years, the polluter pays principle has developed into a basis for
EU environmental policy.242 The ECtHR included the polluter pays principle
in a number of cases (e.g. Tatar v. Romania243 and Mangouras v. Spain244)
in the list of relevant law. Moreover, in Öneryıldız v. Turkey245 it referred
to the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting from Activities
Dangerous to the Environment, whose provision are an elaboration of the
principle.246 Lindhout and van den Broek pointed out that: the ‘Case law
of the European Court of Justice on the polluter pays principle provides
guidelines for burden-sharing and recovery of costs. Thus, the polluter pays
principle underpins the obligation of establishing coherent programmes of
measures aimed at achieving (environmental) policy aims’.247 In the context
of multiple resource pollution, such as with air pollution, they pointed out
that: ‘establishing a plan or programme will be necessary to achieve a fair
sharing of the burden in line with the polluter pays principle. The guidelines
of the polluter pays principle may also be applied in cases of transboundary
pollution and underpin the need of cooperation between all levels of govern-
ment.’248
To apply the polluter pays principle in the context of climate change may
not be as straightforward as it seems. Frequently the pollution is only hazard-
ous in combination with pollution by other actors. Complex causality patterns
make it difficult to determine who is the polluter. Therefore, it is hard for those
affected to single out which party to address for the damage and to establish
causality.249 At this point, State responsibility depends on States accepting
responsibility for climate change. In that context, it is illustrative that the
240 Ibid., p. 34, para 65. For example the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Pre-
paredness, Response and Cooperation preamble, the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and the 2001
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants preamble, para 17.
241 Christiansen 2016, p. 94.
242 Lindhout, Broek van den 2014, p. 46.
243 ECtHR, Tatar v. Romania, 2009.
244 ECtHR, Mangouras v. Spain, 2010.
245 ECtHR, Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004.
246 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 150.
247 Lindhout, Broek van den 2014, p. 59.
248 Ibid., p. 59.
249 This question may be clarified under the currently pending national case in Germany: Lliuya
v. RWE. See more in § 7.5.
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polluter pays principle has not been explicitly incorporated in the UNFCCC.
There is however a reflection of the polluter pays principle incorporated in
the system. Even though the UNFCCC did not include the polluter pays prin-
ciple, the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility based on
respective Capabilities’ implicitly recognizes it.250
As Zahar pointed out: ‘Neither the Paris Agreement nor the COP Decision
adopting it (together, “the Paris Outcome”) refer to the polluter-pays principle
by name. However, the Paris Outcome does strongly imply that greenhouse
gas emissions will need to be priced, internationally as well as domestically,
and, therefore, that states must accept a cost for at least a portion of their
emissions, whether by reducing them themselves domestically or paying other
states to do so.’251 In the Kyoto Protocol, also a cap-and-trade system was
set up, for a small number of States based on the CBDR principle (see hereafter).
Zahar therefore argues that the polluter pays principle ‘now appears well-
grounded in climate change treaty law.’252 He refers only to the ex ante form
of the principle, as ‘The Paris Agreement should not – and in fact does not –
apply in the ex post form of the principle. We may note in this regard that
the Paris Outcome excludes state liability or compensation in relation to ex
post claims for damage resulting from climate change.’253 Khan however,
does not agree that the polluter pays principle is now well-grounded in the
climate change regime. Khan has pointed out that: ‘The PPP [polluter-pays
principle] makes perfectly rational economic and policy sense. The non-accept-
ance yet of the PPP is a testimony of material power in climate regime forma-
tion, where the industrial countries, historically as the main polluters, continue
to dominate.’254
7.4.4 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities (hereafter: CBDR)255 is a guiding principle of international co-
operation and solidarity in various fields of international law.256 The CBDR
250 Khan 2015, p. 638.
251 Zahar 2018a, p. 3.
252 Ibid., p. 12.
253 Ibid., p. 13.
254 Khan 2015, p. 639.
255 In some version, CBDR appears, for example in the Rio Declaration (1992) and the Rio+20
“Future We Want” outcome document (2012). In addition, the concept of ‘differential
treatment’, which is an application of CBDR, is evident in several environmental agreements,
including the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), the UNFCCC (1992), the Convention
to Combat Desertification (1994), the Kyoto Protocol (1997), and the Paris Agreement (2015).
See for example, Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. In the Paris Agreement this
principle is referred to as CBDRRC ‘and in the light of different national circumstances’.
256 Limon 2009, p. 474.
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‘is translated into the explicit recognition that different standards, delayed
compliance timetables or less stringent commitments may be appropriate for
different countries, to encourage universal participation and equity.’257 The
purpose of CBDR is to foster substantively more equal results than what is
achieved through the principle of formal equality.258 This may result in differ-
ential legal norms.259 This duty to cooperate in a spirit of global partnership
is well-established in international law. Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration
provides:
‘States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and
restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differ-
entiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility
that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of
the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies
and financial resources they command.’
As Rajamani pointed out: ‘Even though this principle does not assume the
character of a legal obligation in itself, it is a fundamental part of the con-
ceptual apparatus of the climate change regime such that it forms the basis
for the interpretation of existing obligations and the elaboration of future
international legal obligations within the climate change regime.’260
The UNFCCC preamble elaborates on the proposition that climate change
is a common concern by acknowledging that its global nature ‘calls for the
widest possible cooperation by all countries […] in accordance with their com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.’ [emphasis
added] Combined with the notion that ‘the largest share of historical and
current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed
countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively
low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries
will grow to meet their social and development needs,’ developed country
Parties must take the lead in combating climate change. This notion of common
but differentiated responsibilities is also reflected in Article 3 (1) UNFCCC:
‘The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly,
the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change
and the adverse effects thereof.’
257 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 29, para 40.
258 Cullet 2017, p. 10.
259 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 29, para 40.
260 Rajamani 2018, p. 49.
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Article 4.2 therefore commits parties included in Annex I (developed country
parties and those with economies in transition) to adopt policies and measures
to limit emissions and protect and enhance sinks and reservoirs. At the same
time, Article 4 (6) UNFCCC differentiates in responsibilities between Parties
included in Annex 1. It allows for ‘a certain degree of flexibility […] to the
Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market
economy, in order to enhance the ability of these Parties to address climate
change’.
The principle of CBDR has since developed in the UNFCCC system. Under
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol it was a priority to strengthen the commitments of
Annex 1 countries. In a manifestation of ‘common but differentiated respons-
ibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDR-RC) it was agreed that developed
countries reduced their greenhouse gases (GHG) via a binding agreement
(Annex 1 countries), while developing countries only needed to report their
emissions. This is a stark form of differentiation in core obligations that is
unique among multilateral environmental agreements.261 Since Kyoto, there
has been a move toward what has come to be characterized as ‘self-differ-
entiation’. As Rajamani puts it: ‘those allowing the state, itself, to choose its
individual level of commitment, subject to defined expectations.’262 The next
milestone forms the Paris Agreement.263 As many countries in transition are
now contributing significantly to global emissions.264 Therefore, the 2015
Paris Agreement increase the collective level of ambition to ensure the highest
possible mitigation efforts by all parties and requires all states, developed and
developing, to participate in the GHG mitigation effort.265 So much was also
underlined by Voigt and Ferreira: ‘While categories of countries, such as
“developed” and “developing”, are still relevant, these categories are nowhere
defined; nor does the Agreement make any reference to the Annexes of the
UNFCCC. This is a big shift. The Paris Agreement aims to reflect the responsibil-
ities, capacities, and circumstances of all parties.’266 Article 2 (2) Paris Agree-
ment, reads: ‘This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabil-
ities, in the light of different national circumstances.’ Hereto, the Agreement
includes various elements of differentiation. For example Article 4 Paris Agree-
261 Ibid., p. 2.
262 Ibid., p. 50.
263 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.21, ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ 29 January 2016 UN Doc
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Annex Paris Agreement. For an overview of all the decisions
and their incorporation of the principle of CBDR see Rajamani 2018, p. 50 onwards.
264 Diez 2014.
265 Rajamani 2018, p. 51: ‘The characteristic of climate change as a global commons problem
necessarily requires the participation of key actors in the global response in order to ensure
participation by other relevant states. However, key agents were not sufficiently included.
The United States (US) was not a party to the Kyoto Protocol and China did not have
mitigation obligations under the Protocol.’
266 Voigt, Ferreira 2016, p. 294.
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ment for mitigation provisions, Article 7 for adaptation provisions, or (read
in conjunction) Articles 3, 4 (5) and 7 (13) for differentiation on financial
support.267
Although the principle of CBDR is widely adopted under the climate change,
there is little common ground.268 For example, the question whether
‘historical contributions’ of States to greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere are a ground for accordingly differentiated commitments remains
highly contentious. Whereas developing countries tend to argue that CBDR
imposes legal responsibilities on industrialized countries, the latter tend to
insist that the principle simply provides a framework for pragmatic problem-
solving and attendant burden-sharing.269 This argument is supported by the
fact that developing countries such as China and India are now among the
biggest polluters. Unless they substantially curb their emissions in the near
future, dangerous climate change is unavoidable.
CBDR under the ILA-Climate Change Principles
Draft Articles 4 to 6 primarily deal with the differentiation between countries
with different levels of economic development and vulnerability and the
resulting necessary balancing of interests in combatting climate change. The
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabil-
ities’ is analysed in detail. In the committee’s view, it requires States to respond
to climate change and its impacts in different ways depending on their past,
present, and future contributions to climate change, their levels of wealth, and
other national circumstances.270 Article 5 of the ILA-Climate Change Principles
reflects the CBDR in the context of climate change: ‘States shall protect the
climate system in accordance with their common but differentiated respons-
ibilities and respective capabilities.’ Therefore ‘All States have a common
responsibility to cooperate in developing an equitable and effective climate
change regime applicable to all, and to work towards the multilaterally agreed
global goal.’ The ILA-Climate Change Principles underline that States have
differing historical, current and future contributions to climate change271 and
differing technological, financial and infrastructural capabilities and economic
fortunes and other national circumstances. The heaviest burden therefore falls
on developed States, in particular the most advanced amongst them, which
‘shall take the lead in addressing climate change by adopting more stringent
mitigation commitments and in assisting developing States, in particular the
least developed among them, small island developing States, and other vulner-
267 For a more extensive analysis, see Voigt and Ferreira 2016, p. 297 onwards.
268 Brunnée, Toope 2010, p. 162. For an analyses of the elements of disagreement, see Rajamani
2018, p. 47 and 48.
269 Ibid., p. 160.
270 Schwarte, Frank 2014, p. 204 Schwarte, Frank 2014, ILA, Legal Principles on Climate Change,
Draft Art. 5, para 3.
271 See also § 7.4.3.
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able States, to the extent of their need, in addressing climate change and
adapting to its adverse effects.’272
7.4.5 Transparency, public participation and access to information and
remedies
Elements of transparency, public participation and access to information and
remedies have been incorporated in various international instruments.273
Public participation and access to information are for example recognized in
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, which states that:
‘Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public
authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States
shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making in-
formation widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceed-
ings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.’274
‘According to chapter 23 of Agenda 21,275 one of the fundamental pre-
requisites for the achievement of sustainable development is broad public
participation in decision-making.’276 This need for public participation is also
reflected in Article 12 of the Paris Agreement: ‘Parties shall cooperate in taking
measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training, public
awareness, public participation and public access to information, recognizing
the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing actions under this
Agreement.’ The Paris Agreement also includes several references to trans-
272 ILA Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, Resolution 2/2014, Draft
Art. 5 (3) (a).
273 Voigt 2008, p. 7-10, para 33. The UNFCCC, in Art. 4.1i, ‘obliges Parties to promote public
awareness and participation in the process, including that of NGOs, though it does not
create a public right of access to information. The 1994 Desertification Convention recog-
nizes, in Art. 3ac, the need to associate Civil Society with the action of the State. See also
Art. 12 of the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. The 1993 North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation requires parties to publish their environmental
laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings Art. 4, to ensure that interested
persons have access to judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings to force the
government to enforce environmental law Art. 6, and to ensure that their judicial, quasi-
judicial and administrative proceedings are fair, open and equitable Art. 7.’
274 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 28, para 29.
275 Agenda 21, action plan adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development
UNCED Agenda 21, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 Vol.I, Annex II Rio de Janeiro, 3-14
June 1992.
276 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 28, para 32.
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parency and information sharing. In Article 4 (8) it is stated that ‘In com-
municating their nationally determined contributions, all Parties shall provide
the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding in
accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.’ Other
references are made in Articles 4 (13), 6 (2), and 13.
As has been mentioned above, the due diligence obligation also entails
procedural obligations. These obligations include ‘an obligation to notify and
inform the affected States of the potential damage, an obligation to consult
with them on actions to be taken and an obligation to conduct a so-called
“Environmental Impact Assessment (IEA)” in order to determine the risk and
extent of the damage.’277 In this respect, a properly conducted IEA might serve
as a standard for determining whether or not due diligence was exercised.278
IEA’s have been widely recognised as a prerequisite for transparency, public
participation and access to information and remedies. Voigt pointed out that:
‘the execution of an environmental impact assessment in a transboundary context
is required where there is likelihood of transboundary harm. This obligation is
based on the fact that the requirement to carry out an environmental impact
assessment is so well established in most national laws that it can be regarded as
a general principle of law or even a customary law rule for States to conduct an
IEA.’279
The duty to conduct a IEA was included in the Rio Declaration. Principle 17
states that: ‘Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall
be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant
adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a com-
petent national authority.’280 Also, Article 7 of the ILC-DAPTH requires a risk
assessment in for particular projects or industrial activities where damage is
not anticipated but could result from the activity. ‘In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
Project, the ICJ treated prior IEA and subsequent monitoring of the ongoing
environmental risk and impacts as a continuum. If an IEA is a necessary
prerequisite for effective notification and consultation with other States, then
monitoring may equally be regarded as a necessary element of an effective
IEA.’281 In the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay),282
Judgment of 20 April 2010, the ICJ found that:
277 Dam-de Jong 2013, p. 133.
278 Voigt 2008, p. 7-10.
279 Ibid., p. 12-16.
280 For more examples see Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 33, para 59.
281 Voigt 2008, p. 14.
282 ICJ, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) 2010.
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‘the obligation to protect and preserve, under Article 41 (a) of the Statute, has to
be interpreted in accordance with a practice, which in recent years has gained so
much acceptance among States that it may now be considered a requirement under
general international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment where
there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse
impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource. Moreover,
due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and prevention which it implies, would
not be considered to have been exercised, if a party planning works liable to affect
the régime of the river or the quality of its waters did not undertake an environ-
mental impact assessment on the potential effects of such works.’ (para 204)
In the Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nica-
ragua v. Costa Rica) case,283 the ICJ found that the road building plans did
trigger the obligation to undertake an IEA, an obligation that Costa Rica had
failed to discharge. The Court then concluded that there was no need to
examine whether Costa Rica had a duty to notify or consult, since it had ‘not
complied with its obligation under general international law to perform an
environmental impact assessment prior to the construction of the road.’ (para
168).
As Brunnée pointed out: ‘It is unclear whether the Court considered states’
procedural duties to be strictly sequential, with notification and consultation
being contingent upon a prior finding of risk through an IEA, or whether it
considered that the failure to conduct an IEA had already established a failure
to act diligently.’284 Two separate opinions indicate that the content of the
obligation is still unclear in international law. Judge Donoghue wrote in her
Opinion: ‘a failure to exercise due diligence to prevent significant transbound-
ary harm can engage the responsibility of the State of origin even in the
absence of material damage to potentially affected States.’ Judge Dugard
reached the opposite conclusion: the term ‘general obligation’ had to be under-
stood as denoting ‘a rule of customary international law requiring an environ-
mental impact assessment to be carried out where there is a risk of transbound-
ary harm.’ As Brunnée concluded based on this opinion: ‘He found that this
duty was independent from the obligation to take diligent steps to prevent
transboundary harm, as well as subject to a due diligence standard of its own,
which served to determine its scope.’285
If States are required to execute an IEA in a transboundary context where
there is likelihood of transboundary harm, it can be argued that large projects
that may affect climate change should be subjected to an IEA. This puts the
responsibility of establishing causality with the party conducting the IEA
instead of with the people affected by climate change. This is desirable from
283 Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, ICJ,
Judgment of 16 December 2015.
284 Brunnée 2018, p. 10.
285 Brunnée 2018, p. 11.
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a justice perspective. This reasoning has however not yet been confirmed in
case law.
7.5 INVOKING STATE RESPONSIBILITY
Based on the international norms described above, it can be argued that States
can be held responsible for causing climate change. However, so far, the
international legal system is not yet constructed to deliver justice of this
kind.286 For one, ‘climate change does not fit the traditional legal and factual
conception of transboundary pollution.‘287 ‘There is no immediate link be-
tween cause and effect – the physical emissions on one side of the border and
the damage in neighbouring territory. Instead a multitude of emissions from
various sources alter the composition of the Earth’s atmosphere.’288 Secondly,
not all greenhouse gas emissions are wrongful. For example, anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions resulting from human breathing but also, arguably,
the emissions that, in a particular technological and development context, are
inevitably generated in order to reach a minimal level of human development
and are therefore not wrongful. It would concededly be extremely difficult
to determine how much greenhouse gas emissions are thus justified as neces-
sary and from which threshold emissions would become excessive.289 Thirdly,
the traditional focus of public international law on delimiting rights and duties
of States does not reflect the global nature of many environmental problems,
although the international community does reflect a growing awareness of
the interdependence of the biosphere and the environmental problems besetting
it.290 However, the shift to the international community as the beneficiary,
286 See Haritz 2010, p. 236, Humphreys 2008, p. 64 and Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1111.
287 Schwarte 2012, p. 3.
288 Schwarte, Frank 2014, p. 207 and 208
289 Mayer 2017, p. 248.
290 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1113 and Voigt 2008, p. 7-10, para 78. An example is the growing
attention for the protection of global commons Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1113. See also
Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 53-56. The existence of obligations towards the inter-
national community as a whole was affirmed by the ICJ in the Case concerning the Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd., Judgement of 5 February 1970, para 33. ‘When a State
admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic
persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations
concerning the treatment to be afforded them. These obligations, however, are neither
absolute nor unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between
the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising
vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former
are the concern of al1 States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, al1 States
can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.’
It is also reflected in the context of state responsibility in Article 48 of the International
Law Commission Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 13 Rio Declaration.
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makes it difficult to determine to which State the obligation is owed to. Finally,
assessments of future climate change are not straightforward. Fisher and others
pointed out that ‘Risk, uncertainty, and the delays in consequences of the
changing climate, mean that assessment is heavily dependent on computational
modelling. Scientific uncertainty is inherent in the process of modelling and,
while models are developed as rigorous representations of reality so as to gain
insight, they are not “truth machines”.’291 They conclude that this scientific
uncertainty ‘creates fundamental challenges for law and adjudicative processes,
particularly because of the value placed on legal stability in applying legal
rules and in resolving disputes.’292 These complications will further be
assessed in relation to attribution, causation and allocation of loss.
It will first be briefly addressed whether for climate induced migrants these
rules apply or have been pushed aside by the climate regime as a lex specialis.
It has been argued that the UNFCCC293 and Kyoto Protocol and the Paris
Agreement exclude the applicability of general principles, as they should be
considered a lex specialis. The Kyoto Protocol established a Compliance Com-
mittee, which may instigate sanctions on State Parties that fail to comply with
their treaty obligations. As Wewerinke-Singh notes: ‘This function could be
interpreted as creating lex specialis pertaining to the legal consequences of
violations of the Kyoto Protocol that could, as per Article 15 of the ILC ARS
[ILC-DASR], exclude the applicability of (relevant parts of) the general law of
State responsibility.’294 This, however, does not mean that the existence of
the Compliance Committee or its actual practice replaces the rights of State
Parties to invoke the responsibility of other State Parties in accordance with
the general law of State responsibility. Wewerinke-Sing convincingly argues
that this is not the case, as a result of the principle of effectiveness,
‘we can assume that these treaty bodies are established to enhance the effectiveness
of the treaty regime, and not to weaken it by annulling rights and legal conse-
quences that would normally arise from a breach in accordance with the law of
State responsibility. Second, the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC are expressly
concerned with a ‘common concern of mankind’ and thus, like international human
rights treaties, protect the legitimate interest of the international community as
a whole rather than merely the interest of State Parties.’295
Faure and Nollkaemper share his view and add that: ‘As the Kyoto Protocol
does not regulate inter-State damage, it is also questionable whether pre-
existing legal obligations really overlap with the Protocol’s requirements. Given
the global effects of climate change, it is also very doubtful whether states
291 Fisher, Scotford & Barritt 2017, p. 178.
292 Ibid., p. 178.
293 For an anlyses on the level of Articles in the UNFCCC, see Happold 2013.
294 Wewerinke-Singh 2019, p. 67 and 68.
295 Ibid., p. 67 and 68.
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could opt out of their obligations by bilateral or even multilateral agree-
ments.’296
The situation is not different for the Paris Agreement. The COP decision
that accompanied the Paris Agreement contained a clause stating that Article 8
of the Agreement ‘does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or
compensation’. Therefore, it does not create a new lex specialis that would
preclude the application of the law of State responsibility to international
wrongful acts relating to climate change.297 The ILC asserted that: ‘for the
lex specialis principle to apply it is not enough that the same subject matter
is dealt with by two provisions; there must be some actual inconsistency
between them, or else a discernible intention that one provision is to exclude
the other.’298 Mayer pointed out that: ‘It is all but clear, however, that inter-
national treaties on climate change display either an “actual inconsistency”
with the no-harm/preventive principle or a ‘discernible intention’ to exclude
its application.’299 In conclusion, as the international climate change law
regime does not have its own secondary rules or enforcement mechanisms,
the law of State responsibility can be invoked to deal with breaches of obliga-
tions derived from the climate change regime.300
7.5.1 Forum and standing
Under international law, there has not historically been an obvious forum
before which individuals or groups may seek to challenge States’ actions in
respect of climate change.301 Frequently, environmental agreements are
drafted broadly and provide for many exceptions and derogations. The possi-
bilities for invoking responsibility are further reduced by the fact that environ-
mental agreements are often based on cooperational or monitoring
approaches.302 The fora involved in considering transfrontier pollution dis-
putes vary widely, from the ICJ to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Few of these
fora are suitable to deal with transfrontier pollution. ’Their expertise in environ-
mental issues varies and their approach tends to be conservative. These
tribunals also only have jurisdiction based on the consent of the parties who
296 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 152 and 153.
297 Several States also made declarations to safeguard their rights to compensation for climate
change damage.
298 Mayer 2017, p. 247.
299 Ibid., p. 247.
300 Wewerinke-Singh 2019, p. 67 and 68.
301 Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 84.
302 Christiansen 2016, p. 54.
270 Chapter 7
appear before them.’303 This may not be easy to obtain. ‘In practice very few
cases claiming responsibility for environmental damages have been handled
in this way.’304 ‘With regard to transfrontier environmental harm […] respons-
ibility has rather been accepted than invoked.’305 States often prefer informal
mechanisms due to ‘the rigidity of traditional forms of international respons-
ibility and of dispute settlement mechanisms’ and States are also concerned
about ‘establishing precedents in a very delicate field of international re-
lations.’306
The Climate Change Convention envisages resorting to the ICJ or arbitration,
contingent on further declarations by States (Article 14(2)). ‘Thus far very few
States have made a declaration accepting a mode of compulsory dispute
settlement under Article 14 of the Convention.’307 The International Bar Asso-
ciation ‘recognises that judicial bodies, such as the ICJ and ITLOS, provide
important fora in principle for the resolution of inter-State disputes on climate-
related matters, particularly as they are best placed to develop international
law.’308 The UNFCCC also provides for dispute settlement in Article 14 (1):
‘In the event of a dispute between any two or more Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention, the Parties concerned shall
seek a settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful
means of their own choice.’ Parties may declare submission of disputes to the
ICJ and/or arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the
Conference of the Parties as soon as practicable, in an annex on arbitration.309
The dispute resolution of the UNFCCC also applies for the Kyoto Protocol310
and the Paris Agreement.311 It is however unclear how environmental refu-
gees can benefit from these dispute resolution systems. Therefore, this para-
graph further explores what these judicial bodies could contribute.
ICJ
Only the ICJ, ‘has the jurisdiction and authority to deal – in theory at least –
with the totality of the key legal questions that arise in relation to climate
change.’312 From an institutional point of view, among the strengths of the
Court are its central role within the United Nations, its general jurisdiction,
its wide range of applicable remedies, its transparent decision-making, and
303 ‘Before the ICJ, a contentious case would have to be brought by one State against another.’
Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 6.
304 Voigt 2008, p. 21.
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307 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 128 and 129.
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its theoretical option to seek expert advice.313 However, a number of States
which are seen as being particularly important for the world climate, such
as the USA, China, Russia and Brazil, have not accepted the compulsory juris-
diction clause under the ICJ Statute and it remains open whether they ever
will. They thus cannot be sued before the ICJ, unless a so-called compromissory
clause (Article 36(1)) in a treaty so provides or they were to submit or specific-
ally agree to such proceedings. This seems unlikely. In reality, there is therefore
little chance to sue all States that may add to global warming before the ICJ.314
Also, for State-to-State litigation seeking mitigation and adaptation measures,
the political pressure not to initiate proceedings against other States has so
far been too high.315 For example, attempts by a group of States led by Palau
to request an advisory opinion of the ICJ on States’ obligations and responsib-
ilities in relation to climate change were crushed by political pressures from
development-aid donor States.316 At the moment, it even seems that the ini-
tiative in the General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion has been
stalled.317 However, currently, Vanuatu is exploring possibilities of requesting
an advisory opinion.318 The ICJ might be asked a question such as: ‘What
are the obligations of States under international law in relation to preventing
the causes of climate change, minimizing its adverse effects and providing
compensation for climate change damage?’319
So far, the ICJ approach to applying international environmental law has
been rather conservative. ‘The ICJ has in the past elected to take a narrow
approach to questions presented, and is more likely to reiterate general prin-
ciples of international environmental law in the absence of actionable obliga-
tions clearly established by treaty or international agreement.’320 According
to the International Bar Association: ‘there are real criticisms of the ICJ’s ability
to deal with the technical scientific evidence that will always accompany
environmental claims.’ In the past, while the ICJ had the ability to appoint
technical advisers, it failed to do so in seminal cases such as the Pulp Mills
case.321 However, in the Whaling in the Antarctic case,322 the Court showed
313 Verheyen, Zengerling 2013, p. 778.
314 Magnus 2013, p. 837.
315 Verheyen, Zengerling 2013, p. 781 and 782.
316 Mayer 2017, p. 259. See also Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 84 and 85.
317 Verheyen, Zengerling 2013, p. 781 and 782.
318 See for example https://chairpeace.hypotheses.org/180.
319 Verheyen, Zengerling 2013, p. 760.
320 Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 84 and 85.
321 ‘This deficit was observed in the joint dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh and Judge
Simma, who described the manner in which the ICJ evaluated scientific evidence as flawed,
and noted that the Court had missed a ‘golden opportunity’ to ‘demonstrate its ability to
approach scientifically complex disputes in a state-of-the-art manner.’ Poignantly, they stated
that the Court: ‘had before it a case on international environmental law of an exemplary
nature – a “textbook example”, so to speak, of alleged trans frontier pollution – yet, the
Court has approached it in a way that will increase doubts in the international legal
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the ability to deal with scientific facts. This judgment was given in the face
of sharply differing opinions in the Scientific Committee of the International
Whaling Commission. ’This was the first case ever in which there was cross-
examination of the scientific experts put forward by Australia and Japan.’323
Sands argues that the Court has shown itself able to play a role in helping
the world understand the factual issues that arise in relation to competing
claims as to the science of climate change.324
With respect to the Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the
Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) Compensation Judgment of 2 February
2018, Cittadino argued that while ‘the occasion was ripe with opportunities’
to provide guidance on the methodology for assessing environmental damages
and whether the Court should appoint its own experts when presiding over
cases that present with complex scientific and technical aspects, the Court
missed this opportunity. Instead, ‘the Court opted for an overall evaluation
of damages and engaged with the evidence provided by the parties in a rather
unclear methodological fashion. The result is a judgment that presents many
flaws in its legal reasoning.’325
The Yale Centre for Environmental Law and Policy has proposed a question
to be submitted to the ICJ for its advisory opinion: ‘What are the obligations
under international law of a State for ensuring that activities under its juris-
diction or control326 that emit greenhouse gases327 do not cause, or sub-
stantially contribute to,328 serious damage to another State or States?’329
The scope of this question is limited. The Court is asked to express its opinion
on the ongoing norms governing the present and future conduct of States.
It therefore does not require the Court to engage in highly politicized or
politically controversial questions, such as those involving the attribution of
causation for climate change-related harms that are now becoming apparent;
or those requiring the calculation of the proportionate liabilities of different
community whether it, as an institution, is well placed to tackle complex scientific questions.’
in Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 84 and 85. See § 7.4.2.
322 ICJ, Whaling in the Antarctic, Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening, 2014.
323 Sands 2016, p. 29.
324 Ibid., p. 30.
325 Cittadino 2019.
326 The second element is ‘activities under its jurisdiction or control’: again, the Court is asked
to consider only those activities that can be directly linked to State obligations. Greenhouse-
gas generating activities that do not fall within the jurisdiction or control of States – for
instance, those activities that occur as a result of natural processes over which States do
not have control, are not within the scope of the question.
327 The question concerns only anthropocentric processes.
328 The language of ‘cause or substantially contribute to’ makes clear that the threshold is a
high one. The Court is not asked to consider all greenhouse gas emitting activities under
the jurisdiction or control of States: only those that do serious damage to another State
or States.
329 Kysar 2013, p. 8.
The responsibility approach 273
States for these harms.330 The Court is also not asked to consider questions
of damages; either as a matter of principle or as a matter of quantification.
The ICJ is asked to make a finding as to the content of norms of international
law, and to provide advice in order to guide an organ of the United Nations
system in the performance of its functions.331 Sands endorses the benefit of
an ICJ ruling in the establishment of ‘factual issues that are essentially of a
scientific or technical nature.’332 In his opinion: ‘a finding of fact would be
significant and authoritative and could well be dispositive on range of future
actions, including negotiations.’333 As such, it could, for example help to
accelerate international negotiations by providing a clearer legal framework
for the negotiations within UNFCCC.334 Verheyen and Zengerling are a bit
more ambitious and would like the ICJ to interpret and adjudicate UNFCCC
terms like ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ or ‘dangerous climate
change’ (Article 2), which are not yet fully defined. Another possibility in their
opinion it the contribution of the ICJ to the development of treaty provisions
into general law. They see a possibility to contemplate concrete cases based
on the no-harm rule particularly for projections of loss of land, or at least loss
of habitable land under the recent climate change scenarios.335 Though all
these ideas and proposals are highly interesting, it is a fact that so far no State
or international organisation has initiated a process of seeking an advisory
opinion from the ICJ on climate change related matters from an international
law perspective.
ITLOS
Sands argues that: ‘Given the prospect of increases in ocean temperatures, sea-
level rise and the disappearance of land territory, ITLOS is an obvious place
to bring a request for an advisory opinion on matters that relate to the obliga-
tions of states and international organisations on the protection of the
oceans.’336 According to Bialek, the ‘UNCLOS dispute settlement process has
three major advantages: clear treaty obligations, a direct and clear scientific
link between the subject matter of the instrument, the harmful activity and
the impacts in question, and finally the dispute settlement provisions cover
all major emitters.’337 However, ‘it should be noted that any claims under
330 See § 7.5.4.
331 Ibid., p. 8.
332 Sands 2016, p. 29.’
333 Sands identifies two tiers of issues: the first might include: Is climate change underway?
Have sea-levels risen? Have anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions been the main cause
of atmospheric warming? The second might address more specific issues such as to confirm
that emissions reductions are needed – nationally and globally – to stay below the globally
agreed temperature threshold of 2 degrees Celsius. In Ibid., p. 29 and 30.
334 Kysar 2013, p. 90.
335 Verheyen, Zengerling 2013, p. 782. See § 7.4.1.
336 Sands 2016, p. 33.
337 Center for Climate Change Law and the Republic of the Marshall Islands 2011, p. 9.
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UNCLOS would only cover damage due to maritime pollution or changes in
maritime zones and fishing rights. Recoverable damage under UNCLOS would
thus not encompass agricultural or health damage, but would encompass all
coastal territory and adaptation/protection costs.’338 In the past claims for
the ITLOS have been successful to hold polluters accountable.339
7.5.2 Damaging activity and attribution
If an appropriate forum is found where both parties have standing, the next
step to hold States responsible for transboundary environmental damage, is
either to identify a legally relevant behaviour by a State or to attribute the
actions of private persons to the State. This legally relevant behaviour could
for example be: ‘allowing emissions of greenhouse gases per se or during a
certain time,’ or ‘not having put in place the regulatory means to arrest
emissions over and above a certain threshold.’340
It is hard to characterize the injury caused by the wrongful act due to
complex patterns of causality. Also, ‘it could be argued that millions of private
persons are responsible for greenhouse gas emissions and not the State.’341
As Mayer puts it: ‘In the Anthropocene – a geological era dominated by the
influence of human societies – it is hardly an exaggeration to say that just about
anything that happens anywhere in the world can somehow be related to the
impacts of human societies on the environment, in particular greenhouse gas
emissions and climate change.’342 In general, activities of individuals and
private industries, are not attributable ipso facto to the State. Traditionally,
a State can only be held responsible for the behaviour of private persons, if
the conduct of the individual can be attributed to that State.343 A claimant
will normally have to prove that he/she has actually suffered damage, and
that the damage is of a type which the law regards as recoverable
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration limits a State’s responsibility
for harm to those activities under that State’s ‘jurisdiction and control.’ It is
unclear however, how this principle should be applied. Decisions of inter-
national tribunals do not provide much guidance.344 Tol and Verheyen argue
that: ‘as soon as an activity is permitted or licensed by a State’ it is therefore
under the control of that State. Therefore, ‘the resulting behaviour is attribut-
able to the State because States must exercise due diligence in control of private
persons.’ This argument is frequently made ‘in particular with regard to ultra-
338 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1117 and 1118.
339 See § 7.2.
340 Ibid., p. 1112.
341 Ibid., p. 1111.
342 Mayer 2017, p. 255-260
343 See also § 7.5.3 traditional state responsibility.
344 Wold, Hunter & Powers 2009, p. 8 and 9.
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hazardous activities.’345 On a more abstract level, Tol and Verheyen pointed
out that: ‘the discussion becomes academic if one accepts that monitoring and
regulation of private person’s conduct is still a prime function of states, a
function states can fail to fulfil with the appropriate care. Thus, as a result,
at least the failure to stop, reduce or regulate emitting activities with due care
can trigger state responsibility.’346
Based on the perception of climate change as a hazardous activity, Faure
and Nollkaemper argue that the concept of due diligence – or standard of
care – can result in State responsibility even when the actions of private
persons are not attributable to the State.347 The human rights framework also
supports an interpretation in which States are responsible even when actions
cannot be attributed to them. As stated by the then-Special Representative of
the Secretary-General on human rights and transnational corporations and
other business enterprises: ‘the State duty to protect against non-State abuses
is part of the very foundation of the international human rights regime. The
duty requires States to play a key role in regulating and adjudicating abuse
by business enterprises, or risk breaching their international obligations.’348
This interpretation puts a positive obligation on States to prevent hazardous
activities by private persons if these activities are likely to violate the human
rights of the individuals under the State’s jurisdiction. For environmentally
forced migration, this interpretation means that States may be held to regulate
and control activities that have either a high probability of causing significant
transboundary harm or a low probability of causing disastrous transboundary
harm. In preventing this harm, forced migration due to environmental degra-
dation caused by the hazardous activity may be prevented.
7.5.3 Causation
As Roberts and Pelling pointed out, in general:
‘there is robust evidence linking slow onset processes such as increasing tem-
peratures, sea level rise and glacial retreat to anthropogenic climate change. How-
ever, other slow onset processes like salinisation and loss of biodiversity are influ-
enced by a number of both anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic factors, making
attribution more difficult to establish. Attributing extreme weather events, such
as heatwaves, droughts and floods, is even more complex as natural variability
plays a greater role. It may never be possible to determine the extent to which
anthropogenic forcing contributes to a given weather event. However, it is possible
345 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1111.
346 Ibid., p. 1112.
347 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 143-147. See § 7.5.3.
348 Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 16.
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to determine the extent to which anthropogenic forcing increases the likelihood
of a given weather event.’349
The difficulties arise when these effects need to be attributed to a specific
defendant or group of defendants. The difficulty is partly that damage occurr-
ing now is a result of emissions in the past and particularly because any
individual emitter will only be responsible for a very small percentage of
overall GHGs.350 Factors such as the geographical distance between source
and damage, the fact that multiple sources of pollution may exist, and the
cumulative effect of different pollution sources, make the causal link difficult
to construct.351 A closely related question is whether a GHG emitter can fore-
see or could have foreseen that a particular conduct would or might have an
effect on climate change. Finally it is argued that this type of claim is unjustici-
able, because it involves questions of policy and international relations, which
are exclusively the preserve of the executive or legislature and not subject to
adjudication in the courts.352 Arguably, international claims ‘might also be
preempted by the access to national remedies, especially if tort lawsuits based
on climate change prove to be viable, […] or by the existence of alternative
mechanisms for compensating the victims’ State, such as the Warsaw Inter-
national Mechanism under the UNFCCC.’353
With regard to causation ‘a distinction needs to be made between proof
of general causation (where the overall causality of emissions-favouring con-
duct is to be acknowledged under the precautionary principle), specific
causation (where the causation of a specific incident is facilitated by the
precautionary principle as well) and multi-party causation (where the effect
needs to be different in view of opting for proportional or joint-and-several
liability).‘354 In the context of climate change, general causation requires proof
that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions change the radiative forcing in
the atmosphere, which results in global warming, which then leads to impacts
on ecosystems such as air temperature rise, sea level rise, and shift of climatic
zones.355 As the non-linearity of the climatic system inherently involves un-
certainty, international courts or tribunals will have to decide on the required
standard of proof to establish causation. As Frank pointed out, ‘the standard
of proof required to substantiate a claim for the violation of the duty of pre-
vention’ (as reflected in the ILC-DAPTH) can be derived from the decision in
349 Roberts, Pelling 2018, p. 6.
350 For a more extensive analyses on whether there is a causal link between greenhouse gas
emissions and environmental degradation, see Zahar 2018.
351 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 55 and 56, para 41.
352 This argument has been ruled out in the Urgenda cases
353 Feria Tinta, Milnes February 26, 2018.
354 Haritz 2010, p. 240.
355 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1112.
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the Trail Smelter arbitration356 and ‘the generally recognized rules of evidence
under public international law. Accordingly, “clear and convincing evidence”
of a serious potential damage must be provided.’357 The Corfu Channel
case358 further indicates ‘that proof based on the “balance of probabilities”
would sufice.’359 In the SBT cases360 the precautionary ‘principle was used
to lower the standard of proof in situations where the complexity of facts leads
to a degree of uncertainty.’361
The IPCC reports reflect scientific agreement on an effect of anthropogenic
emissions on the likelihood of climate change. However, they still indicate
a degree of uncertainty. Sands argues that these IPCC reports have gone well
beyond the classical standards on the burden of legal proof.362 ‘Indeed, there
seems to be increasing evidence that even if all Kyoto Protocol commitments
are met, climate change would not be reduced in an effective manner.’363
As Quirico pointed out: ‘proof may be facilitated by collective action […] In
fact, it is easier to demonstrate the probability of diffuse damage than specific
individual damage.’364 However, in the Kivalina case,365 the United States
District Court decided that:
‘Plaintiffs essentially concede that the genesis of global warming is attributable
to numerous entities which individually and cumulatively over the span of centuries
created the effects they now are experiencing. Even accepting the allegations of
the Complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
it is not plausible to state which emissions – emitted by whom and at what time
in the last several centuries and at what place in the world – “caused” Plaintiffs’
alleged global warming related injuries. Thus, Plaintiffs have not and cannot show
that Defendants’ conduct is the “seed of [their] injury.”’366
The United States District Court further concludes that: ‘Based on this inter-
pretation, determining a causal link between anthropogenic GHG emissions
356 See § 7.4.1.
357 Frank 2014, para 2.3.
358 See § 7.4.1.
359 Voigt 2008, p. 16 For an extensive review of case law: see UNGA UN Doc A/CN.4/543,
Survey of liability regimes relevant to the topic of international liability for injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law 2004, p. 130 onwards.
360 See § 7.2.
361 Voigt 2008, p. 16.
362 Sands 2016, p. 21.
363 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 152 and 153.
364 Quirico 2018, p. 192.
365 United States District Court, N.D. California, Oakland Division, Native Village of Kivalina
v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 Federal.Supplement.2d series 863 N.D.Cal. 2009 Case No: C 08-1138
2009.
366 Ibid., p. 880.
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and breaches of first and second generation human rights is a complex
task.’367
In the Dutch Urgenda case the Hague District Court and the Hague Court
of Appeal reached an opposite conclusion. After establishing the standard of
the precautionary principle, the Court of Appeal establishes that: ‘The circum-
stance that full scientific certainty regarding the efficacy of the ordered re-
duction scenario is lacking therefore does not mean that the State is entitled
to refrain from taking further measures. High plausibility, as described above,
suffices.‘368 It dismisses the State‘s defence of the lack of a causal link, as
‘the proceedings concern a claim for imposing an order and not a claim for
damages, so that causality only plays a limited role.’ The Court of Appeal
considers:
‘it suffices (in brief) that there is a real risk of the danger for which measures have
to be taken. It has been established that this is the case. Moreover, if the opinion
of the State were to be followed, an effective legal remedy for a global problem
as complex as this one would be lacking. After all, each state held accountable
would then be able to argue that it does not have to take measures if other states
do not so either. That is a consequence that cannot be accepted, also because
Urgenda does not have the option to summon all eligible states to appear in a
Dutch court.‘369
As Quirico concludes: ‘The reasoning of the Court concerns not only general
causation, but also specific causation, including fundamental rights. This leads
to the conclusion that the duty of care facilitates establishing a causal link
between anthropogenic GHG emissions and the violation of first generation
human rights.‘370 The Dutch Supreme Court also considered the impossibility
of translating the dangers of climate change into specific risks for individual
persons.371 The Supreme Court considered that ‘the case law of the ECtHR
offers starting points for the obligation of the State to reduce, or ensure the
reduction of, the emission of greenhouse gases, as assumed by the Court of
Appeal. This is because the ECHR requires effective and active protection of
the rights safeguarded by Articles 2 and 8 ECHR’372 and ‘It would be extra-
ordinary for a violation of collective human rights not to be covered by Articles
2 and 8 ECHR while each of some innumerable violations on a smaller scale
would fall within the scope of those articles. The circumstance that Article 34
367 For further analysis, see Quirico 2018, p. 192.
368 The State of The Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, The Hague Court of Appeal C/09/456689/
HA ZA 13-1396, Ruling of 9 October 2018, para 63.
369 Ibid., para 64.
370 Quirico 2018, p. 193.
371 The State of The Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, The Supreme Court 2019, Case ECLI:NL:
PHR:2019:1026 19/00135, 13 September 2019, para 3.13.
372 Ibid., para 3.14.
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ECHR does not allow an actio popularis does not detract from this.’373 It
remains to be seen if this line of reasoning will ultimately be adopted at the
international level.
Traditional State responsibility or strict State responsibility
Once the damaging activity and general causation has been established, there
is a requirement to show either that ‘(1) “a State has violated a duty of care
or a rule of international law to incur responsibility” (traditional State respons-
ibility) or (2) that – “where significant environmental injury is concerned”
(hazardous activities) – “the causal link between injury and activity attributable
to the State is enough to trigger State responsibility and compensation duties”
(strict State responsibility).’374 The literature is divided on whether actions
leading to climate change need to be considered a wrongful act (which would
require a violation of a duty of care) or a hazardous activity (which only
requires a causal link).375 Both views will be discussed hereafter.
Traditional State responsibility
The International Law Commission has adopted Draft Articles on the Respons-
ibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereafter: ILC-DASR) in
December 2001.376 Article 1 of the ILC-DASR simply States that ‘every inter-
nationally wrongful act’ entails responsibility, while a wrongful act is defined
as ‘a conduct that constitutes a breach of an international obligation‘ (Article 2).
‘When exactly an obligation is breached depends on the nature and character
of the pertinent obligation. […] That means that State responsibility can only
occur if the respective State has not acted with the appropriate care. In turn,
the standard of “appropriate care” must be determined according to the actual
circumstances and obligation in question.’377 The challenge is to determine
‘exactly what the standard of care or the threshold of negligence is in any given
case.’378
At a minimum the obligation that the State has allegedly breached must
be in force at the time of breach (Articles 13 and 14 ILC-DASR). ‘In cases relating
to treaty law, it will be crucial whether or not the document had been signed
and ratified by the wrongdoing State at the time when the wrongful conduct
occurred. It will be much harder to test rules and standards of international
law deriving from custom regarding their validity for a certain State at a
373 Ibid., para 3.15.
374 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1112 and 1113.
375 See discussion in § 7.1.2.
376 ‘The ILC-DASR are not legally binding per se. However, because they are generally regarded
as being reflective of customary law, the regulations of the ILC are binding as far as they
are part of customary law.’ in Christiansen 2016, p. 40-44.
377 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1112 and 1113.
378 Ibid., p. 1112 and 1113.
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particular time.’379 As has been demonstrated above, in the context of climate
change, customary rules may be decisive, so it will be difficult to establish
the exact moment of applicability.
Even if this moment is established, one could still question if responsibility
would not start earlier. Some argue that States should be responsible for past
pollution.380 This ‘retrospective liability would mean that emissions which
were lawful in the past would be considered wrongful today.’381 As has been
reflected in Article 13 ILC-DASR, retrospectivity may be hard to reconcile with
State liability under international law. However, as Faure and Nollkaemper
pointed out, ‘one might argue that the emission of carbon dioxide and resultant
climate change is a “composite act” that only becomes wrongful after a long
series of emissions.’ Although in the case of climate change it will be imposs-
ible to pinpoint that moment, the effect will be that past emissions will only
be subjected to a responsibility regime at the date when they become cumu-
latively wrongful. This relates to the question of foreseeability of harm.382
Faure and Nollkaemper also pointed out that: ‘the likelihood of a finding
of liability against developing countries is significantly lower-or at least their
share of the liability will be lower’, as they have contributed less to historic
emissions.383 This point is also made by Tol and Verheyen, although they
also pointed out that ‘from the point of view of a small island State or other
least developed countries it could well be argued that large emitters such as
India, Brazil and China cannot be freed of State responsibility for injuries
abroad per se.’384
In the context of climate change, it is the accumulation of pollution by
various actors, that leads to damage, and therefore potentially there are
multiple responsible States. International law recognizes that two or more
States may commit identical offenses in concert or simultaneously.385 ‘The
general principle that applies to such cases is that when two or more States
commit separate wrongful acts that result in a single injury, in principle, each
State is separately responsible for its acts.’386 The question remaining is if
each State is ‘liable separately for his own emissions (with the consequence
that the victim has to bring a high number of lawsuits) or can a joint and
several liability rule be applied?’387 For joint and several liability, ‘liability
379 Christiansen 2016, p. 54.
380 For example Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 172 and 173.
381 Ibid., p. 171.
382 Ibid., p. 172 and 173. See also § 7.3.1 due diligence.
383 Ibid., p. 172 and 173.
384 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1118.
385 See Art. 1 ILC-DASR commentary 6, p. 33 and 34 and Art. 47 ILC-DASR: ‘Plurality of
responsible States. 1. Where several States are responsible for the same internationally
wrongful act, the responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act.’
386 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 166-169.
387 Ibid., p. 166-169.
The responsibility approach 281
would be ’joint’ in that two or more States can be responsible for each other’s
wrongful conduct vis-a-vis third States. It would be ‘several’ insofar as each
State can be held separately responsible, yet there is no need to hold both
responsible.’388 ‘The defendant(s) held liable for the entire cleanup under
a joint and several liability regime are usually allowed to sue other parties
who contributed to the contamination.’389 In these lawsuits it can be deter-
mined what the role of the individual parties has been.390 So far, international
law has not accepted such a rule of joint and several liability. Faure and
Nollkaemper argue that:
‘The development of such a principle would require further development of the
criteria that could be used to determine contribution and allocation. It has been
suggested that such criteria should include causation, blameworthiness, the char-
acter of each state’s intent in breaching its international obligation (specific intent
to cause a wrong would likely be treated more harshly than negligence), the
measure of each state’s legal authority or jurisdiction over the injury producing
conduct, and, directly related to this, causality: the state with the greater measure
of jurisdiction to control conduct is deemed to possess a greater causal connection
to the consequences of such conduct. Such apportionment on the basis of authority
to control would also contribute to deterrence by imposing the burden of compensa-
tion in proportion to the relative capacities of the states to prevent repetition of
the injurious event.’391
Crawford, has noted that ‘there is no need to resort to the principle of joint
and several liability, since the same result could be achieved under normal
rules of attribution. He points out that, in the Corfu Channel case392 the ICJ
did not suggest that Albania’s responsibility for failure to warn was reduced,
let alone precluded, by reason of the possible concurrent responsibility of a
third State (Yugoslavia).’393
Direct or strict State responsibility
At present, only a handful of treaties make States strictly liable for any harm
that occurs in another State’s territory as a result of specific activities, con-
sidered as especially new or dangerous. ‘The rationale for strict liability is that
an actor that profits from potentially harmful or inherently dangerous activities
should be liable for damage that occurred as a result of the harmful activity,
an application of the “polluter pays principle”. Strict liability shifts the burden
388 See Art. 47 ILC-DASR. See also Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 166-169.
389 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 58, para 50.
390 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 165 and 166.
391 Ibid., p. 166-169.
392 See § 7.4.1.
393 Ibid., p. 166-169.
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for risk avoidance to the source of pollution by removing the need to establish
intentional or negligent behaviour to recover damages.’394
Tol and Verheyen argue that, in the context of climate change, under a
strict liability regime, ‘it suffices to show that a State has contributed to causing
global warming and thus to its (adverse) impacts. This would mean that one
could take into account all historical contributions, from all sources for calculat-
ing compensation.’395 However, the ILA Declaration on Legal Principles Re-
lating to Climate Change and the ILC Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss
in the Case of Transboundary Harm arising out of Hazardous Activities396
find against a strict liability of States for environmental harm. The ILC Draft
Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm arising
out of Hazardous Activities do not support strict liability between States, unless
the State itself is the operator. Kiss and Shelton are critical on this lack of strict
liability:
‘The lack of any serious consideration of State liability may be understood in the
context of the prior articles on prevention: failure to fulfill the due diligence duty
to prevent is considered to breach an international obligation and shifts the applic-
able legal regime to one of State responsibility. Still, to dismiss liability as “a case
of misplaced priority” ignores existing positive law which, as described above,
has accepted the principle of State liability without fault in a series of treaties
concerning ultrahazardous activities that are largely conducted by State actors.’397
Schwarte and Frank conclude that the ILA Declaration on Legal Principles
Relating to Climate Change ‘deliberately do not directly address the con-
sequences of non-compliance with the duty of prevention and other principles.
But if a state fails to meet the standard of care […] failure to take proportionate
394 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 57 and 58.
395 Tol, Verheyen 2004, p. 1112 and 1113.
396 For the Draft Articles with commentaries 2006, see Text adopted by the International Law
Commission at its fifty-eighth session, in 2006, and submitted to the General Assembly
as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session A/61/10. The report,
which also contains commentaries on the Draft Articles, appeared in Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two. The UN General Assembly com-
mended on various occasions the principles on the allocation of loss in the case of trans-
boundary harm arising out of hazardous activities, the text of which is annexed to General
Assembly resolution 61/36, to the attention of Governments, without prejudice to any future
action, as recommended by the Commission regarding the principles. The UNGA also
invited Governments to submit further comments on any future action, in particular on
the form of the respective Articles and principles, bearing in mind the recommendations
made by the Commission in that regard, including in relation to the elaboration of a
convention on the basis of the Articles, as well as on any practice in relation to the applica-
tion of the Articles and principles. The topic is on the provisional agenda of the seventy-
fourth session, scheduled for October 22 2019.
397 Kiss, Shelton 2007, p. 1138.
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action may amount to an international legal wrong.’398 In general, ‘State
support for a general rule of strict liability of States for ultrahazardous activ-
ities seems modest at best.’399
7.5.4 Allocation of loss
With regard to wrongful acts, ‘the starting point in international law is that
a responsible state needs only to compensate for damage that is caused by
the wrongful act. This requires a link between emissions, climate change, and
harmful effects. Whether damage is ‘caused’ by an act is primarily determined
by the criteria of normality and predictability or foreseeability.’400 Specific
causation requires the proof that a specific activity causes a specific type of
damage. It is often not easy to connect polluting activities and the cross border
damage, as the law is not designed for complex combinations of factors con-
tributing to the pollution and long chains of causality, such as in the context
of climate change.401 Harm due to climate change is even harder to prove
as there are many polluting activities, which are ‘difficult to track back to any
one State’s failure to avoid activities that cause significant damage to the
environment of another State or in areas beyond national jurisdiction.’402
Despite the development of scientific knowledge, it remains rather unlikely
that a specific hurricane might be attributable to climate change (instead of
being a mere natural phenomenon), let alone to emissions from a specific
country. ‘The impossibility of attributing emissions of a specific country to
specific damages, due to the complex and synergetic effect of the diverse
pollutants and polluters and the non-linearity of climate change, is problematic
in this context.’403 ‘The causal chain between GHG emissions and other climate
change impacts, such as land inundation by rising sea-levels or loss of perma-
frost soil and sea ice, is probably easier to establish,’ as scientific knowledge
has proven a link between climate change impacts and these consequences.404
Mayer even argues that – in cases of non-compliance with the UNFCCC and
the Paris Agreement – , responsibility for the breach of such treaty-based
mitigation commitments would only be incurred for the difference between
actual emissions and the relevant national mitigation commitment.405 Frank
argues that for ’attribution of damages to climate change that have already
occurred the less stringent standard of “preponderance of evidence” generally
398 Schwarte, Frank 2014, p. 209.
399 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 146 and 147.
400 Ibid., p. 158 and 159. See § 7.4.1 due diligence.
401 Voigt 2008, p. 15 and 16.
402 Schwarte 2012, p. 4.
403 Voigt 2008, p. 15.
404 Ibid., p. 17.
405 Mayer 2017, p. 243.
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used in public international law applies.’406 It is still unclear how this would
be decided on by the courts. On the national level, several cases have been
filed against national governments and multinationals for causing climate
change.407 These cases will give an indication on how specific causation for
climate change will be decided upon.
Multi-party causation
In complex situations with multiple actors, the ‘but for test’ or ‘conditio sine
qua non’ formula generally applied to establish causation are of limited use.
It is ’accepted in international jurisprudence that “it matters not how many
links there may be in the chain of causation” connecting the wrongful act with
the injury sustained “provided there is no break in the chain.”’408 In the Trail
Smelter arbitration, ‘multiple causes did not deter the tribunal in its award
of damages. Rather, the fact that the injury was at least partially caused by
the polluting activity of the smelter in Trail, Canada appeared to be suffi-
cient.’409
Many States contribute to GHG emissions. This ‘does not exclude the attribu-
tion of damages according to the concurrent causation of each individual
State.’410 However, the ‘multiplicity of polluters and victims might pose
insurmountable evidentiary dificulties. There is no clear international law rule
on how to apportion damage between multiple wrongdoers or causes of
climate change. Apportioning responsibility will depend on general consider-
ations of equity, which will depend on the facts of a given case. No consistent
preference emerges from case law in this respect.’411 In the Urgenda case,
the Dutch State has put forward that: ‘the Dutch greenhouse gas emissions,
in absolute terms and compared with global emissions, are minimal, that the
State cannot solve the problem on its own, that the worldwide community
has to cooperate, that the State cannot be deemed the party liable/causer
(“primary offender”) but as secondary injuring party (“secondary offender”),
and this concerns complex decisions for which much depends on nego-
tiations.’412 Even though the Court acknowledged that: ‘this is a global prob-
lem and that the State cannot solve this problem on its own. However, this
does not release the State from its obligation to take measures in its territory,
within its capabilities, which in concert with the efforts of other states provide
protection from the hazards of dangerous climate change.’413 The Court also
406 Frank 2014, para 3.3.
407 For example, the German Lliuya v. RWE case or the Dutch Milieudefensie v. Shell case.
408 Voigt 2008, p. 16 and 17.
409 Ibid., p. 15 and 16.
410 Frank 2014, para 2.2.
411 Voigt 2008, p. 20-23.
412 The State of The Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, The Hague Court of Appeal C/09/456689/
HA ZA 13-1396, Ruling of 9 October 2018, para 61.
413 Ibid., para 62.
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considered: ‘if the opinion of the State were to be followed, an effective legal
remedy for a global problem as complex as this one would be lacking. After
all, each state held accountable would then be able to argue that it does not
have to take measures if other states do not so either. That is a consequence
that cannot be accepted, also because Urgenda [respondent in the appeal on
the main issue, appellant in the cross-appeal] does not have the option to
summon all eligible states to appear in a Dutch court.’414
As climate change damages are the result of a multitude of emitters,
emitting activities and emitted gases, it does need to be determined how to
divide responsibility. In chapter two of the ILC-DASR, the ILC approaches the
problem of attributing the same conduct to different States at the same time.
The general principle of the ILC-DASR is, however, to hold each State respons-
ible for its own actions and omissions.415 Article 47 ILC-DASR stipulates that
where several States are responsible for the same internationally wrongful
act, the responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act. Voigt
pointed out that: ‘The challenge arising here is that Article 47 only applies
to cases where several States are responsible for the “same wrongful act” and
not to instances where several States independently commit acts that contribute
to an indivisible harm, as in the instance of climate change damage.’416
Frank opines on the contrary that:
‘every state is severely liable only to the extent concurrent causation can be
attributed. The arbitral award in the Trail Smelter case further specifies that if
multiple causes coincide in substantial damage, the court may estimate the pro-
portional contribution of different factors. This notion can be transferred to the
calculation of states’ liability share for climate damage damages. The prerequisite
is that such an estimate is not speculative, but can be made from “reasonable
inference”‘.417
This would result in due diligence considerations to State responsibility. La
Fontaine on the other hand, suggests that the difficulty of establishing causality,
proves the need for new regional or global treaties in which States accept
collective responsibility. She prefers to rely on the principle of CBDR, as this
does not rely on ‘fault’ as a basis for differentiated responsibility and would
therefore be able to compensate for past emission.418
414 Ibid., para 64.
415 Christiansen 2016, p. 45-48.
416 Voigt 2008, p. 19 and 20.
417 Frank 2014, para 3.4.
418 Deruytter 2009, p. 19 and 20.
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Exclusion of the background risk
‘The literature indicates that potential polluters (like GHG emitters) should not
be held liable for the background risk that they have not caused.’419 In the
literature there has not been much discussion on how the level of liability
should be determined with regard to these background risks.420 Faure and
Nollkaemper are one of the few authors that considered this topic. They
conclude that: ‘the liability rule has to be constructed in such a way that
statistical and scientific evidence is used to examine the probability that the
specific activity (in our case GHG emissions from one State) caused the damage
(in our case climate change).’421 This probability of causation would have
to be based on scientific expertise with all of the inherent uncertainty. Scientists
‘may indicate that there is a certain degree of probability that the aggregate
GHG emissions from particular defendant States would have caused the climate
change damage suffered by the victim State. The question then obviously arises
of how to deal with this uncertainty within the legal system.’422 Faure and
Nollkaemper suggest four possible solutions to deal with this: (1) ‘as soon as
there is any statistical chance that a certain activity may cause certain damage,
the victim receives one hundred percent compensation for all damage;’ (2)
‘to refuse the claim of the victim unless there is one hundred percent certainty
that the act caused the damage;’ (3) ‘award compensation only when the
probability that the damage was caused by the act passes a certain threshold
of, say, fifty percent;’ and (4) compensate according the probability that the
damage was caused by the act.423 It is unclear how this will be decided upon
in future.
Potential types of damage or costs and restitution
If State responsibility to climate change damage is accepted, the next step
would be to determine potential types of damage or costs. In the 1927 Chorzow
Factory case, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated:
‘The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act – a principle
which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the
decisions of international tribunals – is that reparation must as far as possible, wipe
out all the consequences of an illegal act and re-establish the situation which would,
in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in
kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which
a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sus-
tained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of
419 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 161.
420 Ibid., p. 161-164.
421 Ibid., p. 161-164.
422 Ibid., p. 162.
423 Ibid., p. 161-164.
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it – such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of com-
pensation due for an act contrary to international law.’424
Subsequently, the ICJ held in the Corfu Channel case ‘that Albania was respons-
ible under international law for allowing the use of its territory to harm British
vessels and therefore that Albania must pay compensation for the loss of
property and human life.’425
This approach is reflected in the ILC-DASR which envisages that the re-
paration for the injury shall take the form of restitution, compensation and
satisfaction. (Articles 31–35). Article 31 ILC-DASR defines injury as ‘including
any damage whether material or moral’ caused by the internationally wrongful
act. Material damage includes all potential losses in infrastructure, property
and other clearly defined economic assets, including ‘costs incurred in respond-
ing to pollution damage’, which – taken literally – means also any adaptation
measure.426 Reparation for climate change would probably entail monetary
compensation, as restitution will often not be possible. For example, for slow-
lying small island States, it will be physically impossible to restore the situation
ex ante. ‘A victim State will, therefore, be seeking financial compensation to
cover the costs associated with material damage to environmental resources
(pure environmental damage) and consequential damage to people and
property (consequential environmental damage), including restoration.’427
The ILC has listed types of damage that are to be compensated for loss in
case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities. The ILC-DAPTH
list includes: loss of life or personal injury, loss of, or damage to, property,
loss of income, the costs of measures of reinstatement of the property, or
natural resources or environment, and the costs of response measures.428
In Principle 2, the ILC stipulated that the damage suffered has to be ‘signi-
ficant’, which refers to something more than ‘detectable’ but need not be at
the level of ‘serious’ or ‘substantial. The applicability of the ILC-DAPTH in the
context of climate change is however limited. It is a nonbinding declaration
that is not applicable to problems relating to the global commons.429 It is
striking that the ILA Declaration on Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change
focus on prevention and international cooperation and are silent on what type
of damage may be compensates.
424 Permanent Court of International Justice, The Factory At Chorzow Claim for Indemnity
The Merits, Germany v. Poland, 1928, para 125. See also Voigt 2008, p. 18 and Faure, Noll-
kaemper 2007, p. 173-176.
425 Wold, Hunter & Powers 2009, p. 6 and 7.
426 Voigt 2008, p. 18.
427 Ibid., p. 18.
428 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 56, para 36.
429 ‘The ILC takes the view that these cases lie beyond the scope of state responsibility shall
be resolved by a fair and equitable system established according to the state’s discretion.’
in Christiansen 2016, p. 92 and 93.
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Environmental damage
In international law, to be eligible for compensation, the damage must acquire
a certain threshold. Despite the variety of terms used in liability treaties
(‘serious’, ‘severe’, ‘significant’, ‘substantial’, ‘wide-spread’, ‘long-lasting’, ‘long
term’) the ILC maintained that damage should be compensated when it is more
than detectable, but it does not need to achieve the level of ‘serious’ or ‘sub-
stantial’.430 ‘Material damages will be easier to define and to assess in finan-
cial terms than purely environmental or ecological damages.’431 The Training
Manual on International Environmental law concludes that: ‘To serve as an
effective vehicle for environmental protection, liability regimes must be
expanded from traditionally recognized forms of compensable damage to cover
harm to the environment itself. […] The challenge in developing environmental
liability regimes is therefore to help people realize that they are “responsible”
for consequences of their acts on the environment.’432
Voigt further pointed out that: ‘Ecological damage, […] is dificult to
quantify and to define. Despite the general acceptance of ecological damages
in international law, it is questionable whether such damage is capable of being
measured by factual and objective standards.’433 The Training Manual on
International Environmental law gives some guidelines: ‘Several criteria have
been developed for this purpose,’ including ‘linking the damage to the market
price of the environmental resource […] or to the economic value attached
to its use […] Liability regimes normally balance an economic value based
on reasonable costs of restoration measures, reinstatement measures or prevent-
ative measures. Environmental liability regimes may also foresee compensation
for further damages exceeding those related to the adoption of such restoration
measures, when both restoration and comparable measures, are not technically
feasible or not reasonable.’434 When the damage is quantified ‘Liability
regimes often require that the part of compensation paid for restoration or
clean-up be spent for that purpose and any additional compensation should
be used for specific environmental purposes.’435
430 Douhan 2013, para 15.
431 ‘There is no commonly accepted definition of environmental damage; different legal regimes
adopt different definitions. Neither is there a generally accepted definition to be found in
international law. However, a working definition was proposed in 1998 by the UNEP
Working Group of Experts on Liability and Compensation for Environmental Damage:
“Environmental damage is a change that has a measurable adverse impact on the quality
of a particular environment or any of its components, including its use and non-use values,
and its ability to support and sustain an acceptable quality of life and a viable ecological
balance.” In this sense, environmental damage does not include damage to persons or
property, although such damage could be consequential to the damage caused to the
environment.’ Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 52.
432 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 52.
433 Voigt 2008, p. 18.
434 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 59, para 51.
435 Ibid., p. 59, par 52.
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In the Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa
Rica v. Nicaragua) case,436 the ICJ for the very first time decided a compensa-
tion claim for environmental damage. The Court was asked to determine the
amount of compensation due to Costa Rica, based on its earlier ruling that
‘sovereignty over a ‘disputed territory’ belonged to Costa Rica and that
consequently Nicaragua’s activities, including the excavation of three caños
and the establishment of a military presence in that territory, were in breach
of Costa Rica’s sovereignty. Nicaragua therefore incurred the obligation to
make reparation for the damage caused by its unlawful activities’ (para 93).
The Court was of the ‘view that damage to the environment, and the conse-
quent impairment or loss of the ability of the environment to provide goods
and services, is compensable under international law.’ In determining the
compensation due for environmental damage, the Court assessed the ‘value
to be assigned to the restoration of the damaged environment as well as to
the impairment or loss of environmental goods and services prior to recovery.’
The Court considers that ‘such compensation may include indemnification
for the impairment or loss of environmental goods and services in the period
prior to recovery and payment for the restoration of the damaged environment’
(para 42). The Court also emphasizes that ‘Payment for restoration accounts
for the fact that natural recovery may not always suffice to return an environ-
ment to the state in which it was before the damage occurred. In such
instances, active restoration measures may be required in order to return the
environment to its prior condition, in so far as that is possible.’(para 43)
The Court acknowledges that to establish the damage uncertainties will
arise. It considers:
‘In cases of alleged environmental damage, particular issues may arise with respect
to the existence of damage and causation. The damage may be due to several
concurrent causes, or the state of science regarding the causal link between the
wrongful act and the damage may be uncertain. These are difficulties that must
be addressed as and when they arise in light of the facts of the case at hand and
the evidence presented to the Court. Ultimately, it is for the Court to decide
whether there is a sufficient causal nexus between the wrongful act and the injury
suffered.’ (para 34).
The Court also recalls that the absence of adequate evidence as to the extent
of material damage will not, in all situations, preclude an award of compensa-
tion for that damage. It refers to the Trail Smelter case,437 where it concluded:
‘Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental
436 ICJ, Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area, Costa Rica v. Nicaragua,
2015.
437 See § 7.2.1.
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principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve
the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the dam-
ages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if
the evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable
inference, although the result be only approximate.’ (para 35).
In the context of climate change damage, this standard may serve to somewhat
relief the burden of proof on the claimant, to prove that the damage was the
result of a particular pollution. For example, even when a claimant cannot
prove that a certain disaster such as avalanches due to melting snow-caps is
the result of a State not preventing pollution by those under its territory and
control, this does not preclude an award of compensation.
When valuating the environmental damage in the Certain Activities carried
out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) case, the Court
does not choose between the valuation methods proposed by the parties, since
‘they are not the only methods used by such bodies for that purpose, nor is
their use limited to valuation of damage since they may also be used to carry
out cost/benefit analysis of environmental projects and programmes for the
purpose of public policy setting.’ The Court also considers that: ‘This approach
is dictated by two factors: first, international law does not prescribe any specific
method of valuation for the purposes of compensation for environmental
damage; secondly, it is necessary, in the view of the Court, to take into account
the specific circumstances and characteristics of each case.’ (para 52). The Court
then went through a detailed analysis of the arguments for and against com-
pensation claims filed by Costa Rica for replacement of six specific goods and
services (timber, fiber and energy, carbon sequestration and air quality, natural
hazard mitigation, soil formation and erosion control, and biodiversity). At
the end, without any explanation how the Court reached this amount, it
declared that a ‘reasonable’ damages amount was $120,000. In sum, this case
Costa Rica v. Nicaragua is important in the sense that the ICJ for the first time
ever awarded compensation for environmental damage. However, this case
unfortunately offers little guidance on how to value a proper measure of
compensation.
When environmental degradation forces people into migration, there is
a clear damage on items with an economic value, such as the value of a
property or the loss of income. There is also damage to the environment which
is much harder to reflect in economic term, such as in the case of loss of fauna
and flora, or in the case of damage to ecosystems or landscapes. ‘Claims can
also relate to measures to be taken in the future to prevent the damage from
continuing. Indeed, this is the primary consequence of an international
wrong.’438 As Faure and Nollkaemper pointed out: ‘It may make little sense
for the victim states to sue for a proportion of monetary damages representing
438 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 174.
The responsibility approach 291
the value of the damage caused by climate change if GHG emissions were to
continue unabated.’439 Faure and Nollkaemper therefore conclude that ‘a
claim could appropriately include both a duty to mitigate440 and liability
for the residual climate change damage.’441
Compensation for migration due to environmental degradation is even
more complex. As Mayer rightfully pointed out:
‘it is far from obvious that the harms suffered by migrants themselves and, a
fortiori, the harms suffered by surrounding communities as a consequence of
migration can be considered as, if not a direct consequence of excessive greenhouse
gas emissions, at least a proximate and foreseeable effect of this wrongful act. The
vulnerability and precariousness of migrants are not inherent to the migration
experience, but largely depend on how relevant laws and policies assist and protect
the rights of migrants. Likewise, the interactions between migrants and the sur-
rounding communities depend on multiple factors, including the maturity of
political organizations and the courage of political leaders to resist to the temptation
of populist and xenophobic discourses. Except in the most extreme circumstances,
a host of circumstantial elements determine whether migration occurs as a con-
sequence of climate change impacts as well as how it unfolds and how much harms,
if any, are suffered by migrants themselves and by surrounding communities.’442
He further substantiates the argument by pointing out that: ‘Value loaded
decisions are needed to determine whether migration is preferable and, if so,
which form of migration, supported by which political resources. Human and
political agencies are thus essential to determining migration decisions.’443
A bit more clarity can be found in the situation for SIDS. ‘For example, the
Government of Kiribati recently purchased 20 km2 of land on Vanua Levu,
Fiji’s second largest island at a cost of 8.77 million USD.’444 These costs would
clearly qualify for compensation if liability can be established.
7.6 THE PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Another reflection of responsibility outside the context of State liability can
be found in Article 3 ILA Declaration on Legal Principles Relating to Climate
Change. This Article describes ‘sustainable development’ as the guiding
principle in the climate change context.
439 Ibid., p. 174.
440 Under the UNFCCC system, different forms of compensation have been envisaged, such
as a climate change fund or the distribution of mitigation and adaptation means and
claiming for a change in behaviour of the polluters. See Christiansen 2016, p. 7 and 8.
441 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 173-176.
442 Mayer 2017, p. 257.
443 Mayer 2017, p. 255-260
444 Roberts, Pelling 2018, p. 6.
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‘Draft Article 3. Sustainable Development
1. States shall protect the climate system as a common natural resource for the
benefit of present and future generations, within the broader context of the inter-
national community’s commitment to sustainable development.
2. In the sustainable and equitable use of natural resources, including the climate
system as a common natural resource, States shall anticipate, prevent and minimise
the causes of climate change, and mitigate its adverse effects for the benefit of
present and future generations in accordance with FCCC Article 3.4.
3. In the context of addressing climate change and its adverse effects, sustainable
development requires States to balance economic and social development and the
protection of the climate system and supports the realisation of the right of all
human beings to an adequate living standard and the equitable distribution of the
benefits thereof. To that extent, policies and measures taken in response to climate
change must integrate environmental, economic and social matters.
4. Social and economic development plans, programs and projects must be inte-
grated with climate change responses in order to avoid adverse impacts on the
latter, taking into account the priority needs of developing countries for the achieve-
ment of sustainable economic growth and poverty eradication.‘
Consequently, the protection of the climate system must be balanced against
the right of States to economic and social development. The climate system
is defined as ‘a common natural resource’ that has to be managed for the
benefit of present and future generations. Its protection is the responsibility
of the whole international community.445
The Paris Agreement446 also contains references to sustainable develop-
ment. In Article 2 (1) it confirms that: ‘This Agreement […] aims to strengthen
the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable
development’. This ambition is further clarified in Article 4 (1):
‘In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties
aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible,
recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to
undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science,
so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the
basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate
poverty.’ [emphasis added].
445 Schwarte, Frank 2014, p. 203.
446 See § 7.1.
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The emphasis is on voluntary cooperation (see for example Article 6 (1))447
in minimizing the risks of climate change through mitigation, adaptation,
finance, technology transfer and capacity-building in a way that supports
sustainable development.448
The ‘principle of sustainable development is widely accepted as an im-
portant principle by States,’ the exact meaning is still heavily debated.449
‘Many scholars argue that sustainable development is too vague a concept
and too ambiguous in meaning for it to have normative status.’450 While
others are of the view that sustainable development has acquired a place in
the international law lexicon, and therefore the relevant question is not whether
sustainable development is law, but rather how to apply it in specific practical
situations.451 In 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro452 recognized that environmental and develop-
ment concerns were interrelated.453 In 1997 in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros
Project, Hungary v. Slovakia case, Judge Weeramantry in his separate opinion
considered that: ‘The principle of sustainable development is a part of modern
international law by reason not only of its inescapable logical necessity, but
also by reason of its wide and general acceptance by the global commun-
ity.’454 Schrijver and Prislan argue that the ICJ relied upon the principle of
sustainable development as ‘a basis for shaping the future conduct of Hungary
and Slovakia with respect to the Danube.’455 They also note that it is unclear
447 Art. 6(1) of the Paris Agreement reeds: ‘Parties recognize that some Parties choose to pursue
voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions
to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote
sustainable development and environmental integrity.’
448 The Paris agreement also makes references to sustainable development in Art. 2, 4, 6, 7,
8, and 10.
449 For an extensive analysis see Schrijver 2008 and Harmelen van, Leeuwen van & Vette de
2015, p. 14 onwards.
450 Harmelen van, Leeuwen van & Vette de 2015, p. 16.
451 Ibid., p. 16. For example, Sands has stated that ‘there can be little doubt that the concept of
sustainable development has entered the corpus of international customary law.’ See Beyerlin 2013.
452 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN DOC A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1,
12 August 1992.
453 Beyerlin, Stoutenburg 2013.
454 ICJ, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v. Slovakia 1997, p. 95.
This is also reflected in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Argentina v. Uruguay 2010, p. 14,
para 75. ‘The Court notes that the object and purpose of the 1975 Statute, set forth in
Article 1, is for the Parties to achieve “the optimum and rational utilization of the River
Uruguay” by means of the “joint machinery” for co-operation, which consists of both CARU
and the procedural provisions contained in Articles 7 to 12 of the Statute. The Court has
observed in this respect, in its Order of 13 July 2006, that such use should allow for sustain-
able development which takes account of “the need to safeguard the continued conservation
of the river environment and the rights of economic development of the riparian States’
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay Argentina v. Uruguay, Provisional Measures, Order of 13
July 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 133, para. 80.’
455 Schrijver, Prislan 2008.
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to what extent this will be implemented in practice, as this ‘depends on the
actual negotiations between the parties, since, considering the provisions of
the Special Agreement, the ICJ’s pronouncements on the environment remained
more recommendatory than prescriptive.’456
The ILA Committee on the Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development
developed the New Delhi Declarttion of Princpiples of International Law
Relating to Sustainable Developement.457 The Principles are: (1) The duty
of States to ensure sustainable use of natural resources, (2) The principle of
equity and the eradication of poverty, (3) The principle of common but differ-
entiated responsibilities, (4) The principle of the precautionary approach to
human health, natural resources and ecosystems, (5) The principle of public
participation and access to information and justice, (6) The principle of good
governance, and (7) The principle of integration and interrelationship, in
particular in relation to human rights and social, economic and environmental
objectives.
In practice, ‘growing numbers of international treaties, particularly in the
fields of international trade and environmental law do address sustainable
developmental goals and instruments. International legal decisions and prin-
ciples are beginning to recognise these goals and instruments explicitly,458
as they are increasingly being invoked before national courts and tribunals
around the world.’459 The most commonly accepted and cited definition is
that of the Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development, which
stated in its 1987 Report, Our Common Future, that sustainable development
is development ‘that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’460 The parameters
of sustainable development are further clarified in Agenda 21461 and the Rio
456 Schrijver, Prislan 2008.
457 ILA, New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development
2002, Resolution 3/2002.
458 See for example ICJ, Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v. Slovakia
1997, incl. Separate Opinion of Vice President Weeramantry. See also ICJ, Advisory Opinion
on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996, para 438.
459 Harmelen van, Leeuwen van & Vette de 2015, p. 14 and 15.
460 UNGA UN Doc A/42/427, Development and International Economic Co-operation: Environ-
ment. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development. Note by the
Secretary-General. Annex “Our Common Future, 4 August 1987.
461 ‘One of the commitments of Millennium Development Goal number 7 Ensure environmental
sustainability, is to “Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies
and programmes.” Paragraph 30 of the Millennium Declaration speaks of the need for
greater policy coherence and increased cooperation among multilateral institutions, such
as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization.’ In Voigt 2008,
p. 7-10.
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Declaration462 and several other instruments.463 Special attention in this
context is given to indigenous communities464 and other local commun-
ities465 for their role in achieving sustainable development.466 It is evident
from many international instruments467 that ‘equity is central to the attain-
ment of sustainable development.’ Equity includes both ‘inter-generational
equity’468 and ‘intra-generational equity’.469 This inter-generational equity
is of growing importance in the debate on climate change and has resulted
in several national cases of juveniles against their State.470
However, as the Institute for Environmental Security pointed out, ‘as an
element of sustainable development it is unclear what precise legal conse-
quences might flow from the principle of inter-generational equity.’471 Equity
requires distributive choices. These distributive choices can only be made in
a legitimate way by a legitimate government in a single State, as there are no
organisations on an international level that could make these choices.472
‘Lowe points out that it seems impossible to create criteria that can be applied
to adjust the equities and to hold the proper balance between environmental
462 Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration states that ‘The right to development must be fulfilled
so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations.’ Principle 5 of the Rio Declaration states that: ‘All States and all people shall
cooperate in the essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for
sustainable development, in order to decrease the disparities in standards of living and
better meet the needs of the majority of the people of the world.’ For a comprehensive
analysis see Harmelen van, Leeuwen van & Vette de 2015.
463 For an overview, see Schrijver 2008, p. 24.
464 E.g. the 1993 Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic States,
in Principle 7, recognizes the vital role of indigenous peoples in managing natural resources.
‘We recognize the special role of indigenous peoples in environmental management and
development in the Arctic, and of the significance of their knowledge and traditional
practices, and will promote their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable
development in the Arctic.’ In Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 35, para 73.
465 E.g. in preambular paragraph 12 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, and is
further detailed in its Art. 8j, 10c, and 17.2. Art. 8j states that: Contracting Parties shall:
‘subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations
and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles [...]
and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders
of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the
benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices.’ In
Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 35, para 74.
466 Harmelen van, Leeuwen van & Vette de 2015, p. 10.
467 For example, the 1994 Desertification Convention, the 2001 Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants, the 2002 New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International
Law relating to Sustainable Development and the 1987 Report, Our Common Future.
468 The Rio Declaration links the intergenerational equity with the right to development. In
Christiansen 2016, p. 63-69.
469 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 26, para 21.
470 See for example on the national level, Juliana v. U.S. and in the Supreme Court of the
Philippines Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources.
471 Harmelen van, Leeuwen van & Vette de 2015, p. 25 and 26.
472 Ibid., p. 25 and 26.
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protection and development, among States at very different stages of develop-
ment and with different natural resources.’473 Schrijver pointed out Gillespie’s
critical remark that: ‘At the same time, this imprecise meaning of the concept
may well allow people to continue with “non-sustainable” patterns of pro-
duction and consumption which are deeply rooted and appear difficult to
change.’474 In 2015 an attempt was made to define the goals of sustainable
development more precise.
7.6.1 The Sustainable Development Goals
In September 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda).475 The Agenda consists
of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 accompanying targets.
These goals and targets were formulated through a participatory and multi-
stakeholder process that involved States, global civil society and many other
actors. The 17 Goals are successors to the 8 Millennium Development Goals
(2000)476 and aim to be a comprehensive set of targets that tackle poverty
and inequality. The 17 Goals cover a range of sustainable development issues:
(1) no poverty, (2) zero hunger, (3) good health and well-beig, (4) quality
education, (5) gender equality, (6) clean water and sanitation, (7) affordable
clean energy, (8) decent work and economic growth, (9) industry, innovation
and infrastructure, (10) reduced inequalities, (11) sustainable cities, (12) re-
sponsible consumption and production, (13) climate action, (14) life below
water, (15) life on land, (16) peace, justice and strong institutions, and (17)
partnership for the goals.477
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development stresses that ‘the Sustainable
Development Goals and targets are integrated and indivisible, global in nature
and universally applicable’ (para 55) and that it is important to recognize the
link between sustainable development and other relevant ongoing processes
in the economic, social and environmental fields.478 ‘Agenda 2030 is innovat-
ive in that it is universally applicable, requiring all states, whether industrial-
ized or developing, to implement the SDGs nationally and, when able, to
473 Ibid., p. 27.
474 Schrijver 2008, p. 24.
475 UNGA UN Doc A/RES/70/1, , Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 Septem-
ber 2015. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
21 October 2015, para 16.
476 In September 2000 the UN General Assembly stipulated in its Millennium Declaration eight
millennium development goals, with the inclusion of environmental sustainability MDG
7. UNGA UN Doc A/RES/55/2, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. 55/2. United
Nations Millennium Declaration, 18 September 2000.
477 Irvine 2018, p. 12.
478 UNGA UN Doc A/RES/70/1, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, 21 October 2015, para 55.
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contribute to international cooperation for sustainable development.’479 The
2030 Agenda recognizes migration as a core development consideration, which
marks the first time migration is integrated explicitly into the global develop-
ment agenda.480 In the introduction of the 2030 Agenda it is mentioned that:
‘We recognize the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and
sustainable development. We also recognize that international migration is a multi-
dimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin,
transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses.
We will cooperate internationally to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration481
involving full respect for human rights and the humane treatment of migrants
regardless of migration status, of refugees and of displaced persons. Such co-
operation should also strengthen the resilience of communities hosting refugees,
particularly in developing countries. We underline the right of migrants to return
to their country of citizenship, and recall that States must ensure that their returning
nationals are duly received.’ (para 29).
Several targets also mention migration: 4.b, 5.2, 8.7, 8.8, 10.7, 10.c, 16.2 and
17.18.482 Of these targets, the central reference to migration is made in target
10.7 under the goal ‘Reduce inequality in and among countries’, calling to
‘facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of
people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed
migration policies.’ Many other targets also directly reference migration, and
for others migration is a cross-cutting issue that should be considered. Imple-
mentation of the SDGs provides an opportunity to protect and empower mobile
populations to fulfil their development potential and benefit individuals,
communities and countries around the world.483 It is broadly recognized
that several goals (such as 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 13, 16 and 17 are related to migration,
however remarkably migration is not explicitly linked to environmental
degradation or climate change.484
In a Practitioners Guide, the IOM stresses that: ‘The inclusion of migration
in the Sustainable Development Goals sets an important precedent for how
migration governance can progress in years to come. The principle of universal-
ity that underpins the Goals is especially significant for migration, as it can
479 Gupta, Arts 2017, para 1.
480 Irvine 2018, p. 13.
481 This is also reflected in target 10.7 under goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among
countries.
482 For a more extensive analysis see Foresti, Hagen-Zanker & Dempster 2018, p. 5 and 6. For
an overview of the impact of migration on different SDGs and targets, see Foresti, Hagen-
Zanker & Dempster 2018, p. 10-13.
483 Irvine 2018, p. 13.
484 See for example how the SDGs are reflected in IOM programmes the website https://
www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ICP/MProcesses/IOM-and-SDGs-brochure.pdf.
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promote international collaboration on the issue.’485 And also that: ‘by streng-
thening coherence between migration and development agendas, migration
policies can improve development outcomes, and development policies can
improve migration outcomes.’486 The IOM identifies the inclusion of migration
in the 2030 Agenda to present a range of opportunities. For example, by
touching on a variety of migration topics, the SDGs demonstrate the multi-
dimensional nature of migration and enable progress across different issues.
The SDGs also have the potential to raise awareness of migration topics and
their interconnection to development. The development of the topic can also
benefit from the review and reporting processes that will help identify lessons
learned and best-practices, as well as improve migration data, strengthening
evidence on the links between migration and development.487 Remarkably,
SDG 13 on climate action does not mention migration or displacement, or
recommend the inclusion of this important phenomenon in climate policies.
The actual impact of the SDG’s on environmental migration is hard to measure,
but the increasing coherence between development and migration seems to
be a trend.488
485 Irvine 2018, p. 14.
486 Ibid., p. 14.
487 Ibid., p. 21.
488 See for example the Global Compacts as discussed in § 2.1.2.
8 Specific protection possibilities for different
types of environmental refugees within the
responsibility approach
8.1 SUDDEN-ONSET DISASTERS
In general, States are not responsible for injury due to a natural disaster, unless
such disaster was triggered or aggravated by a human act. International law
requires States to take ‘necessary and practicable measures, either preventively
or in response to damage.’ These measures include disaster responses after
the disaster occurred.1
In the context of climate change it needs to be established whether the
disaster was triggered or aggravated by human acts such as GHG emissions.
When general causation is considered, a causal link between an activity and
the general outcome needs to be established. Scientific evidence supports that
climate change leads to an increase in or aggravation of natural disasters. The
scientific findings of the IPCC can serve as guidance for climate change dam-
ages. To establish ‘clear and convincing’ evidence, ‘the causal nexus from
climate change to damage cannot be interrupted. The threshold is high, which
means high persuasiveness needs to be given. The elimination of the slightest
doubt, however, is not necessary. Proof “beyond reasonable doubt” is thus
not required. The findings of the IPCC prove that continuous emission of GHGs
will lead to devastating effects.’2 What remains difficult is to pinpoint which
natural disaster is the result of or aggravated by climate change, instead of
being a natural disaster that occurs naturally without human impact.
Specific causation will be difficult to establish. Even though better climate
models, more powerful computers, and refined methodologies now allow
researchers to quantify how climate change has increased the likelihood or
severity of heat waves, droughts, deluges, and other extreme events, it is
difficult to establish specific causation.3
1 Wold, Hunter & Powers 2009, p. 9.
2 Christiansen 2016, p. 85.
3 In the Lliuya v. RWE AG, Essen Higher Regional Court, Case No. 2 O 285/15 more clarity
can be offered on how special causation can be established. In this pending case a Peruvian
farmer who lives in Huaraz, Peru, filed claims for declaratory judgment and damages in
a German court against RWE, Germany’s largest electricity producer. Lliuya’s suit alleged
that RWE, having knowingly contributed to climate change by emitting substantial volumes
of greenhouse gases GHGs, bore some measure of responsibility for the melting of mountain
glaciers near his town of Huaraz.
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Apart from these general considerations, it is highly unlikely that States
would try to hold other States responsible for the damage of natural disasters.
These are circumstances dealt with in the context of humanitarian aid and
cooperation and not in a responsibility framework. Responsibility for natural
disasters that were triggered or aggravated by humans will be dealt with in
national courts where victims can sue States4 and other major polluters (such
as MNE’s) under national tort law.5
8.2 SLOW-ONSET DISASTERS
The same remarks that have been made above on sudden-onset disasters apply
for gradual environmental degradation. An extra difficulty can arise for estab-
lishing general causality, as the connections between the polluting activity
and the damage are even more complex and often less visible as they reveal
themselves over a longer period of time. An exception are the low-lying small
island States. The causal link between these SIDS and climate change is com-
plicated, but is it generally accepted that the sea-level rise is caused by human-
induced climate change. It is also easier – compared to other types of slow-
onset degradation – to support the causal link between migration and the risk
of submergence of the island States. However, as McAdam has pointed out,
the SIDS will have become uninhabitable long before the island has been
submerged. As both the IPCC and the UNFCCC report that SIDS are already
feeling the impacts from climate change, the scale and scope of the environ-
mental harms faced by small islands support the question if the no-harm
principle applies for GHG emissions of developed and polluting States.6 The
no-harm principle would require action to prevent (further) harm from being
done to the low-lying small island States. This argument can be supported
by case law under the UNCLOS.7 The ITLOS in the MOX Plant Case holds inter-
national cooperation to be vital to preventing pollution in the marine environ-
ment.8 The Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy argues that:
‘Applying the argument to Palau’s [a sinking island state] situation would imply
that Palau should be able to take a “discussion-based” approach to addressing the
severe impact of other states’ greenhouse-gas emissions to its survival. Better still,
major emitters of carbon dioxide should discuss the impact of their actions with
Palau before going ahead and polluting. Unfortunately, this has not happened.’9
4 See for example Loth 2016.
5 For case law on climate change litigation see http://climatecasechart.com.
6 Wold, Hunter & Powers 2009, p. 1-4.
7 See § 7.3.1 UNCLOS.
8 ITLOS, Mox Plant Case Ire. V. U.K., 2001.
9 Kysar 2013, p. 72 and 73.
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When harm is not prevented, it has to be decided if responsibility is dealt with
under the regime of lawful acts (which would consider the contribution to
climate change as a hazardous activity), or under a system of wrongful acts
(where States have violated a duty of care). It also has to be decided if and
to what extent States can be held to account for (migration due to) slow-onset
disasters. And even if all legal hurdles can be surmounted, is that the quantum
of compensation required is much too significant for one State or even several
States to commit to.10
8.3 ARMED CONFLICT
The laws of armed conflict recognise the need for environmental protection.
It would go beyond the scope of this research to get into detail on the obliga-
tions of States to preserve and protect the environment during armed con-
flict.11 The fact that during the environmental degradation an armed conflict
takes place does not quintessentially differ the responsibility of States.
8.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
The responsibility approach is the obvious approach to apply to environmental-
ly forced migration due to industrial pollution.12 Pollution is the object of
international law if the pollution is transfrontier or the pollution affects areas
not subject to the jurisdiction of any State (global commons). Transfrontier
pollution is defined by the OECD as: ‘any intentional or unintentional pollution
whose physical origin is subject to, and situated wholly or in part within the
area under the national jurisdiction of one state and which has effects in the
area under the national jurisdiction of another state.’13 Well-known illustra-
tions of severe damage to the environment are the 1984 Bhopal gas leak
disaster, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, the 1986 Basel
chemical spill into the Rhine, and the cyanide spill in the year 2000 from the
Baia Mare mine in north-western Romania.14 Instead of leading to liability
cases for international courts, most incidents have led to multilateral treaties
addressing the question of liability of operators and in some circumstances
10 Ibid., p. 78.
11 A very thorough analysis can be found in Dam-de Jong 2013 and in Christiansen 2016,
p. 149-189.
12 However, most cases will be based on national law and are not covered under the scope
of this research.
13 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 52 and 53.
14 Ibid., p. 51.
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of States, in terms of both substantive and procedural rules.15 These treaties
often provide for responsibility regardless of fault in case of a discharge of
highly dangerous (such as radioactive or toxic) substances, or an abnormally
dangerous activity (e.g., launching of space satellites). Even when no treaty
applies to the activity, according to the ILC-DAPTH, States should take all
appropriate measures ‘to prevent significant transboundary harm16 or at any
event to minimize the risk thereof’, and States concerned ‘shall cooperate in
good faith and, as necessary, seek the assistance of one or more competent
international organizations in preventing significant transboundary harm or
at any event in minimizing the risk thereof.’17
The above discussed cases (the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the Corfu Channel
case, the case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, the Pulp Mills
on the River Uruguay case, the SBT cases, and the Certain Activities carried
out by Nicaragua in the Border Area case) demonstrate that Courts can hold
States to account for environmental degradation based on general principles
of environmental law. As the cases are limited in number and cover a broad
variety of topics, it is hard to predict how international courts will deal with
environmental pollution. It is clear from these cases however that environ-
mental damage is compensable under international law. It is not possible yet
to predict how international courts will deal with damage from diffuse sources
of pollution or non-point sources (‘such as acid rain or automobile pollution
where it is difficult or impossible to link the negative environmental effects
with the activities of specific individual actors’).18
On the national level there is a rise litigation for consequences of pollution.
‘Though a majority of the cases appears to be public or administrative law
cases, there is also an increase in the number of liability cases.’19 These cases
may provide international tribunals with input for their decision-making. They
can also provide for negotiations of new frameworks.
Affected individuals can also try to hold responsible States to account for
regional human rights tribunals, where the right to life ‘could be invoked to
obtain compensation [or] the right to a fair trial could be invoked when the
approval of logging operations is expected to have a harmful effect on the
environment, and the rights to a fair hearing could help individuals fight the
15 UNGA UN Doc A/CN.4/543, Survey of liability regimes relevant to the topic of inter-
national liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by inter-
national law 2004, p. 112. For examples see Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006.
16 This includes harm caused to persons, property or the environment and ‘transboundary
harm’ means harm caused in the territory of or in other places under the jurisdiction or
control of a state other than the state of origin, whether or not the states concerned share
a common border.
17 Christiansen 2016, p. 86.
18 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 57 and 58.
19 Faure, Nollkaemper 2007, p. 125.
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approval.’20 Even though human rights litigation has not been very successful
so far, the development of scientific knowledge to establish links between the
pollution and damage and what seems an increasing willingness – at least
on the national level – to address these issues may bode for more success in
the future.
8.5 PLANNED RESETTLEMENT
Planned resettlement has been acknowledged by the Conference of the Parties
(COP) to the UNFCCC as an adaptation strategy. The 2010 Cancún Agreement
invited the Parties to enhance understanding and cooperation with regard
to these adaptation strategies.21 In 2015 Gromilova pointed out that the issue
of planned relocation of threatened communities has not received much
attention in the discourse on climate change. She argues that this is: (1) due
to the difficulty in deciding whether the planned relocation is required at all
and in identifying the optimal time for starting it; (2) because resettlements
in the past have not been very successful; and (3) that the issue of planned
relocation has not received sufficient attention, in spite of the Cancún Agree-
ment and despite the urgency of the situation for certain regions, and also
despite the fact that certain nations themselves acknowledge the need to be
resettled.22 This lack of attention is in part being addressed by the ‘Guidance
on protecting people from disasters and environmental change through
planned relocation’.23 This Guidance on Planned Relocation sets out general
principles to assist States and other actors faced with the need to undertake
planned relocation. In this Guidance, planned relocation is defined as:
‘a planned process in which persons or groups of persons move or are assisted
to move away from their homes or places of temporary residence, are settled in
a new location, and provided with the conditions for rebuilding their lives. Planned
Relocation is carried out under the authority of the State, takes place within national
borders, and is undertaken to protect people from risks and impacts related to
disasters and environmental change, including the effects of climate change. Such
Planned Relocation may be carried out at the individual, household, and/or
community levels.’
20 Harmelen van, Leeuwen van & Vette de 2015, p. 77.
21 Cancun Adaptation Framework, para 14 f.
22 Gromilova 2015, chapter 2, p. 78-81.
23 Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change Through Planned
Relocation 2015. Available at https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/qwx6dcvl9762fv9itnqn
98ogx1h3sjzz.
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Principle 6 states that:
‘States bear the primary responsibility under international law to respect, protect,
and fulfill the human rights of people within their territory or subject to their
jurisdiction. This includes the obligation to take preventive as well as remedial
action to uphold such rights and to assist those whose rights have been violated.
States also have responsibilities to prevent and reduce disaster risk and exposure
to it, and to address the negative impacts of environmental change, including
climate change. In some cases, these responsibilities may require Planned Relocation
in order to protect persons or groups of persons.’
The Guidance was complemented by ‘A toolbox: Planning Relocations to
Protect People from Disasters and Environmental Change’,24 a project devel-
oped by Georgetown University, UNHCR, and IOM 2016. On the national level,
Fiji developed in 2018 ‘Planned Relocation Guidelines. A framework to under-
take climate change related relocation’.25 Planned relocation also appears in
the 2015 Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction with a clear human-
itarian focus and is also mentioned in the recently approved Global Compact
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (herafter: Global Compact for Migra-
tion) under objective 5 on enhancing the availability and flexibility of pathways
for regular migration for ‘migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin
due to slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and
environmental degradation’ where in place adaptation or return is not possible.
The UNFCCC approach is in line with the precautionary principle, which
requires prevention before damage occurs. This concept of migration as mitiga-
tion needs to be further developed, as this could be very beneficial for environ-
mental refugees. This would turn them into rights holders that can claim
responsible States to relocate them and allow for others to stay behind in a
location that can sustain them. It would probably also urge States into reclaim-
ing the cost of pollution from major polluters (such as big oil companies or
electricity companies) as they otherwise will have to resettle affected people
at their own expense. The topic of planned relocation is however gaining
traction within the UNFCCC framework. The Conference of Parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention Climate Change, meeting in Cancún in 2010,
‘encouraged enhanced action and international cooperation on planned re-
location as one of three types of human mobility that should be considered
within climate change adaptation measures’ (Article 14(f)). The Task Force
24 A Toolbox: Planning Relocations to Protect People from Disasters and Environmental
Change 2017, available at https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/sites/default/files/
publications/PLANNING%20RELOCATIONS_TOOLBOX_SPLIT%20VERSION.pdf.
25 Fiji: Planned Relocation Guidelines – A framework to undertake climate change related
relocation 2018, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/5c3c92204.html.
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on Displacement under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and
Damage (WIM) included planned migration in its mapping exercise.26
On the other hand, planned resettlement can also be perceived as a com-
pensation for damage. On the national level, for example we have seen
attempts to sue big oil companies for the cost of relocation.27 On the inter-
national level, the only possibility for individuals to claim compensation for
planned resettlement would be through human rights litigation. This seems
feasible, as human rights are generally affected by planned resettlement.28
However, as has been discussed above, human rights litigation has not been
very successful so far.
26 The Warsaw International Mechanism For Loss And Damage Associated With Climate
Change Impacts. Task Force on Displacement. 2018.
27 The native Alaskan town of Kivalina sits on a narrow barrier island 80 miles above the
Arctic circle. Rising temperatures have melted the sea ice that once protected it from fierce
storms, resulting in rapid erosion, and it’s been evident for over a decade that the town
will have to move. But relocating a town, even one of just 400 people, is expensive: between
$100 and $400 million, and it’s unclear where the money will come from. So in 2008, the
town decided to sue fossil fuel companies for the moving costs. It was ultimately dismissed
on the grounds that greenhouse gas emissions are regulated on the federal level by the
Clean Air Act and the Environmental Protection Agency.
28 This has also been demonstrated on the national level. For example in the The State of The
Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, The Hague Court of Appeal C/09/456689/ HA ZA 13-
1396, Ruling of 9 October 2018, para 40-44.

9 General conclusion on the legal international
framework
This paragraph will provide a general conclusion on the most significant
benefits and weaknesses of the different approaches. This forms the basis for
Part III that discusses possibilities for the development of the various
approaches and Part IV that discusses the possibilities for and integral
approach.
9.1 CONCLUSION ON THE RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH
A rights-based approach has some clear advantages. Human rights provide
a legitimate set of guiding principles for global public policy because they
are widely accepted by societies and governments everywhere. Human rights
can help strengthen government accountability and clarify the scope of author-
ities’ responsibilities.1 The human rights system focusses on the effect of the
environmentally forced migration on people, therefore difficult questions such
as whether the migration is forced (see the security approach) or the cause
of the environmental degradation (see responsibility approach) can be omitted.
The human rights system also provides a forum where individuals can hold
their States to account. The added value of a rights-based approach therefore
lies in the identification of environmentally forced migration as a human rights
infringement.2
Every State, has a duty to adopt measures to protect everyone within its
jurisdiction from the harmful effects of environmental degradation. The fact
that the State did not cause the threat does not excuse the State‘s failure to
try to protect against it. Moreover, a State unable to fulfil these duties with
its own resources may be obliged to seek assistance from other States.3 As
the majority of environmental refugees will remain internally displaced, most
of the responsibilities under the human rights approach lie with the home
State. The home State is therefore the main duty-bearer to protect their rights.
This distribution of responsibilities is in stark contrast with the reality that
the countries that have contributed the most to anthropogenic climate change
(as a major cause of environmentally forced migration) will be the least affected
1 Kälin, Schrepfer 2013, p. 12.
2 UNGA UN Doc A/67/299 2012.
3 Knox 2009, p. 37.
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by it. As Zetter has argued: ‘what has enforced displacement is a global
process, not a local crisis.’4 Therefore, the obligation for States to support the
development of human rights in other countries, needs to be further built upon.
‘The cooperation principle within human rights law underscores the need for
resource and technology flows from wealthier to poorer nations to assist in
mitigation and adaptation.’5
Human rights do not require States to respond to every threat to human
rights, wherever it arises.6 Under human rights law States are required to
strike a reasonable balance between environmental protection and other issues
of societal importance, such as economic development. This balance may
however not violate minimum substantive standards. However, as most of
the rights affected by or violated by environmental degradation are second
or third generation rights, these rights are generally not justiciable and are
therefore subject to political supervision. Also, as environmental degradation,
and climate change in particular, will place an additional burden on the
resources available to States, economic and social rights are likely to suffer.7
Furthermore, ‘courts may lack the resources and expertise, as well as the
political mandate, to determine specific levels of environmental protection.’8
As many types of environmentally forced migration are due to slow onset
processes, there is a time frame to prevent forced migration all together.
Human rights obligations generally do not cover future risks and therefore
lack this possibility. Only through procedural human rights such as the right
to information, the ‘affected persons can impact the decisions made on their
future. If adaptation policies fail, the procedural rights may also be instru-
mental for access to a court. The effectiveness of procedural rights is however
seriously harmed by the fact that States most likely to suffer severe human
rights harms are poorly resourced States that often lack the means to compile
quality data and to attract broad-based international support.’9
9.2 CONCLUSION ON THE SECURITY APPROACH
The security approach often treats environmentally forced migration as a
reactive response of last resort where migration is seen as failure. This per-
ception can steer the debate in the direction of how to avoid those environ-
mental refugees to come to developed countries, leading to a stricter migration
4 Zetter 2008, P. 62 and 63.
5 Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 36.
6 Knox 2009, p. 3 and 4.
7 For an extensive analysis on the impact of climate change on economic, social and cultural
rights see Jodoin, Lofts 2013, UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/22/43 2012, or Humphreys 2008,
p. 25.
8 Knox 2009, p. 29.
9 Vliet van der 2014.
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regime. Migration as a whole is generally left to national legal discretion rather
than being subject to comprehensive international legal control. International
law is particularly poorly equipped to respond to the challenge of climate-
induced displacement.10 Environmental refugees generally do not qualify
as refugees in the legal meaning. They are therefore perceived as regular
migrants. Regular migration schemes however only cover a small group of
people and do not reflect the forced character of the flight.
Humanitarian aid and temporary access schemes can be very beneficial
in the context of sudden onset disasters. However, temporary access (with
an unclear legal status) is not an option for long term migration due to slow-
onset disasters or permanent (planned) resettlement. Also other forms of
complementary protection show very little promise. In general, it is safe to
conclude that international law is currently poorly equipped to respond to
the challenge of climate-induced displacement and the potential security risks
it may bring.
The security approach may however be beneficial in sparking interest from
particularly developed States for the topic of environmentally forced migration.
As internal migration is beginning to be acknowledged as a security challenge,
both as a traditional security issue and as a human security issue, this may
shift the focus from home State responsibility to one of international co-
operation. This will be discussed in part IV.
9.3 CONCLUSION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY APPROACH
The basic rule of international environmental law is that States are duty-bound
to prevent, reduce and control risk of environmental harm to other States.
Therefore, the responsibility approach focusses the debate in two directions.
The first is the prevention of environmental degradation and the second is
the responsibility of polluting States to make full reparations for any injuries
caused. Both these elements are relevant for environmental refugees. A pre-
vention of environmental degradation may prevent the need for migration
all together. If migration cannot be prevented, compensation for climate change
damages may be sought.
The prospect to receive compensation for climate change damages on the
basis of international environmental law is low. States are very reluctant to
fall back on the international law of State responsibility to settle disputes on
cross-border environmental degradation or damage to the global commons.
States that are willing to claim compensation for damages on its territory
resulting from changing climatic conditions will meet substantial challenges,
‘international law is ill equipped when confronted with a complex situation,
such as compensation for climate change damages. Vague primary rules,
10 Saul 2009, p. 11.
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multiplicity of actors, different types of damages and non-linear causation all
pose significant challenges to the traditional law on State responsibility.’11
Treaty obligations on climate change are sparse and often ambiguous and
use broad terminology. ‘While a specific obligation to prevent climate change
damage could be read into Article 2 and 4.2 UNFCCC, there is still a wide
margin for interpretation.’12 With the adoption of the COP21 Paris Agreement,
a legally binding global action plan to limit global warming to well below
2°C was accepted. Even though migration was explicitly mentioned, it remains
to be seen if environmental refugees can benefit from the UNFCCC regime. At
a minimum – as was reflected in the subsequent COPs – forced migration is
now a topic that is considered as a mainstream element of climate change.
The Task Force on Displacement has played an excellent role in clarifying the
concept and putting it on the agenda. A next step would be the identification
and adoption of enforceable rights for environmental refugees.
General principles of international environmental law have to be applied
through an obligation of due diligence. This includes a balancing test, ‘which
renders the definition of an objective standard almost impossible. Thus, a heavy
burden of proof is placed on the State which has to establish a failure to act
with due diligence.’13 The Dutch Urgenda case has shown that a lower stand-
ard of causality can be adopted for cases that do not claim an award of dam-
ages, but that require an order that the State is acting unlawfully.
Even though it may be difficult to establish State responsibility and liability
in a legally enforceable way, the general principles under this approach may
be beneficial in the context of justice considerations. It is evident from current
scientific research that the States most affected by climate change have hardly
contributed to it. From a perspective of justice, the responsibility approach
can therefore be beneficial in emphasizing the responsibility of the developed
States to contribute to a solution. This will be further discussed in part IV.
11 Voigt 2008, p. 1, 2 and 20.
12 Ibid., p. 20.




Environmentally forced migration poses new, complex and challenging circum-
stances. As such, existing protection regimes need to be extended to incorporate
protection possibilities for environmental refugees. The potential for deploying
existing norms and legal frameworks offers the most promising avenue. This
paragraph therefore explores possibilities of further developing existing legal
frameworks within the different approaches.

10 The rights-based approach
Most international human rights instruments were drafted before the emerg-
ence of environmental law and the environment as a common concern and,
as a result, do not mention the environment. Human rights institutions have
been able to bridge part of this gap by using the human rights instruments
as a ‘living document’, but many protection gaps remain. As discussed in
part II, ‘human rights obligations of States in an environmental context have
been either deduced from a substantive right to a healthy environment’1 (on
the regional and national level), from international environmental laws ‘that
incorporate and utilize human rights guarantees deemed necessary or im-
portant to ensuring effective environmental protection [especially procedural
rights or from human rights law that] re-casts or interprets internationally-
guaranteed human rights to include an environmental dimension when en-
vironmental degradation prevents full enjoyment of the guaranteed rights.’2
In this last approach, a healthy environment is considered a sine qua non for
the full enjoyment of the respective human rights.3
As Knox has classified, the current
‘jurisprudence takes a two-pronged approach. First, it sets out strict procedural
duties, including prior assessment of environmental impacts, access to participation
in decision-making and to judicial remedies, which States must follow in deciding
how to strike the balance between environmental protection and other societal
interests, such as economic development. Second, it defers to the substantive
decisions that result from these procedures, as long as the decisions do not result
in the reduction of human rights below minimum standards.’4
This chapter will explore if current human rights jurisprudence may extend
to protect those forcedly displaced by environmental degradation (including
those affected by climate change).
1 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 3.
2 Shelton 2006.
3 See Ammer et al. 2010, p. 3 and Shelton 2008, p. 130. Shelton also points out a fourth
relationship between human rights and environmental law: International environmental
law articulates ethical and legal duties of individuals that include environmental protection
and human rights. This dimension falls outside the scope of this research.
4 Knox 2009, p. 5.
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This chapter first analyses the possibilities for a global substantive right
to a healthy environment. Furthermore, it analyses the possibilities of
strengthening the role of procedural rights and – as most environmental
refugees are from developing States that must be considered unable or some-
times unwilling to protect its nationals against environmentally forced migra-
tion – this paragraph also analyses the existence of positive extraterritorial
obligations for States. It ends with an analysis on obligations towards IDPs.
10.1 RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT
The human right to a healthy environment is a right with both individual and
collective connotations. In its individual dimension and its relationship to other
rights, its violation may have direct or indirect repercussions on the indi-
vidual.5 Environmental degradation may cause irreparable damage to human
beings. Inadequate environmental conditions can undermine the effective
enjoyment of other enumerated rights, such as the rights to life, health, water,
and food. Therefore, a healthy environment is a fundamental right for the
existence and well-being of humankind.6 This right to a healthy environment
covers harm to the environment that infringes on human rights and leaves
out environmental degradation that does not appreciably affect humans.
Consistent with this recognition, the right to a clean environment has been
codified in soft law instruments, regional human rights agreements,7 national
constitutions, and sub-national constitutions.8 And topic specific instruments
also make references to environmental quality.9
5 IACtHR, Environment and Human Rights Advisory Opinion, OC-23/17 of November 15,
2017, p. 2.
6 Ibid., p. 2.
7 On the regional level, the ACHPR was the first international human rights instrument to
contain an explicit guarantee of environmental quality ‘all peoples shall have the right to
a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development’ Art 24. Subsequently,
the Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the American Convention on
Human Rights (Protocol of San Salvador) included the right of everyone to live in a healthy
environment ‘everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment’ Art 11, para
1. In 2003, the African Union adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, which states that women ‘shall have
the right to live in a healthy and sustainable environment’ in Art 18 and ‘the right to fully
enjoy their right to sustainable development’ in Art 19.
8 Burger et al. 2017, p. 31.
9 The CRC makes a reference to environmental quality in Art 24. Art12 (2) b ICESCR requires
states parties to improve ‘all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene’. Calls for
a human right to an environment of a particular quality have found voice in a variety of
UN declarations, resolutions and statements of principle, see for example the various
declarations of principle which emerged from the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the 1992
Rio Conference. See Clark et al. 2007, p. 10.
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In its collective dimension, as an autonomous right, it constitutes a uni-
versal value that is owed to both present and future generations. Even though
the role of human rights in international environmental law has expanded
enormously over the last two decades (e.g., references to human rights in the
Paris Agreement) and will continue to do so,10 the core international human
rights treaties do not recognize a freestanding right to a clean environment,
or to a stable climate. Human rights treaties ‘still do not guarantee a universal
right to a decent or satisfactory environment if that concept is understood in
qualitative terms unrelated to impacts on the rights of specific humans.’11
10.1.1 A freestanding right to a healthy environment
A right to a healthy environment would allow for claims to protect the en-
vironment as such, without a necessary effect on humans. This would allow
complainants to address environmental degradation in an earlier stage, thus
preventing environmentally forced migration. This would be an improvement
to the current possibilities to make claims after the damage has taken place
for individuals. The right to a healthy environment encompasses not only an
environment that is safe for humans, but one that is ecologically-balanced and
sustainable in the long term. In her final report, the Special Rapporteur in the
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
Ksentini explained that: ‘the term “healthy environment” has been generally
interpreted to mean that the environment must be healthy in itself (ecological
balance) as well as healthful, which requires that it is conducive to healthy
living.’12
Articulating a new fundamental right to a healthy environment will require
States to take measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to
promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development
and use of natural resources and provide an enforcement mechanism for
affected communities.13 However, what constitutes a decent environment
10 Knox stresses that ‘the Principles [Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environ-
ment 2018] provide a sturdy basis for understanding and implementing human rights
obligations relating to the environment, but they are in no sense the final word. The
relationship between human rights and the environment has countless facets, and it will
continue to develop and evolve for many years to come.’, HRC Framework Principles on
Human Rights and the Environment, UN Doc A/HRC/37/59 annex 1, introduction.
11 Boyle 2012, p. 627.
12 Economic and Social Council, Review of further developments in fields with which the
sub-commission has been concerned. Human Rights and the Environment. UN Doc E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1994/9 1994.
13 Shelton 2008, p. 163 and 164 and Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 18. The ESCR Commit-
tee has stated in CESCR, General Comment No. 14 2000 that the right to a healthy environ-
ment includes, ‘inter alia, preventive measures in respect of occupational accidents and
diseases; the requirement to ensure an adequate supply of safe and potable water and basic
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is a value judgment. Birnie and Boyle stated that: ‘there is little international
consensus on the correct terminology’ in both global and regional human rights
instruments, and that any attempt to define environmental rights in qualitative
terms is ‘bound to suffer from uncertainty […] and […] cultural relativism.’14
Governments will have to strike a fair balance between for example natural
resource exploitation and nature protection, to industrial development and
air and water quality or land use development and conservation of forests
and wetlands. This ‘fair balance’ is moderated only to some extent by inter-
national agreements on such matters as climate change and the conservation
of biological diversity.15
As an extra complication factor, the environment is often impacted by cross-
border pollution that is hard to control by the affected State. A freestanding
human right to a clean environment would therefore be of limited use. As
Limon pointed out: the universal declaration of a right to an environment of
a certain quality ‘could help individuals hold their own governments account-
able for environmental degradation by enabling recourse to international
human rights mechanisms (e.g., treaty bodies) and, linked to this might also
facilitate or encourage the development of “novel theories of responsibility,”
such as the application of joint and several liability in human rights law (it
could therefore help, for example, the Inuit vis-‘a-vis their own govern-
ments).’16 At the same time, he concludes that a freestanding right to nature
is not helpful for cross-border pollution.17
10.1.2 Substantial rights presupposing a healthy environment
Human rights institutions have derived ‘a right to a healthy environment
indirectly as a component of other human rights that presuppose a healthy
sanitation; and the prevention and reduction of the population’s exposure to harmful
substances such as radiation and harmful chemicals or other detrimental environmental
conditions that directly or indirectly impact upon human health.’
14 Harmelen van, Leeuwen van & Vette de 2015, p. 78. The right to a healthy environment
has achieved most attention in Latin America. For example, in the IACtHR, Kawas-Fer-
nández v. Honduras case of 3 April 2009, the Court considred in para 148. ‘in accordance
with the case law of this Court 192 and the European Court of Human Rights, 193 there
is an undeniable link between the protection of the environment and the enjoyment of other
human rights. The ways in which the environmental degradation and the adverse effects
of the climate change have impaired the effective enjoyment of human rights in the continent
has been the subj ect of discussion by the General Assembly of the Organization of Ameri-
can States 194 and the United Nations. 195 It should also be noted that a considerable
number of States Parties to the American Convention have adopted constitutional provisions
which expressly recognize the right to a healthy environment.’
15 Boyle 2012, p. 627,
16 Limon 2009, p. 469-472.
17 Ibid., p. 469-472.
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environment.’18 A benefit of this approach is that there is no need to define
controversial notions as a satisfactory or decent environment. Boyle argues
that:
‘it may serve to secure higher standards of environmental quality, based on the
obligation of states to take measures to control pollution affecting health and private
life. Above all it helps to promote the rule of law in this context: governments
become directly accountable for their failure to regulate and control environmental
nuisances, including those caused by corporations, and for facilitating access to
justice and enforcing environmental laws and judicial decisions.’19
In this paragraph a broadening of the scope of State obligations in the context
of environmental degradation will be discussed for the right to life, property
and health.
Right to life
A better identification of environmentally forced migration as a threat to life
would improve protection possibilities as it would bring more cases of environ-
mentally forced migration within the scope of the right to life. So far, human
rights courts have put an emphasis on the procedural aspects and allow States
a wide margin of appreciation in deciding on what measures to take. As long
as minimum standards are not violated, courts are very reluctant to recall
substantive decisions. The right to life however, does not instruct States how
to respond. A more progressive approach for courts would be to actively judge
the substantive decisions.
Another possibility to clarify the content of the right to life in relation to
environmental refuge, will be when people who have in vain sought for
refugee protection due to environmental degradation will be returned to their
home States.20 Under these circumstances, national courts of third States will
be asked to make a judgement on the substantive element of the right to life.
However, only very severe environmental degradation would prevent return
due to non-refoulement considerations, so it would only cover a very small
group of environmental refugees.
Right to property
Many housing, land and property rights will be affected by environmentally
forced migration. Although most effectively dealt with in domestic settings,
international law can provide guidance with setting minimum standards. A
progressive interpretation of positive obligations under the right to property
would require States to plan for and to take measures against foreseeable
18 See for example Ammer et al. 2010, p. 3 and Shelton 2008, p. 130.
19 Boyle 2012, p. 613.
20 See § 5.2.1 life.
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threats to the right to property.21 At a minimum, States should ensure full
and genuine consultation with and participation by affected communities.22
Right to health
States are obliged to realize progressively the right to the highest attainable
standard of health.23 In its General Comment 14, the ESCR Committee lists
some obligations that are at the very least minimum core obligations arising
from the right to the highest attainable standard of health.24 The wording
of the General Comment suggests that the list is not exhaustive. This list could
be extended with other minimum rights relevant for environmental refugees,
such as a right to culture. Hunt and Khosla propose to adopt as a new core
obligation the obligation ‘to take reasonable steps to slow down and reverse
climate change. For example, states have a core obligation to take reasonable
steps to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level
that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’25
It is very unclear however what the minimum obligation of this proposal
would entail. The wording ‘reasonable steps’ ask for a value judgement that
can only be judged in the wider context of the balance between environmental
harm and the benefits of the activities causing it. A less ambitious goal would
be to identify existing minimum obligations as being relevant for environ-
mental refugees. When these connections will be better visible, States and
human rights instruments will be more likely to apply these rules in the context
of environmentally forced migration.
10.1.3 Rights of nature
More progressively than the right to a healthy environment, several authors26
argue for a right of nature. According to Borràs, this new approach is emerg-
ing. It recognizes the rights of nature itself. This implies ‘a holistic approach
to all ways of life, including all ecosystems.’27 Nature is considered a subject
of rights. Ecuador, Bolivia and a growing number of communities in the United
States are basing their environmental protection policies on the premise that
nature has inalienable rights, as have human beings. According to Borras, the
recognition of the rights of nature implies a holistic approach to all ways of
life, where human beings have the legal authority and responsibility to enforce
21 See for example ECtHR, Öneryildiz v. Turkey 2004, para 135.
22 See also § 3.1.3 the duty to facilitate public participation.
23 ICESCR, Article 21.
24 See § 3.1.2 the right to health.
25 Humphreys, Robinson 2010, p. 250.
26 See for a list of references and relevant legal frameworks Earth Law Center 2018.
27 Borràs 2017, p. 226.
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these rights on behalf of nature.28 Borras refers to the 2011 Wheeler versus
Director de la Procuraduria General del Estado en Loja case.29 This case is
based on Article 71 of the Ecuadorian Constitution,30 that protects the rights
of nature. In this case, the project to widen the Vilcabamba-Quinara road
deposited large quantities of rock and excavation material in the Vilcabamba
River. Wheeler and Huddle successfully argued this directly violated the rights
of nature by increasing the river flow and provoking a risk of disasters from
the growth of the river with the winter rains, causing large floods that affected
the riverside populations who utilize the river’s resources. On March 30, the
Provicial Court of Loja issued a Court decision
‘which granted an injunction against the Provincial Government of Loja to stop
violating the constitutional rights of the Vilcabama River to exist and to maintain
its vital cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes […] The Chamber
granted the motion, agreeing that “the action of protection is the only suitable and
effective remedy to stop immediately and focused environmental damage” and
applying the precautionary principle, the judges say [...] “until such time it is
objectively proven that no probable or certain danger exists over works carried
out in a particular area producing contamination or environmental damage, it is
the constitutional duty of judges to immediately pay attention to safeguarding and
enforcing the legal protection of the rights of Nature, avoiding contamination by
whatever means, or ensuring remedy. Note that with relation to the environment
we shall consider not only certain damage, but also indications of possibility”’31
As Borràs further pointed out: ‘The Court also endorsed the intergenerational
principle, recognizing the importance of nature to protect the interests of
present and future generations’.32 May pointed out that another interesting
aspect of this case is that the plaintiffs could have built a ‘regular’ case due
to the damage caused by erosion and flooding, but instead opted for building
their claim on the rights of nature.33 This case, although based on a national
constitution that acknowledges a right to nature, demonstrates the possibilities
under this approach. As a next step, Kotzé and Villavicencio Calzaldilla,
suggest that the courts will have to ‘reconcile the conflicting environmental
provisions in the Constitution, to clarify the relationship between the environ-
mental right and the rights of nature, and to give greater recognition to the
28 Ibid., p. 227.
29 Wheeler versus Director de la Procuraduria General Del Estado en Loja, 2011, accessible in Spanish
at https://mariomelo.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/proteccion-derechosnatura-loja-11.pdf.
30 For a background analysis of this right see Kotzé, Calzadilla 2017, p. 415 onwards. For
the scope and content, see p. 422 onwards.
31 Wheeler versus Director de la Procuraduria General Del Estado en Loja, 2011, §5). In Borràs 2017,
p. 244. The Court decision is accessible in Spanish at https://mariomelo.files.wordpress.
com/2011/04/proteccion-derechosnatura-loja-11.pdf.
32 Borràs 2017, p. 244.
33 May 2011.
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novelty of the rights of nature through a jurisprudential paradigm shift which
conveys the importance, scope and autonomous basis of nature’s rights.’34
Adopting a rights of nature approach would give the environment a central
role in the decisions that affect the environment. As a consequence environ-
mental degradation should be either prevented or mitigated or balanced
against other interests, which in turn would lead to less environmental de-
gradation and therefore less forced migration due to environmental degrada-
tion. However, the acceptance of rights of nature has gained little ground. It
is unlikely that such a right would develop on a global scale in the near future.
10.1.4 The environment as a public good within the context of economic and
social rights
Boyle takes a more modest approach and argues for a declaration or protocol
that ‘would recognize the link between a satisfactory environment and the
achievement of other civil, political, economic, and social rights and would
make more explicit the relationship between the environment, human rights,
and sustainable development and address the conservation and sustainable
use of nature and natural resources.’35 Boyle argues that, to be meaningful,
a right to a decent environment has to address the environment as a public
good, within the context of economic and social rights.36 In his opinion, the
right to a healthy environment should be clarified within the context of eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights, ‘which would entail giving greater weight
to the global public interest in protecting the environment and promoting
sustainable development.’37 A substantive right to a healthy environment
would add ‘a broader and more explicit focus on environmental quality which
could be balanced directly against the covenant’s economic and developmental
priorities.’38 As a guideline for its content Boyle follows the general rule
derived from case-law that: ‘the right to pursue economic development is an
attribute of a State’s sovereignty over its own natural resources and territory,
but it cannot lawfully be exercised without regard for the detrimental impact
on the environment or on human rights.’39 As Shelton puts it: ‘In effect, the
process of decision-making and compliance with environmental and human
rights obligations, rather than the nature of the development itself, constitute
34 Kotzé, Calzadilla 2017, p. 429.
35 Boyle 2012, p. 616 and 617.
36 Ibid., p. 628.
37 Ibid., p. 641.
38 Ibid., p. 628.
39 For example, in the ICJ Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Argentina v.
Uruguay, 2010, para 177, the Court noted that the ‘interconnectedness between equitable
and reasonable utilization of a shared resource and the balance between economic develop-
ment and environmental protection is the essence of sustainable development’.
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the key legal tests of sustainable development in current international law.’40
If a right to a decent environment would be addressed as a public good, within
the context of economic and social rights, this would also have consequences
for the positive extraterritorial obligations.41 As the human rights institutions
have already accepted the connection between various substantive rights and
a healthy environment, this interpretation seems a feasible option to pursue.
10.2 PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
Human rights bodies have given substantive rights, such as the right to life
and health and right to a healthy environment meaningful content by requiring
the State to adopt various techniques of environmental protection, such as
environmental impact assessment, public information and participation, access
to justice for environmental harm, and monitoring of potentially harmful
activities. The extent of these procedural obligations is still up for debate, and
could provide enhanced protection.
10.2.1 Right to information
‘A “right to information” can mean, narrowly, freedom to seek information, or,
more broadly, a right of access to information, or even a right to receive it. Cor-
responding duties of the State can be limited to abstention from interfering with
public efforts to obtain information from the State or from private entities, or
expanded to require the State to obtain and disseminate all relevant information
concerning both public and private projects that might affect the environment.’42
As environmentally forced migration is evidently a complex issue of environ-
mental and economic policy, this seems to imply that appropriate investigation
and studies are required. ‘States must assess the potential environmental
impacts of activities, monitor those impacts over time, and ensure that the
affected public receives information about the activities and may participate
in decisions concerning them.’43 This requires a broad interpretation of the
right to information.
This broad interpretation of the right to information would be in line with
the level of protection that has been required in the context of the protection
of indigenous peoples. For indigenous peoples the right to information is
40 Shelton 2008, p. 163 and 164.
41 See § 10.3 obligation to provide humanitarian assistance.
42 Ibid., p. 134.
43 Knox 2009, p. 16 and 17 and Ammer et al. 2010, p. 41.
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explained to entail an obligation to actively inform those people on any de-
cision that affects their physical and cultural survival.44
As has been mentioned above, the execution of the right to information
involves choices and decisions about resource distribution and capacity, about
what and how much to gather at what cost. An increased obligation to inform
might weigh heavily on affected States, as the States most affected by climate
change are generally developing States.
10.2.2 Right to public participation
The right to public participation in the context of environmental degradation
is broadly accepted. The Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights
obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable
environment, Knox concludes that:
‘all States should ensure that their laws provide for effective public participation
in climate and other environmental decision-making, including by marginalized
and vulnerable groups, and that they fully implement their laws in this respect.
Such participation not only helps to protect against abuses of other human rights;
it also promotes development policies that are more sustainable and robust.’45
In order for the participation to be meaningful in the context of environmental-
ly forced migration, public participation should take place before people are
forced to leave. Decisions on mitigation or adaptation projects must be made
with the informed participation of the people who would be affected by the
projects.46 As the exact content of State duties is unclear, the protection of
environmental refugees would benefit from a further identification of the duties
for States to actively seek for public participation and proper implementation.
For indigenous peoples the right to public participation is explained to
entail an obligation to seek their ‘FPIC’. This obligation is based on their special
dependency on the land. Even though a similar justification cannot be con-
structed for most environmental refugees, they often do belong to vulnerable
groups that are traditionally difficult to inform and often unable to seek the
information themselves. A strengthening of the obligation to inform environ-
mental refugees (especially before they are forced into migration) would
substantially improve their possibilities to adapt or mitigate or make informed
decisions when or where to migrate. Especially in the context of slow-onset
disasters, early information would allow for time to adapt or mitigate and
44 See § 3.1.4. indigenous peoples and vulnerable groups.
45 A/HRC/31/52 , Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations
relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, 2016, at
58.
46 Ibid., at 59.
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might prevent forced migration altogether. Therefore, some authors have
proposed a progressive interpretation of the right to public participation that
would widen the scope of FPIC for specific other groups such as ’ethnic groups’,
‘minorities’ and ‘local communities’.47 This would require governments to
obtain FPIC before making a decision affecting these groups. The extent of the
requirement of consent is still unclear, however the most acceptable explanation
would require States to seek consent without a veto power for affected com-
munities where the State has a margin of appreciation to balance the rights
of the indigenous peoples against other rights. Some authors express concern
about widening the scope of FPIC to ‘simply and indiscriminately apply the
indigenous rights framework to all local communities without justifiable legal
grounds’ (as their special attachment to the lands). This might undermine
indigenous advocacy initiatives ‘given their particular characteristics and
needs.’48 I agree that without a proper justifiable legal ground, the obligation
to FPIC should not be implemented for all local communities. This would
jeopardize the acceptance of the special position of indigenous peoples due
to their attachment to the land. However, a more conservative approach where
States are obliged to actively and demonstrably seek for consent of affected
communities through providing the necessary information would solve the
problem that vulnerable affected people often not have a de facto possibility
to participate as information does not reach them (in time). This would not
require the consent of affected people, but would require the State to actively
seek for public participation.
Another possibility that has been raised is that NGO’s should have a more
prominent role in the protection of the environment. A legal basis for this
extended role can be found in the Aarhus Convention which, unlike human
rights treaties, provides for public interest activism by NGOs.49 Environmental
NGOs use access to information and lobbying to raise awareness of environ-
mental concerns and they ‘tend to have high success rates in enforcement
actions and public interest litigation.’50 Extending the possibilities for public
interest activism by NGO’s would empower affected people, but does not go
far beyond current possibilities, as already NGO’s can represent affected people.
Boyle concludes that:
47 For an overview see Kanosue 2015, p. 656.
48 Forest Peoples Programme 2013.
49 Article 6, extends public participation rights to anyone having an ‘interest’ in the decision,
including NGOs. ‘Sufficient interest’ is not defined by the Convention but, in its first ruling,
the Aarhus Compliance Committee held that, ‘although what constitutes a sufficient interest
and impairment of a right shall be determined in accordance with national law, it must
be decided “with the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to justice” within
the scope of the Convention’. See Boyle 2012, p. 624-626.
50 Boyle 2012, p. 624-626.
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‘The further elaboration of procedural rights, based on the Aarhus Convention,
would facilitate the implementation of a right to a healthy environment, and give
greater prominence globally to the role of NGOs in public interest litigation and
advocacy. These two developments go hand in hand and represent a logical ex-
tension of existing policies and would represent a real exercise in progressive
development of the law.’51
10.2.3 Right to remedy
The possibilities of holding national governments to account are limited and
the possibilities for holding third States to account even more so. This is one
of the inherent weaknesses of the human rights system. However, existing
possibilities can be put to better use. Shelton argues that the system of periodic
reporting on human rights issues should be better utilized, as it offers ‘a public
forum for challenging State action or inaction on environmental protection
as it affects the enjoyment of human rights.’ In her opinion, ‘UN treaty bodies,
NGOs and activists have often overlooked the importance of participating in
reporting procedures.’ She pointed out that ‘the periodic reporting procedure
has been strengthened through the recent addition of follow-up procedures
to monitor compliance.’52 The current system allows for further participation
in reporting procedures, so the effects of State decisions on the environment
could be put forward in these procedures. This would at least put a spotlights
on these issues and might encourage States to pay further attention to proced-
ural obligations.
10.3 POSITIVE EXTRATERRITORIAL STATE OBLIGATIONS
Limon notes that ‘in the globalized world, individual human interaction and
personal cause and effect no longer respect traditional concepts of sovereignty.
As a consequence, the idea that harm and responsibility must both reside
within a single state would, according to this view, become redundant (es-
pecially in the case of economic, social, and cultural rights).’53 As Humphreys
puts it: ’more than most other issues, climate change throws into relief the
inadequacies of the international justice system, given the scale and intimacy
of global interdependence that drives the problem and must also drive its
solutions.’54 Ziegler, the former Special Rapporteur on the right to food,
clarified that:
51 Ibid., p. 642.
52 Shelton 2008, p. 144.
53 Limon 2009, p. 473.
54 Humphreys 2008, p. 64.
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‘The primary responsibility to ensure human rights will always rest with national
governments. However, given the current context of globalization and strong
international interdependence, national governments are not always able to protect
their citizens from the impacts of decisions taken in other countries. All countries
should therefore ensure that their policies do not contribute to human rights
violations in other countries. In such a globalized, interconnected world, the actions
taken by one Government may have negative impacts on the right to food of
individuals living in other countries.’55
The drafters of the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States
in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (hereafter: Maastricht
Principles) conclude that:
‘Extraterritorial obligations (ETOs) are a missing link in the universal human rights
protection system. Without ETOs, human rights cannot assume their proper role
as the legal basis for regulating globalization and ensuring universal protection
of all people and groups. A consistent realization of ETOs can generate an enabling
environment for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and guarantee the primacy
of human rights among competing sources of international law. ETOs provide for
State regulation of transnational corporations, State accountability for the actions
and omissions of intergovernmental organizations in which they participate, set
standards for the human rights obligations of IGOs, and are a tool needed to
ultimately stop the destruction of eco-systems and climate change.’56
In 2019, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities gave a joint statement on human rights
and climate change. The statement assesses the effect of climate change on
human rights and underlines the State parties have obligations, including extra-
territorial obligations, to respect, protect and fulfil all human rights of all
peoples.57 Currently, the extent of positive obligations, in particular the obliga-
tion to fulfil ESCR, is still widely disputed.58 This paragraph explores to what
extent States have extraterritorial obligations that can be used to enhance
55 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/7/5, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development 2008, p. 9 and
10, para 21.
56 Michéle 2014, p. 5.
57 Joint Statement on “Human Rights and Climate Change” by the Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, 16 September 2019, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24998&LangID=E.
58 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 3.
326 Chapter 10
protection possibilities for environmental refugees. The paragraph first analyses
obligations for transboundary harm affecting civil and political rights.59 The
next part identifies obligations for transboundary cooperation: the duty to assist
in achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
ICESCR and the duty to offer or provide humanitarian assistance.60
10.3.1 Transboundary harm
For environmentally forced migration due to pollution and climate change,
the threat is often caused by diffuse actors, both public and private, many of
whom are located in other countries.
‘In order for human rights law to require States to address the entire range of harms
caused by climate change, it would have to impose duties on States with respect
to those living outside their. Human rights law arguably does require States to
respect and to some extent, more controversially, to protect the rights of those
outside their own territory or jurisdiction. But the extraterritorial application of
the ICCPR, ICESCR, and other global human rights treaties is heavily contested and
remains unclear.’61
First, it needs to be determined who falls within the extraterritorial jurisdiction
of a State. ‘Human rights instruments address jurisdiction in different ways.’
Some ‘contain no explicit jurisdictional limitations,’ and others ‘limit at least
some of their protections to individuals subject to or within the jurisdiction
of the State, leaving it unclear how far their protections extend beyond the
State’s territory.’62 The dominant view on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
the ICCPR, adopted by the ICJ, the HRC, and most scholars, is that the ICCPR
requires each party to respect and ensure the rights of both those within its
territory and those subject to its jurisdiction.63 In its General Comment on
Art 2(1), the HRC said that ‘a State party must respect and ensure the rights
laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control
of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State
Party.’64 It is still controversial what entails this effective control. ‘No authorit-
59 See § 10.3.1.
60 See § 10.3.2 obligations to provide assistance and obligations to provide humanitarian
assistance.
61 McInerney-Lankford 2009, p. 40.
62 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/25/53, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, poli-
tical, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development 2013, para 63.
63 Knox 2009, p. 42. In CCPR, General Comment No. 31 2004, the HRC confirmed that
– ’a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone
within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the
territory of the State Party.’
64 CCPR, General Comment No. 31 2004.
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ative body has addressed whether transboundary environmental harm may
bring its victims within the effective control of the State where the harm origin-
ates.’65
For a lack of a decision of an authoritative body on effective control result-
ing in extraterritorial jurisdiction for transboundary environmental harm,
direction needs to be found from regional human rights bodies. ‘In Bankovic
v. Belgium, the ECtHR rejected the argument that the NATO bombing of Serbia
in 1999 amounted to effective control of the places bombed.’66 ‘The Inter-
American Commission, however, has taken a more expansive view. In 1999,
it held that by shooting down an unarmed plane over international waters,
“placed the civilian pilots […] under their authority”.’67 In the context of
climate change, Knox concludes that: ‘it is hard to see how transboundary
harm caused by climate change could meet the standard employed by the
ECHR. If aerial bombardment does not give states effective control of the places
affected, it seems unlikely that such control would result from the less imme-
diate and drastic measure of allowing greenhouse gases to cross international
borders.’68 From the perspective of effective control, it is unlikely that States
can be held to have positive duties to prevent environmentally forced migra-
tion in other States. Multiple actors from many countries together are respons-
ible for human induced climate change, but have little influence over the final
result, as if only they would stop polluting, nothing much would change.69
To increase protection possibilities, it could be argued that extreme cases
could give rise to extraterritorial jurisdiction. For example, the jurisdictional
limit in Art 2(1), does not seem to apply to the right of self-determination,
small island States that may submerge due to climate change and sea-level
rise may be subjected to extraterritorial jurisdiction. As the natural resources
and means of subsistence of small island States are threatened, States have
a duty to take the necessary steps to prevent climate change and sea-level
rise.70 According to Knox: ‘This duty may provide a basis for the extension
of the environmental human rights jurisprudence: states may be required to
extend procedural safeguards (such as transboundary environmental impact
assessments) to ensure that they take into account the possible effects of their
policies on this right and, if they do, they may still have wide discretion to
65 McInerney-Lankford 2009, p. 41.
66 Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 in McInerney-Lankford 2009, p. 41.
67 IACmHR, IACmHR, Alejandre v. Cuba 1999 in McInerney-Lankford 2009, p. 41.
68 Knox 2009, p. 44.
69 However in the above mentioned case Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands,
the Hague Court of Appeal did not accept the defense by the State of the Netherlands that
‘The State asserts that it is very much relevant that the Dutch emissions are minor in
absolute terms and that the Netherlands cannot solve the global problem of climate change
on its own.’, para 30.
70 Knox 2009, p. 45 and 46.
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decide for themselves which policies to adopt.’71 Shelton argues that: a
‘government of a State may, and, indeed, arguably has the duty to, assert and
defend the rights of its inhabitants, rather than remaining passive and
ultimately defending itself for alleged rights-violating acts and omissions. The
premise of the approach is that in the international community […] govern-
ments exist for the purpose of protecting the sovereign rights of the state and
the human rights of their inhabitants, present and future.’72 Based thereon,
she concludes that:
‘it may be possible to recast the rights and duties involved when transboundary
harm occurs, to achieve the goals of prevention and accountability, merging the
law of state responsibility for transboundary environmental harm with international
human rights law. Rather than individuals attempting to vindicate their rights,
plaintiff states may represent those individuals as well as future generations in
bringing claims against the responsible states, thus utilizing state sovereignty as
a vehicle for implementing international human rights law and international
environmental law.’73
She fails to describe how the law of State responsibility and international
human rights should merge and how States would successfully vindicate their
rights from other States. As even the SIDS have not taken their case to an
international court, it seems unlikely that States will try and protect those
people forced into migration due to environmental degradation with an ever
more complex causal relation between the pollution and the migration, such
as for example changing rains patterns.
If extraterritorial jurisdiction was to be extended, the most promising
possibility is to extend procedural obligations. States could be held to ‘conduct
an environmental impact assessment of transboundary harm originating in
the State and give all those affected, including non-residents, the ability to
participate in the decision-making process.’74 However, ‘unless the extraterri-
torial victims of transboundary harm are given rights equivalent to those of
the residents of the source country, including the right to vote, the source
country will retain the sole authority to decide whether to proceed with the
71 Ibid., p. 46.
72 Humphreys, Robinson 2010, p. 91.
73 Ibid., p. 91.
74 Maastricht Principle 14 see § 10.3.2 the Maastricht Principles which attempts to clarify
extraterritorial obligations of States on the basis of standing international law claims that
these obligations already exists: ‘States must conduct prior assessment, with public participa-
tion, of the risks and potential extraterritorial impacts of their laws, policies and practices
on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. The results of the assessment must
be made public. The assessment must also be undertaken to inform the measures that States
must adopt to prevent violations or ensure their cessation as well as to ensure effective
remedies.’
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activities threatening transboundary harm.’75 Knox suggests that: ‘states could
be given less discretion as to where to set levels of environmental protection.
Human rights bodies have been willing to set minimum substantive standards
for environmental protection; they could seek to make those standards more
specific for transboundary harm.’ However, he also warns that there are other
good reasons for human rights bodies to hesitate to adopt highly specific
environmental standards as they usually lack the technical expertise and the
political mandate to do so.76
With regard to the obligations to respect and protect, ’a State presumably
may comply with them in the environmental context by extending extraterri-
torially the procedural safeguards developed in the environmental human
rights jurisprudence and by striking a balance between environmental pro-
tection and other policies, as long as the decisions do not result in the de-
struction of the human rights of those outside, as well as within, its juris-
diction.’77 For environmental refugees, the duty to respect would oblige third
States to take no measures (such as economical development projects in the
domestic State) that may lead to the forced displacement in the domestic State
and have a negative effect on the economic, social and cultural rights. Under
the duty to protect, States are held to prevent private actors under their control
to cause forced displacement due to economic development projects or pollu-
tion.78
Based on the procedural and substantive norms developed by human rights
bodies in applying human rights law to environmental harm, States would
be held to ‘follow procedures designed to ensure full, well-informed participa-
tion by those most affected. On the substantive level, under no conditions could
States allow climate change to destroy the human rights of the most vulner-
able.’79 While the obligation to provide information, may be met relatively
easy,80 the other procedural requirements of the environmental human rights
jurisprudence are not as easily met. Those who may be forced to migrate due
to environmental degradation ‘should be able to participate in a full and
informed manner in the international decision-making process as to how much
environmental harm to allow.’81 As the international law system is based on
States as the representative of its inhabitants, it is unclear how individuals
would affect or appeal decisions.82
75 Knox 2009.
76 Ibid., p. 51.
77 Knox 2009, p. 50.
78 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 58.
79 Knox 2009, p. 59.
80 Knox suggests that the work of the IPCC is a global effort to assess the environmental
impacts of climate change and make the assessments public so that they can inform con-
sideration of policy options. Ibid., p. 52 onwards.
81 Ibid., p. 56.
82 For a more extensive analyses see Ibid., p. 52 onwards.
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If the progressive decision of the IACtHR in the Saramaka People v.
Suriname case83 is followed, free, prior, and informed consent is required,
with respect to large-scale development or investment projects that would have
a major on indigenous peoples. Applied in the context of climate change, Knox
reasons that: ‘that approach would mean that states‘ decisions to emit levels
of greenhouse gases that would cause major adverse consequences on vulner-
able states would require prior consent by those vulnerable states.’84 He
underlines that ‘the veto of the most vulnerable would be available only in
extreme cases, to protect against interference that could otherwise destroy the
rights of those affected, such as through obliteration of a State by rising sea
levels.’85 Even though it is unrealistic that States comply with this obligation,
as States cannot be forced to do so, Knox suggests that:
‘Given the massive threat climate change poses to human rights, it is not unrealistic
to imagine that states will accept that they have a duty to cooperate to address
it, that the content of the duty is informed by the jurisprudence of human rights
bodies on environmental harm, and that at a minimum human rights law requires
states not to cause the widespread destruction of the human rights of those most
vulnerable to climate change.’86
In conclusion, extraterritorial jurisdiction over environmental degradation is
difficult. The legal bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction over human rights are
contested and the procedural approach is of limited use if specific minimum
standards for environmental protection are not set. On top of this, especially
for environmental degradation due to climate change, the complexity of the
situation does not correspond with the environmental human rights juris-
prudence of a single polity that experiences both the benefits of economic
development and the environmental harm that it engenders. Obviously, it has
the responsibility to decide where to strike the balance between the benefits
and harms. As Knox pointed out:
‘A state-by-state consideration of extraterritorial effects of domestic actions would
also not […] clearly require states to coordinate their responses with one another.
This is an obvious shortcoming with respect to a problem whose sources and
victims are all over the world. Without assurances that other States are also re-
ducing their emissions of greenhouse gases, it makes little sense for any State to
reduce its own emissions, since doing so would impose economic burdens on the
State with little prospect of compensating environmental benefits.’87
83 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname 2007.
84 Knox 2009, p. 57.
85 Ibid., p. 58.
86 Ibid., p. 52 onwards.
87 Ibid., p. 52.
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10.3.2 Duty of cooperation
In 2019 five UN human rights treaty bodies issued a joint statement on human
rights and climate change. In this statement, the duty for international co-
operation was clarified:
‘As part of international assistance and co-operation towards the realization of
human rights, high-income States should also support adaptation and mitigation
efforts in developing countries, by facilitating transfers of green technologies, and
by contributing to financing climate mitigation and adaptation. In addition, States
must co-operate in good faith in the establishment of global responses addressing
climate-related loss and damage suffered by the most vulnerable countries, paying
particular attention to safeguarding the rights of those who are at particular risk
of climate harm and addressing the devastating impact, including on women,
children, persons with disabilties and indigenous peoples.’88
Knox concludes that the duty to cooperate is the best way to enhance pro-
tection for human rights violations due to climate change.89 Under the co-
operation principle, States have a duty to cooperate to prevent violations of
human rights, including violations from global challenges such as climate
change. Knox suggests that the duty of cooperation would require States to
try to act as a single polity and therefore, ‘the international community as a
whole would be required to follow the procedural and substantive norms
developed by human rights bodies in applying human rights law to environ-
mental harm.’90 The duty of cooperation will be assed in this paragraph for
the general duty to assist in achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the Covenant and the duty to offer or provide human-
itarian assistance.
Obligations to provide assistance
The United Nations Charter provides that States must cooperate with each
other and the UN in promoting fundamental rights.91 The duty of cooperation
to assist in achieving progressively the full realization of human rights is
88 Joint Statement on “Human Rights and Climate Change” by the Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, 16 September 2019, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24998&LangID=E.
89 Knox 2009, p. 5 and 6 and Christiansen 2016, p. 99.
90 Ibid., p. 52 onwards.
91 See, e.g. Articles 55 and 56 UN Charter.
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generally accepted under human rights law.92 The United Nations Charter
provides that States must cooperate with each other and the UN in promoting
fundamental rights (Art 56, 55(c)) and the ICESCR refers explicitly to inter-
national assistance and cooperation as a means of realizing the rights contained
therein (Art 2, 11, 15, 22 and 23). This has been reiterated by the CESCR in its
general comments relating to the implementation of specific rights guaranteed
by the Covenant93 and by various UN special rapporteurs.94 This obligation
to cooperate is strengthened by the UNFCCC adaptation provisions which
require that: All Parties shall:
‘Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop
and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management, water
resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, parti-
cularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertification, as well as floods’ (Art
4.1(e)) and ‘The developed country Parties shall also assist the developing country
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in
meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects’95
Also the CRC (Art 4 and 24 (4)) and the CRPD (Art 32) contain obligations for
international cooperation. Also Millennium Development Goal 8 calls for the
development of a global partnership for development based on cooperation
and support.96 Also SDG 17:
‘seeks to strengthen global partnerships to support and achieve the ambitious targets
of the 2030 Agenda, bringing together national governments, the international
community, civil society, the private sector and other actors. Despite advances in
certain areas, more needs to be done to accelerate progress. All stakeholders will
have to refocus and intensify their efforts on areas where progress has been slow.’97
92 The OHCHR, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights, UNGA UN Doc
A/HRC/10/61, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights on the relationship between climate change and human rights, 2009 states that human
rights law imposes extraterritorial duties. In para 84-91, the report refers to several CESCR
general comments to identify four types of extraterritorial duties: 1 to ‘refrain from inter-
fering with the enjoyment of human rights in other countries’; 2 to take measures to prevent
private actors from engaging in such interference; 3 to take steps through aid and coopera-
tion ‘to facilitate fulfilment of human rights’ abroad; and 4 to ensure that international
agreements do not adversely affect human rights. See also Knox 2009, p. 492-495.
93 See, in particular, CESCR General comment No. 2 1990, CESCR General Comment No.
3 1990, CESCR, General Comment No. 7 1997, CESCR, General Comment No. 14 2000, and
CESCR, General Comment No. 15 2003.
94 For an overview see Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations. Commentary,
p. 47.
95 Art 4.4 UNFCCC.
96 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 56.
97 Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform 2019.
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According to de Schutter, ‘when read in conjunction with the Charter of the
United Nations and the Vienna Declaration, the ICESCR can be understood as
establishing obligations by States to uphold the human rights of populations
in other States.’98 He argues that: ‘There is a growing recognition […] that
the fact of the interdependency of States should lead to impose an extended
understanding of State obligations, or an obligation on all States to act jointly
in face of collective action problems faced by the international community of
States.’99 The 2009 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights on the relationship between climate change and
human rights clarifies that: ‘International cooperation to promote and protect
human rights lies at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations’ and ‘States
have also committed themselves not only to implement the treaties within
their jurisdiction, but also to contribute, through international cooperation,
to global implementation. Developed States have a particular responsibility
and interest to assist the poorer developing States.’100
Several levels of obligations have been suggested. A (conservative) inter-
pretation based on the duty to respect by Craven suggests to recognize that
each State is required to ensure that it does not undermine the enjoyment of
rights of those in foreign territory.101 A third possibility, based on the duty
to protect, requires ‘each State to prevent private actors under its jurisdiction
or control from harming human rights in other States.’102
Another progressive ‘interpretation is that while the primary responsibility
for meeting the obligations under the ICESCR remains on the State with juris-
diction over the people concerned, States in a position to assist other States
to meet those obligations are required to do so.’103 This interpretation is very
progressive, as it is open ended (as it depends on the availability of resources)
and implies positive duties. It can entail both obligations to provide long-term
assistance and to respond to emergencies.104 This ‘duty to provide inter-
national assistance may be an extension of the duty to fulfil, which may have
98 Schutter de 2006, p. 18 and 19.
99 Ibid., p. 18 and 19.
100 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights on the relationship between climate change and human rights,
para 85.
101 The CESCR has regularly applied this duty of non-interference, with particular reference
to the rights to health, food, and water. See CESCR, General Comment No. 15 2003, and
CESCR, General Comment No. 14 2000, and CESCR, General Comment No. 12 1999.
102 Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations. Commentary, p. 49. See for example
see CESCR General Comment 14 2000: ‘States parties have to respect the enjoyment of the
right to health in other countries, and to prevent third parties from violating the right in
other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political
means.’
103 Knox 2009, p. 47.
104 See § 10.3.3.
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less political support than more widely accepted duties to respect or pro-
tect.’105 This duty to provide international assistance as an extension of the
duty to fulfil, has been considered controversial, given its emphasis on positive
State action in other countries. However, it is gaining acceptance in the human
rights community as a secondary or subsidiary obligation that applies if the
domestic State for reasons beyond its control fails to fulfil economic, social
and cultural rights and when measures taken to respect and protect are not
sufficient.106
Ammer, Nowak and Hafner identify three additional limitations: (1) the
domestic State needs to ask for assistance of third States; (2) the extraterritorial
obligations only have to be accomplished progressively; and (3) the obligation
to assist only applies for achieving minimum standards of basic human
rights.107 In the case of climate change, this could be the foundation of an
obligation for high carbon emitting States to adopt mitigation policies, and
to assist poorer States in adopting mitigation and adaptation measures.
The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights108 constitute an international expert
opinion, restating human rights law on extraterritorial obligations. They were
issued on 28 September 2011 by 40 international law experts from all regions
of the world, including current and former members of international human
rights treaty bodies, regional human rights bodies, as well as former and
current Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations Human Rights Council.
The Maastricht Principles clarify extraterritorial obligations of States on the
basis of current international law.109
The Maastricht Principles confirm that all States have obligations to respect,
protect and fulfil human rights, both within their territories and extraterri-
105 Ibid., p. 48.
106 See for example Economic and Social Council UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/47, The right to food.
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, 24 January 2005, para
44: ‘States which do not have sufficient resources at their disposal to ensure economic, social
and cultural rights, including the right to food, have an obligation to seek international
support, and States which are in a position to assist others have a obligation to do so.’ And
para 45: ‘States parties should take steps to respect the enjoyment of the right to food in
other countries, to protect that right, to facilitate access to food and to provide the necessary
aid when required.’ Ziegler also points out that States have further recognized their collect-
ive responsibility In the United Nations Millennium Declaration, as well as in the World
Food Summit Declaration and Plan of Action (1996) and the United Nations Millennium
Declaration, paras. 2 and 19.
107 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 56.
108 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights 2011, available at: https://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-
navigation/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23.
109 Michéle 2014.
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torially (Principle 3). These ‘extraterritorial obligations encompass: a) obliga-
tions relating to the acts and omissions of a State, within or beyond its terri-
tory, that have effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that State’s
territory;110 and b) obligations to take action, separately, and jointly through
international cooperation, to realize human rights universally.’ (Principle 8).
The scope of the jurisdiction, supported by the Maastricht Principles is much
wider than the ‘effective control’ criterium that is applied in the context of
transboundary harm. The Maastricht Principles presume jurisdiction in
‘(a) situations over which the State exercises authority or effective control; (b)
situations over which State acts or omissions bring about foreseeable effects on
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, whether within or outside
its territory; and (c) situations in which the State, acting separately or jointly,
whether through its executive, legislative or judicial branches, is in a position to
exercise decisive influence or to take measures to realize economic, social and
cultural rights extraterritorially, in accordance with international law.’ (Principle 9).
With respect to the obligation to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights
extraterritorially the Maastricht Principles hold that ‘All States must take action,
separately, and jointly through international cooperation.’ (principle 28).
‘States must: a) prioritize the realisation of the rights of disadvantaged, marginalized
and vulnerable groups; b) prioritize core obligations to realize minimum essential
levels of economic, social and cultural rights, and move as expeditiously and
effectively as possible towards the full realization of economic, social and cultural
rights; c) observe international human rights standards, including the right to self-
determination and the right to participate in decision-making, as well as the prin-
ciples of non-discrimination and equality, including gender equality, transparency,
and accountability; and d) avoid any retrogressive measures or else discharge their
burden to demonstrate that such measures are duly justified by reference to the
full range of human rights obligations, and are only taken after a comprehensive
examination of alternatives.’ (Principle 32).
‘As part of the broader obligation of international cooperation, States, acting
separately and jointly, that are in a position to do so, must provide inter-
national assistance to contribute to the fulfilment of economic, social and
cultural rights in other States’ (Principle 33). The Maastricht Principles are often
quoted in academic literature and human rights reports. However, few States
have endorsed these. Therefore, their status in international law remains
uncertain, if not controversial.
110 See § 10.3.1.
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Obligations to provide humanitarian assistance
Ammer et al. pointed out that: ‘An obligation […] to claim [or accept] human-
itarian aid does not exist de lege lata. However, a current trend towards
changing this position can be observed.’111 Various non-binding instruments
call for the recognition of a right to humanitarian aid and the responsibility
to provide it.112 ‘Some argue that the right to humanitarian aid is part of
the common law, however this is controversial.’113 ‘While a general inter-
national legal obligation of the international community has not yet been
established, it is argued that third States should contribute – in accordance
to their capacities – to the mitigation of disasters. Third States have the right
to offer aid.’114 In his report to the Commission on Human Rights, the Repres-
entative of the Secretary-General, Deng concludes that: ‘a refusal to accept
an offer of international cooperation and assistance where necessary to realizing
subsistence rights recognized under the treaty could be considered to consti-
tute, at the least, “a deliberately retrogressive measure” and, at most, a breach
of treaty obligations.’115
The international community, however, has been cautious to recognize
a duty of a State to accept offers of humanitarian assistance. The right to offer
humanitarian assistance to other States in case of disaster or similar emergency
is implicitly recognized. At the same time, it is underlined that ‘the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, human-
itarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country
and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country’.116 Despite
the widely held view that sovereignty is in decline it continues to define the
context of human rights.117
With regard to cooperation in the context of disaster relief assistance, the
General Assembly recognized, in Resolution 46/182, that: ‘The magnitude and
duration of many emergencies may be beyond the response capacity of many
affected countries. International cooperation to address emergency situations
and to strengthen the response capacity of affected countries is thus of great
importance. Such cooperation should be provided in accordance with inter-
111 See Ammer et al. 2010, p. 7.
112 For example, the Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies,
the Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Disaster Relief and the Guiding
Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance. On the obligation to seek international
assistance and cooperation, see Principle 34 Maastricht Principles.
113 See Ammer et al. 2010, p. 60.
114 Ibid., p. 7.
115 Economic and Social Council, UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2, Report, Compilation and
analysis of legal norms, 1995, at 354.
116 General Assembly, Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance
of the United Nations, UN Doc A/RES/46/182 1991 and Economic and Social Council,
UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2.
117 Humphreys, Robinson 2010, p. 159 and 160.
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national law and national laws.’118 As is reflected in the Sendai Framework’s
guiding principles, paragraph 19 (a), indicate that: ‘Each State has the primary
responsibility to prevent and reduce disaster risk, including through inter-
national, regional, subregional, transboundary and bilateral cooperation.’ The
duty to prevent disaster risks is also recognized in the Cancún Adaptation
Framework, which invites Parties to enhance action on adaptation, taking into
account their common but differentiated responsibilities and capacities as well
as their priorities and circumstances.119 The Draft Articles on the Protection
of Persons in the Event of Disasters underline that the obligation to reduce
risk implies measures primarily taken at the domestic level and rejects any
implication of a collective obligation.120 However, cooperation is enshrined
in general terms in draft Article 7 and more in detail in draft Article 8 that
covers the phase following the onset of a disaster or in the post-disaster
recovery phase and focuses on cooperation of a reciprocal nature.121
10.3.3 R2P
The concept of R2P122 focuses on the responsibility of every State towards
protection of its own population from certain threats.123 If a State is unable
or unwilling to take its responsibility, the international community should
bear the responsibility.124 Some have argued that when assistance after major
disasters is blocked, stalled, or otherwise held up by governments that fear
such assistance would somehow jeopardize their control or violate their
sovereignty, this may invoke the R2P for the international community.125
118 General Assembly, Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance
of the United Nations, UN Doc A/RES/46/182 1991, Annex, para 5.
119 The Cancun Adaptation Framework 2010, para 14.
120 ILC, Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, with commentaries
2016, comment 8 on Article 9. See also § 4.1.1 and 4.2.1.
121 Ibid.
122 This text is based on a previous article ‘Environmental Degradation and the Role of the
International Community: Is there a lesson to be learnt from R2P? Vliet van der 2014a.
123 The original document is the World Summit Outcome, UN Res. A/60/1, 24 October 2005
para 138 and 139.
124 Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 65.
125 Deng, former Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons,
stated that ‘International concern with these fundamental human rights issues is in full
accord with the cardinal principle of sovereignty. No Government can legitimately invoke
sovereignty for the deliberate purpose of starving its population to death or otherwise
denying them access to protection and resources vital to their survival and well-being. The
presumption that if a Government is incapable of providing protection and assistance then
the international community should act, either on the invitation of the host country or with
international consensus, to fill the vacuum is in consonance with the principle of sover-
eignty.’ UN Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1993/35 1993, para 151. See also
Mooney 2008.
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An example often referred to is that of the Cyclone Nargis that hit Burma and
the regime refused to allow international aid to the victims.126
The initial concept of R2P included phenomena such as famines and
‘overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the State con-
cerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and signi-
ficant loss of life is occurring or threatened’. However, the UN Security Council
endorsed a narrow understanding of the concept in its resolution 1674 and
considers only ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity’.127 As it is very difficult to qualify environmental degradation
as one of these causes, I argue that R2P does not apply for environmentally
forced migration and does not allow interference by the international commun-
ity with the national sovereignty of the State hit by disaster. This however
does not leave the concept of R2P useless in the context of environmentally
forced migration, as an obligation to protect environmental refugees could
be based on the same obligation that forms the basis of the establishment of
the R2P regime itself: the international obligation to prevent large scale suffer-
ing. This obligation corresponds with changed notions regarding State sover-
eignty and with the moral and legal obligations emanating from various human
rights treaties.
The system of R2P is based on the assumption that the severity and scale
of the suffering forms an adequate basis for the responsibility of the inter-
national community to protect the victims. R2P demonstrates the political will
of the international community to accept responsibility when large scale
suffering goes unanswered. This could serve as a basis for protection against
large scale suffering due to environmental degradation (as was included in
the original draft).
A system for the protection of environmental refugees, based on the blue-
print of R2P would have to reflect the same pillar framework as the concept
of R2P. Under each pillar, there is a continuum of graduated policy instruments
focusing on three different stages: the responsibility to prevent,128 to react129
and to rebuild.130 The primary responsibility for protection of environmental
refugees must lie with the national State (pillar 1). States should for example
do field based research, set up proper systems of compensation, emergency
126 See for example Ford 2009.
127 UNSC UN Doc S/RES/1674 2006, Resolution 1674, 2006, para 4.
128 Prevention in environmental degradation will entail the prevention of the environmental
degradation itself mitigation and prevention of forced migration as a result of environmental
degradation adaptation.
129 The reaction to forced migration entails offering protection during the flight or while waiting
for a possible returnpreferably in the same region. If return is not possible the reaction
would extend to a responsibility to resettle those people.
130 The phase of rebuilding will focus on prepping areas to make them fit for habitation, in
order to make it possible for people to return home. If it is not possible to return home,
the international community has a responsibility to rebuild a community in a different place.
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relief, or compensation and establish other forms of good governance. The
assistance of the international community encouraging States to meet their
responsibilities under pillar one can be expressed through dialogue, education
and training on human rights and humanitarian standards and norms.131
If national States are unable to deal with the problem of environmental refu-
gees by themselves, the international community should help the national State
to protect its (potential132) environmental refugees. The national State would
be monitoring the action, while the international community is assisting for
example by protecting environmental refugees during their flight, to operate
refugee camps or to offer emergency relief (pillar 2). The international com-
munity only takes over the responsibility from the national State if the national
State is unable to protect its environmental refugees and request for help133
(pillar 3). Interventions without request is conceivable under extreme circum-
stances, for example when States adopt a strategy to negatively affect minorities
by not protecting them or expelling them to areas prone to degradation.134
In that case the international community will be responsible for protecting
the environmental refugees and to work towards their return home or to
resettlement. As with R2P the focus with environmental refugees should be
on prevention. As the highest impact of environmental degradation occurs
in developing countries, unable to carry the burden, the role of the inter-
national community herein is crucial.
An important aspect of the R2P is that the actions under the different pillars
are interwoven and can take place at the same time. This integral approach
could offer huge advantages in the field of environmental refugees. While a
State can put in the effort to protect environmental refugees by its best abilities,
the international community might assist with financial or technical support
(under pillar 2) and take over the protection of refugee camps or coordinate
emergency relief if the national State is unable to do so (pillar 3). The strength
of the R2P approach is that it puts an emphasis on forging common strategy
rather than on proposing costly new strategies. There are many tools available
under R2P, that can be used in a coordinated way to address environmental
131 UNGA UN Doc A/63/677 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Report of the
Secretary General, 12 January 2009.
132 As with R2P the focus with environmental refugees should be on prevention, for example:
by establishing legal rules to prevent pollution, establishing early warning systems, doing
field research and putting up systems of good governance. As the highest impact of
environmental degradation occurs in developing countries, unable to carry the burden,
the role of the international community herein is crucial. If the R2P model would be partially
adopted, the assistance of states in the prevention of environmentally forced migration
would be -much more than the current support in the form of development aid- a legal
obligation. van der Vliet 2014, p. 75.
133 In the original R2P concept this request for help is not required, but it would be hard to
find support for intervention of the international community without consent of the host
state.
134 Some authors argue that in this situation R2P applies, e.g. Ford 2009.
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degradation. R2P is therefore instrumental as a regulatory framework for co-
operation between and action by States and non-State actors.135
Applying the systematics and tools of R2P to environmental degradation
can lead to the following toolbox:
















































































135 As is one of the functions of international law, see Schrijver 2012, p. 1296.
136 Table designed by the author and Rademaker and based on Biermann, Boas 2010, p. 60-88;
Evans 2009, and Voorhoeve 2007. Table has previously been published in Vliet van der
2014.
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10.4 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
Given the likelihood that internally forced displacement will predominate,
the Guiding Principles fulfil a crucial role. The Guiding Principles mainly focus
on the responsibilities of home States. In practice, some elements of the Guid-
ing Principles still need clarification. For example, it is unclear when, if and
how those displaced as a result of slow-onset disasters will be protected.
Protection will be enhanced by clarifying the concept and different types of
environmentally forced migration. Also a better rate of embedding of the
Guiding Principles is required.137 Efforts should be made for better national
embedding and implementation. This falls outside the scope of this research,
as these initiatives take place at the national level. However, as the States with
the most IDPs are generally developing States, a logical next step is to assess
how international institutions can support home States in protecting IDPs.
The concept of environmentally forced migration is more and more
reflected in the actions of these international institutions. The ‘”Review of UN
Entities” Mandates’ study found either direct and indirect references to dis-
placement and migration issues to climate change in over half of the forty UN
entities’ recent strategic policy documents.’138 ‘Several UN entities specifically
highlight climate change, displacement and migration-related issues in their
strategy documents.’139 References include both durable solutions for displace-
ment and preparations for potential displacement. Also, in practice, several
UN institutions provide assistance to displaced people in disasters, recognizing
climate change as contributing to hazards that lead to disasters (for example
ILC, OCHA, UN-Habitat).140 ‘ESCAP, ILO, OHCHR, UNESCO and UNU-EHS have
made significant contributions in the areas of research and advocacy to increase
137 Field research in four countries has indicated that the Guiding Principles are very weakly
embedded Bangladesh, Kenya and Ghana and were not implemented in Vietnam. In all
four countries and compliance was extremely poor. Zetter 2011, p. 58.
138 ‘UN entities ILC, IOM, ISDR, OCHA, UNDP, UNFCCC, UNESCO, UN-Habitat, UNHCR
also act as secretariats and provide substantive support to States for international agreements
and processes relevant to disaster displacement and climate change.’ In The Warsaw
International Mechanism For Loss And Damage Associated With Climate Change Impacts.
Task Force on Displacement. 2018, p. 5, available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/
resource/WIM%20TFD%20II.3%20Output.pdf.
139 Ibid., p. 5. ESCAP, FAO, ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UNHCR, UNESCO, UNFCCC, UNU-EHS
140 ‘Or their strategies identify displaced people as a vulnerable group requiring specific
attention in their broader work related to climate change, humanitarian response to disasters,
or disaster risk reduction: UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNISDR, UN Women, WFP, WHO,
World Bank. Disaster displacement, including related to climate change, is addressed system-
wide through a spectrum of activities, such as: disaster risk reduction, infrastructure
development, livelihoods to build resilience, emergency assistance, human rights protection,
addressing cultural loss, migration management, planned relocation assistance, and assist-
ance to access climate finance.’ In The Warsaw International Mechanism For Loss And
Damage Associated With Climate Change Impacts. Task Force on Displacement. 2018, p. 5
and 6.
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understanding about how climate change impacts human mobility.’141 Fur-
thermore, key development actors, such as ‘UNDP and the World Bank, have
also more clearly emphasized their important role in addressing displace-
ment.’142 All these actions reflect a growing awareness of a global responsib-
ility for environmentally forced migration. The recognition of the topic by such
a broad array of international institutions shows at least an awareness that
some of the affected States will be unable to deal with the consequences of
disasters on a national scale.
The Platform on Disaster Displacement concludes that there is a ‘gap in
terms of dedicated responsibility for normative and policy development on
the specific protection needs of disaster displaced people, including related
to climate change.’ It also concludes that ‘the UN currently lacks a system-wide
lead, coordination mechanism, or strategy on internal and cross-border disaster
displacement, including related to climate change.’143 Therefore, improved
coordination to assist States could improve protection possibilities. In the words
of the Platform on Disaster Displacement: ‘The lack of overall leadership also
has implications for the UN system’s ability to provide coordinated programme
country-level support for States most affected by displacement related to
climate change, and to ensure coordinated contributions to the implementation
of relevant international frameworks and processes.’144 However, it is unclear
which institution should take the lead and coordinate actions, as environ-
mentally forced migration is a problem with a root in so many different areas
that are relevant to a broad spectrum of international institutions. According
to the Mary Robinson Foundation, this policy coherence can be established
for example by ensuring that OHCHR has a role in engaging on the Taskforce
on Displacement under the UNFCCC as well as developing the UNFCCC’s role,
and hence the climate dimension, of migration instruments. The Foundation
pointed out that: currently ‘country delegations to the UNFCCC, whose members
make up the decision making apparatus, including the Executive Committee
of the Warsaw Mechanism, do not necessarily include human rights experts
as part of their delegations.’145 Policy coherence may be one of the most
effective ways to deal with the consequences of environmentally forced
migration. It will be very difficult however to achieve the integration of a broad
range of instruments with very different focus, aim and enforcement
mechanisms (see also part IV).
141 Ibid., p. 6.
142 Ibid., p. 6.
143 Ibid., p. 7.
144 Ibid., p. 8.
145 Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice 2016, p. 8.
11 The security approach
This chapter analyses how the security approach can be used to respond to
the protection need of environmental refugees. For one, the security approach
offers more than the legal regulation of borders. It also encompasses, for
example, diplomacy, trade and development. The focus of the security
approach on minimising threats diverts the attention to early measures such
as mitigation and adaptation and disaster risk reduction which are viable
options.1 Also, an often overlooked advantage is that it involves a new stake-
holder: the military. The military has broad field experience with the effects
of climate change on security,2 and with using scenarios in their planning
processes. It also possesses (non-public) detailed strategic intelligence. There-
fore, under the security approach there is a considerable toolbox of legal and
non-legal instruments that can be deployed: this will be further discussed in
part 4. This chapter further focusses on the legal possibilities.
11.1 THE REFUGEE FRAMEWORK
11.1.1 Broader interpretation of the Refugee framework
The protection for refugees under the Refugee Convention is limited to those
being persecuted for one of the Convention grounds. There is a heavy emphasis
on the necessity of establishing an element of intent and personal authorship
of the harm suffered. This is not an easy match with the situation of environ-
mental refuge.3 However, the Refugee Convention has proven to be a flexible
instrument that can adapt to situations that were not considered while the
instrument was drafted. Environmentally forced migration may cause for
creative interpretations. However, some authors rule out the possibility of
progressive interpretation to include environmental refugees. They stipulate
that the Refugee Convention was neither drafted with environmentally-dis-
placed persons in mind, nor can be reasonably interpreted to include those
persons.4 Williams pointed out that: ‘– while some interpretative expansion
1 For example Bosello et al. 2007.
2 Daragahi 2019.
3 See § 5.1.1.
4 E.g. Falstrom 2002, p. 4 and further.
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has taken place – stretching the Refugee Convention’s scope so as to incor-
porate the notion of environmental refugees (which is an ambiguous term in
itself) is problematic and would encounter prohibitively strict resistance from
the international community.’5 This subparagraph analyses how the various
elements of the Refugee Convention could nevertheless be progressively
interpreted should one wish to incorporate environmental refugees within
its definition.
Persecution
As was discussed in § 5.1.1, the Refugee Convention inherently relies on the
concept of ‘persecution’, which will always have to be linked to one of the
five Convention grounds for refugee status. Environmentally forced migration
does not meet the threshold as this is currently understood in law. The term
‘persecution’ is not defined in the Convention. Currently, serious or systematic
human rights violations are normally considered to amount to persecution.
The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status concludes that: ‘a threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group is
always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights – for the same
reasons – would also constitute persecution.’6 A more progressive interpreta-
tion of persecution could therefore consider if home States can be held to
violate human rights, simply by failing to protect its citizens from environ-
mental degradation. Ammer et al argue that while it is increasingly recognized
in the literature that persecution may also be due to violation of economic,
social and cultural rights, these international human rights principles could
be used to clarify the nature and seriousness of the vulnerability in individual
cases, which amounts to persecution. They argue that General Comments of
the UN treaty bodies could be used to identify a ‘core obligation’ that can serve
as a basis for examining whether there is a persecution. They suggest that a
threshold of persecution can be that if core obligations were violated, the
degree of seriousness demanded would be fulfilled. They conclude that, given
the situation of ‘environmental refugees’ who had to leave their home country
due to environmental changes that seriously endanger their lives or livelihoods,
this would mean that they would usually meet the requirements for the
existence of ‘persecution’.7
However, there must be a link to the convention grounds. As Rohl pointed
out: ‘With regard to the non-availability of resources to cover vital subsistence
needs, insufficient state attention or negligence is not sufficient to claim refugee
status, unless it can be shown that discriminatory practices underlie the eco-
5 Williams 2008, p. 508-510.
6 Kolmannskog 2008.
7 Ammer et al. 2010, p. 63.
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nomic hardship of certain groups.’8 The same was also mentioned by
McAdam.9 These remarks link to the element of intent and personal authorship
of the harm suffered. Protection against environmental degradation is not
provided for harm that affects everybody in the same way. Instead there
should be an added element that makes the situation harmful for the indi-
vidual. It seems unlikely that the element of persecution can be interpreted
in a way that it includes environmental refugees, where the victims don’t have
an added layer of harm, such as discrimination by the government (for reasons
of the Convention grounds). A progressive interpretation of the element of
persecution to an interpretation based on the violations of core human rights
that would not require a link to the Convention grounds is highly contro-
versial.
Third States or private actors as persecutor
Kollmanskog raises the question if States that are the most responsible for the
climate change could be considered persecutors.10 As McAdam rightfully
pointed out:
‘This is a complete reversal of the traditional refugee paradigm: whereas Convention
refugees flee their own government (or private actors that the government is unable
or unwilling to protect them from), a person fleeing the effects of climate change
is not escaping his or her government, but rather is seeking refuge from – yet
within – countries that have contributed to climate change.’11
The little case law available does not support such a progressive interpretation.
In Australia, the Refugee Review Tribunal stated:
‘In this case, the Tribunal does not believe that the element of an attitude or motiva-
tion can be identified, such that the conduct feared can be properly considered
persecution for reasons of a Convention characteristic as required. […] There is
simply no basis for concluding that countries which can be said to have been
historically high emitters of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases, have any
element of motivation to have any impact on residents of low lying countries such
as Kiribati, either for their race, religion, nationality, membership of any particular
social group or political opinion.’12
8 Rohl 2005, p. 5 and 6.
9 McAdam 2012, p. 44: ‘for deprivation to move beyond the ‘mere’ non-realization of a right
to a violation of a right in a matter that amounts to persecution, a discriminatory element
in required’.
10 Kälin, Dale 2008, p. 39.
11 McAdam 2010b and McAdam 2011, p. 12 and 13.
12 Australian Refugee Review Tribunal 8 0907346 [2009] RRTA 1168 10 Dec 2009 para 51 in
McAdam 2010b.
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If attitude and motivation are to be considered a prerequisite for persecution
by third States, this excludes historical emissions. However, with today’s
knowledge, one could argue that if States know they contribute to climate
change, and still do not stop causing this harm, that affects the environmental
refugees, that this may result in the attitude and motivation for persecution.
Conisbee and Simms conclude that: ‘Harm is intentional when a set of policies
is pursued in full knowledge of its damaging consequences. The causes and
consequences of climate change […] are now sufficiently understood. To dis-
regard that knowledge, or to fail to respond adequately, must be classed as
intentional behaviour.’13 This argument for considering third States as per-
secutors, does not solve the element of intent and personal authorship of the
harm suffered. It seems to suggest that persecution should be presumed for
everybody whom is facing an existential threat. Even if this were to be
accepted, still it would be very hard to make an argument that this violation
of existential human rights was for reason of Convention grounds and it is
unlikely that a progressive interpretation would be accepted without this link.
Convention grounds
In order to qualify as a refugee under the Refugee Convention, the persecution
must be on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or member-
ship of a particular social group. As has been mentioned in part II, environ-
mental degradation does not affect individuals, but it affects all people in the
same area. Therefore, they are considered unfortunate victims instead of being
persecuted on one of these five grounds. The category of ‘social group’ has
proven flexible in history. However, as the persecution itself (in this case
human rights violations due to environmental degradation) cannot define the
social group, the group must be connected by a fundamental, immutable
characteristic. It would therefore be hard to define any group at all for environ-
mental refugees. In the literature the fact that environmental refugees are often
members of vulnerable groups (as they are most likely to be seriously affected)
is used as an argument that this constitutes a ‘social group’. It is doubtful
whether this vulnerability would construct such a classification, as hunger
refugees have not been accepted as a basis for refugee protection.14 Also, as
the refugee instrument was clearly not designed as a mechanism to protect
against poverty, an interpretation that would be based on this type of vulner-
ability, would really stretch the applicability of the Convention far beyond
what the drafters intended. Secondly, even if this controversial interpretation
were to be accepted, and the combination of belonging to vulnerable groups
and being forcedly displaced due to environmental degradation would qualify
those people as members of a social group, it would still be hard to make the
argument that they are being persecuted for reasons of belonging to this group.
13 Conisbee, Simms 2003, p. 30 and 31.
14 See for example McAdam 2010b.
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Protection by the national State
Finally, the Refugee Convention is based on the presumption that refugees
are persecuted by their own governments or that because their own govern-
ments are allowing them to be persecuted. This is the reason why third States
need to step in and protect the refugees. However, for most environmental
refugees ‘their governments likely will not have abandoned them and indeed
may be actively trying to assist them in dealing with climate change.’15 This
approach is supported by the responsibility of the home State to protect its
population. A progressive interpretation could accept de facto serious threats
to life against which a State does not protect to fulfil this criterion.16 Consider-
ing all elements of the Refugee Convention, progressive interpretation of the
Refugee Convention would not suffice to include environmental refugees in
the protection scope. This would require an extension of the Convention.
Regional refugee instruments
As the regional refugee instruments contain broader definitions to include
‘events seriously disturbing public order’ and ‘massive violations of human
rights’, these instruments are more likely to include environmental refugees
than the global Refugee Convention. In theory, it could be argued that ‘massive
violations of human rights […] include severe violations of economic and social
rights [which are most likely to be violated], and would thus recognise the
victims of these violations as refugees.’17 As has been demonstrated § 2.2
human and State actions highly impact if and when forced migration is re-
quired due to environmental degradation. Therefore, it could be argued that
the State (in)action does create forced migration. Also Kälin ‘sees the potential
for sudden-onset disasters to be characterised this way, [although he considers
it] rather unlikely that States concerned would be ready to accept such an
expansion of the concept beyond its conventional meaning.’18 If States would
be willing to accept such an expansion, at least the cases of sudden-onset
degradation where migration takes the form of flight would be protected. For
slow-onset degradation, still a lot of issues need clarification. It is unclear who
is forced to leave at what point in time. This depends on a lot of factors and
is less directly tied to the environmental degradation. If slow-onset disasters
were to be recognised as a reason for protection, the regional instruments
should also drop the requirement of an ‘actual threat’. A possibility for pro-
tection against future harm (such as in the Refugee Convention) is a necessity
for protecting victims of slow-onset disasters in any timeframe other than the
very last moment when the situation is extreme and life-threatening and would
allow for planned resettlement instead of flight.
15 Wyman 2013, p. 179 and 180.
16 See for example Ammer et al. 2010, p. 26 and 27.
17 Rohl 2005, p. 5.
18 McAdam 2011, p. 15.
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11.1.2 Extension of the Refugee Convention
The Refugee Convention has come under attack for not catering for today’s
problems of generalised violence, natural disasters and mass migration. ‘How
to deal with the asylum-migration nexus (or mixed migration), has become
a frequent discussion topic in forced migration circles.’19 The expansion of
Convention is often cited as a possible option. For example, Cooper proposed
an addition to Article 1A of ‘degraded environmental conditions that endanger
life, health, livelihoods and the use of resources’ based on Article 25(1) of the
UDHR.20 The logic in such proposals can be found in the fact that the Refugee
Convention has a very broad coverage and a corresponding system for assess-
ing asylum claims.’21
Against extension
Most authors and institutions now agree that whilst superficially the extension
of the Refugee Convention appears to be an easy solution, in reality there are
a number of serious challenges to the proposition. These challenges are based
both on the concept of protecting environmental refugees and risks of under-
mining the current framework.
As first conceptual challenge, the identification of environmental refugees
can be problematic. Unpicking the root cause of the migration and distinguish-
ing between environmental degradation and other causes of someone’s move-
ment can be a huge challenge. With these unclarities of the concept, it will
be impossible to enforce the extended convention. Second, slow onset degrada-
tion often causes departure ‘before the circumstances degenerate to life-
threatening proportions’22 rather than a ‘flight’. The Refugee instruments
however, seem to assume that ‘protection must be linked to “flight” […] [and]
do not adequately address the time dimension of pre-emptive and staggered
movement.’23 Thus they neglect the major differences between temporary,
permanent or circular climate change-induced migration.24 Third, most en-
vironmental refugees will be displaced within the borders of their State.
Therefore, any refugee instrument would only apply for a small group of
environmental refugees, as these instrument require those affected to be outside
their home country. Finally, as the rationale for protection by third States was
that individuals may need protection against their own State, this does not
accord with the situation of environmental refugees.25 For some environmental
refugees, there may ‘exist either an element of contributory culpability on the
19 Kolmannskog 2008.
20 Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 36, and 39-42.
21 Ibid., p. 36, and 39-42.
22 McAdam 2011, p. 50.
23 Ibid., p. 50-53.
24 UNHCR 2002. In UNGA UN Doc A/67/299, p. 15, para 62.
25 Wyman 2013, p. 167-216.
The security approach 349
part of the State government […] (such as where government-sponsored devel-
opment projects have led to the creation of environmental refugees).’ In most
situations however, home States are willing to protect, but are simply ‘unable
to offer any assistance to its citizens where the environmental change is of
such a magnitude that international support is the only viable option (e.g.,
where rising sea levels threaten the existence of small island States). The UNHCR
considers ‘lumping both groups together under the same heading would
further cloud the issues and could undermine efforts to help and protect either
group and to address the root causes of either type of displacement.’26
Apart from this conceptual challenges, extending the Refugee Convention
can undermine the current protection regime. ‘Any expansion or amendment
of the refugee definition would lead to a devaluation of the current protection
for “convention refugees” because it may encourage receiving States to treat
refugees in the same way as “economic migrants” to reduce their responsibility
to protect and assist.’27 For example, the UNHCR considers that initiatives to
amend the refugee definition ‘would risk a renegotiation of the 1951 Refugee
Convention’ which ‘could result in a lowering of protection standards for
refugees and undermine the international refugee protection regime altogether’
due to the current political environment.28 Many authors agree that there
is ‘no consensus for extending the refugee regime [and that] most receiving
States want to restrict it further than improve it.’29 Attempts to extend the
Refugee Convention have faced severe opposition from State governments
concerned that such a move would open the ‘refugee floodgates’ given the
shear enormity of the problem, and especially ‘by refugee-receiving States
adjacent to conflict- and disaster-prone areas that are already burdened by
large refugee populations and would be required to assume even greater
obligations.’30 At the bare minimum, renegotiating the Convention to incor-
porate ‘environmental refugees’ would, inevitably, introduce greater complexity
and confusion into status-determination procedures. Finally, on a practical
level, not all States in the Asia–Pacific region (which is one of the most affected
regions by climate change in the world) are signatories to the 1951 Convention,
including States with substantial existing refugee and migrant numbers such
as Malaysia and Indonesia.
26 Williams 2008, p. 508-510.
27 Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 41. ‘Any removal of the antidiscrimination norms under-
pinning the 1951 Convention to accommodate environmentally displaced people would
involve a substantial rewriting of the Convention’s definition with unpredictable conse-
quences for the Convention’s interpretation in other cases’ in Burson 2010, p. 160 and 161.
28 UNHCR 2014, p. 9.
29 Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 41. See also Lopez 2007, and Kolmannskog 2008.
30 Burson 2010, p. 160 and 161 and Williams 2008, p. 508-510.
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11.1.3 The Global Compact on Refugees
The Global Compact on Refugees intends to provide a basis for predictable and
equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing among all United Nations Member
States, together with other relevant stakeholders. It is a response to the increase
in scope, scale and complexity of refugee situations. The Global Compact on
Refugees is not legally binding. It represents the political will and ambition
of the international community as a whole for strengthened cooperation and
solidarity with refugees and affected host countries. It will be operationalized
through voluntary contributions to achieve collective outcomes and progress towards
its objectives, set out in para 7. These contributions will be determined by each
State and relevant stakeholder, ‘taking into account their national realities,
capacities and levels of development, and respecting national policies and
priorities’ (para 4).
The Global Compact on Refugees includes the consideration that ‘While
not in themselves causes of refugee movements, climate, environmental degradation
and natural disasters increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee move-
ments.‘ [emphasis added] (para 8). Environmental refugees are therefore
excluded from the refugee protection framework. This is in line with the
current analyses that environmentally forced migration is not protected under
the Refugee Convention. It would have been consistent if the Global Compact
on Refugees would have been silent on the topic in the rest of the instrument,
since it has excluded environmentally forced migration from its scope. How-
ever, the paragraph continues that ‘However, averting and resolving large
refugee situations are also matters of serious concern to the international
community as a whole, requiring early efforts to address their drivers and
triggers, as well as improved cooperation among political, humanitarian,
development and peace actors.’ (para 8) ‘The international community as a
whole is also called on to support efforts to alleviate poverty, reduce disaster
risks, and provide development assistance to countries of origin, in line with
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other relevant frameworks.’
(para 9). It also recognizes that ‘in certain situations, external forced displace-
ment may result from sudden-onset natural disasters and environmental
degradation. These situations present complex challenges for affected States,
which may seek support from the international community to address them.‘
(para 12). It is however unclear what this support from the international
community should entail.
The Global Compact on Refugees excludes environmental degradation as
a cause for refuge. However, it does encourage States to incorporate measures
to deal with root causes and considers the topic in several paragraphs. If the
instrument concludes that it does not apply, it would have been more logical
to not address the topic any further. The instrument is therefore ambivalent.
The Global Refugee Forum in December 2019 will be dedicated to receiving
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formal pledges and contributions. It remains to be seen whether countries will
include environmentally forced migration into their pledges.
11.2 THE COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION FRAMEWORK
The very existence of the principle of complementary protection highlights
the limitations of the Refugee Convention to protect ‘individuals engaged in
refugee-type experiences but unable to meet the Convention’s definitional
requirements.’31 As such, complementary protection identifies additional legal
sources that can provide an alternative basis for protection which can be built
upon.
11.2.1 Non-refoulement
As has been discussed in part II, the principle of non-refoulement requires
considerable development to incorporate environmental refugees. As McAdam
and Limon pointed out:
‘Courts have observed that “destitution” or “dire humanitarian conditions” can
amount to inhuman or degrading treatment in certain cases. However, the meaning
of “inhuman or degrading treatment” has been carefully circumscribed so that it
cannot be used as a remedy for general poverty, unemployment, or a lack of
resources or medical care, other than in truly exceptional cases. In particular, courts
have been reluctant to recognise an international protection need unless a State
deliberately withholds resources or actively occasions harm. It is therefore unlikely
that a lack of basic services alone would substantiate a complementary protection
claim, unless it made survival upon return impossible.’32
Kolmannskog and Trebbi argue that:
‘The focus on return rather than the cause and impact of the initial movement may
get us around some of the challenges of particularly slow-onset disasters, including
the “voluntary-forced” continuum. If return is not possible, permissible, or reason-
able owing to circumstances in the place of origin and to personal conditions, a
person should receive protection and a clear status. Linking return to wider human
rights has the advantage of being open to dynamic interpretation, but it also allows
for discretion.’33
31 Williams 2008, p. 513.
32 McAdam, Limon 2015, p. 16.
33 Kolmannskog, Trebbi 2010, p. 729.
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This norm could progressively evolve in the jurisprudence. For lack of a global
refugee court, this development will take place at the national level.
Permissibility of return
At some stage, ‘State parties to the ICCPR may owe protection obligations to
those who are displaced by environmental conditions if those conditions
amount to inhuman or degrading treatment.’34 If the conditions due to en-
vironmental degradation are severe enough, this obligation may be confirmed
by national courts. Although it would be difficult ‘to substantiate these condi-
tions, […] this avenue for protection is one that could be strengthened by
codification, or strict adherence to the international obligations set out in the
ICCPR. This is probably the strongest existing basis on which environmentally
displaced people may found a legal right to protection.’35
On the regional level, based on Article 3 ECHR, some authors have argued
that sending environmentally-displaced persons back to a region where they
can no longer survive, amounts to an inhuman or degrading treatment (in
other words, return is not permissible). Severe environmental disruptions
caused by natural disasters or climate change could result in a situation, where
vital infrastructure is destroyed and provision of basic services such as clean
water, food and electricity is hindered. Kolmannskog and Trebbi therefore
suggest that ‘the return itself could arguably constitute ill-treatment, perhaps
even torture’.36 Return could thus be included under the non-refoulement
obligation.
It remains to be seen, however if local and regional courts will accept this
broad interpretation of the non-refoulement obligation, or whether they adhere
to the requirement of an exceptional case, where the humanitarian grounds
against the removal are compelling and where the risk must be real (and
therefore a foreseeable consequence of the transfer, and personal). If the harm
must be individualised, ‘the appellant must establish not simply the existence
of a matter of broad humanitarian concern, but exceptional circumstances of
a humanitarian nature such that it would be unjust or unduly harsh to deport
the particular appellant.’37 This would seriously limit the protection scope
for environmental refugees, as most protection needs also depend on the
actions of the group.
34 Zetter 2011, p. 20.
35 Ibid., p. 19 and 20.
36 Kolmannskog, Trebbi 2010, p. 7225.
37 Vliet van der 2014, p. 170. It has also been suggested that ‘by arguing that expulsion cases
involving climate change-related harm form a sui generis category because, unlike other
article 3 non-refoulement cases, the host state is implicated. Claimants may additionally
or alternatively invoke their right to physical and moral integrity under article 8, advancing
arguments relating to the proportionality of expulsion in light of the host state’s dispropor-
tionate emission of greenhouse gases that cause climate change.’ Scott 2014, p. 404.
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Another possibility would be to base the non-refoulement obligation on
Article 2 ECHR. ‘Although there is no non-refoulement component attached
to Article 2 ECHR, State practice and jurisprudence could develop in this
direction in the future.’38 ‘After all, just as Article 3 ECHR, Article 2 provides
a basis for granting subsidiary protection in Article 15 of the Qualification
Directive.’39 This development should be cautiously pursued, as the ECtHR
‘has been inclined to allow the State a higher degree of latitude where the
cause of harm is “natural”.’40 Therefore, it may actually be more beneficial
to an applicant to acknowledge the multi-causality of the decision to migrate,
as the combination of environmental, social, economic and political factors,
as this may better substantiate an Article 2 or 3 claim than purely natural
causes.41
Another possibility of positive development is to broaden the scope of non-
refoulement to include economic and social rights on a more profound level.
In view of the growing influences of the doctrine of the indivisibility of human
rights and the ‘integrated approach’, international human rights jurisprudence
could form the basis of such an approach. The UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has not yet considered whether any rights in the
ICESCR contain a non-refoulement obligation. Foster, suggests that:
‘Where the person fears a violation based on the receiving state’s failure to respect
rights (by withdrawing or preventing access to rights or actively denying them
to a particular segment of the population) or failure to protect rights (by being
unable or unwilling to protect against violation by non-state actors), the assessment
is arguably no more complicated than where a civil and political right is at issue.’42
If this were to be accepted, the scope needs to be clarified a lot further. So
far, ‘the ECtHR has suggested that the applicant must demonstrate “an added
measure of persecution, prosecution, deprivation of liberty or ill treatment”
beyond a “mere” violation of the right.’43 Applying this to the context of
environmental degradation, this suggests ‘that a right is violated if the very
essence of the right is destroyed or nullified.’44 For environmental refugees,
this threshold could well be met in time, but it would cover only the most
serious cases. It has also been suggested that the situation needs to remain
38 Moor de, Cliquet 2010, p. 64 and 65.
39 Ibid., p. 65. See § 11.2.3 EU Qualification directive.
40 McAdam 2011, p. 21. See § 3.1.2 the right to life.
41 Ibid., p. 21.
42 Ibid., p. 35 and 36.
43 Ibid., p. 34. ‘The justification for this appears to be a policy one: the ECHR does not make
Contracting States the “indirect guarantors of freedom of worship for the rest of the world”,
and thus a higher threshold of harm beyond the absolute, non-derogable rights of articles
2 and 3 must be met.’ in Ibid., p. 34.
44 Ibid., p. 34.
354 Chapter 11
‘exceptional’. This would be problematic, as most environmental refugees will
be affected as groups.45
There are signs that in practice, more expansive practices on socio-economic
deprivation may be developing on a voluntary basis.46 In practice, considera-
tions based on the principle of non-refoulement have been applied in case of
natural disasters. ‘For example, in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami, the Office
of the UNHCR called for the suspension of returns to the affected regions, which
was widely respected.’47 Even though States often refer to these types of
protection as for humanitarian reasons, it is still based on the notion of non-
refoulement. It remains to be seen whether such practices based on non-refoule-
ment considerations could lead to a generally accepted practice, or even a
binding norm. With De Moor and Cliquet I agree that: ‘generally accepted non-
refoulement practices could lead to a ‘soft law’ instrument (comparable to the
IDP-principles) or even to customary international law.’48 That way, the prin-
ciple of non- refoulement could become the basis for a new regional system
of asylum for environmentally- displaced persons. However, this would only
offer a protection against return and not a legal status. Furthermore, so far
little happened in State practice to be optimistic on the formulation and adop-
tion of such new soft law instruments.
Reasonableness of return
As McAdam has pointed out: ‘The traditional western approach of individual-
ized decision-making about protection on technical legal grounds seems highly
inappropriate to the situation of climate-induced displacement.’49 The same
argument can be made for other types of environmentally forced migration.
For those people, ‘the responsibility for displacement is highly diffuse […]
and the numbers of those displaced may require group-based rather than indi-
vidualized solutions.’50 A considerable relaxation of the requirement of the
individuality of the harm would substantially broaden protection possibil-
ities.51 A possible point of reference could be the ‘reasonableness of return’
as has been suggested by Kolmannskog and Trebbi52 and Kälin.53 Although
currently the courts look at returnability through the prism of preventing
45 Ibid., p. 34.
46 Ibid., p. 28: ‘The reasoning of the European Court suggests that a considerable expansion
of the existing jurisprudence would be required for the same socio-economic deprivation
to be found to preclude removal. As the court has repeatedly observed, the ECHR is not
an instrument designed to achieve global equality.’
47 Moor de, Cliquet 2010, p. 65. For more examples of state practice relating to complementary
protection see McAdam 2011, p. 36 onwards.
48 Ibid., p. 64.
49 McAdam 2011, p. 52.
50 Ibid., p. 52.
51 Ibid., p. 52 onwards.
52 Kolmannskog, Trebbi 2010, p. 724-728.
53 Kälin 2010, p. 98.
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torture and other ill-treatment, they argue that it could be possible to look
more broadly at non-refoulement. For it should also be considered that, in
some cases, forcing someone to return is unreasonable. The ‘returnability test’
would dispense with the need to make a distinction between forced and
voluntary movement. The returnability of the person concerned should be
considered on the basis of whether it is ‘legally permissible, factually feasible
and morally reasonable to insist they should be returned to his or her country
of origin.’54 If returnability is not possible, then the individuals concerned
should be regarded as forcedly displaced persons in need of protection and
assistance in another State. This returnability test can be particularly beneficial
for those displaced by slow-onset disaster where it is otherwise very difficult
to demonstrate the forced character of the migration.55 The Representative
of the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons
has argued that:
‘Return cannot be reasonably expected from the persons concerned, e.g. if the
country of origin does not provide any assistance or protection at all or far below
international standards as long as the displacement lasts. The same is true where
it does not provide any kind of durable solutions according to international
standards, in particular when zones have become or were declared uninhabitable
and return to their homes therefore is no longer an option for the displaced.’56
Linked to the returnability test, Kälin proposes that people who have protection
needs and who cannot be returned ‘should be entitled (i) to enter countries
of refuge, (ii) to stay there temporarily, i.e. as long as the obstacles to their
return exist; (iii) to protection against refoulement as well as expulsion to other
countries; and (iv) to stay permanently if after a prolonged period of time
(some years) it becomes clear that return is unlikely to become an option
again.’57 This dynamic interpretation could provide a something of a solution.
The drawbacks, however, are the potential time and costs of considering cases
individually, with the discretion which inevitably is applied by States and
courts leading to protracted legal processes, and discrepancies between differ-
ent jurisdictions.
54 Kälin, Schrepfer 2012, p. 65.
55 The analyses on the reasonableness of return would require some ’assessment of the
intensity, severity and nature of future harm, based on the individual’s circumstances.’
This type of assessments is however not uncommon on the context of refugee determination.
in McAdam 2011, p. 52.
56 Kälin 2008, p. 7 and 8.
57 Kälin, Schrepfer 2012, p. 61.
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11.2.2 Temporary protection
Temporary protection measures seem to offer the most promising way for-
ward.58 ‘There are various examples of ad hoc migration concessions for
victims of natural disasters, which also offer some potential for application
to other environmentally displaced persons.’59 The main limitations are that
such protection is temporary indeed while the need for protection may be
permanent and those offered temporary protection often have limited rights
compared to regular refugees.
Mass-influx
‘In mass influx situations, States have already acknowledged minimum obliga-
tions to ensure admission to safety, respect for basic human rights, protection
against refoulement and safe return when conditions permit return to the
country of origin.’60 ‘Some humanitarian mechanisms can only be triggered
once a failed asylum application has been made, or take into account the length
of time a person has already spent in the country in which they are seeking
to remain (and thus the level of integration there).’61 In time, these generally
accepted practices could lead to a ‘soft law’ instrument. Especially for slow
onset disasters increased visibility and a focus on the cause of migration may
add to the development of generally accepted principles.
Humanitarian asylum/discretionary forms of protection
‘Many States have some form of discretionary leave to remain on their territory
for humanitarian or compassionate grounds. Their applicability will vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, since each has different requirements as to eligibility
for humanitarian protection.’62 States often provide a ‘temporary protection’
status on ‘compassionate grounds’ with limited rights (compared to refugees).
As with non-refoulement obligations, in time these generally accepted practices
could lead to a ‘soft law’ instrument (comparable to the IDP-principles) or even
to customary international law through a bottom-up development of law,
which has been argued for example by Edwards.63 It remains to be seen
however, whether environmentally forced migration will be considered as
58 Aghazarm, Laczko 2009, p. 416.
59 Ibid., p. 415.
60 UNHCR 2011, para 14, p. 5 and Rohl 2005, p. 5 and 6.
61 McAdam 2011, p. 44.
62 Ibid., p. 44.
63 ‘Edwards suggests that, at most, the general practice of hosting people displaced by
environmental events may be seen as contributing to the development of a right of tempor-
ary protection on humanitarian grounds under customary international law, rather than
under treaty.’ Ibid., p. 15. For the EU Temporary Protection Directive to apply, the major
hurdle for its application in future is that it a qualified majority needs to decide that it
applies. Due to the political climate, this is unlikely to happen in the near future.
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a ground for humanitarian protection. Small-scale disasters and slow-onset
disasters are not very likely to be considered a sufficient basis for humanitarian
asylum. On top of this, in most scenario’s an internal flight alternative will
be available, and therefore exclude those environmental refugees from human-
itarian asylum. As humanitarian asylum covers situations of exceptional nature
it is also unclear whether environmental refugees could on the long run be
considered exceptional.64 A stronger narrative for those affected by small-scale
disasters (and especially reoccurring ones) may provide a basis for discretion-
ary forms of protection.
11.2.3 Subsidiary protection
Subsidiary protection is granted by State parties of the OAU Convention and
the EU countries. In general environmental refugees are currently excluded
from subsidiary protection. This area of law therefore needs to be substantially
developed before it will provide protection to environmental refugees.
EU Qualification Directive
At first glance, the signs for a progressive development in this area are not
positive. During the drafting process of the EU Qualification Directive 2011,65
the member States did not support the inclusion of environmental disasters
in the protection scope. The original version of Article 15(c) of the first proposal
was considerably broader than the final provision adopted. In the original
version, it was proposed to offer protection to individuals displaced as ‘a result
of systematic or generalized violations of their human rights’. This ‘might
arguably extend to environmentally displaced persons, even if only in narrowly
circumscribed circumstances.’66 Under the current Article environmental
refugees are clearly excluded, apart from those who are also in situations of
armed conflict. In theory Article 15(c) could be amended to include environ-
mental refugees, but in the latest amendment of the Qualification Directive,
it was argued that there is no need to amend Article 15(c), as ‘the relevant
provisions were found to be compatible with the ECHR.’67 It is therefore unlike-
ly that this Article will be amended in the near future.
However, Kolmannskog and Myrstad argue that the compatibility with
the ECHR may lead to the inclusion of environmental refugees, as the case law
of the ECtHR on Article 2 and 3 ECHR provides a strong argument that sub-
64 Ibid., p. 44.
65 EC Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country
Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International
Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, 2011/95/EU.
66 Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 53.
67 Ibid., p. 53.
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sidiary protection should be granted in certain cases of extreme natural disaster
or degradation on the basis of the ban on torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment or the right to life as reflected in Article 15(a) and (b) of the Quali-
fication Directive.68
McAdam also sees room for broadening the scope of Article 15 (b), namely
‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ to include environmental
refugees. It has also been suggested ‘to include the forced return of environ-
mentally-displaced persons to regions which can no longer sustain human
life. Whether or not such a broad interpretation of the eligibility criteria will
be accepted in the future as providing protection for environmentally-displaced
persons, will largely depend on the case law of the ECtHR and the ECJ.’69
The Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament
pointed out that, at least on the policy level, there is a possibility to develop
the legal instruments that would provide a basis for temporarily prolonging
the validity of visa or residence titles of third country nationals of a country
affected by a natural disaster. ‘Art 78 of TFEU […] provides a mandate for the
Union both to harmonize the existing national practices by amending the
current legislative framework (i.e. Qualification Directive) and to adopt new
legal measures for a EU instrument addressed at environmentally displaced
individuals including an all embracing provisions covering both displacement
caused by rapid and slow onset environmental events.’70 In addition, member
States may ‘postpone the removal of TCNs [third country nationals] due to
specific circumstances including technical difficulties under Article 9 (2) of
the Return Directive.’71 The Return Directive could also be reviewed to include
environmental refugees as a generic category in which removal should be
suspended. However, these instruments do not provide a right of entry, they
only allow for a longer stay for the duration of the impossibility of return.72
68 Moor de, Cliquet 2010, p. 65. See § 3.2.1 The right to life.
69 Moor de, Cliquet 2011, p. 11.
70 Kraler, Cernei, Noack 2011, p. 71.
71 Kraler, Noack & Cernei 2011, p. 69.
72 Ibid., p. 70. Kolmannskog and Myrstad argue for ‘inclusion of natural-disaster related
displacement in the directives being developed as part of the Common European Asylum
System.’ Kolmannskog, Trebbi 2010, p. 722 and 723. However, Kraler er al argue that for
allowing environmental refugees to enter the territory, a completely different framework
needs to be established. The Directorate-General for Internal Policies has pointed out that
‘such a mechanism will be of an essential political nature and it will require political will
to adopt relevant recommendations or to design particular visa schemes for humanitarian
admissions. In practice, such humanitarian visas could be incorporated into EU emergency
responses to individual disasters and could build on international examples of humanitarian
admissions.’
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11.3 VOLUNTARY MIGRATION
McAdam has argued in the context of low-lying island States, that to prevent
statelessness ‘one option would be that territory elsewhere would be ceded
to the affected State to ensure its continued existence. If other States agreed
that this was the same State, statelessness would not arise. ‘As a matter of
principle, there is nothing in international law that would prevent the
reconstitution of a State […] within an existing State (although the political
likelihood of this happening today seems remote).’73 This would be a volun-
tary action of the ceding State, as the right to self-determination does not
operate so as to give the inhabitants of these States a right to claim land in
other States.74 ’The acquisition of land alone does not secure immigration
or citizenship rights, but is simply a private property transaction. […] It is
only with formal cession of land at the State-to-State level that one State
acquires the lawful international title to it and nationals can move to that area
as part of their own national territory. The likelihood of this happening today
is remote.’75 To form an Union with another State would be another option.
In such a case, any contracting State to which territory is transferred shall grant
its nationality on persons who would otherwise be stateless.76
Migration can therefore be an effective way to plan migration. In particular
for slow-onset disasters and frequently recurring sudden-onset disasters,
migration is a sensible adaptation strategy. In this respect, proactively anticipat-
ing and planning for migration is an important policy option. Cantor concludes
that ‘most states in the region view immigration law (rather than refugee law)
as the principal tool for responding to the situation of aliens affected by
disasters.’77 The research suggests that a consistent and harmonised applica-
tion of existing national law, policy and practice in the context of environ-
mental degradation may at present be more effective than seeking to supersede
them with new international ‘protection’ law.78
As international law does not support forced migration for most environ-
mental refugees, voluntary migration based on other grounds (such as labour
migration,79 temporary seasonal employment,80 or regional free movement
73 McAdam 2010, p. 15.
74 Theoretically, too, it would be possible for one State to ‘lease’ territory from another,
although one might query the extent to which power could then be freely exercised suffi-
ciently to meet the other requirements of statehood in such a case. McAdam 2010a, p. 122.
75 McAdam 2010a, p. 17.
76 UNHCR 2009, p. 1 and 2.
77 Cantor 2015, p. 38.
78 Ibid., p. 39.
79 Suggested policies with respect to labour migration: Burson 2010, p. 56 onwards.
80 ‘It is often thought that New Zealand has undertaken to resettle people from Tuvalu who
will be displaced by rising sea levels. In fact what exists is a temporary seasonal employ-
ment programme which is very limited in its terms.’ See Aghazarm, Laczko 2009, p. 415
and 416.
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agreements) may allow for migration as adaptation. The requirements that
voluntary migrants must meet are very high however and resettlement schemes
are often available for a limited number of people.81 Therefore, voluntary
migration is only a viable option for a small group of environmental refugees.
I agree with Laczko and Aghazarm that:
‘These ad hoc and special measures are far from offering an effective protection
regime for those forced to migrate because of sudden catastrophic weather events,
let alone those impacted by slow-onset changes to their environments. Moreover,
whether or not this adds up to an evolving soft law norm is highly debatable. It
does show some malleability at the edges of immigration policy, while, at the same
time, highlighting how the environmental migration policy/ protection is mediated
by the more pressing needs of immigration control.’82
However, the migration of a small group of people may, in reality, support
a much larger group of people due to the fact that some migrants could remit
some of their wages and salaries back to their community. These remittances
can then be used to prevent or remedy some of the negative consequences
of environmental degradation and may therefore allow other people to stay.
11.3.1 The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
Following the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016, United
Nations Member States, for the first time in history, committed to develop,
negotiate and adopt a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
(hereafter: Global Compact for Migration).83 The Global Compact for Migra-
tion is a non-binding cooperation framework that aims at international migra-
tion governance and management through inter-governmental dialogue. It
contains a set of guiding principles, and also articulates concrete measures
for action related to border management, documentation, migrant services,
capacity building for States, consular protection, skills recognition, mechanisms
of portability and building environments for migrants and diasporas to be
actors of development.
The text of the Global Compact for Migration
‘contains multiple references to environmental migration, articulating a wide and
comprehensive understanding of the challenges linked to the environment-migration
81 See for an analyses McAdam 2011, p. 57 onwards.
82 Aghazarm, Laczko 2009, p. 415 and 416.
83 On December 19 2018, the UNGA endorsed the Global Compact for Migration in resolution
UNGA UN Doc A/Res/73/195, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on
19 December 2018. 73/195. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,
11 January 2019.
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nexus. Most of the references related to environmental migration are made under
Objective 2: ‘Minimizing the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel
people to leave their country of origin’, which contains a section specifically de-
dicated to the subject and entitled ‘Natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate
change, and environmental degradation’ (Objective 2, paragraphs 18.h-18.l). Further-
more, a few important references can be found under Objective 5: Enhance availabil-
ity and flexibility of pathways for regular migration.’84
It is notable that, the Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division
of the IOM has identified 10 key takeaways from the Global Compact for
Migration on environmental migration:
‘1. The GCM clearly identifies slow onset environmental degradation, natural
disasters and climate change impacts as drivers of contemporary migration.
2. The text acknowledges the multi-causality of migration as environmental drivers
interact with political, economic and demographic drivers.
3. The text articulates comprehensive potential responses to address these drivers:
design of appropriate measures in the countries of origin to make migration a choice
rather than a desperate necessity; disaster preparedness, disaster risk reduction
and disaster response; and facilitation of population movements.
4. The GCM recognizes that climate change mitigation and adaptation measures
in countries of origin need to be prioritized to minimize drivers of migration.
5. The text also acknowledges that adaptation in situ or return of migrants might
not be possible in some cases and that the strengthening of regular migration
pathways (planned relocation and visa options) need to be part of migration
management tools.
6. The GCM outlines the need for states to cooperate to identify, develop and
strengthen solutions for people migrating in the context of slow-onset environmental
degradation (in particular desertification, land degradation and sea level rise) and
slow-onset disasters (drought).
7. The GCM outlines the importance of working at the regional level to address
environmental drivers of migration.
8. The text encourages policy coherence by highlighting that the GCM rests on a
number of global instruments related to climate change, disaster and environmental
governance: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and the Paris Climate Agreement, the United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the 2030 Agenda
9. The text also highlights the need to take into account recommendations stemming
from state-led initiatives with a focus on mobility linked to natural disasters outside
of the UN context: the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons
in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, and its follow up, the Platform
on Disaster Displacement, as well as the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative
(MICIC).
84 Ionesco, Chazalnoël 2018.
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10. The GCM recognizes the need for more investments in strengthened evidence,
data and research to address environmental migration challenges.’85
From the positive perspective, the Global Compact for Migration is the first
major migration policy that addresses environmental degradation. It accepts
environmental degradation as one of multiple causes of migration and incor-
porates slow-onset disasters that are frequently overlooked in other instru-
ments. Another positive aspect is that it covers different stages including
prevention, protection during flight and resettlement options. It includes
migration as an adaptation strategy and encourages the development of
migration options. The Global Compact for Migration also stresses the import-
ance of cooperation.
However, the document is voluntary and non-binding. Second, ‘the issue
of cross-border displacement in the context of climate change, disasters and
environmental degradation is just one element within the Compact. It also
does not directly address internal displacement.’86 Third, the success of the
Global Compact for Migration will depend hugely on political will. The
political will should not be overrated. The document caused controversy across
Europe prior to being signed and ‘several EU countries joined the US and
Australia in opting not to adopt the document. So, it remains to be seen if,
or how, the 34-page framework will translate into actual policy changes, like
more humanitarian visas for those displaced by drought or rising seas.’87
11.4 DEVELOPMENT OF NEW INSTRUMENTS
Apart from the development of separate legal frameworks, it is also possible
to identify which rights and protection norms are applicable on the various
types of environmental refugees and to draw them together as a means for
framing how we understand this sort of movement, what kinds of rights and
needs people have and what sort of rights need to be protected.88 For
85 Ionesco, Chazalnoël 2018.
86 The Warsaw International Mechanism For Loss And Damage Associated With Climate
Change Impacts. Task Force on Displacement. 2018, p. 8.
87 Beeler 2018.
88 ‘This idea was pitched to 145 governments at UNHCR’s high-level ministerial meeting
last December. However, only four countries pledged to explore initiatives at the regional
and sub-regional levels to assess the protection gaps created by new forms of forced
displacement, such as climate-related displacement. This underwhelming support is perhaps
not surprising, given that mid-last year UNHCR’s Standing Committee, which is comprised
of states, rejected a proposal for a pilot scheme whereby UNHCR would become the lead
agency for the protection of persons affected by natural disasters.’ In UNHCR 2014. See
also Anderson 2012. In practice, the 2018 Global Compact for Migration did include a
paragraph on environmentally induced migration, but it doesn’t provide much guidance
on how the protection should be provided see § 11.3.1.
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example, human rights based non-refoulement can be clarified in the context
of environmental refugees and it protection scope possibly extended by pro-
gressively interpreting the principle in the light of existing refugee and human
rights law. This development of a soft law framework of guiding principles
doesn’t require States to assume any new hard law obligations, but can ‘create
a synthesis of existing (and analogy of) international law in the form of prin-
ciples.’89 ‘They would gain authority from the fact that they would reflect,
and be consistent with, binding law. In addition, such a framework could
usefully point to other types of solutions that would facilitate planned and
orderly movement.’90 This could, for example be instructive in formalizing
‘long-standing ad hoc schemes of temporary protection.’91 ‘Finally, over time,
such framework may facilitate the implementation of such norms into domestic
law, or inform, with the benefit of State practice, new multilateral instru-
ments.’92 ‘Such an approach could draw upon the precedent of how the
international community has addressed the IDP issue, with the development
of Guiding Principles at the global level leading to the negotiation of treaties
at the regional level.’93 The adaptation of the Global Compact for Migration
has not lived up to that promise.
A similar approach is taken in the Nansen Initiative. This bottom-up, State-
led consultative process with multi-stakeholder involvement seeks to build
consensus among states on the elements of a protection agenda, which may
include standards of treatment. Its outcomes may be taken up at domestic,
regional and global levels and lead to new laws, soft law instruments or
binding agreements.94 ‘Recognising that a “one size fits all” response is in-
appropriate, the Protection Agenda sets out a toolbox of strategies to strengthen
resilience and manage the risk of future displacement.’95 The toolbox focuses
on protection before, during and after displacement. It covers disaster risk
reduction, and adaptation to build resilience in communities.96 In time, this
bottom-up processes may lead to the adaptation of international rules that
reflect the practice that has been developed.
89 Kolmannskog 2008.
90 McAdam 2011, p. 57.
91 Ibid., p. 49. Although some argue that this requires the development of a new inter-state
treaty Betts, Kaytaz 2009, p. 24.
92 Ibid., p. 57.
93 Betts, Kaytaz 2009, p. 24.
94 See https://www.nanseninitiative.org/secretariat/.
95 McAdam 2016, p. 1543.
96 Ibid.
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11.4.1 Drafting a new convention
Another way to address the protection gap, would be to draft and adopt a
completely new and separate international convention. Betts has pointed out
that at least three elements need to be incorporated: ‘(1) being outside one’s
country of origin, (2) fleeing an existential threat; and (3) lacking domestic
remedy.’97 In order to determine an existential threat, Betts defines the existen-
tial threat to ‘include not only the right to life but also elements of quality of
life that are fundamental to human dignity.’ He emphasizes the importance
of the requirement of the lack of a domestic remedy. This ‘highlights the
conditions under which migration represents the only realistic adaptation
strategy’ and ‘enables prioritisation, ensuring that states’ commitment to
protecting non-refugee survival migrants does not become an open-ended
commitment.’98
In the literature various suggestions have been made for new treaties, e.g.
creating a protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a protocol to the
UNFCCC,99 or following the framework of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment to create
a new convention.100
However, McAdam has identified101 five shortcomings to creating a new
refugee treaty:
- ‘it is difficult to isolate climate change from other factors as the main cause
of movement;’102
- ‘it would privilege environmental refugees over other forced migrants (such
as those escaping poverty), perhaps without an adequate (legal and/or
moral) rationale as to why;’103
- ‘it may be premised on a model of individual status determination, which
is unsuited to mass displacement scenarios and may impose a high thres-
hold on applicants in terms of linking displacement to climate change;’
[this would also apply to other types of environmental refugees]
- ‘defining “climate refugees” may harden the category and exclude some
people from much-needed assistance.’ [this would also apply to other types
of environmental refugees]
97 Betts, Kaytaz 2009, p. 5.
98 Ibid., p. 5 and 6. See also § 11.1.2.
99 See e.g. Biermann, Boas 2010. For another UNFCCC-based proposal, see Williams 2008.
100 ‘Falstrom advocates the elaboration of a new document that would focus not only on
protecting those individuals who are forced to leave their homes due to environmental
displacement, but also would require specific obligations from state parties to prevent the
root causes from occurring.’ In Lopez 2007, p. 402-408.
101 In the context of climate change, but the arguments apply to other types of environmental
degradation as well.
102 See § 2.1.3 causality.
103 See § 2.1.2.
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- ‘there would seem to be little political appetite for a new international
agreement.’104
McAdam identifies an additional difficulty for slow-onset degradation, as ‘the
refugee paradigm, which premises protection needs on imminent danger, does
not capture the need for safety from longer-term processes of climate change
which may ultimately render a person’s home uninhabitable.’105 I agree with
McAdam that – due to the complexity of the problem – it will be hard to define
who is entitled to protection. It should not include economic migration, but
it should also not exclude those in need for protection. Due to the non-linear
character of environmental degradation and the multi-causality, it will be hard
to determine who is eligible for protection.
Despite these reservations, it is promising that the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe has acknowledged the particular responsibility of
industrialised member States ‘To develop in the asylum systems of member
States and in international law protection for people fleeing long-term climate
change in their native country.’ This responsibility is especially to ‘the countries
of the “global South” affected by man-made climate change, and should
therefore provide appropriate asylum for climate refugees.’106
104 McAdam 2011, p. 56.
105 Ibid., p. 56.
106 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 2307 (2019) A legal status
for “climate refugees”, Text adopted by the Assembly on 3 October 2019 (34th Sitting), para
5.4.

12 The responsibility approach
The purpose of this chapter is to assess existing legal principles on their
possibility to be elaborated, adapted, or particularised to respond to this new
situation of environmental refugees, through creative interpretation or extra-
polation by analogy. In contrast to part 2, this chapter will also consider the
moral and ethical side of responsibility.
As international environmental law is very fragmented and is often devel-
oped after a particular incident, it is hard to predict how this field of law will
respond to new threats, such as climate change. Another complicating factor
is that States are very reluctant to settle their disputes in the legal context of
State responsibility. Therefore, case law is as limited as it is fragmented.
Consequently, it is difficult to predict developments in that area. Both legal
regimes struggle with the complexity of the causes of climate change and the
cumulative causes. ‘In the absence of an agreed approach in international law
on the determination of causation, it is not clear how a court or tribunal would
deal with the issue of complex and cumulative causes.’1 On the national level,
courts are already confronted with these difficult issues2 and might provide
some input on the answer. Against this background, this chapter will explore
alternative possibilities for responsibility outside the accountability framework.
1 Voigt 2008, p. 16.
2 A German court has ruled in LLiuya v. RWE that it will hear a Peruvian farmer’s case against
energy giant RWE over climate change damage in the Andes, a decision labelled by
campaigners as a ‘historic breakthrough’. In this case, Lliuya argues that RWE, as one of
the world’s top emitters of climate-altering carbon dioxide, must share in the cost of
protecting his hometown Huaraz from a swollen glacier lake at risk of overflowing from
melting snow and ice. RWE’s power plants emitted carbon dioxide that contributed to global
warming, increasing local temperatures in the Andes and putting property at risk from
flooding or landslides. Now the court must decide whether the accused’s contribution to
the chain of events depicted here is measurable and calculable. In 2018, in two separate
cases, New York City and Massachusetts, and San Francisco and Oakland brought a case
against ExxonMobil, Chevron, Shell, BP, and ConocoPhillips. The suit alleges that the
defendants – five of the largest publicly traded carbon producers – are responsible for
historical contributions to, and damage from, climate change, and that they ‘engaged in
a sophisticated climate denial effort which misled consumers, investors and the public and
exacerbated the climate crisis by delaying meaningful action to reduce emissions.’ In the
Netherlands a case was filed against Shell by Milieudefensie in 2019. This case is a follow-up
of the Urgenda case in which the government was addressed.
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12.1 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The legal status of international environmental law principles and concepts
is varied and may be subject to disagreement among States. ‘Some scholars
believe the development of a single comprehensive treaty of fundamental
environmental norms may be a future solution to counteract fragmentation
and provide clarity about the legal status of various principles.’3 I consider
this an unlikely development, in particular due to the disagreement on the
legal status. Such a project would at best support the codification of the most
modest explanation of environmental law principles. It would also have to
be very general and would – especially in the context of complex issues such
as climate change – require a lot of adaptation to specific situations. Even
though it would clarify the legal status, it would still leave many questions
unanswered.
‘The focus of international environmental law today is preventative and precaution-
ary, to manage environmental risk and protect the environment on a global level.’4
Experience has taught us that ‘prevention of environmental harm should be the
“Golden Rule” for the environment,’ for both ecological and economic reasons.
Harm is often irremediable, or the ‘costs of rehabilitation are often prohibitive.’5
The concept of prevention ‘gives rise to a multitude of legal mechanisms, including
prior assessment of environmental harm, licensing or authorization that set out
the conditions for operation and the consequences for violation of the conditions,
as well as the adoption of strategies and policies [good governance].’6
12.2 HUMAN RIGHTS
In order to be able to play a role of meaning, human rights laws and institu-
tions must evolve fast to rise to the unprecedented international challenge that
climate change creates.
‘As human rights adjudication bodies hear future climate change-related claims,
they may be able to assign State responsibility for mitigation and adaptation
measures in a way that overcomes the challenge of future and diffuse causation
in tort liability. A human rights approach emphasizes the obligation of all States
to cooperate in mitigation and adaptation with maximum urgency and to the
maximum extent possible to ensure the progressive realization of human rights
as the climate change threat progresses’.7
3 Kurukulasuriya, Robinson 2006, p. 24, para 9.
4 Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 62.
5 Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 32, para 57. See also Voigt 2008, p. 7-10.
6 Ibid., p. 32, para 58. See also Voigt 2008, p. 7-10.
7 Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 37 and 38. see § 10.3.2.
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Human rights bodies can also clarify the legal obligations of for example
positive obligations in the context of climate change. Human rights bodies
may provide access to justice for individuals that are affected by climate
change. The ‘International Council on Human Rights Policy’ has suggested
that:
‘if some or all of the justice claims already acknowledged within the climate regime
can be refined and successfully channelled through human rights – or if human
rights law can provide a basis for choosing among them – both disciplines will
be enriched and many individuals stand to benefit. At present, however, it appears
that inchoate property rights (to environmental entitlements) are trumping inchoate
human rights (to protection from and reparations for environment related dam-
ages).’8
Human rights bodies may provide access to justice. Individuals may be able
to challenge the behaviour of their own State. They may base their claims on
acts of pollution by their national State or on a failure of their national State
to protect them against the consequences of pollution by non-State actors or
third States. However, from a practical point of view (or based on considera-
tions of justice) it would be most beneficial if the actions of the most polluting
States could be challenged for human rights courts of the countries that are
heavily affected, but have contributed little to the problem (‘diagonal’ human
rights obligations).9 The Advisory Opinion from the IACtHR as requested by
Colombia on the environment and human rights ((Obligaciones Estatales en
Relación con el Medio Ambiente en el Marco de la Protección y Garantía de
los Derechos a la Vida y a la Integridad Personal – Interpretación y Alcance
de los Artículos 4.1 y 5.1, en Relación con los Artículos 1.1 y 2 de la Con-
vención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos)10 ‘opens a door – albeit in a
cautious and pragmatic way – to cross-border human rights claims arising
from transboundary environmental impacts.’11 If the explanation of Feria-Tinta
and Milnes is accepted that the ‘effective control’ requirement can be explained
as ‘effective control over the activities carried out that caused the harm and
consequent violation of human rights,’12 this means that third States may
8 Humphreys 2008, p. 55-60.
9 See § 7.3.
10 IACtHR, Environment and human rights Obligaciones Estatales en Relación con el Medio Ambiente
en el Marco de la Protección y Garantía de los Derechos a la Vida y a la Integridad Personal –
Interpretación y Alcance de los Artículos 4.1 y 5.1, en Relación con los Artículos 1.1 y 2 de la
Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, Advisory Opinion 2017.
11 Feria Tinta, Milnes February 26, 2018.
12 IACtHR, Environment and human rights Obligaciones Estatales en Relación con el Medio Ambiente
en el Marco de la Protección y Garantía de los Derechos a la Vida y a la Integridad Personal –
Interpretación y Alcance de los Artículos 4.1 y 5.1, en Relación con los Artículos 1.1 y 2 de la
Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, Advisory Opinion 2017, para 104. ‘En virtud
de todas las consideraciones anteriores, de conformidad con los párrafos 72 a 103 y en
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be held to account in international human rights courts for not preventing
pollution that is under their effective control and that led to human rights
violations. However, it is not very likely that international human rights courts
easily accept this explanation, as this would limit the sovereignty of States.
National jurisprudence indicates that problems of causation and attribution
may be overcome.13 However, several significant problems remain. As en-
vironmental degradation affects groups of people and the actions of the people
in those groups affect the need for migration, this is not easily translated into
human rights violations. Also the allocation of loss is a very complex task,
that international human rights tribunals are most likely unable to perform.
So far, there is no clear indication of how international human rights tribunals
allocate this type of multi-causal, multi-party loss. It may be argued that these
complex damages may be better dealt with under a system of CBDR as has
been accepted in the climate change negotiations.
12.3 RESPONSIBILITY
As has been discussed in chapter 7, the possibilities for State responsibility
are limited. However, Voigt argues that: ‘the continuing relevance of the
principles of state responsibility is not to be underestimated. [...] Given the
urgent need to strengthen global efforts to protect the climate system, a case
involving a compensation claim for climate damages could indeed present
a court or tribunal with a unique chance to strengthen the formulation and
implementation of primary rules for environmental protection.’14 This is
confirmed by Verheyen: ‘If State responsibility claims were to mature and be
adjudicated in international courts, major polluting States would be in danger
of facing an enormous burden of costs and damages – even if only relative
to their contribution to the problem. Such a claim for climate change damages
would be largely unpredictable – especially if the claims were based on
increased risk.’15 This paragraph focusses on pathways for solutions that may
be accepted on the basis of responsibility without liability.
Verheyen has convincingly argued that the way forward should be based
on negotiation instead of litigation. Although,
respuesta a la primera pregunta del Estado solicitante, la Corte opina que: [...] Los Estados
deben velar porque su territorio no sea utilizado de modo que se pueda causar un daño
significativo al medio ambiente de otros Estados o de zonas fuera de los límites de su
territorio. Por tanto, los Estados tienen la obligación de evitar causar daños transfronterizos.‘
For a translation of the Advisory Opinion see Feria Tinta, Milnes February 26, 2018.
13 See § 7.3, 7.5.2 and 7.5.3.
14 Voigt 2008, p. 20-23.
15 Verheyen 2005, p. 337.
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‘the approach to liability for environmental damage fits the climate change pheno-
menon generally, and therefore, existing liability regimes can serve as examples
for designing a climate change damage liability scheme. The underlying assumption
is that it is preferable for the international community to tackle the issue of climate
change damage by way of negotiation soon – rather than to wait for the reactions
of people and countries at some point in the future when the impacts of climate
change become more and more apparent (litigation-based approach).’16
A litigation based approach would result in some (few) affected parties (States
or private entities) recovering their damage or being provided monies for
adaptation purposes. Based on the no-harm rule and the duty to cooperate,
she concludes that States have a general duty to ensure that an equitable
solution is found. She concludes that: ‘In the case of climate change damage,
this means that people and countries injured by the impacts of climate change
should be able to claim adaptation costs or compensation for residual damage
regardless of their diplomatic or political capacity. Such scheme covering all
potential victims of climate change can only be negotiated.‘17
One of the frameworks in which compensation can be negotiated is the
UNFCCC framework. The UNFCCC framework has increasingly acknowledged
the connection between climate change and migration. However, as it stands
today the regime has not dealt with compensation for forced migration. So
far, the international climate regime has focussed on steps towards preventing
climate change as a phenomenon and has not focussed sufficiently on the
consequences of climate change.18 It has incorporated the ambiguous term
‘loss and damage’, but it is unclear what the legal consequences of this concept
are.19
Wyman made a very useful contribution in the debate to point out that
apart from the rights gap, there is also a ‘funding’ gap. She describes this
funding gap as: ‘the lack of a dedicated source of international funding to help
offset the costs that developing countries may incur in dealing with climate
change migration.’20 This gap may be remedied by international funds
‘financed by developed countries to assist developing countries with the costs
of climate migration.’21 Another market-oriented solution to distribute the
costs of climate change impacts that is supported by the international commun-
ity is insurance.22
16 Ibid., p. 364.
17 Ibid., p. 363.
18 Ibid., p. 336 and 337.
19 This will be discussed in § 12.3.1.
20 Wyman 2013, p. 169.
21 This will be discussed in § 12.3.2. See also Wyman 2013, p. 169.
22 See § 12.3.3.
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12.3.1 Loss and damage
As has been mentioned above, the UNFCCC framework has adopted the am-
biguous term ‘loss and damage’.23 Loss and damage refers to ‘negative effects
of climate variability and climate change that people have not been able to
cope with or adapt to.’24 This definition is really different from the definition
of ‘damage’ in international law, for example the definition by the ILC.25 To
illustrate this, in the Paris agreement, adopted during the COP 21 in December
2015, it is specifically written that ‘loss and damage’ does not involve or
provide a basis for any liability or compensation.26 Kugler and Moraga argue
that the concept of ‘loss and damage’ is substantially useless with regard to
reparation under international law because it is too ambiguous.27 It does not
therefore close any rights gaps and is not likely to do so in the future, as some
States made very clear that loss and damage does not involve or provide a
basis for any liability or compensation.
12.3.2 Compensation funds
As has been mentioned above, compensation funds should ‘help offset the
costs of climate migration, especially in the developing world.’28 As most
migration will be internal, it would be logical to cover this type of migration
under the compensation fund. However, this is ‘a matter typically regarded
as falling within the purview of nation States.’29 Mayer therefore argues that
it would be best to adopt a horizontal approach in which financial support
would be provided to developing States that incorporate vulnerable popula-
tions and are responsible for protecting them. He further supports his argu-
ment by pointing out that:
‘attributing loss and damage at the individual level is particularly challenging,
whereas horizontal approaches allow consideration of probabilistic harm and
compensation through bundle payments’, and (2) ‘horizontal approaches are more
suitable for pursuing goals such as economic efficiency, the reduction of loss and
damage, the creation of an incentive for climate change mitigation, and broader
goals of social justice’.30
23 Kugler, Sariego 2016, p. 103.
24 Warner, Geest van der & Kreft 2013, p. 10.
25 See § 7.1.1.
26 Paris Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21 2015 FCCC/CP/2015/L9/Rev1 para 51, p. 8. See also
Kugler, Sariego 2016, p. 104.
27 Kugler, Sariego 2016, p. 103.
28 Wyman 2013, p. 181.
29 Ibid., p. 181.
30 Mayer 2014.
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If the problems with determining who will be compensated for what can be
somehow overcome, Wyman has identified four possible sources of funding
that might be useful for addressing climate migration: ‘existing funds for
migration (such as the International Organization for Migration’s Development
Fund),’31 disaster relief resources (such as the United Nations Central Emerg-
ency Response Fund and Asian Development Bank’s Asia Pacific Disaster
Response Fund), development assistance32 and climate change funds.33 Dis-
aster relief resourced can often be found on the national level.34 However,
as the most affected States are often not high-volume emitters, these funding
schemes do not automatically solve issues of distribution. Another disad-
vantage is that it also does not address the root causes of environmentally
forced migration.35 These disadvantages are avoided under development
funding, when assistance is used to reduce vulnerability to environmental
degradation and therefore reduce the extent of forced dislocation (sustainable
development). Wyman suggested that even
‘adaptation funding sources under the UNFCCC could be used to “complement”
development assistance from the major donor agencies, as development is framed
as adaptation. She also points out that adaptation funds established under the
UNFCCC also potentially could be used to finance resettlement and relocation costs,
assuming again that it is possible to tie these costs to climate change.’36
A prominent example of funding under the UNFCCC is the Adaptation Fund,
which is established by the parties to the Kyoto Protocol.37 Even though, to
date it has not approved projects which appear to concern migration directly,
the Fund’s board has ‘the authority to establish a window within the Fund
for climate migration, or a “substructure” or “facility” for climate migration
under the adaptation window. [This] could provide the first dedicated multi-
lateral source of funding for climate migration.’38 Support for this course of
action can be found in the Cancún Adaptation Framework that invites the
Parties to undertake ‘[m]easures to enhance understanding, coordination and
cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration
31 Wyman refers to a recent report from the Asian Development Bank that states that, ‘[t]he
IOM Development Fund [...] has funded and is funding pilot migration and climate change
and environmental projects in Egypt, Mauritius, and Kenya.’ Wyman 2013, p. 181.
32 Wyman includes this source, as she argues that ‘climate migration is an issue that should
be addressed in part by reducing pre-existing vulnerabilities’. Ibid., p. 181.
33 Wyman 2013, p. 181.
34 ‘Such as the Mexican catastrophe reserve fund, FONDEM and Costa Rica, Nicaragua and
Honduras also have or intend to create national funds.’ In Verheyen 2005, p. 344.
35 Ibid., p. 344.
36 Wyman 2013, p. 211 onwards.
37 Ibid., p. 184.
38 Ibid., p. 181.
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and planned relocation.’39 It can be argued that by recognizing migration
as a type of adaptation, it ‘invites funding for migration related issues within
the context of increased action on adaptation,’ even though ‘it does not impose
any obligations on States in relation to migration, such as assisting developing
countries with the costs of climate migration.’40
Also the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called for
enhanced co-ordination, mediation and funding to support action to be taken
at local, national and international levels in order ‘to take a proactive stance
to better identify and anticipate the impact of climate change on population
movements.’ It suggested that:
‘consideration should be given to the establishment of an international solidarity
fund to provide protection to people forced to migrate due to climate disasters.
Co-operation with the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) could be con-
sidered, in accordance with the Declaration on European Principles for the Environ-
ment signed by the CEB on 30 May 2006 together with the European Commission
and several other international financial organisations (the European Investment
Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Nordic Environ-
ment Finance Corporation, the Nordic Investment Bank) in a joint effort to imple-
ment the fundamental right of present and future generations to live in a healthy
environment;’41
In general, the use of development assistance, migration, and disaster relief
funding sources avoids the problems with establishing a causal link between
(man-made) climate change and migration. However, Wyman pointed out
that:
’developing countries are likely to be concerned that developed countries will evade
their responsibility for helping with adaptation if climate migration is addressed
using existing funding sources for development assistance, migration, and disaster
relief, even if the idea is to use better financed versions of these sources. Using
non-climate funds to meet needs related to climate change might be regarded as
undermining the idea that developed countries have special obligations due to their
responsibility for climate change. In addition, developing countries are unlikely
to support using development institutions to distribute funding, because developing
countries have little control over the governance of these institutions.’42
39 UNFCCC, Cancun Agreement, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth
session, held in Cancun from 29 November – 10 December 2010, Cancun, 2011. FCCC/CP/
2010/7, at II para 14f.
40 Wyman 2013, p. 183.
41 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 2307 (2019) A legal status
for “climate refugees”, Text adopted by the Assembly on 3 October 2019 (34th Sitting), para
5.3.3.
42 Wyman 2013, p. 214 and 215.
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Developing countries likely would prefer to use climate adaptation funds. This
would however limit protection of environmental refugees to those who are
affected by climate change43 and who can establish this link.44
Verheyen sums up some of the difficulties that have to be overcome in
the context of victim compensation funds that can also be applied to other
types of funding. She argues that if the compensation fund is a State-based-
system:
‘it would carry the disadvantage of having to make as the definition of covered
areas and injuries, thresholds of damage, contributions from public budgets to a
fund “up front” and the ensuing institutional problem of administering (and
investing) the monies in the fund. Nevertheless, despite the fact that many details
of such a scheme would have to be agreed, and then possibly separately for the
various likely impacts of climate change, does not preclude the usefulness of such
an approach per se.’45
12.3.3 Insurance
Another market-oriented solution to distribute the costs of climate change
impacts that is supported by the international community is insurance. Two
types of instruments are conceivable: liability insurance (purchased by the
person creating the risk or causing the damage) and ‘weather’ insurance
(purchased by individuals or entities to protect the value of their property).46
Even though the liability insurance was not designed to protect victims (but
to ‘increase the utility of a risk averse injurer’),47 it can be used in the context
of environmentally forced migration based on the notion of joint and several
liability.48 Verheyen refers to the example of the EC environmental liability
scheme. The directive49 is
‘based on a public law approach and focuses on contaminated sites. It establishes
strict liability for damage to land, water and biodiversity from specified activities
and fault-based liability for damage to biodiversity from other “occupational”
43 For an analyses on the differentiation between damage brought about by anthropogenic
climate change and natural variability, and how a solution might be negotiated, see Ver-
heyen 2005, p. 362.
44 Wyman 2013, p. 211 onwards.
45 Verheyen 2005, p. 345.
46 Ibid., p. 359.
47 Ibid., p. 359.
48 Verheyen 2005, p. 354.
49 Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on environmental
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage of 21 April
2004, OJ Nr. L 143/56.
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activities. The proposal foresees that, when a damage is caused by the actions or
omissions of several operators, they are jointly and severally liable.’50
For ‘weather’ insurance, Verheyen pointed out: ‘in the case of climate change,
and for extreme weather events in particular, an agreement about mandatory
“weather” insurance coverage is conceivable, where individuals or regional
authorities would insure against certain types of extreme weather events on
the private market, while the premiums would be paid by polluters/operators/
States.’51 These systems are especially conceivable for sudden-onset disaster,
such as weather extremes, ‘given that extreme events are likely to cause havoc
and endanger human lives.’52 These systems are more complicated for slow-
onset degradation as these lack the clear damage in a certain point of time,
but unfold themselves over a longer period of time. These ‘gradual changes
such as gradual coastal inundation due to sea level rise might be better regu-
lated through a scheme based on a joint fund.’53
In practice, the UNFCCC released a Clearing House for Risk Transfer plat-
form, to connect insurers and vulnerable populations, and to provide technical
assistance to countries seeking to implement new risk solutions.54
50 Verheyen 2005, p. 354.
51 Ibid., p. 359.
52 Ibid., p. 359.




As has been reflected in part II, environmental refugees are protected under
various sets of rules of international law. As was demonstrated in part III,
creative interpretation or extrapolation by analogy, does not suffice to create
a robust protection framework for environmental refugees. Both parts analyse
protection possibilities from either a rights-based, a security or a responsibility
approach. This is in line with current practice where oftentimes legal scholars
from different legal backgrounds address the problem of environmentally
forced migration from their own field of expertise, creating a solution based
on the rights of the people affected, or the duties of those who cause man-made
environmental degradation, or the duties of States for border control or human
security. However, such approaches, however helpful, are bound to be frag-
mented. Therefore, this part seeks to provide a comprehensive and a systematic
analysis of how the various approaches as analysed in parts II and III can
mutually reinforce each other in order to create a better equipped legal pro-
tection regime.
As was demonstrated in part II and III, environmentally forced migration
covers a wide variety of types of environmental refugees and refugee
situations. Therefore, this part proposes a context-oriented and dynamic
interpretation, whereby the law should be interpreted ‘with a view to the ever-
changing environment in which it must be applied.’1 This dynamic interpreta-
tion is already applied in the context of migration law.2 The dynamic interpre-
1 Kolmannskog, Trebbi 2010, p. 729 and 730.
2 ‘For example, recognizing that the 1951 Convention was not adequate to address States’
contemporary concerns with asylum and refugees, UNHCR conceived the Convention Plus
initiative in 2003. Its aim was to supplement the aspects of refugee protection inadequately
addressed by the Convention. The initiative attempted to facilitate a “grand bargain” on
the allocation of responsibility for refugee protection, whereby Northern States could meet
their interest in limiting irregular migration through contributing to refugee protection
in the South. The initiative thereby attempted to use issue-linkage to connect Northern
States’ interests in migration to refugee protection. Central to this initiative was the notion
that “protection in the region of origin” could serve as a substitute for spontaneous arrival
asylum and an implicit recognition that, so long as Northern States funded protection in
the South, they could legitimately control immigration. Regime complexity offered UNHCR
an opportunity to engage in issue-linkage as a means to channel States’ wider interests
in other issue-areas back into a commitment to refugee protection. This is because the
institutional connections across different regimes made it more plausible to States that a
relationship between refugee protection and the other issues existed.’ Betts 2010.
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tation can assist policy makers in dealing with the complex nexus of migration
and environmental degradation. Stakeholders should be aware of the various
approaches and adjust their strategy in picking a protection approach (or more
than one) that best suits the protection needs of the environmental refugee.
In sum, this part will systematically map the protection possibilities and
challenges for overlapping approaches and then it will more in detail map
protection possibilities for the different types of environmental refugees.
13 Overlapping approaches
As Alter and Meunier have pointed out, the increasing density of international
regimes that are (often) not hierarchically ordered has contributed to the
proliferation of overlap across agreements, conflicts among international
obligations, and confusion regarding what international and bilateral obliga-
tions cover an issue, leading to regime complexity. This international regime
complexity reduces the clarity of legal obligation and requires an analysis,
based on thinking about any international rule or regime as being embedded
in a larger web of international rules and regimes.1 In order to deal with this
complexity, this research adopts an international hybrid law approach2 that
considers the rules concurrent, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated
as is proposed by Corendea. Corendea initiated and developed the concept
of ‘International Hybrid Law’ in 2007, based on the ‘policy oriented juris-
prudence developed by Lasswell and McDougal and The Living Tree Doctrine
of progressively interpreting accepted legal norms.’3 Corendea argues that
a hybrid law approach is becoming more mainstream, as he has identified
a ‘recent trend of international courts using an “adaptive interpretation” of
international law while delivering both judgments and advisory opinions.’4
Although the hybrid law approach started out as a research tool, it can be
instrumental in developing innovative legal solutions. In the current context,
an international hybrid law approach ‘aims to formulate a legal mechanism
rooted in environmental law, human rights and refugee (migration) law that
derives its strength of enforcement from the tripartite functionaries of all three
legal faculties and can be implemented within an international legal context.’5
1 Alter, Meunier 2009. The same horizontal interaction between subsystems of international
law has been addressed by Wyatt 2010, p. 596.
2 See for a similar approach in the context of climate change Corendea 2016. ‘The foundation
for adopting such an approach lies in the concerted arguments for evolving legal articulation
posited within both the policy-oriented jurisprudence developed by Lasswell and McDougal
and the “Living Tree” doctrine of progressively interpreting accepted legal norms. This
reasoning has been corroborated by the recent trend of international courts using an
‘adaptive interpretation’ of international law while delivering both judgments and advisory
opinions.’ In Corendea 2016, p. 36.




In the context of the impact of climate change, Corendea and Mani argue
‘there are two main advantages of employing a hybrid legal approach.’ First,
‘it presents a clear picture of exactly where the legal instruments to address
each aspect of environmentally forced migration can be sourced from. Simul-
taneously allows for the combined application of the principles encapsulated
within all three branches of law [environmental law, human rights and refugee
(migration) law] to respond to such loss and damage.’6 They further explain:
‘Moreover, the strength of the principles within each branch of law, whether soft
or binding, can counterbalance each other in the formulation of legal arguments
to address specific violations. For example, while the strict liability of the polluter
may vary across jurisdictions, the human right to a clean and healthy environment
is a fundamental and inalienable human right, which forms a part of customary
international law.’7
Second, the tripartite instrumentalities available at hand, increases the level
of protection afforded to environmentally forced migrants. ‘For example, the
legal protection of climate refugees/migrants is found not within refugee/
migration law but under human rights law and environmental law. Although
the 1951 Convention in itself does not apply to climate migrants, the principles
under it such as “non-refoulement” can be extracted from it and made applic-
able to climate induced migrants.’8 These arguments can be easily translated
into benefits for environmentally forced migration.
However, even though an international hybrid law approach supports the
combination of the different approaches (and their corresponding legal
regimes), combining approaches is complicated. Each approach has a different
focus (victims, States, polluters), different assumptions (e.g. movement is forced
or voluntary) and focusses on different time frames (prevention, adaptation,
mitigation, protection during migration, resettlement). Also, questions can arise
on which branch’s rules will apply and – ‘where there is an actual or potential
conflict in the internal logic or ideology behind each system – how conflicts
should be mediated.’9 Therefore, in the design and implementation of inter-
national law, conflicts between the rules applicable under the different inter-
national regimes should be as far as possible avoided and solved through a
harmonizing interpretation.10 As the various international instruments are




9 Wyatt 2010, p. 596.
10 In practice, we can see for example in Draft Article 10 ILA-Climate Change Principles, on
‘Inter-Relationship’, that it makes the connection to other areas of public international law,
such as the protection of human rights, the law of the sea, and international trade and
investment that significantly overlap with climate law.
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mentally forced migration, this chapter explores how the various instruments
can interact.
13.1 THE RIGHTS-BASED AND SECURITY APPROACH
The literature on environmentally forced migration already adopted elements
of a combination of a security and rights-based approach in the forms of
‘human security’ that focuses both on the interest of States to minimise threats
and on ethical duties of States, and ‘complementary protection’ that may limit
the possibility to return people to areas heavily affected by environmental
degradation.11 A strongpoint of the human security approach is that it is
attractive for both developed and developing States. For developed States it
is interesting as it underlines the self-interest of those States to prevent global
instability and a large influx of environmental refugees. As Betts explains in
the context of the refugee regime, burden-sharing can be explained by issue-
linkage: ‘burden-sharing is not subject to a clearly defined normative and legal
framework. Cooperation on burden-sharing, therefore, takes place largely in
the context of ad hoc bargaining, [...] Because burden-sharing is largely discre-
tionary, it is subject to States’ interests.’12 By pointing out benefits for the
States, these States may also be more inclined to accept an implementation
of general rules on the context of environmentally forced migration that seeks
to enhance protection possibilities in all stages and to make use of migration
as an adaptation strategy. A security approach can therefore attract the neces-
sary attention, especially from the developed countries that may otherwise
be less inclined to be involved in the process. As such developed States may
be convinced that it is in their best interest to act now instead of receiving
floods of migrants in the future. For developing States, the human security
framework may be an opportunity to have those most affected by environ-
mental degradation identified and protected with the help of the international
community.
The holistic nature of the security approach can be beneficial to strengthen
protection of human rights. For example, the use of scenario planning (to
investigate possibilities for future risks),13 as a non-legal tool of the security
11 See § 5.2.
12 Betts 2010, p. 19 and 20.
13 The identification of future risks based on several scenarios that may happen, will help
determine which action is likely to contribute to the prevention of human rights violations.
This is a working method, not frequently used in the legal field. This method may help
identify which actions should be taken. However, in the context of climate change, ’the
means of prevention are as hypothetical as the impacts they must prevent; indeed more
so, given the unpredictable feedback effects of many interventions. This has made climate
change forecasting highly dynamic, reliant on multiple feedback loops. Predicted impacts
are constantly readjusted to take account of varying or changing assumptions. Innumerable
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approach, can be beneficial in identifying which situations should be legally
regulated to minimize threats. This may compensate for the fact that human
rights focus (mainly) on violations that already have taken place. Scenario
planning may identify situations where it may be relevant for third States to
invest in early warning measures such as mitigation and adaptation and
disaster risk reduction in other States, in order to create stability in unstable
regions or to prevent mass-migration even when international law would not
oblige third States to do so. Also, armies have experience in dealing with
climate aspects during missions, and often have access to non-public data.
This military information may be central in substantiating human rights claims
or in mapping possibilities for the prevention of human rights violations. As
McAdam and Saul pointed out:
‘Viewing climate-induced displacement through a human security lens may bring
significant strategic advantages, not least in helping to mobilise international action
in support of the displaced, in holistically conceptualising the needs of the dis-
placed, and in supplying flexible political solutions which can respond to immediate
needs and provide much-needed domestic legitimation for the reception of an
exceptional category of foreigners who fall outside the contours of regular migration
programmes.’14
The security approach can on its turn benefit from the visibility of the effects
of environmental degradation on universally accepted human rights under
the rights-based approach, which puts a human face on environmental degra-
dation.
McAdam and Saul however, also warn for the risks of a human security
approach. They argue that:
‘a “human security” approach may also counter-productively displace and under-
mine binding legal protections, by substituting human rights standards and
approaches for the discretionary, political ‘human security’ agenda. The form and
content of a human security approach in a given situation is shaped by the political
choices of powerful States and driven by the preferences and priorities of donors
and international agencies – an agenda which is accordingly negotiable, highly
variable, and likely to generate gaps in protection.’15
For this reason, the security approach is met with resistance by affected States,
as it will not be their interest that is central in the discussion, but the interest
of (often developed) polluting States, fearing mass-influx to their countries.
Affected States pointed out that if the topic is ‘securitized’, refugees are labelled
mitigation, adaptation and development paths can be designed, each with different baseline
assumptions and impact ranges.’ In Humphreys 2008, p. 17 and 18.
14 McAdam, Saul 2008.
15 Ibid.
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as a threat to national, internal or regional security, instead of as affected
people. Affected countries also voiced their concerns that most situations of
environmentally forced migration will not be addressed, as they are not
relevant or not on a scale big enough to receive the attention of the inter-
national community. The international community would, for example, only
be willing to address problems that would be considered a threat to the
stability of the region. At the same time, developing States also fear for their
sovereign rights when the international community does interfere. This fear
has surfaced clearly in the discussion on the applicability of the responsibility
to protect.16 Furthermore, especially in the context of climate change, affected
States also pointed out that the responsibility of the developed States is not
(explicitly) considered under a human security approach, and therefore does
not reflect the contribution of developed States to the problem.
More promising are the possibilities of a combination of a rights-based
and a security approach in the context of the regime of complementary pro-
tection. It combines migration control (security approach) and possible human
rights violations as a reason not to expel people (rights-based approach).17
As has been discussed in § 6.2.5, the
‘Immigration and Protection Tribunal New Zealand has accepted that exposure
to the impacts of natural disasters can, in general terms, be a humanitarian circum-
stance that could make it unjust or unduly harsh to deport. Nevertheless, in such
a case the appellant must establish not simply the existence of a matter of broad
humanitarian concern, but exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature such
that it would be unjust or unduly harsh to deport the particular appellant from
New Zealand.’18
This regime therefore has to be further developed before it would include
environmental refugees.
Betts also warns for the risks of overlapping regimes. He refers to the use
of the IDP protection framework as an instrument of migration control.19 The
existence of internal flight alternatives may limit access to other countries, as
asylum is only offered to those without an internal flight alternative.20 There-
fore, an international hybrid law approach can be used to support and enhance
protection possibilities, but it can also be instrumentalized to undermine
protection regimes.
16 See § 10.3.3.
17 For example, Betts refers to this overlap of refugee law with other regimes – which he refers
to as the ‘refugee regime complex’ – and mentions complementary protection as an example
of supporting regimes. Gross violations of human rights may give a right to protection
under a migration framework. In Betts 2010, p. 23.
18 AC Tuvalu [2014] NZIPT 501370-371, para 32. See also Kälin 2008, p. 7 and 8.
19 Betts 2010, p. 23.
20 Ibid., p. 13.
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13.2 THE RIGHTS-BASED AND RESPONSIBILITY APPROACH
International environmental law and human rights regimes overlap in various
ways:21 (1) Adequate environmental protection can be considered a pre-
condition for the enjoyment of existing human rights;22 (2) existing human
rights can be a tool for achieving improved protection of the environment23
and vice versa, substantive minimum environmental standards to restrict
pollution are a necessary complement to the procedural rights;24 (3) human
rights and environment are interrelated through the concept of ‘sustainable
development’ for the benefit of future generations and through the concept
of the ‘duties of mankind towards the environment’; and (4) a substantive
human right to a clean environment is developing.25 Therefore, human rights
and environmental protection each represent different, but overlapping, societal
values that can mutually support each other. ‘Obviously not all human rights
violations are necessarily linked to environmental degradation. Likewise,
environmental issues cannot always be addressed effectively within the human
rights framework, and any attempt to force all such issues into a human rights
rubric may fundamentally distort the concept of human rights.’26
As Wewerinke-Singh and Van Geelen pointed out:
‘An integrated approach to human rights and climate change law can enhance
accountability for mitigation actions that, ultimately, reduce some of the risks of
climate displacement in states like Vanuatu. International human rights law not
only provides obligations to protect peoples and individuals against forced displace-
ment resulting from climate change that complement and reinforce obligations
21 This overlap is particularly visible in the context of the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access
to Information Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environ-
mental Matters Aarhus Convention. For an analyses on this overlap in the context of the
right to an adequate/clean/healthy environment and how this is shaped in Europe, see
Hey 2015.
22 If states implement programmes for the control and reduction of pollution of the atmosphere
and the marine environment, and to conserve biodiversity, this often is beneficial for the
enjoyment of human rights especially the rights to health and a healthy environment. See
Lewis 2012, p. 409 onwards.
23 ‘Environmental problems may be combatted through the assertion of existing human rights,
such as the rights to life, personal security, health, and food. In this regard, a safe and
healthy environment may be viewed either as a pre-condition to the exercise of existing
rights or as inextricably intertwined with the enjoyment of these rights.’ In Lewis 2012,
p. 39.
24 Shelton 2008, p. 163 and 164.
25 See § 10.1.
26 Lewis 2012, p. 39. ‘Others however, argue that environmental issues belong within the
human rights category, because the goal of environmental protection is to enhance the
quality of human life. And human beings are merely one element of a complex, global
ecosystem, which should be preserved for its own sake. Under this approach, human rights
are subsumed under the primary objective of protecting nature as a whole.’ In Lewis 2012,
p. 39.
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contained in international climate change law, but also has its own mechanisms
of implementation that can be used to address climate change. Conversely, obliga-
tions derived from international climate change law, as well as states’ commitments
reflected in NDCs, can be used as baselines in the assessment of states’ compliance
with their human rights obligations pertaining to climate change.’27
Taking a human rights approach to climate change-induced displacement can
provide a clear and globally applicable means of developing viable rights-based
solutions. Human rights can be considered as a set of internationally agreed
values that everyone should enjoy and around which common action can be
negotiated and motivated. As Limon has argued:
‘Although states comply imperfectly with their duties under human rights law,
they have at least taken formal steps to commit to those duties, and advocates may
rely on such commitments to strengthen their rhetorical and legal arguments.
Human rights can thus be forward looking means of encouraging the evolution
of, and providing a qualitative contribution to, robust, effective, and sustainable
policy responses at both the national and international level, across mitigation and
adaptation.’28
Knox takes the argument a step further: ‘The fact that the State did not cause
the threat does not excuse the State‘s failure to try to protect against it. More-
over, a State unable to fulfil these duties with its own resources may be obliged
to seek assistance from other States.’29
Environmental law standards can give guidance to the level of impact on
human rights that are to be considered acceptable and human rights can be
instrumental in determining the effect of pollution. For example, the UNFCCC
calls for States to cooperate with another in accordance with CBDR. ‘While CBDR
as it is understood in environmental law (assigning responsibility based on
historical contribution to damage and capacity30) is perhaps not directly
applicable to human rights law, the underlying principles of justice and equity
(i.e., the promise that responsibility will be distributed fairly) clearly are.’31
Human rights law can help to provide formal content for and operationalize
this principle of CBDR. As Knox pointed out, a human rights perspective helps
to determine what level of action is required.32 ‘Human rights law both
27 Wewerinke-Singh, Van Geelen 2018, p. 691.
28 Limon 2009, p. 457-463.
29 Knox 2009, p. 37.
30 E.g. Art 3 of the UNFCCC.
31 Limon 2009, p. 473-475. For example, a principle similar to CBDR operates in the Inter-
national Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, which implicitly acknowledges
differences in capacity (if not responsibility), when it says that each state is required to
take steps ‘individually and through international assistance and co-operation’ with a view
to ‘progressive realisation’ of the rights in the Covenant (Art. 2(1)).
32 Knox 2019.
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bolsters the CBDR principle and helps to provide standards that can give it
operational meaning in the context of such contestations.’33
However, it should be pointed out that there is:
‘a long-standing dichotomy between formal and substantive justice: the hard rule-of-
law formalism of human rights on one hand versus the soft law, policy orientation
of the UNFCCC on the other. The ethical language of “equity” and “common but
differentiated responsibilities” of the UNFCCC has a quite different texture to the
moral certainty and universalism of statements like the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights (UDHR) and the international human rights covenants.’34
Therefore, these instruments do not mix easily. The same argument can be
made for the focus of these instruments. The climate change regime is ‘aimed
at preventing dangerous climate change for the benefit of mankind, not for
the benefit of particular victims, affected regions or countries.’35 There may,
however, be State obligations under Article 2 of the ICESCR and the UNFCCC
that are complementary, such as the duty of cooperation, the no-harm rule,
or equity.36 As the International Council on Human Rights Policy pointed
out, both instruments ‘prioritise respect for and fulfilment of social and eco-
nomic rights through development and poverty eradication.’37 The ICESCR,
obliges States to: ‘take steps, individually and through international assistance
and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means.’38
With similar objectives, the UNFCCC also includes obligations between States,
to provide international support for adaptation and technology transfer pro-
grammes. The cooperation principle within human rights law underscores
the need for resource and technology flows from wealthier to poorer nations
to assist in mitigation and adaptation.39 Therefore, the International Council
on Human Rights Policy concludes that the ‘two treaties create a matching
architecture of rights and duties between States, citizens, and the international
community.’40
However, some States raised informal concerns, as they fear the overlap
will ‘make delegations less likely to sign up to stringent emission reduction
targets for fear that, if they were to fail to reach those targets, they might leave
33 Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 35.
34 Humphreys 2008, p. 6.
35 Voigt 2008, p. 20-23.
36 McInerney-Lankford 2009, p. 434 and 435.
37 Humphreys 2008, p. 286.
38 Art. 2 1 ICESCR.
39 Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 33-39.
40 Humphreys 2008, p. 86.
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themselves open to litigation.’41 Limon describes that ‘some developed coun-
tries also have concerns that developing countries may be using the issue of
climate change as a “backdoor” to reintroduce the related and controversial
issues of extraterritorial application of human rights and the establishment
of a new universal “right to a safe and secure environment”.’42 Developing
countries, fear that human rights may be abused ‘as a way of either preventing
their development (i.e., climate change affects human rights and thus countries
must slow the process of industrialization) or of conditionalizing climate
change adaptation funds.’43 States therefore conclude that human rights must
be dealt with by the Human Rights Council and climate change by the
UNFCCC.44 In that context, States have urged that ‘the Human Rights Council
and related bodies should not be seen to be replacing or duplicating the
UNFCCC process or challenging its primacy on climate change matters.’45
On a positive note, the Human Rights Council Working Group on the Right
to Development argued in the context of international climate finance that:
‘Under the international human rights framework, including the International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the Declaration on the Right
to Development, States have committed to international cooperation for the
realisation of human rights. The systemic human rights risks posed by climate
change therefore mandate a concerted global effort to mobilise the financial
resources required for adaptation and mitigation. In line with their human rights
obligations and their commitments made in the context of international environ-
mental and development cooperation, States should ensure that international climate
finance is centred around partnership between States and informed by solidarity,
equity and justice.’46
Based on the CBDR, the report argues that it is incumbent upon developed
countries, which have been responsible for the majority of accumulated green-
house gas emissions and have benefited most from carbon-intensive develop-
ment pathways, to assume the greatest responsibility for the provision of
climate finance (para 54). The report further refers to arguments made that
41 Limon 2009, p. 459-461.
42 Ibid., p. 461.
43 Ibid., p. 461.
44 For example, ‘the United States takes the view that a “human rights approach” to addressing
climate change is unlikely to be effective, and that climate change can be more appropriately
addressed through traditional systems of international cooperation and international
mechanisms for addressing this problem, including through the UNFCCC process.’ Similarly,
Canada noted in its national submission that it ‘joined consensus on resolution 7/23,
notwithstanding initial concerns that the Council is not the most appropriate forum for
a discussion on climate change issues. Canada believes the UNFCCC is the most appropriate
forum in which to address issues related to climate change.’ In Ibid., p. 460.
45 Ibid., p. 460.
46 UNGA UN Doc, A/HRC/WG.2/19/CRP.4, Promoting rights-based climate finance for
people and planet, 18 April 2018, para 51.
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CBDR should shape the obligations of developed countries to provide finance
for the loss and damage that is associated with climate change impacts in
developing countries (para 55).
Also, on the national level there has been a correlation between human
rights and climate change action. As the Human Rights & Climate Change
Working Group of the Center for International Environmental Law has pointed
out:
‘24 countries mentioned human rights in their Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions, with 17 countries insisting on the importance of integrating human
rights in climate actions.47 Seven additional countries mentioned human rights
when describing their domestic legal framework.48 In addition, many INDCs also
refer to other specific aspects of rights-based policies, such as the need to guarantee
food security, the importance of gender equality and the participation of women,
and the need to ensure public participation in climate policies.’49
However, these national commitments do not go far enough. Even if States
fully implement their commitments, they will not put the world on a path
that avoids disastrous consequences for human rights.50 Therefore, human
rights may serve to push for a higher level of protection.
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in a report
to the General Assembly on the relationship between human rights and climate
change explained: ‘the human rights framework complements the Convention
by underlining that ‘the human person is the central subject of development,’
and that international cooperation is not merely a matter of obligations of a
State towards other States, but also of the obligations toward individuals.’51
This opinion was also reflected in the Inuit Petition to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. The Petitioners alleged that the United States
is responsible for violating the human rights of the Inuit people by its failure
‘to cooperate with international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.’
Following this line of reasoning, in future, human rights adjudication bodies
may be able to overcome the complications due to diffuse causation in the
47 Bolivia, Brazil, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras,
Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, South Sudan, and Uganda.
48 Cuba, El Salvador, Indonesia, Nepal, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
49 Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group 2015.
50 ‘Shortly after states published their intended national commitments, UNEP determined
that full implementation of the NDCs would lead to emission levels in 2030 that would
likely cause a global average temperature increase of well over 2°C, and quite possibly
over 3°C. 54 From a human rights perspective, therefore, it is necessary not only to imple-
ment the current NDCs, but also to greatly strengthen them to meet the target set out in
article 2 of the Paris Agreement.‘ In Knox 2019.
51 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights on the relationship between climate change and human rights,
2009, para 87.
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context of State responsibility. However, unless the right to a freestanding right
to a clean environment becomes much further developed, this approach would
be limited to those types of environmental degradation that pose an imminent
threat to the an rights of individuals. It is therefore not suitable as an instru-
ment of preventing environmental degradation per se, based on risk assess-
ments of future risks.
Already in 2008 Kolmannskog pointed out that:
‘Since most forced migration will probably be internal and regional, resettlement
and financial obligations are other important aspects of burden-sharing. A new
international environmental migration fund could provide the financial basis for
measures to deal with the forced migration. In addition to “the ability-to-pay”
principle, the burden-sharing mechanism could be based on the polluter pays
principle.’52
It can be argued that the loss and damage instrument under the UNFCCC can
be used as such a migration fund. However, available funds under the loss
and damage instrument are limited and the fund covers much more situations
than migration alone. Migration would therefore have to compete with other
types of loss and damage that may be much easier to demonstrate.
It is generally accepted that environmental degradation and the effects of
climate change weaken States’ capacities and hinder them from fulfilling their
obligation to protect people’s rights. A rights-based approach enhances equity
and encourages more effective, fairer, and more sustainable policy outcomes,
which may balance out some of the imbalance of capacities. Limon explains
that: ‘by bringing the climate change debate to the level of individual people,
all of whom have equal status under international law, a human rights
approach has the potential to “level the playing field” in international nego-
tiations, which have to date been dominated by large states involved in largely
economically motivated power plays and trade-offs.’53 At a minimum, ‘by
drawing attention to the broader human rights implications of climate change
risks, the human rights perspective, in line with the precautionary principle,
emphasizes the need to avoid unnecessary delay in taking action to contain
the threat of global warming.’54
13.2.1 Justice
A central point in the discussion on climate change and human rights is the
element of justice. This element of justice considers who should bear the
52 Kolmannskog 2008.
53 Limon 2009, p. 459-461.
54 UNGA UN Doc A/HRC/10/61, para 91.
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burden for the protection of those who suffer from environmental degradation,
and therefore combines element of the rights-based and responsibility
approach.
The element of justice may serve to clarify obligations between different
actors, but it can also generate the opposite result. Different types of justice
will appoint different claim opponents (for example, those who polluted, those
who are able to pay or those who affect property rights) and lead to different
‘just’ solutions. The International Bar Association’s ‘climate change justice and
human rights task force’ describes climate change justice as encapsulating
‘rights and obligations spanning generations, across political entities, and
implicates State, corporate and individual responsibilities.’55 It also refers to
the description of the Mary Robinson Foundation: ‘climate justice ”links human
rights and development to achieve a human-centred approach, safeguarding
the rights of the most vulnerable and sharing the burdens and benefits of
climate change and its resolution equitably and fairly.”’56
In the literature, a wide support can be found for various types of climate
change justice to deal with the global challenge of climate change. At the
climate negotiations several ethical issues on climate justice were raised. At
least five types of justice claim have been raised that are both different in kind
and not obviously compatible: corrective justice, substantive justice, procedural
justice, distributive justice and formal justice.57
Corrective justice
Corrective justice is based on the concept that some States have caused (and
still are causing) high emissions leading to climate change, that has caused
and continues to cause injuries affecting a different (much larger) group, who
lives in parts of the world that are often unable to deal with the consequences
of climate change.58 The main objective of corrective justice is to correct the
wrongdoings (high emissions) through punishment or compensation. An often
proposed way of compensation is through the establishment of international
funds.59 These funds should support injured parties or support those who
might be affected to prevent the damage. The establishment of these funds
does not require an acknowledgement of liability, but an acceptance of respons-
ibility by those States that have caused high emissions.60 This moral respons-
55 Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 3.
56 Ibid., p. 2.
57 Humphreys 2008, p. 55-60. This chapter follows the description of the different types made
by the International Council on Human Rights Policy.
58 Ibid., p. 55-60.
59 See § 12.3.2.
60 ‘This responsibility is reflected in the differentiation under the UNFCCC, where Annex 1
parties are required to take the lead and bear a greater burden by receiving a lesser share
of the future total global GHG emissions allowable in order to achieve the stabilisation
objective.’ in Burson 2008, p. 28 and 29. See also Humphreys 2008, p. 55-60.
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ibility would partially be based on the acceptance of historical emissions that
affect many people in vulnerable countries today.61 In this construct, ‘the
richer States are the primary duty-bearers and the poorer States (potential)
rights-bearers. Individuals and other private actors are second-order bearers
of rights and duties.’62
Substantive justice
Substantive justice focuses on the loss of future capacity and potential. A global
reduction of the use of fossil fuels and greenhouse gas emissions ‘will tend
to lock in vast wealth disparities between groups in different regions.’63 A
solution for this injustice focusses on effectively reducing ‘global dependence
upon greenhouse gas emissions without in the process permanently disad-
vantaging a global majority who were not responsible but who may forfeit
their future prosperity.’64 This claim has been central in much of the much
climate change debate.65 In this framework, the transfer of clean technologies
may provide for the future growth of affected States, so the injustice of locked-
in inequality can potentially be avoided.66 This justice claim also reflects a
primary relationship between States. The ‘richer States are the primary duty-
bearers and the poorer States (potential) rights-bearers.’67
Procedural justice
Procedural justice deals with questions on how to construct mechanisms that
will ensure that a just solution can be reached, that the concerns and interests
of different stakeholders are heard fairly, and that steps are taken as a result
(procedural justice)?68 The procedural justice should construct ‘mechanisms
that will ensure that a just solution can be reached, that the concerns and
interests of different stakeholders are heard fairly, and that steps are taken
as a result.’69 According to International Council on Human Rights Policy:
‘The claim for procedural justice [...] is partially met in the arduous processes
of negotiation itself.’70 Most texts suggest that inter-State negotiations should
solve the allocation of burdens through balancing public interest.71
61 Burson 2008, p. 26 and 27.
62 Humphreys 2008, p. 57.
63 Ibid., p. 57.
64 Ibid., p. 56. Another element often reflected in this context is that emission of developing
states are often “subsistence” or “survival emissions”, where emissions of developed states
are often “luxury emissions” and these different types of emissions should be weight
differently. See for example Ibid., p. 9-12.
65 Ibid., p. 56.
66 Ibid., p. 58.
67 Ibid., p. 56.
68 Ibid., p. 58.
69 Ibid., p. 56.
70 Ibid., p. 58.
71 Ibid., p. 57.
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Distributive justice
The Distributive justice serves social means. It ensures a fair distribution of
benefits and burdens throughout groups identified by social, racial, class, or
gender characteristics. Two further question arise: ‘(1) What is a fair allocation
of the costs of preventing the global warming that is still avoidable?;’ and ‘(2)
What is a fair allocation of the costs of coping with the social costs that will
not in fact be avoided?’72 This fair allocation of costs requires ‘equity’. This
concept is inherent in the Brundtland definition of sustainable development
and also reflected in draft Article 4 of the ILA-Climate Change Principles. ‘(1)
States shall protect the climate system on the basis of equity, of which the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabil-
ities […] is a major expression. (2) States shall protect the climate system in
a manner that equitably balances the needs of present and future generations
of humankind.’73 This Intergenerational equity is an important element of
climate change justice. Gender equity is also an essential element, as ‘women
will disproportionately bear the burdens created by climate change’.74
The same argument can be made for other vulnerable groups, such as children
and indigenous people. As is been rightfully argued by the ‘Experts’ Group
on Global Climate Obligations’, ‘human rights law can play a critical role in
elaborating the social justice and equity dimensions of global climate change
responsibilities.’75 Human rights law can provide input for the content and
operationalization of social justice.76
In the literature, several authors have cautioned for distributive justice
based on the States’ ability, as has been adopted in the UNFCCC.77 Burson for
example pointed out that: ‘Countries with large populations but low develop-
ment levels have the potential ability to contribute by adopting policies and
measures that restrict certain aspects of their development (e.g. transport).
Often, these same countries have not contributed to the problem and so it
seems unjust to impose such a burden on them.’78 This concept of justice
based on ability may therefore lead to unjust results. This can be partially
remedied by the need-based justice. Burson pointed out that this is also
recognised by the UNFCCC, by including in Article 3 (2) that, in determining
the level of CBDR under Article 3(1): the specific needs and special circum-
stances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and of those Parties,
especially developing country Parties, that would have to bear a disproportion-
72 Ibid., p. 56.
73 Art 4 (1) and (2) ILA-Climate Change Principles.
74 Esrin, Kennedy 2014, p. 47.
75 Farkas, Kembabazi & Safdi 2013, p. 33 and 34.
76 Ibid., p. 33 and 34.
77 For example in Art 46 and Art 31 UNFCCC. See for example Burson 2008, p. 26 and 27.
78 Burson 2008, p. 28 and 29.
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ate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full considera-
tion.79
Formal justice
Formal justice frames climate change as ‘entitlements derived from prior usage
or legitimate expectations.’80 These entitlements (of carbon users) ‘cannot be
rescinded arbitrarily in favour of a larger policy goal.’81 Therefore, the rights-
bearers in this concept of justice are the carbon users.82 The primary right-
bearers are private actors, though States remain the primary duty-bearers.83
‘A persuasive argument might even be made that compensation should be
due to the polluters if they are to give up their acquired entitlement to the
global carbon dump.’84 ‘If States are to mandate emission cuts in the public
interest, they must do so while respecting the rights of individuals. All States
might, in principle, be duty-bearers, required to agree a scheme globally that
will respect private rights locally.’85 This concept of justice is called formal
justice, as ‘it relies upon a strict reading of existing legal norms even though
they may seem ill-suited to the problem at hand.’86 As is rightfully pointed
out by the ‘International Council on Human Rights Policy’, the strength of
the formal justice claim ‘lies not only in the claim of strict legal rectitude but
also in the fact that a greenhouse gas abatement regime is likely to trigger
the opposition of these actors, who are generally politically powerful.’87 Under
the UNFCCC umbrella, the aspect of formal justice is reflected in the emissions
trading regime established under the Kyoto Protocol. This regime ‘grants
emissions rights to states on the basis of prior usage, and has been elaborated
in close consultation with affected private polluters. The trading regime is
sensitive to claims that emissions entitlements were legitimately acquired by
these actors. It provides them with a voice in the regime and flexibility in
deciding how to alter their behaviour.’88 It may very well be for this reason
that although the formal justice claim does not enjoy universal support, it could
be more effective than the substantive or corrective justice claims, despite the
fact that the latter are widely agreed.89
79 Ibid., p. 28 and 29.
80 Humphreys 2008, p. 57.
81 Ibid., p. 57.
82 Ibid., p. 57.
83 Ibid., p. 57.
84 Ibid., p. 57.
85 Ibid., p. 58.
86 Ibid., p. 57.
87 Ibid., p. 57.
88 Ibid., p. 58.
89 Ibid., p. 58.
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13.3 THE SECURITY AND RESPONSIBILITY APPROACH
The most direct link between security and responsibility can be found in
bilateral and multilateral agreements on shared resources. These agreements
aim to preserve the quality of the resources and prevent conflicts over them
(e.g. they may regulate water use, as upstream excessive water use may leave
areas downstream uninhabitable, which may spark violence against upstream
communities). In the context of climate change, States supporting a security
approach in the climate change context are often major polluting States con-
cerned with instability in affected regions or a large influx of refugees towards
their States. It is for reasons of security that States may take responsibility for
causing environmental degradation. The international environmental law may
then act as a point of reference on the levels of pollution that are acceptable.
However, this approach focusses on the interest of developed States and is
therefore not broadly supported by developing States. They fear that only those
situations that are of interest to developed States will be addressed. Developing
States focus on other instruments to create stability and to prevent conflict.
For example, insurance systems can reduce the impact of disasters, either
preventing people to migrate or allowing them to return to their place of origin
and rebuilt their houses. This means that there is no added pressure on other
communities to support those migrants and less possibilities for conflicts to
arise, as environmental degradation is not only a cause, but also a consequence
of forced migration.90
It is noteworthy that the overlap between the security and responsibility
approach is already visible in practice. The Cancún Adaptation Framework
(an environmental framework) explicitly concerns itself with climate induced
migration (a security framework). In every subsequent COP since Cancún,
considerations on migration have been included.91 This is also mirrored in
current migration instruments. In the Global Compact for migration and the
Global Compact on Refugees several references are made to environmentally
forced migration.92 At this point in time, these instruments basically cross-
reference to environmental instruments. They do not include State obligations
on how to deal with environmentally forced migration. This will be a next
step in their development.
90 McCue 1993, p. 151. See also § 13.3.
91 Most notably, in Paragraph 49 of the Paris COP Decision referring to Loss and Damage,
the Conference of the Parties ‘requests the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International
Mechanism to […] develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize
and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.’ [emphasis added]
and at COP24, the Task Force on Displacement has delivered on its mandate, and the
recommendations on integrated approaches have been forwarded by the Executive Commit-
tee for consideration by Parties. See also § 7.1.1.
92 See § 11.3.1 and § 11.1.3.
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In practice, any form of adaptation is to a large extent a question of
resources, information and infrastructure. As the responsibility for the pro-
tection of people on its territory is the primary responsibility of national States,
developed States should contribute to adaptation measures in developing
countries. Scenario planning (as a tool used by the military community to
assess the risk for future environmental degradation and the risk for migration
and conflict) can assist in predicting future harm. These predictions of security
risks may motivate developed States to prevent harm from happening. Military
data may also provide with the scientific evidence that is currently lacking
to build a strong case under the environmental law regime. Military intelli-
gence can for example be combined with the precautionary approach (respons-
ibility) in shaping responses to situations that lack full scientific certainty, but
can lead to environmental degradation or a breach of human rights.93 Even
if scenario planning might not offer a sufficient basis for legal causality, at
a minimum it may add to the moral obligations deriving of general principles
of international environmental law, such as the precautionary principle to assist
affected States.
A very progressive interpretation of the UN Charter, may include ‘a breach
of an international environmental obligation of “essential importance” […]
as a threat to peace and security.’94 This would make it a Security Council
issue. Voigt has argued that climate change can constitute a breach of an
obligation of essential importance based on a breach of Article 4.2 UNFCCC
in conjunction with Article 2 UNFCCC,95 a breach of the no-harm rule96 or
a breach of the precautionary principle.97 She argues that climate change
constitutes a breach of ‘essential importance’ that justifies involvement of the
Security Council in environmental matters. However, the political support
for this view must be considered limited in this moment.
93 It is receiving a growing attention. See for example Werrell, Femia 2015.
94 Voigt 2009, p. 300.
95 Ibid., p. 301.
96 Ibid., p. 302.
97 Ibid., p. 303.

14 A context-oriented and dynamic
interpretation for different types of
environmental refugees
The analyses in Part II has demonstrated how the different types of environ-
mental refugees are protected under the various approaches. Based on this
analysis, it can be concluded that different types of environmental refugees
are best protected under different approaches (even though the other
approaches may provide with additional protection, as regimes can be over-
lapping). Instead of opting for one of the approaches as a main protection
strategy, this paragraph suggests that in order to aim for best protection, it
is required to use all approaches in a fluid way.1 A fluid approach can offer
more than just a broadening of legal protection regimes. The difference in
approaches is a highly relevant difference that should be considered by legal
practitioners, as the approach determines the expectations that one holds from
the law and provides a framework in which complementary norms are bar-
gained. A different approach thus leads to a different logical solution and thus
preselects possible legal outcomes. This fluid approach can best be achieved
through a context-oriented and dynamic interpretation.2 As Kolmannskog and
Trebbi argue: ‘It is important to interpret law with a view to the ever-changing
environment in which it must be applied.’3 This paragraph will further draw
possibilities for such a context-oriented and dynamic interpretation for different
types of environmental refugees.
1 The findings in this paragraph have been published in Vliet van der 2018.
2 Kolmannskog, Trebbi 2010, p. 729 and 730.
3 Ibid., p. 729.
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Figure 13: Schematic overview of the different types of environmental refugees and
how they relate to the different approaches
14.1 SUDDEN ONSET DISASTERS
As demonstrated in § 4.1, sudden-onset disasters are best protected by the
home State under a rights-based approach. The rights-based approach offers
a generally accepted framework of rules that apply to everybody at any time,
therefore including those forcedly displaced by sudden-onset disasters. Under
the responsibility approach, those affected by sudden-onset disaster may invoke
the responsibility of polluters in cases where there is a (proven) causality
between their actions and the (non-natural) disaster(caused by or aggravated
by human actions). This causality is hard to construct. The security framework
will generally not offer solutions for sudden-onset displacement, as generally
they affect only parts of the country. This leaves other parts of the country
available as internal flight alternatives, therefore impeding protection obliga-
tions of third States. Only in case of serious sudden-onset disasters in border
areas, third States may be willing to provide access and stay based on human-
itarian considerations.4
In general, those internally displaced are covered under the scope of the
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and operational guidelines, as long as the migrants were forced or obliged
to flee. This element of force is relatively easy to establish in case of large-scale
sudden disruptions of the environment that acutely impact areas, such as big
typhoons or floods. More debatable are less devastating disasters that occur
frequently. If frequent, disasters prevent the possibility to earn a living and
support the family. Can this still be framed as forced migration, or is this a
voluntary economic type of migration? This will have to be determined in
future on a case to case basis.5 In these last circumstances, the IDPs have to
fall back on the general human rights framework to protect them. As Wewe-
rinke-Sing and Van Geelen have argued in the context of climate change:
‘international human rights […] has its own mechanisms of implementation
that can be used to address climate change.’6 International human rights law
provides obligations to protect peoples and individuals against forced displace-
ment resulting from environmental degradation. However, this obligation is
limited, as was considered by the ECtHR:
‘where the State is required to take positive measures, the choice of means is in
principle a matter that falls within the Contracting State’s margin of appreciation.
[…] In this respect an impossible or disproportionate burden must not be imposed
on the authorities without consideration being given, in particular, to the operational
choices which they must make in terms of priorities and resources; this results from
the wide margin of appreciation States enjoy. This consideration must be afforded
even greater weight in the sphere of emergency relief in relation to a meteorological
event, which is as such beyond human control, than in the sphere of dangerous
activities of a man-made nature.’7
Further, in particular for forced migration due to various small-scale events,
it will be very challenging to prove that a State is required to take positive
action.
As a protection mechanism, a rights-based approach also does not respond
adequately to pre-emptive movement and the effects of adaptation and mitiga-
tion measures are often overlooked. The responsibility approach may address
this by redirecting the focus to the cause of the forced migration: the environ-
mental degradation itself. The responsibility approach can also offer ways to
5 For example, principle 29 of the Guiding Principles states that ’Competent authorities have
the duty and responsibility to assist returned and/or resettled internally displaced persons
to recover, to the extent possible, their property and possessions which they left behind
or were dispossessed of upon their displacement. When recovery of such property and
possessions is not possible, competent authorities shall provide or assist these persons in
obtaining appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation’ or the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee, ‘IASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations
of Natural Disasters’ 2011, or the Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced
Persons.
6 Wewerinke-Singh, Van Geelen 2018, p. 691.
7 ECtHR, Budayeva and others v. Russia 2008, para 134 and 135.
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address the responsibility of polluting States. However, proving causality
between pollution and migration due to sudden-onset disaster will be far from
straightforward (even though it is easier to establish than with slow-onset
disasters). Possibly, commitments as reflected in NDCs (under the UNFCCC) can
be used as a baseline in the assessment of States’ compliance with their human
rights obligations.8 At a minimum, the responsibility approach can strengthen
– if not the legal – the moral obligation for polluting States to contribute to
solutions for climate related slow-onset disasters in affected countries. Apart
from the possibilities for State liability, the UNFCCC and its protocols may
provide finance mechanisms for adaptation or mitigation, therefore addressing
the lack of anticipation possibilities under the human rights framework. Also,
human rights and environmental rights can mutually reinforce each other,
for example in the right to a healthy environment. The security approach can
offer cross-border protection for sudden-onset disasters on a humanitarian
basis. This protection may be strengthened by emphasizing the human rights
implications (which may result in a human rights-based non-refoulement).
Especially in the context of sudden-onset disasters due to climate change, a
security approach can also be instrumental in establishing the causal link
between the pollution and the forced migration, as this approach is familiar
with future risk assessments and there seems to be a consensus on the links
between environmental degradation and migration.
14.2 SLOW-ONSET DISASTERS
Despite the long timeframe for action (due to the slow-onset character of the
disasters), victims of slow-onset disasters are generally considered to suffer
from the biggest protection gap. The main reasons for the protection gaps
identified for environmentally forced migration due to slow-onset disasters
are: (a) the lack of a clear causal relation between the environmental degrada-
tion and the reason to migrate; and (b) the lack of a clear element of force in
the decision to migrate. ‘Slow onset disasters will lead to a tipping point at
which people’s lives and livelihoods come under such serious threat that they
have no choice but to leave their homes. But even before the tipping point
is reached, many people will decide to leave in anticipation of worse to come
or in order to improve their economic situation which has become dire
amongst other factors due to environmental degradation.’9 It is virtually
impossible to determine exactly at which point people’s lives and livelihoods
come under such serious threat that the migration should be considered forced.
In general, those who move primarily due to gradual environmental degrada-
tion are often poorly visible as they leave often not in large numbers over a
8 Wewerinke-Singh, Van Geelen 2018, p. 691.
9 Vliet van der 2018, p. 21.
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longer period of time. The degree of force in the migration may also be con-
sidered differently at the different stages of gradual environmental degradation.
For those displaced by slow-onset disasters there may therefore be operational
and normative protection gaps, internally and internationally, because they
risk being considered economic or voluntary migrants.10
The approach that offers the best protection possibilities for slow-onset
disaster related migration is the rights-based approach. This approach suffers
the least from the aforementioned causes of the protection gap. As the human
rights framework focusses on the violation of basic rights as such irrespective
of the cause of the violation and the nature of the movement (voluntary or
forced), it applies to all types of migration due to slow-onset disasters. For
this reason, the rights-based approach often assumes the movement to be
forced. The human rights framework may provide access to Courts in order
to address environmental degradation. However, apart from a general obliga-
tion to promote human rights, it is difficult to enforce human rights. Environ-
mental degradation clearly affects human rights, but violations of these rights
are difficult to demonstrate. Also, the human rights instrument is a responsive
instrument that does not allow for early mitigation and adaptation, while in
reality slow-onset disasters provide a unique opportunity to do so due to their
gradual character.
The security approach offers little options for those forcible displaced due
to slow-onset disasters. In general, they will be considered as economic
migrants and access and stay will be restricted. ‘Human rights law has
expanded States’ protection obligations beyond the “refugee” category, to
include (at least) people at risk of arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment [complementary pro-
tection]’.11 However, for now, human rights violations caused by environ-
mental degradation are as such highly unlikely to give rise to a non-refoule-
ment obligation.12 When slow-onset disasters may affect peace and stability
10 Kolmannskog 2008 executive summary.
11 McAdam 2012, p. 53.
12 ‘In the case AC Tuvalu [2014] NZIPT 501370-371, the Immigration and Protection Tribunal
New Zealand has accepted that exposure to the impacts of natural disasters can, in general
terms, be a humanitarian circumstance that could make it unjust or unduly harsh to deport.
Nevertheless, in such a case the appellant must establish not simply the existence of a matter
of broad humanitarian concern, but exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature
such that it would be unjust or unduly harsh to deport the particular appellant from New
Zealand. It will be hard to meet this threshold. However, the judicial decision stipulates
that if return is not possible, permissible or reasonable due to circumstances in the place
of origin and personal conditions, a person should receive protection.’ In Vliet van der
2014, p. 170. In para 32 the Court considered: ‘As for the climate change issue relied on
so heavily, while the Tribunal accepts that exposure to the impacts of natural disasters
can, in general terms, be a humanitarian circumstance, nevertheless, the evidence in appeals
such as this must establish not simply the existence of a matter of broad humanitarian
concern, but that there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature such that
it would be unjust or unduly harsh to deport the particular appellant from New Zealand.’
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in certain regions, security aspects may come into play. Slow-onset disasters
have the potential to destabilize regions and cause conflicts over reclining
resources.13 The political will to address slow-onset disasters may rise, and
possibilities for mitigation and adaptation may be created.
The responsibility approach may provide with funding of mitigation and
adaptation measures for slow-onset disasters through the UNFCCC finance
mechanisms. Possibly also the migration itself may be funded if it is considered
an adaptation strategy (even though these finance mechanisms are not designed
to deal with migration). Under the responsibility approach, the slow-onset
disaster may benefit from the larger window of opportunity to address the
root of the problem. It may respond more accurately to pre-emptive movement
and may stimulate ways for safe, orderly and regular migration. Possibly,
commitments as reflected in NDCs (under the UNFCCC) can be used as a baseline
in the assessment of States’ compliance with their human rights obligations.14
A big limitation under the responsibility approach however, is that is suffers
from a double problem of causation: causality between the movement and
the degradation, and the chain of causality between human actions and slow-
onset disasters. This seriously limits the possibilities for State liability. How-
ever, the narrative of the responsibility approach can at a minimum contribute
to the moral obligation of polluting States to contribute to a solution.
The situation might be slightly different for SIDS. At some point questions
on causality between the environmental degradation and the migration will
no longer exist, and it will be evident that the migration is forced. Supported
by a human rights framework, this will enhance protection possibilities for
cross-border migration (non-refoulement). Another relevant aspect is that SIDS
raise questions that are relevant under a security agenda, such as questions
on sovereignty, nationality and ownership over resources (in particular in the
seabed). This particular type of slow-onset degradation is therefore much more
likely to be considered under a security approach.15 Some argue that under
these circumstances there is a responsibility to protect.16
14.3 ARMED CONFLICT
Armed conflict is best covered under a security approach. The conflict itself
is generally accepted as a basis for protection. International humanitarian law
provides internal protection and widespread violence generally suffices for
13 See § 6.3.
14 Wewerinke-Singh, Van Geelen 2018, p. 691.
15 ‘Interestingly, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol both consciously ignore issues pertaining
to the potential loss of sovereignty or statelessness caused by climate change-related
impacts.’ In Limon 2009, p. 455.
16 See § 10.3.3.
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access to third countries based on regular national migration laws. The pro-
tection of forced migrants from a security perspective is mainly a remedial
mechanism. For these protection mechanisms, there is no added value in
framing a conflict as caused by environmental degradation.17 However, from
the perspective of prevention, it may be useful to frame a conflict as being
caused by environmental degradation. For example, conflicts over shrinking
or growing resources may be prevented altogether if preventive action is taken
on time. For example, by concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements on
the use of resources. The rights based-approach may be instrumental in ex-
panding third countries’ protection obligations beyond the ‘refugee’ category
(non-refoulement). Armed conflict is generally not considered under the
responsibility narrative.
14.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
Environmental contamination is best covered by the responsibility approach.
Under the responsibility approach the focus will be on the prevention of
environmental degradation or compensation for damage. In case of less en-
vironmental degradation, less people will be forced to migrate, thus addressing
the problem at its root. In the context of environmental degradation and
transboundary damage, the law of State responsibility can ‘support primary
rules established by treaties or customary law which aim at preventing en-
vironmental damages and, second, provide injured States with a right to
restitution and compensation.’18 Breaches of human rights due to environ-
mental contamination may be invoked for national courts to strengthen liability
claims, or may serve to get access to justice through human rights courts. A
rights-based approach can also help to determine the effect of environmental
contamination on humans. The security narrative is not relevant for environ-
mental contamination, unless it is a global contamination with major effects
on the peace and security such as climate change. Under those circumstances,
the political will to address environmental contamination may rise, and pos-
sibilities for mitigation and adaptation may be created.
17 In the literature there is a growing interest for environmental degradation as an underlying
cause for conflict. See for example Hsiang, Burke & Miguel 2013.
18 Voigt 2008, p. 2 and 3. ‘There is, however, little empirical evidence that State responsibility
for environmental damage has been regarded by States as a positive inducement to prevent-
ing damages or as a means for restoration or compensation. One example is the Chernobyl
accident, which caused significant harm to a number of Northern European countries, none
of which attempted to claim compensation from the Soviet Union.’ In Voigt 2008, p. 3.
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14.5 PLANNED RESETTLEMENT
Forced resettlement or development displacement is governed by various
guidelines. It differs from other types of climate refugees because the timing
of displacement is fixed and planned and somebody or some institution is
responsible for a correct execution of the resettlement. The emphasis of the
regulation of forced resettlement is that the rights of the people forcedly
displaced are respected. This type of migration is therefore best covered by
a rights-based approach. For forced resettlement, the security approach offers
no useful platform, as it is perceived as an internal situation that does not affect
third States (unless there is a spill over effect to neighbouring countries, for
example for SIDS). Forced resettlement will generally not be considered under
the responsibility approach, other than from the perspective that somebody
or some institution is responsible for a correct execution of the resettlement.
Planned resettlement can be very beneficial as an adaptation strategy. If
lands no longer sustain certain groups of people, the migration of some or
all of these people may be a demonstration of the ability to migrate and to
take control of the situation. Rights-based considerations can underscore the
minimum values of treatment that these migrants need to be provided with
before, during and after transit. Those displaced should have a strong input
in the selection of who will move where and at what time. Various legal
guidelines prescribe what minimum (especially procedural) rights should be
met, in particular for indigenous peoples with a strong attachment to the land
or other vulnerable groups (e.g. women, children, disabled). Regional Human
rights tribunals have ruled several times in favour of indigenous groups that
had their traditional land polluted or claimed for other purposes.19 However,
the enforcement of these judgments is difficult in practice. These cases do
demonstrate that a violation of environmental law (responsibility approach)
that affects either individual or group human rights (rights-based approach)
may prevent migration if the pollution is properly addressed. The security
approach can be relevant when migrants seek legal routes to migrate to other
countries, for example through labour migration schemes or education pro-
grammes. If the procedural guidelines are adhered to, it is unlikely that
planned relocation will cause instability in the region through conflicts with
earlier residents of the area of resettlement. In that context, the security
approach will not be very relevant.
19 For example in the cases ACmHPR, Centre for Minority Rights Development Kenya and
Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya 2010
and ACmHPR, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre vs Nigeria 2001.
15 General conclusion
Environmental degradation will push many people into migration in the next
decennia. From a legal perspective, those forced to migrate due to environ-
mental degradation (environmental refugees) are not acknowledged as a special
group that requires protection. Protection must therefore be found in legal
frameworks that protect either against forced displacement or against environ-
mental degradation. However in this era of (rapidly) increasing environmental
degradation (e.g. human induced climate change), international law has to
evolve in order to respond to a whole new array of legal questions, including
that of forced migration due to environmental degradation.
Environmentally forced degradation challenges traditional approaches in
international law. Unlike traditional refugees, environmental refugees need
no protection against their home State. This therefore excludes them from
protection under the Refugee Convention. Oftentimes the home State is willing
but unable to support those forced into migration due to environmental
degradation. Most environmental refugees migrate within their own countries
(Internally Displaced Persons). As these are often developing countries, the
problems that arise from environmental degradation exceed the home States
capacity. Any viable solution therefore requires the involvement of the inter-
national community.
Another typical element of environmentally forced migration is that it offers
a timeframe in which pre-emptive action can be taken. Because environmental
degradation can take place over a long period of time (for example air- or soil
pollution) there is a unique timeframe in which migration can either be pre-
vented or managed into a safe, orderly and regular migration. However, legal
instruments for migration are broadly responsive in character and only allow
for a determination of a ‘refugee’ status after the migration has taken place.
A further typical element is that environmental degradation is often not
a linear process. Also, many events such as drought may occur unfrequently,
therefore one year areas may be uninhabitable, which are habitable the next.
The need for migration is also heavily influenced by group action (some may
leave to sustain the remaining ones financially), State action (support after
sudden-onset disaster, for example by providing food and tents, may allow
people to stay) and the (in)actions of those affected (for example building
houses that may sustain earthquakes lowers the risk of forced migration). As
a consequence, the element of force is more of a continuum than a clear
moment in time. The law needs to come up with clear assessment frameworks
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to determine if migration is considered forced. This will be very complicated,
as so far, there isn’t even an internationally agreed legal definition on environ-
mentally forced migration.
Finally, for some types of environmental refugees, return is often impossible
for a long period of time (for example, areas that are frequently affected by
floods) or permanent (for example for low-lying SIDS). This may cause pro-
tection gaps, as most classic migration instruments focus on return. New
instruments therefore need to include resettlement strategies instead of tem-
porary protection for these types of environmental refugees.
From an environmental perspective, the law struggles with the multi-causal
and cross-border character of the problem. For example, climate change is the
effect of a large number of polluting actions today and in the past in all
countries of the world, this is not easily translated into the binary language
of law. Complicated strains of causality often lead to impunity or at a mini-
mum place a very heavy burden of proof on those affected. Climate migration
challenges the assumption often made in international environmental law that
the benefits and burdens of certain actions often rest within the same State.
Even though science is more and more capable of predicting consequences
of climate change, in certain hotspots, international law is broadly unfamiliar
with dealing with future damage based on risk assessments. In the context
of environmentally forced migration, waiting for the moment that strains of
causality are clear and/or damage is imminent would waste the window of
opportunity to either prevent or regulate migration.
So far, environmentally forced migration has been broadly addressed in
three different ways: as a rights-based approach, as a security approach and
as a responsibility approach. These approaches all have a different perception
of the problem of environmentally forced migration: environmental degrada-
tion as a risk for people, environmental degradation as a cause for floods of
refugees or a threat to international security and environmental degradation
itself as the core issue. The difference in approaches is a highly relevant
difference that should be considered by legal practitioners, as the approach
determines the expectations that one holds from the law and provides a
framework in which complementary norms are bargained.
The rights-based approach
The rights-based approach considers climate forced migration from an anthro-
pocentric point of view, addressing the adverse effects of environmental
degradation on human beings. In order to provide protection, general human
rights have to be clarified in the context of environmentally forced migration.
Human rights regimes focus on the duties of home States to protect people
under their jurisdiction. This means that States will have to put in place legal
protection mechanisms to protect their inhabitants against too high levels of
pollution. The fact that the State did not cause the threat does not excuse the
State‘s failure to try to protect against it. Moreover, a State unable to fulfil these
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duties with its own resources may be obliged to seek assistance from other
States. Human rights can clarify State obligations towards IDPs. Their wide
acceptance of human rights makes them a powerful guideline for global public
policy. Based on the concept of rights holders and duty bearers, human rights
can help build accountable governance.
However, the rights-based approach also has some inherent weaknesses.
As the majority of environmental refugees is situated in developing countries,
protection possibilities are limited for three reasons. First, these States are held
to a lower protection standard for several of the affected human rights (CBDR).
Second, these States are often unable (e.g. economically or strategically) to
deal with the consequences of environmental degradation. And, lastly, these
States often have contributed the least to climate change (as one of the causes
of environmental degradation). Apart from the weaknesses due to the fact
that most displacement takes place in developing States, protection is also
hindered by the complex and diffuse link between environmental degradation
and migration. Finally, human rights obligations leave little room to consider
future risks. Although, this weakness can be partially overcome by strengthen-
ing procedural obligations, such as the obligation for Environmental Impact
Assessments for large projects.
For Internally Displaced Persons several non-binding and binding instru-
ments have been adopted. In these instruments, the general human rights have
been clarified in the context of forced displacement. However, a significant
number of Internally Displaced Persons suffer from a protection and assistance
deficit. A clear protection gap exists due to poor implementation of legal
standards, the weak status of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displace-
ment (as non-binding principles) and the absence of opportunities for Internally
Displace Persons to have their rights ensured, implemented or legally enforced
at the domestic level.
The rights-based approach can benefit from a further development of a
freestanding right of a clean/healthy environment. Also, a stronger focus on
the procedural rights may develop into a right to information of those likely
to be affected (and a duty for Environmental Impact Assessments), a say in
decision-making processes on mitigation and adaptation measures or an
obligation to seek their ‘Free, Prior, and Informed Consent’. Further, the system
of periodic reporting on human rights issues could be better utilized as a public
forum for challenging State action or inaction on environmental protection
to at least put the spotlight on the issue. Finally, a stronger emphasis on
positive extraterritorial State obligations could be developed into positive duties
to prevent environmentally forced migration in other States by controlling
harmful activities within the State. Another possible path is that of building
on the duty to cooperate as a way to enhance protection for environmental
refugees. In extreme circumstances, if a State is unable or unwilling to take
its responsibility, a responsibility to protect may be developed based on a
blueprint of the Responsibility to Protect.
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The security approach
The security approach contemplates the interdependence between human
vulnerability and national security. Migration is considered a threat derived
from uncoordinated responses which could in turn increase the risk of domestic
conflict, as well as have international repercussions. Within this approach,
States receiving migrants will govern this migration through refugee conven-
tions and national and international migration instruments. For cross-border
migration, the security approach is the most obvious approach, as the national
State will have to grant access and stay. Migration as a whole is generally left
to national legal discretion rather than being subject to comprehensive inter-
national legal control. International law is limited to narrow and specialised
interventions in areas such as refugees, migrant workers or humanitarian aid.
In general the receiving States often perceive the migration as voluntary, as
environmental refugees generally do not qualify as refugees in the legal
meaning (Although, some regional refugee conventions allow for an interpreta-
tion that would include environmental refugees). Although regular migration
schemes may offer a possibility of access to another country for some people,
it is not a response to the problem of environmentally forced migration. In
practice, States do respond to emergency situations, for example in the form
of temporary access. However, temporary access (with an unclear legal status)
is not an option for long term migration due to slow-onset disasters or per-
manent (planned) resettlement. Even when environmental refugees do not
qualify as legal ‘refugee’ and cannot benefit from regular migration options,
protection might have to be granted if return would violate the international
legal obligations not to return a person to serious ill-treatment such as torture,
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. However, no court
has currently granted protection against return for reasons of environmental
degradation. And even if it were granted, it would only protect against the
most extreme situations of environmental degradation, where return would
threat the right to life, would put the environmental refugee in danger of being
subjected to torture and/or other human rights violations that are sufficiently
flagrant to give rise to a non-refoulement obligation. This system would need
to be developed before it would encompass environmental refugees.
The current legal and normative distinction between refugees and volun-
tary, economic migrants fails to recognize the diversity of reasons why people
may be forced to cross borders. Unlike economic migrants that look for better
opportunities elsewhere, environmental refugees move away from a situation
that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their
life. They move because they have to and (may) require assistance from third
States to offer them protection. In general, cross-border protection instruments
are unable to address the underlying causes of environmental displacement.
The instruments focus on the output: forced migration. However, many cases
of forced migration due to environmental degradation may be prevented when
the underlying cause (environmental degradation) is addressed. Within the
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current system, temporary protection measures seem to offer the most promis-
ing way forward. These ad hoc temporary protection mechanisms have mainly
been applied in the context of sudden-onset natural disasters, but have a
potential for application for other types of environmentally forced migration.
The main limitations are that such protection is temporary indeed while the
need for protection may be permanent and those offered temporary protection
often have limited rights compared to regular refugees. National courts may
also develop a more extensive test for the return of those affected by environ-
mental degradation, although this would require a big shift from current
practice. Another possibility is the broadening of the scope of subsidiary
protection. Threats to the right to life due to environmental degradation may
be accepted as an argument that subsidiary protection should be granted in
certain cases of extreme natural disaster or degradation on the basis of the
ban on torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.
The responsibility approach
The responsibility approach has a strong focus on anthropogenic climate
change. It considers the obligation of polluting countries of the Global North
(and other polluters) to address the needs of countries that will suffer most
in the Global South. From a legal perspective it focusses on international
environmental law and the rules of international law on State responsibility.
A strongpoint of the responsibility approach is that it shifts the debate from
protection of migrants to mitigation and compensatory remedies to prevent
migration. It also carries a moral weight, as developed countries are mostly
causing pollution, which provides the opportunity to leverage funding and
assistance for the affected countries. The topic of climate change can be
addressed under the treaty regimes of the UNFCCC, UNCLOS and human rights.
However, the prospect to receive compensation for cross-border environmental
degradation on the basis of international environmental law is low. States are
for example very reluctant to fall back on the international law of State re-
sponsibility to settle disputes on cross-border environmental degradation or
damage to the global commons. International law is ill equipped when con-
fronted with a complex situation, such as compensation for climate change
damages. The allocation of responsibility for climate change poses a number
of significant problems: (1) interpretative problems (what is loss and damage?);
(2) problems of justification for liability; (3) relatedly, the issue of retrospective
liability provisions (how can we justify liability even once responsibility is
determined?); and (4) finally, problems of causal allocation and proof. How-
ever, at the same time, the support for a responsibility approach in the context
of environmentally forced migration is growing. For example, within the
UNFCCC and its subsequent COPs, the connection between climate change and
human mobility is increasingly acknowledged.
The UNFCCC, may offer ways of State responsibility or even liability. For
example, a breach of the very specific quantified emission limitation and
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reduction commitments from the Kyoto Protocol could be considered a breach
of a treaty obligation that potentially could give rise to State liability. The Paris
Agreement obligates all parties to prepare, communicate and maintain success-
ive (non-legally binding) ‘nationally determined contributions’ and includes
significant provisions on adaptation and, for the first time, a self-standing
Article dealing with loss and damage. The Task Force on Displacement under
the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage is another example
of growing awareness and possibly responsibility of States for environmentally
forced migration.
So far, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has not
dealt with climate change litigation, even though climate change affects the
marine environment. ITLOS has regarded the precautionary approach as an
integral part of the due diligence, which may serve as a point of reference in
the climate change context. Further, the obligation to conduct an environmental
impact assessment is a direct obligation under the Convention and a general
obligation under customary international law. This might be a powerful tool
in the climate change context. In its Order of 3 December 2001 in the MOX Plant
Case,1 the ITLOS considered the duty to cooperate in exchanging information
concerning environmental risks a ‘fundamental principle in the prevention
of pollution of the marine environment’ (para 82). This indicates that the duty
to cooperate may be legally enforceable. The case law of ITLOS could therefore
provide a starting point of interpretation of the pollution prevention duties
under UNCLOS with respect to the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
In an Advisory Opinion,2 the IACtHR confirms the possibility of ‘diagonal’
human rights obligations. This Advisory Opinion opens a door to cross-border
human rights claims arising from transboundary environmental impacts, such
as climate change. It remains a hurdle however that human-rights litigation
demands evidence that an injury has been caused to the rights of identifiable
people (standing), by an identifiable actor (causation and attribution) as well
as evidence that the injury could be redressed. While domestic climate policies
often recognise a balance between the benefits of a particular economic policy
for a State and the environmental harm it creates, it is not easy to translate
this to transboundary harm where signatories ‘only’ contribute to climate
change. It can be concluded that, although particular treaty regimes as the
climate regime, the law of the sea and the human rights regime, may be
developed in future, currently they do not suffice to prevent, minimize or
restore climate change damage.
1 ITLOS, Mox Plant Case Ire. V. U.K. 2001.
2 IACtHR, Environment and human rights. Obligaciones Estatales en Relación con el Medio Ambiente
en el Marco de la Protección y Garantía de los Derechos a la Vida y a la Integridad Personal –
Interpretación y Alcance de los Artículos 4.1 y 5.1, en Relación con los Artículos 1.1 y 2 de la
Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, Advisory Opinion 2017, available at: http://
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_23_esp.pdf.
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Independently from these treaty regimes, general principles of international
law may provide protection. First, the no harm rule could be a potentially
powerful tool in the context of climate. Through holding the emitting State
to its procedural duties and a focus on the preventive dimension of the no
harm rule, a ‘positive’ duty to take concrete steps to protect the environment
can be established. However, the general no-harm rule does not provide any
guidance either for allowed behaviour or for behaviour which is not allowed.
A possible approach would be to question whether States were and are able
to take action to significantly reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, which
would significantly reduce their contribution to future climate change damage.
Second, as climate change, is surrounded by scientific uncertainties, one
could argue that the precautionary principle might be used to construct a liability
suit against a State by arguing, for example, that not taking adequate measures
to reduce the risks of climate change could be considered a breach of the
obligation to refrain from harmful activities, as interpreted by the precautionary
principle. It is very uncertain however if this argument would be accepted
by the relevant courts. Even if the principle is applied, there is little guidance
on what action it requires.
Third, at first glance, the polluter pays principle makes perfectly rational
economic and policy sense in the climate change context. However the prin-
ciple is not fully accepted in the climate regime. Neither the Paris Agreement
nor the COP Decision adopting it refer to the polluter-pays principle by name.
At the same time, it can be argued that the Paris Outcome does strongly imply
that greenhouse gas emissions will need to be priced, internationally as well
as domestically, and, therefore, that states must accept a cost for at least a
portion of their emissions, which is a reflection of the polluter pays principle.
In the Kyoto Protocol, also a cap-and-trade system was set up, for a small
number of States based on the CBDR principle. But even if the principle is fully
accepted as a legal principle, the fact that the pollution is only hazardous in
combination with pollution by other actors and complex causality patterns
make it difficult to determine who is the polluter. Therefore, it is hard for those
affected to single out which party to address for the damage and to establish
causality. Based on case law of the European Court of Justice, in the context
of multiple resource pollution, such as with air pollution, at a minimum the
polluter pays principle requires a a plan or programme to achieve a fair
sharing of the burden. The principle can also underpin the need of cooperation
between all levels of government.
Fourth, the principle of CBDR may be applied. The CBDR is both firmly
established in the climate regime, and the subject of fierce debates about its
precise parameters. Aside from the basic proposition that parties’ responsibil-
ities under the climate change regime are to be differentiated, there is little
common ground. According to the ILA, the CBDR principle in the climate change
context requires States to respond to climate change and its impacts in different
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ways depending on their past, present, and future contributions to climate
change, their levels of wealth, and other national circumstances.
Alternatively, the responsibility for climate change is also discussed in the
context of sustainable development. The principle of sustainable development
is widely accepted as an important principle by States although the exact
meaning is still heavily debated. It has been argued that States shall protect
the climate system as a common natural resource for the benefit of present
and future generations, within the broader context of the international com-
munity’s commitment to sustainable development. The climate system is
defined as ‘a common natural resource’ that has to be managed for the benefit
of present and future generations. However, the emphasis is on voluntary
cooperation.
In future, international human rights bodies may provide access to justice
for individuals that are affected by climate change. Human rights adjudication
bodies may be able to assign State responsibility for mitigation and adaptation
measures in a way that overcomes the challenge of future and diffuse causation
in tort liability. They can also clarify the positive legal obligations in the context
of climate change. However, several significant problems remain. As environ-
mental degradation affects groups of people and the actions of the people in
those groups affect the need for migration, this is not easily translated into
human rights violations. Also the allocation of loss is a very complex task,
that international human rights tribunals are most likely unable to perform.
A substantially different route forward is negotiation of solutions instead
of litigation. The concept of ‘loss and damage’ under the UNFCCC does not
involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation. However, it
provides a basis for compensation or adaptation. Another example of a nego-
tiated solution is insurance. This is a market-oriented solution to distribute
the costs of climate change impacts. This may lead to better results than
individual claims for liability that would only cover small groups of environ-
mental refugees. However, at the same time, international environmental law
should keep building on the concept of prevention, which gives rise to a
multitude of legal mechanisms, including prior assessment of environmental
harm, licensing or authorization that set out the conditions for operation and
the consequences for violation of the conditions, as well as the adoption of
strategies and policies (good governance).
Overlapping approaches
So far, responses to environmentally forced displacement have generally been
fragmented, uncoordinated and unpredictable. The rights-based approach,
the security approach and the responsibility approach can mutually reinforce
each other in order to create a more coherent and better equipped legal pro-
tection regime. The approaches can be instrumental in enticing States to
participate in solutions that would not have been acceptable under a different
approach. Further, using an international hybrid law approach will allow legal
General conclusion 413
practitioners and policy makers to consider protection possibilities outside
the context in which the instrument is negotiated. The hybrid law approach
presents a clear picture of exactly where the legal instruments can be sourced
from and simultaneously allows for the combined application of the principles
encapsulated within these approaches. The different approaches will allow
legal practitioners to better frame environmentally forced migration as a breach
of the respective legal regimes and the strength of the principles within each
approach can counterbalance each other in the formulation of legal arguments
to address specific violations. It allows for addressing environmentally forced
migration in all its stages: prevention, protection during the migration and
protection after the migration. However, even though an international hybrid
law approach supports the combination of the different approaches (and their
corresponding legal regimes), combining approaches is complicated. Each
approach has a different focus (victims, States, polluters), different assumptions
(e.g. movement is forced or voluntary) and focusses on different time frames
(prevention, adaptation, mitigation, protection during migration, resettlement).
Also, questions can arise on which branch’s rules will apply and how conflicts
should be mediated. In practice we can already see the merging of the different
approaches, in the form of cross-referencing to the various instruments: for
example, the Global Compact for Migration contains multiple references to
environmental degradation and the Cancún Adaptation Framework explicitly
concerns itself with (climate induced) migration.
As the concept of environmentally forced migration is broad and complex,
rights and obligations need to be clarified in the context of various types of
environmental refugees. The broad concept should guide State action, but in
order to develop appropriate responses, the different characteristics of the
various types of environmental refugees have to be considered. Being aware
of the various approaches and subsequent protection possibilities helps finding
better protection possibilities on a case to case basis. These individual claims
may help to build a system from the ground up and will allow for the use
of the various approaches in an instrumental way, rather than letting the
chosen instrument guide us to a ‘solution’. In order to aim for best protection
for climate induced migrants, it is required to use a context-oriented and
dynamic interpretation.
The progressive development of international law is very likely insufficient
to address the protection needs of environmental refugees. Therefore, inter-
national law experts should take a central role in the development of new
protection regimes. The law should not be limited to a role in which it can
only address the worst cases and provide protection to a few individuals.
International law experts cannot change the law as it is, nor should they argue
that the international law can be interpreted for new situations (such as climate
change) in ways that threaten the sheer fabric of international law. It is obvious
that the current system – that is built on the concept of national sovereignty –
is suboptimal to address such complex and global issues as migration and
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climate change as we face today. Environmentally forced migration can best
be dealt with in a more holistic way, involving various stages and various
actors. While this approach would provide much better protection for those
affected by slow-onset degradation that only becomes life threatening in the
final stages, it would logically and economically be best addressed in its early
stages. As has been illustrated by mirroring the current Responsibility to
Protect pillar system, both the home State and the international community
should take action in various stages (i.e. prevent, react, rebuild).3 The inter-
national community should primarily assist the home State, for example by
helping to design domestic measures and early warning systems. However,
it may well prove to be necessary that the international community to also
take collective action, for example through insurance or compensation funds
or through loss and damage compensation. These actions can take place
simultaneously and can cover stages from prevention of migration and pro-
tection during migration till return or resettlement.
The law can also be used to inform policymakers on alternative rules. Also,
various narratives should be used to engage both developing and developed
States in the creation of new protection instruments. For example, migrant
receiving States should be informed of their interest to prevent migration by
addressing environmental degradation in sending States at an early stage.
However, the interest of affected States should be central, as the involvement
of the people affected by environmental degradation is critical in reaching
solutions to empower those affected. A rights-based narrative can be used to
frame the protection of environmental refugees from the perspective of the
effect on people and their basic human rights. In that context, if migration
cannot be avoided, migration as adaptation from a position of strength is the
preferred outcome. Both sending and receiving States should increasingly
support regular pathways of voluntary migration as a means of adaptation.
Furthermore, a responsibility narrative can be used to inform developed States
on the importance of addressing environmental degradation in developing
States at an early stage in order to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals
(in particular SDGs 13 climate action, 14 life below water and 15 life on land)
and to support the progressive development of human rights in developing
States. The system of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capacities can be used to reflect that some States have contributed more to
global environmental degradation and have benefited more from the polluting
industrial development, and thus should take a larger share of the burden
for the solutions required. Due to the seriousness of the matter, the central
question should not be what States can be forced to do, but how much they
can contribute to prevent serious harm. A combination of these narratives may
stimulate States to draw up new protection regimes that have a firm basis in
3 See UNGA UN Doc A/63/677 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Report of the
Secretary General, 12 January 2009.
General conclusion 415
existing law. Good examples of such systems can be found in the development
of the Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons4 and the Agenda
for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters
and Climate Change.5 As long as climate change and other forms of environ-
mental degradation are not addressed properly, the number of environmental
refugees is bound to rise over time. Therefore, the protection regime needs
to be built and extended rapidly. This requires innovative ways of finding
solutions that go beyond the mere interpretation of international law. Inter-
national law experts should engage more with policy makers in order to find
these creative solutions.
4 UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1,
PR00/98/109 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Guiding Principles), UN Doc
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.
5 Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement, Agenda for the Protection
of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, Volume
I available at: https://nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-




DE INTERNATIONALE RECHTSBESCHERMING VAN MILIEUVLUCHTELINGEN
Een mensenrechtenbenadering, een veiligheidsbenadering en een aansprakelijkheids-
benadering
In de afgelopen jaren is in verschillende toonaangevende juridische en beleids-
documenten benadrukt dat aantasting van het milieu mensen tot migratie kan
dwingen. Dit noopt tot het ontwikkelen van een samenhangend beschermings-
kader voor deze milieuvluchtelingen. Dit onderzoek analyseert hoe milieu-
vluchtelingen worden beschermd onder het geldende internationaal recht en
hoe deze bescherming kan worden verbeterd. Allereerst moet worden bepaald
wie recht heeft op bescherming. Dit is geen gemakkelijke taak. Gedwongen
milieu-migratie is een zeer complex fenomeen. Vanwege de multicausaliteit
van de beslissing om te migreren en de complexiteit van het vaststellen van
een moment waarop migratie als gedwongen wordt beschouwd, is het moeilijk
om te bepalen wie als een milieuvluchteling moet worden beschouwd. Boven-
dien verschillen milieuvluchtelingen onderling sterk van elkaar. Waar in
sommige situaties (zoals aardbevingen) tijdelijke humanitaire hulp zou vol-
staan, zou in andere situaties (stijgende zeespiegel of verwoestijning) alleen
permanente hervestiging een adequate oplossing zijn.
Het complexe karakter van gedwongen milieu-migratie laat zich moeilijk
vertalen in het binaire karakter van het recht. Via een systematische juridische
analyse kunnen elementen van verschillende juridische instrumenten op een
instrumentele manier worden gebruikt om milieuvluchtelingen op de korte,
middellange en lange termijn te beschermen. Aangezien het recht op dit
moment slecht toegerust is om milieuvluchtelingen te beschermen, wordt een
analyse van de huidige beschermingsregimes (deel II) aangevuld met een
analyse van de mogelijkheden voor progressieve interpretatie (deel III), gevolgd
door een verkenning van een meer holistische benadering door middel van
het combineren van een mensenrechtenbenadering, een veiligheidsbenadering
en een aansprakelijkheidsbenadering(deel IV).
De mensenrechtenbenadering beschouwt milieumigratie vanuit een antropo-
centrisch oogpunt en focust op de effecten van milieudegradatie op mensen.
Aangezien de meeste mensenrechteninstrumenten niet expliciet verwijzen naar
aantasting van het milieu, moeten de algemene regels worden geïnterpreteerd
als rechten en garanties die relevant zijn voor de bescherming van milieuvluch-
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telingen. Deze identificatie heeft deels plaatsgevonden in het kader van de
Richtlijnen voor de bescherming van ontheemden, zoals ontwikkeld door een
team van internationale rechtsgeleerden onder leiding van prof. Walter Kälin.
Hierin zijn rechten opgenomen voor de bescherming van personen tegen
gedwongen verplaatsing en voor hun bescherming en bijstand tijdens verplaat-
sing, alsmede tijdens terugkeer of hervestiging en re-integratie. Op papier zijn
de rechten van ontheemden goed beschermd, maar in de praktijk ontbreken
mogelijkheden voor ontheemden om hun rechten op nationaal of internationaal
niveau af te dwingen. Een sterk punt van de mensenrechtenbenadering is dat
de mensenrechten waarop deze is gebaseerd algemeen worden aanvaard door
samenlevingen en overheden. Het creëert een gemeenschappelijk juridisch
kader of universele norm met wettelijk bindende verplichtingen voor Staten
en juridisch afdwingbare rechten voor individuen. Internationale mensenrech-
tenkaders kunnen juridische leemten op nationaal niveau opvullen. Mensen-
rechten kunnen ook de reikwijdte van de verantwoordelijkheden van over-
heden en internationale organisaties ten opzichte van ontheemden verduidelij-
ken. Het concept van houders van rechten en dragers van plichten helpt het
concept van verantwoord bestuur te versterken. Met name procedurele rechten
(recht op informatie, inspraak van het publiek en rechtsmiddelen) kunnen ertoe
bijdragen dat staten worden gedwongen rekening te houden met de rechten
van de personen die worden getroffen door milieudegradatie. Echter, aangezien
de meerderheid van de milieuvluchtelingen zich in ontwikkelingslanden
bevindt, zijn de beschermingsmogelijkheden beperkt. Ten eerste zijn deze staten
in sommige gevallen gehouden aan een lagere beschermingsnorm voor de
geschonden mensenrechten. De meeste van de getroffen rechten zijn tevens
rechten van de tweede generatie, die notoir zwakke handhavingsmechanismen
hebben. Deze rechten worden ook afgewogen tegen openbare belangen (inclu-
sief economische belangen). Zelfs wanneer de rechten van de eerste generatie
worden aangetast (zoals het recht op leven en eigendom), vallen deze niet
onder hun normale handhavingsprocedures, want in het beste geval kan de
schade vaak alleen indirect worden toegeschreven aan de geïdentificeerde
daders, zoals het geval is met klimaatverandering. Ten tweede zijn de meest
getroffen Staten vaak niet in staat (bijv. economisch of strategisch) om om te
gaan met de gevolgen van aantasting van het milieu en hebben deze staten
soms het minst bijgedragen aan de oorzaak van de milieudegradatie zoals
in het geval van klimaatverandering. Een andere beperking van de mensen-
rechtenbenadering is dat het systeem geen preventieve migratie toestaat,
hoewel dit soms wel wenselijk is. Mensenrechtenschendingen worden normaal
gesproken vastgesteld nadat de schendingen zich hebben voorgedaan en het
stelsel houdt maar beperkt rekening met toekomstige effecten.
Het valt nog te bezien of regionale mensenrechtenhoven in staat zullen
zijn om de regelgeving rondom ontheemden af te dwingen. Rechterlijke
instanties zijn zeer geschikt om procedurele rechten te beschermen, maar
beschikken mogelijk niet over de middelen en expertise, evenals het politieke
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mandaat om specifieke niveaus van milieubescherming te bepalen. De jurispru-
dentie richt zich daarom vooral op procedurele plichten van Staten. De juris-
prudentie geeft Staten de vrijheid om aanvaardbare hoeveelheden milieuschade
te bepalen, zolang de staten de procedurele rechten respecteren en hun beslis-
singen niet leiden tot de vernietiging van de beschermde rechten. Wanneer
milieuschade de mensenrechten beïnvloedt, hebben staten de vrijheid om een
billijk evenwicht te vinden tussen de rechten van het individu en de belangen
van anderen in de bredere gemeenschap. Tevens mag de last die op de Staat
komt te liggen niet onredelijk zijn, zoals het geval zou kunnen zijn bij natuur-
rampen waartegen Staten niets konden ondernemen. De praktijk heeft aange-
toond dat de bevoegdheid van de rechtbank om schadevergoeding toe te
kennen aan slachtoffers van mensenrechtenschendingen beperkt is. De gerechts-
hoven worstelen ook met het grensoverschrijdende karakter van door de mens
veroorzaakte vervuiling en milieudegradatie. Daarbij gaat de regel dat de Staat
die de voordelen van bepaald handelen plukt, ook zou moeten opdraaien voor
de schade, lang niet altijd op. Het internationale beschermingssysteem aan-
vaardt slechts zeer beperkte grensoverschrijdende verplichtingen op het gebied
van mensenrechten. De toekomstige ontwikkeling van de bescherming van
de mensenrechten voor milieuvluchtelingen moet de grensoverschrijdende
verplichtingen van de Staat om de mensenrechten te respecteren, te beschermen
en te vervullen, verbeteren. Hiertoe kan het verplichtingen opleggen tot het
verstrekken van internationale financiering, bijstand en samenwerking.
De veiligheidsbenadering houdt rekening met de onderlinge afhankelijkheid
tussen menselijke kwetsbaarheid en nationale veiligheid. Over het algemeen
is de veiligheidsbenadering gebaseerd op het beeld dat massamigratie een
bedreiging kan vormen voor de veiligheid. Ongecoördineerde migratie vergroot
het risico op binnenlandse conflicten en mogelijk internationale conflicten.
Staten die migranten ontvangen, zullen deze migratie reguleren en beperken
en alleen bescherming bieden aan een beperkte en smalle groep milieuvluchte-
lingen. Ontwikkelde landen beschouwen migratie die door het milieu wordt
veroorzaakt vaak als vrijwillige migratie en zien het daarom niet als een taak
voor de internationale gemeenschap om deze migranten te beschermen. Staten
kunnen daarom bescherming bieden wanneer zij dat nodig achten via het
nationale migratiebeleid. Een sterke focus op massamigratie als gevolg van
aantasting van het milieu, zoals aangekondigd door verschillende alarmisten,
kan Westerse regeringen er juist toe aanzetten om strengere migratieregimes
te ontwikkelen. Hoewel een aantal staten in de nasleep van rampen in de
praktijk toegang verleent en het terugsturen van mensen naar getroffen gebie-
den tijdelijk opschort, dient deze praktijk te worden opgeschaald, gerepliceerd
en systematischer en voorspelbaarder te worden toegepast. Humanitaire hulp
en tijdelijke toegang kunnen zeer nuttig zijn in de context van plotselinge
rampen. Tijdelijke toegang (met een onduidelijke juridische status) is echter
geen optie voor lange termijn migratie als gevolg van zich langzaam voltrek-
kende rampen of permanente (geplande) hervestiging. Een belangrijk nadeel
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van de beveiligingsbenadering is dat de bepaling van toegangs- en verblijfs-
rechten in het algemeen op individuele basis plaats heeft. Deze individuele
bepalingsprocedures komen echter niet overeen met de realiteit van milieu-
migratie die vaak wordt beïnvloed door groepsgedrag.
Over het algemeen kwalificeren milieuvluchtelingen niet als vluchtelingen
in de juridische betekenis, omdat ze niet worden vervolgd om redenen zoals
genoemd in het VN-Vluchtelingenverdrag van 1951 of omdat ze geen daadwer-
kelijke dreiging kunnen bewijzen. Milieuvluchtelingen worden daarom over
het algemeen de toegang en het verblijf ontzegd en worden als economische
migranten beschouwd. Het uitbreiden van de reikwijdte van het Vluchtelingen-
verdrag van 1951 zou echter niet alleen het beschermingsniveau van het
Verdrag zelf in gevaar brengen, maar zou tevens alleen overlevingsmigratie
als laatste redmiddel ondersteunen en de mogelijkheden voor preventieve en
geplande migratie ernstig beperken. Nieuwe instrumenten zoals de Global
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration en de Global Compact on
Refugees, erkennen de noodzaak om de oorzaken van migratie aan te pakken
en erkennen milieudegradatie als een oorzaak van migratie. Aan deze erken-
ning zijn op dit moment echter geen dwingendrechtelijke verplichtingen
gekoppeld.
De aansprakelijkheidsbenadering houdt rekening met de verplichting van
vervuilende landen in het Noorden en andere vervuilers om tegemoet te komen
aan de behoeften van landen die het meest te lijden hebben van klimaatveran-
dering in het Zuiden. De aanpak is gericht op het voorkomen van aantasting
van het milieu en is juridisch gebaseerd op het internationale milieurecht, de
regels van het internationale recht inzake staatsaansprakelijkheid en het prin-
cipe van duurzame ontwikkeling. De aansprakelijkheidsaanpak omvat daarom
een breder spectrum dan juridische aansprakelijkheid en verantwoordelijkheid.
Het heeft ook betrekking op kwesties van staatssteun en morele verplichtingen.
Een sterk punt van de aansprakelijkheidsbenadering is dat deze het debat
verschuift van bescherming van migranten naar een verkenning van mitigatie
en adaptatie om migratie te voorkomen. Deze benadering heeft ook een moreel
gewicht, ten opzichte van ontwikkelde vervuilende landen om financiering
en hulp aan de getroffen landen te bieden. Dit wordt onder andere omschreven
in the context van de internationale klimaatonderhandelingen. Een vergelijk-
bare verantwoordelijkheid voor ondersteuning is te vinden in de Duurzame
Ontwikkelingsdoelen (de zgn. SDGs). Verder kan de verplichting om milieu-
effectbeoordelingen uit te voeren bij mogelijke grensoverschrijdende milieurisi-
co’s als gevolg van industriële activiteit, worden benut om de effecten van
milieudegradatie op migratie inzichtelijk te maken. Deze verantwoordelijkheid
ligt dan bij de Staat, in plaats van bij die mensen die erdoor worden getroffen.
Met betrekking tot juridische aansprakelijkheid en verantwoordelijkheid
is het internationale recht slecht toegerust wanneer het wordt geconfronteerd
met een complexe situatie, zoals schade door klimaatverandering. Vage pri-
maire regels, een veelvoud van actoren, verschillende soorten schadevergoe-
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ding en niet-lineaire oorzakelijkheid vormen allemaal belangrijke uitdagingen
voor het traditionele aansprakelijkheidsrecht. van staten en maken de uitkomst
voor de aansprakelijkheid van een specifieke staat zeer onvoorspelbaar. Ook
is er historisch gezien geen voor de hand liggend forum om zaken aan te
spannen tegen vervuilers. In de huidige vorm bieden het klimaatregime, het
internationale recht van de zee en het mensenrechtenregime, onvoldoende
mogelijkheden om schade door klimaatverandering te voorkomen, te minimali-
seren of te herstellen. Onafhankelijk van deze regimes kunnen algemene
beginselen van internationaal recht bescherming bieden:
- Het ‘no-harm beginsel’ kan een potentieel krachtig instrument zijn in de
context van het klimaat. Door de vervuilende staat aan zijn procedurele
plichten te houden en zich te concentreren op de preventieve dimensie
van de no-harm regel, kan een ‘positieve’ plicht om concrete stappen te
nemen om het milieu te beschermen, worden vastgesteld. De algemene
regel biedt echter geen richtlijnen voor welk gedrag is toegestaan. Volgens
de algemene opinie is het noodzakelijk om een schending van een zorgvul-
digheidsplicht of nalatigheid te bewijzen. Het bepalen van een due dili-
gence-norm voor antropogene klimaatverandering vormt echter een moei-
lijke uitdaging. Aangezien klimaatverandering een kwestie van accumulatie
is, veroorzaken alleen de geaccumuleerde acties van meerdere Staten
gedurende een lange periode de toegenomen klimaatverandering. Vermin-
dering door één Staat zou het risico op schade niet effectief verminderen,
aangezien andere staten hun vervuiling kunnen voortzetten of zelfs meer
kunnen vervuilen. Een betere aanpak zou dus zijn de vraag te stellen hoe
Staten actie kunnen ondernemen om hun eigen uitstoot van broeikasgassen
aanzienlijk te verminderen, om aldus hun bijdrage aan toekomstige schade
door klimaatverandering aanzienlijk te verminderen.
- Aangezien klimaatverandering omgeven is door wetenschappelijke onzeker-
heden, zou men kunnen stellen dat het voorzorgsbeginsel kan worden
gebruikt om een aansprakelijkheidsvordering tegen een staat op te bouwen.
Ontwerp-artikel 7 van de ILA-beginselen inzake klimaatverandering is een
voorbeeld van hoe het voorzorgsbeginsel kan worden toegepast in de
context van klimaatverandering. Het is echter zeer onzeker of deze uitleg
door de relevante rechterlijke instanties zal worden aanvaard. Zelfs als
het principe wordt toegepast, vereist het geen specifieke vorm van actie
of norm en legt het daarom geen specifieke verplichting op aan de partijen.
- Op het eerste gezicht lijkt het principe dat ‘de vervuiler betaalt’ ook ge-
schikt om toe te passen op klimaatverandering. De toepassing ervan is
echter mogelijk niet zo eenvoudig als het lijkt. Vaak is de vervuiling alleen
gevaarlijk in combinatie met vervuiling door andere actoren en maken
complexe causaliteitspatronen het moeilijk om te bepalen wie de daadwer-
kelijke vervuiler is. Daarom is het voor betrokkenen moeilijk om uit te
zoeken welke partij voor de schade moet worden aangesproken en om
causaliteit aan te tonen. De onduidelijke status van het principe is een
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verdere complicatie. Staten zullen waarschijnlijk de toepassing van het
principe in het internationale klimaatrecht (nog) niet accepteren. De afwe-
zigheid van het principe in het UNFCCC en de Klimaatovereenkomst van
Parijs is wat dat betreft illustratief.
- Een ander principe dat vaak wordt aangehaald in de context van klimaat-
verandering is het principe van gemeenschappelijke maar gedifferentieerde
verplichtingen en respectieve capaciteiten (CBRD). Het principe van CBDR
is enerzijds verankerd in het klimaatregime maar anderzijds het onderwerp
van hevige discussies over de precieze parameters. Afgezien van de over-
eenstemming dat de verantwoordelijkheden van partijen onder het klimaat-
veranderingsregime moeten worden gedifferentieerd, is er weinig overeen-
stemming. Volgens de ILA vereist het CBDR-principe in de context van
klimaatverandering dat staten op verschillende manieren reageren op
klimaatverandering en de gevolgen daarvan, afhankelijk van hun vroegere,
huidige en toekomstige bijdragen aan klimaatverandering, hun welvaarts-
niveau en andere nationale omstandigheden. Het principe geeft echter geen
inzicht in wat de bijdrage concreet zou moeten zijn.
Concluderend is het vooruitzicht om schadevergoeding voor klimaatveran-
dering te ontvangen op basis van internationale milieuregelgeving laag. Staten
zijn zeer terughoudend om terug te vallen op het internationale aansprakelijk-
heidsrecht om geschillen over grensoverschrijdende aantasting van het milieu
of schade aan de ‘global commons’ te beslechten. Een meer veelbelovende
aanpak kan zijn om hulp van andere Staten te zoeken voor de bescherming
van het milieu op basis van het principe van duurzame ontwikkeling. In de
context van klimaatverandering is bijvoorbeeld erkend dat Staten het klimaat-
systeem moeten beschermen als een gemeenschappelijke natuurlijke hulpbron
ten behoeve van de huidige en toekomstige generaties, binnen de bredere
context van het streven van de internationale gemeenschap naar duurzame
ontwikkeling.
Overlappende benaderingen
Over het algemeen, omdat het concept van milieuvluchteling zoveel verschil-
lende vormen van migratie omvat, is een one-size-fits-all-oplossing zeer ontoe-
reikend. Verschillende situaties vereisen verschillende oplossingen. Daarom
is een contextgerichte en dynamische interpretatie van de verschillende toepas-
selijke rechtsinstrumenten vereist. Verschillende juridische kaders zijn ook
gericht op verschillende actoren (thuislanden, derde staten of vervuilers),
houden rekening met verschillende aspecten (aantasting van het milieu, men-
senrechten of de dreiging van ongecoördineerde migratie) en bestrijken ver-
schillende tijdspaden, waaronder preventie van migratie, bescherming tijdens
of na migratie.
Een hybride juridische benadering kan behulpzaam zijn bij het formuleren
van een juridisch mechanisme dat is geworteld in milieuregelgeving, mensen-
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rechten en vluchtelingenrecht. De kracht van de principes binnen elke tak van
de recht, of deze nu zacht of bindend zijn, kunnen elkaar compenseren bij
het formuleren van juridische argumenten om specifieke schendingen aan te
pakken. Het uitgangspunt moet zijn dat migratiepreventie de best mogelijke
uitkomst is. Als migratie niet kan worden vermeden, moet de waardigheid
van de gedwongen ontheemden centraal staan. Daarom moet preventieve
geplande migratie een realistische optie zijn die door staten wordt ondersteund.
Aangezien uit de praktijk blijkt dat terugkeer vaak geen realistische optie is,
moeten derde landen hervestiging toestaan in plaats van tijdelijke bescherming.
Deze rechten moeten gebaseerd zijn op collectieve rechten en niet op indivi-
duele vaststellingsprocedures.
Elke oplossing vereist internationale hulp of lastenverdeling. Deze verplich-
tingen moeten sterker verankerd zijn in het internationale recht en verder
worden geïnterpreteerd in de context van milieu-gedwongen migratie. De
brede acceptatie van de milieudegradatie als oorzaak van migratie moet
worden omgezet in een samenhangend internationaal juridisch en beleidskader,
dat flexibiliteit mogelijk maakt voor verschillende soorten milieumigratie en
verschillende lokale omstandigheden. Dit vereist zowel politieke wil bij het
ontwikkelen van nieuwe instrumenten als een proactieve rol van internationale
gerechtshoven om van geval tot geval een samenhangend kader op te bouwen
dat door milieu gedwongen migratie in al zijn vormen en fasen adresseert
en de slachtoffers daarvan beschermt.
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